In Re the State of Texas, Ex Rel. Lindy Beaty v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00181-CR

In re The State of Texas, Ex Rel. Lindy Beaty

Original Proceeding

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator, the State of Texas on behalf of Lindy Beaty, the elected County

& District Attorney of Ellis County, petitions this Court to order Respondent,

the Honorable Dan L. Wyde, Senior Judge, sitting by assignment, to withdraw

his Order on Defendant’s Motion for the District Attorney to Disqualify or

Recuse Her Office, signed on May 16, 2025, which grants the Defendant’s

Motion for the District Attorney to Disqualify or Recuse Herself filed by Real

Party in Interest, Juan Manuel Cuellar, Jr. We conditionally grant the State’s

petition.

BACKGROUND

Prior to her election, Beaty worked in private practice in Ellis County.

She worked with Ricky Sipes as part of Sipes & Beaty, PLLC. After her
election, she employed Sipes as her First Assistant County & District Attorney.

While he was in private practice, Sipes was appointed to represent Cuellar for

a criminal charge. Sipes withdrew from all outstanding court-appointed cases

in October of 2024, and Beaty & Sipes PLLC ceased operation on October 31,

2024. Beaty took office on January 1, 2025.

Cuellar filed a motion to disqualify the entire District Attorney’s office

from prosecuting his case on February 11, 2025, arguing that because Sipes

and Beaty worked together, she was disqualified due to Sipes’ representation

of Cuellar. In response to Cuellar’s motion, the State agreed that Sipes was

disqualified and stated it would wall him off from any participation in the case.

The State argued, however, that Beaty did not represent Cuellar, and

accordingly, neither she nor the remainder of her office was disqualified.

MANDAMUS RELIEF

To be entitled to mandamus relief, the record must establish that (1) the

relator has no adequate remedy at law and (2) what the relator seeks to compel

is a ministerial act, not an act involving a discretionary judicial decision. In re

Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The issue here is not

whether the State has an adequate remedy at law regarding the trial court’s

order of disqualification. It does not. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 44.01; In

re State, 572 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, no pet.). Rather, the

issue is whether the State satisfied the ministerial act prong. A relator may

In re State, ex rel. Beaty Page 2
satisfy this prong by establishing that the relator has a clear right to the relief

sought under law that is definite and unambiguous, and that "unquestionably

applies to the indisputable facts of the case." In re State ex rel. Mau v. Third

Court of Appeals, 560 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting State

ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d

207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Further, if a trial court enters an order for

which it has no authority, mandamus will also issue. In re State ex rel. Best,

616 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

DISQUALIFICATION

The law regarding the disqualification of a district attorney and her staff

is clear.

A trial court has limited authority to disqualify an elected district

attorney and her staff from the prosecution of a criminal case.

Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The office of a

district attorney is constitutionally created and protected; thus, the district

attorney's authority “cannot be abridged or taken away" lightly. Id. (quoting

Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 303-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); Neville v.

State, 622 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.).

Pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure and case authority, a

district attorney "shall represent the State in all criminal cases" except when

a district attorney's employment prior to election would be adverse to the

In re State, ex rel. Beaty Page 3
prosecution of a particular case, i.e. a conflict of interest. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. arts. 2A.102(a), 2A.105(a); Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 76; Neville, 622

S.W.3d at 102. Consequently, a trial court may not disqualify a district

attorney on the basis of a conflict of interest unless that conflict rises to the

level of a due-process violation. Landers, 256 S.W.3d at 304 (citing State ex rel.

Hill v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)); In re Cox, 481

S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding).

When a conflict claim does not involve prior representation of the

defendant by the district attorney in the same criminal matter, as is the case

here, a due-process violation occurs only when the defendant can establish

"actual prejudice," not just the threat of possible prejudice to the defendant’s

rights. Landers, 256 S.W.3d at 304-305. Mere allegations of wrongdoing will

not suffice. See State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 877 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1994, orig. proceeding). Further, a district attorney may

be disqualified only for a violation of the defendant's due-process rights and

not for violations of the disciplinary rules of professional conduct alone.

Landers, 256 S.W.3d at 310 (emphasis added). See also In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d

383, 393, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

No testimony was taken at the hearing on the motion to disqualify.

Cuellar argued at the hearing that Beaty and Sipes were law partners “under

In re State, ex rel. Beaty Page 4
one roof, [who] shared mutual staff, and . . . shared computer networks, a filing

system that the discovery, any kind of attorney notes[,] would have been

readily and easily available to . . . Ms. Beaty.” He also argued that, based on

personal experience with law firms generally, “there are conversations about

cases that happen haphazardly in the hallway” and that even though Beaty

asserted she did not recall his case being discussed, “it just doesn't quell my

client's fears that the privileged information that he shared with his attorney,

Mr. Sipes, would not in some way be used against him."

With these arguments, Cuellar did not establish “actual prejudice” that

rises to the level of a due-process violation. He showed only a threat of possible

prejudice which does not rise to the level of actual prejudice required for a due-

process violation.

Additionally, Cuellar urged the trial court to use the disciplinary rules

of professional conduct to disqualify Beaty, and thus her entire office, relying

primarily on the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ opinion in In re Cox, 481 S.W.3d

289, 293 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding). However, Cuellar’s

reliance, on Cox is misplaced. Cuellar quoted a passage from Cox to the trial

court and to this Court to support his position that disqualification may occur

due to a violation of the disciplinary rules of professional conduct. However,

that particular passage does not pertain to the disqualification of an elected

district attorney. The Cox opinion held that the district attorney in that case

In re State, ex rel. Beaty Page 5
could not be disqualified. Id. at 295. Rather, the passage relied on by Cueller

pertains to the disqualification of a special prosecutor, not the district attorney.

The standard for disqualification of a special prosecutor is different from the

standard for disqualification of an elected district attorney and her entire

office. Id. at 293. And even if the passage concerned the disqualification of a

district attorney, the Court of Criminal Appeals has said that the trial court

cannot disqualify a district attorney on the disciplinary rules of professional

conduct alone. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 393, 395 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020); Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); State ex

rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d

207, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, the trial court could not grant Cuellar’s

motion to disqualify due to a violation, if any, of the disciplinary rules of

professional conduct.

CONCLUSION

Because the law on disqualification is settled, and because Cuellar did

not establish actual prejudice which rises to the level of a due process violation,

the trial court had no authority to disqualify Beaty, and thus her entire office,

from representing the State in the case against Cuellar. Further, the trial

court had no authority to grant Cuellar’s motion to disqualify on the basis of a

disciplinary rules of professional conduct violation alone. Thus, the record

established the violation of a ministerial act by the trial court in granting

In re State, ex rel. Beaty Page 6
Cuellar’s motion to disqualify Beaty and her office.

Accordingly, we conditionally grant the State’s Petition for Writ of

Mandamus and direct Respondent, the Honorable Dan L. Wyde, Senior Judge,

sitting by assignment, to promptly withdraw the Order on Defendant’s Motion

for the District Attorney to Disqualify or Recuse Her Office, signed on May 16,

2025. The writ will issue only if Respondent fails to comply with the relief

ordered within 14 days from the date of this opinion.

LEE HARRIS
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: July 31, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Writ conditionally granted
Do Not Publish
OT06

In re State, ex rel. Beaty Page 7