Ex Parte Janette Marie Goering v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00437-CR

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering

On appeal from the
413th District Court of Johnson County, Texas
Judge William C. Bosworth Jr., presiding
Trial Court Cause No. DC-I202500510

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Janette Marie Goering was arrested for the offense of aiding in the

commission of terrorism. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 76.03. Bail was set at

$5,000,000, and Goering filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus

seeking a bail reduction. After a hearing, the trial court denied the requested

relief. In her sole issue on appeal, Goering claims that the trial court abused

its discretion in refusing to reduce the $5,000,000 bail amount. We reverse

and remand.

RELEVANT LAW

Prior to conviction, every citizen accused of a crime has a “strong interest

in liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). To protect that

interest, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

Additionally, the Texas Constitution guarantees that “[a]ll prisoners shall be

bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, when the proof is

evident ....” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11. This constitutional right to reasonable

bail has also been codified in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 1.07, 17.15(a)(2).

In balancing the liberty interest of an accused person and the safety

interests of society, the Texas Legislature adopted rules and guidelines that

can be used to obtain pretrial release through the posting of an adequate bail

bond. See id. arts. 17.01-.53. With regard to excessive bail, an accused has the

right to assert his or her constitutional right to reasonable bail through the use

of a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d

617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Ex parte Keller, 595 S.W.2d 531, 532-

33 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). The burden of proof is on the defendant

to show that the amount of bail set was excessive. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 595

S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

While a magistrate has broad discretion in determining the dollar

amount and any conditions of bail, exercise of that discretion is governed by

factors set forth in article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(a). These factors are:

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 2
1. Bail and any conditions of bail shall be sufficient to give
reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be used to make bail an
instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which
the offense was committed are to be considered, including whether
the offense: (A) is an offense involving violence as defined by
Article 17.03; or (B) involves violence directed against a peace
officer.

4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be
taken on this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law
enforcement, and the community shall be considered.

6. The criminal history record information for the defendant,
including information obtained through the statewide
telecommunications system maintained by the Department of
Public Safety and through the public safety report system
developed under Article 17.0211, shall be considered, including any
acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and any
instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court
following release on bail.

7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.

Id.

1 Pursuant to an order of this Court, the trial court filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law

addressing whether a public safety report (“PSR”) was reviewed and what specific information the
trial court relied upon in making its ruling. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 17.021, 17.022. The
trial court stated that it did not review a PSR. We note that even if the trial court’s failure to consider
a PSR was erroneous, Goering did not preserve this issue for our consideration and does not contend
that she was harmed by the failure to consider a PSR. See Ex parte Segovia, 690 S.W.3d 771, 776 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2024, no pet.).

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 3
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a habeas proceeding regarding a claim of excessive bail, we review a

trial court's decision regarding the amount of bail for an abuse of discretion. Ex

parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under this standard,

the appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial

court; however, reviewing a trial court’s judgment for an abuse of discretion

“requires more of the appellate court than simply deciding that the trial court

did not rule arbitrarily and capriciously.” See Ex parte Tata, 358 S.W.3d 392,

397 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d) (citing Cooley v. State,

232 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)). In

reviewing the trial court’s bail decision, the appellate court must measure the

trial court's ruling against the relevant criteria. Id. at 397-98.2

When, as here, the trial court provided written findings of fact and

conclusions of law, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s factual

findings when they are supported by the record. See Ex parte Estrada, 573

2 See also, Ex parte Benefield, 403 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Cochran, J., concurring),

explaining:

Setting an appropriate bail … is a weighty decision with important considerations and
constitutional concerns on all sides. It is, however, a decision that all too often results
in the pretrial detention of the accused citizen, despite compelling evidence suggesting
pretrial release may be less costly to the community, fairer to the defendant, and, when
appropriate conditions are attached, capable of ensuring the safety of the community.
Appellate courts must provide meaningful review of the bail and pretrial-release
decision to ensure that trial judges strike a constitutional balance between community
safety and ensuring a defendant's appearance on one side, and the social and financial
costs (both to the State and defendant) of oppressive pre-trial detention on the other.

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 4
S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). The trial court,

acting as sole factfinder, may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s

testimony, even when that testimony is uncontroverted. See State v. Ross, 32

S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When the trial court makes explicit

credibility findings, we must defer to those determinations. See State v.

Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

ANALYSIS

Goering contends that all of the article 17.15 factors weigh in favor of

reducing her bail. While we do not agree that every factor weighs in Goering’s

favor, we agree that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reduce

her $5,000,000 bail.

Nature and Circumstances of the Offense (Third Factor)

The nature of the crime and the potential sentence are “primary factors”

to consider in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Ex

parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd).

Here, the trial court concluded that the “nature and circumstances of the

offense justify a five-million-dollar bail amount.”

In its findings of fact, the trial court noted that the circumstances of the

offense involved “significant planning, reconnaissance, and coordination

among multiple participants[,]” resulting in “violent conduct directed toward

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 5
government staff and facilities.” Specifically, this offense arises from a

coordinated attack on a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

detention facility on July 4, 2025, “during which multiple armed individuals

infiltrated the perimeter of the facility, fired fireworks at the facility, and

vandalized structures and surveillance equipment.” One of the responding law

enforcement officers was shot during the attack, and has since fully recovered

from his injuries.

The trial court also found that Goering was affiliated with organizations

associated with Antifa ideology, and that she assisted with events involving

tactical or preparedness training, such as teaching individuals how to

construct Faraday bags.3 The court further found that Goering expressed

solidarity with Antifa-related activities opposing United States Immigration

and Customs Enforcement on her social media accounts.

Goering’s alleged level of involvement in the offense is relevant here. See

Ex parte Davis, 147 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.). The trial

court specifically found that Goering “is alleged to have provided material

support to the offense by supplying a Faraday bag used by [the alleged shooter]

to evade law enforcement detection following the attack.” Conflicting evidence

was presented as to when Goering may have provided this bag to the alleged

3 A Faraday bag was described as “something … to put a cell phone inside, or an electronic device, to

mitigate the digital signature to, essentially, hide yourself.”

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 6
shooter – either at a “gear check” the night before the attack, or at an allegedly

unrelated sewing workshop Goering hosted at her home several months prior

to the attack. The trial court’s findings do not directly address when Goering

provided the Faraday bag; however, we note that the trial court did not

specifically find that Goering was present at the “gear check” or that she

participated in the preparation activities there. Goering is not accused of

providing weapons to participants, personally participating in the attack on

July 4, 2025, being present at the facility on the night of the attack, personally

committing any act of violence, or transporting or actively concealing any of

the participants after the attack.4 She is accused of providing a bag at some

point prior to the attack that eventually helped conceal the alleged shooter’s

cell phone signal.

The offense of aiding in the commission of terrorism under section 76.03

does not establish its own independent penalty range; rather, it adopts the

punishment range of the underlying terrorism offense in section 76.02. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 76.02(a), 76.03(b). Section 76.02 enhances the

applicable punishment range to

4 The record reflects that certain individuals apparently conspired to relocate the alleged shooter after

the attack and help him evade law enforcement detection. The investigator testified that surveillance
video from the day after the attack captures Goering meeting with some of these individuals at a gas
station; however, he agreed with defense counsel that he had no evidence that Goering was part of the
plan to relocate and/or conceal the shooter and that she was not charged for that conduct.

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 7
one category higher than the most serious offense listed in
Subsection (a) that was committed or conspired to be committed,
except that … if the most serious offense is a felony of the first
degree, the offense under this section is a felony of the first degree
with a minimum term of confinement of fifteen years.

Id. at § 76.02(b). According to the arrest warrant affidavit, which was admitted

at the hearing, Goering was arrested for a first-degree felony offense. The

affidavit does not specify which section 76.02 offense underlies Goering’s

charge, though the facts in the record indicate that the first-degree felony

offense of aggravated assault against a public servant under section

22.02(b)(2)(B) could apply. See id. at §§ 22.02(b)(2)(B), 76.02(a), (b). If this is

correct, Goering’s punishment range would be fifteen to ninety-nine years or

life in prison. Id.

Inability to Make Bail (Fourth Factor)

The only evidence regarding Goering’s inability to make bail came from

her husband’s testimony. The trial court concluded that Goering “can make a

five-million-dollar bail,” citing to a portion of Goering’s husband’s testimony as

support. Elsewhere, however, the trial court expressly found Goering’s

husband’s testimony not to be credible and stated that it did not rely on his

testimony in making its decision. Whether or not the trial court considered

Goering’s husband’s testimony in making its determination, we find nothing

in the record to factually support the conclusion that Goering has the financial

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 8
ability to make a $5,000,000 bail.5 However, the trial court also concluded that

Goering “failed to present sufficient credible evidence of her financial

resources, assets, liabilities, or efforts to obtain a bond sufficient to establish

an inability to make bail.” (emphasis added). Affording deference to the trial

court’s credibility finding, this conclusion is supported by the record and

weighs against reducing Goering’s bail.

Community Safety (Fifth Factor)

In considering the community’s safety, the trial court emphasized the

coordinated, violent nature of the attack against government facilities and

staff, and the fact that a peace officer was shot during the event. The court

also noted that the ongoing investigation involves multiple co-defendants and

determined that before Goering’s arrest, she traveled to Johnson County to

support individuals who had been arrested for their participation in the attack.

Again, we find it important to note Goering’s role in the offense here.

She is not accused of participating in the coordination or execution of the

violent attack. While the trial court appropriately considered a generalized

concern for law enforcement and community safety in avoiding similar attacks

on government facilities and staff, there was no evidence presented that

5 Goering’s husband testified that their current assets include $25,000 in a personal checking account,

a credit card with either a $30,000 limit or a $35,000 limit, and a house that they purchased
approximately five years earlier for $300,000 with a 30-year mortgage on it. He further testified that
Goering lost her job when she was arrested and that he owes her attorney another $25,000.

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 9
Goering personally presents an identifiable threat to law enforcement or the

community. See Chavez v. State, 671 S.W.3d 775, 786-87 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2023, no pet.).

Criminal Record and Family Violence (Sixth Factor)

Goering has no criminal history, and the record does not indicate the

existence of any other pending charges. Goering provided the court with

fourteen character letters as well as live witness testimony regarding her

character and non-violent nature.

Citizenship (Seventh Factor)

Goering’s citizenship was not directly addressed at the hearing. There

was evidence that her father was in the military and that she spent most of

her childhood growing up in Nevada. Neither of the parties contend that

Goering is not a U.S. citizen.

Under the heading “Risk of Flight,” the trial court found that Goering

“has ties outside Texas.” The facts underlying this determination are that

Goering grew up in Nevada, she has “friendships in international locations,”

and she contributed some money to her mother four years ago for her mother

to purchase a home in the Philippines. The record does not indicate whether

that home was ever purchased or, if so, whether her mother still owns it.

Goering’s husband testified that she has close friends in Japan and Canada,

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 10
but no details of these friendships – including whether Goering has ever

physically traveled to visit these friends – were developed.

As for her community ties, the record indicates that Goering has lived in

Texas since 2018. She is married and owns a home with her husband in Texas.

She also holds a degree in software engineering and was steadily employed

prior to her incarceration. Goering is also an active member in multiple clubs

and organizations in her community.

Assure Appearance Without Oppression (First and Second Factors)

The trial court found that Goering “failed to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the current bail is excessive.” While bail should be

sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance of a defendant’s appearance,

“[w]hen bail is set so high that a person cannot realistically pay it … the trial

court essentially ‘displaces the presumption of innocence and replaces it with

a guaranteed trial appearance.’” Ex parte Robles, 612 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Tex.

App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d

220, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)); see also Ex parte

Curran, No. 14-23-00252-CR, 2023 WL 8431231, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Dec. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(finding $25 million bail in capital murder case “wholly unprecedented and

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 11
without specific supporting evidence” and a “de facto setting of no bond.”).6

Moreover, though the trial court's rejection of the sole financial witness's

testimony defeats Goering’s showing of inability to pay, “[j]ust as a defendant's

inability to afford bail does not, in itself, demonstrate that bail is excessive, a

defendant's ability to afford bail in the amount set does not in itself justify bail

in that amount.” Beard, 92 S.W.3d at 573; see also Badall v. State, No. 09-04-

211-CR, 2004 WL 1699911, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2004, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reducing $1,000,000 bail on

murder charge to $400,000, finding bail “extraordinarily high” despite

defendant’s failure to establish inability to make bail). We must question

whether $5,000,000 is a “reasonably” high amount of bail considering the

specific circumstances in this case. See Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573

(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d) (explaining that in determining whether a

trial court’s order is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, “we cannot

disregard the extraordinary amount of bail ordered.”).

The State cites to Ex parte Bautista-Renteria, 717 S.W.3d 445 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 2025, no pet.), in support of the trial court’s decision to uphold the

$5,000,000 bail amount. In that case, the appellate court upheld a cumulative

6 “Although unpublished cases have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them as an aid

in developing reasoning that may be employed.” Holland v. State, 702 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2024, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rhymes v. State, 536 S.W.3d 85, 99 n.9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017,
pet. ref'd)).

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 12
$4,700,000 bail on five non-capital felony charges including murder, two counts

of aggravated assault, deadly conduct, and evidence tampering. Id. at 453.

However, in that case, the defendant was accused of personally firing an AK-

47 style rifle over a dozen times at a group of young men who mistakenly

turned onto a road next to his shop, killing one of them, and then soliciting his

family (including his children) to help him conceal evidence. Id. at 449. The

appellate court found no abuse of discretion considering the random, violent

nature of the defendant’s actions, the difficulty of crafting bond conditions

sufficient to protect the public given the facts of the case, evidence that the

defendant might be involved in ongoing criminal activity, and the defendant’s

status as a Mexican national with parents residing in Mexico. Id. at 449-52.

Those aggravating factors are not present in Goering’s case.

Five million dollars is an extraordinarily high amount of bail; even so,

such an amount might fall within the zone of reasonable disagreement under

appropriate circumstances. Those circumstances are not present here.

Goering was arrested for a single, non-capital first-degree felony offense. She

is a Texas resident with no criminal history and no history of failing to appear

in court. She presents no identifiable threat to the victim or community, and

has no history of violence. Goering allegedly provided material support to the

offense in a nonviolent way by providing a Faraday bag that the alleged shooter

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 13
utilized in evading law enforcement; however, she is not accused of being part

of the group of co-defendants who actively helped conceal that individual after

the attack.

Having measured the trial court’s ruling against the bail criteria, we find

that bail in this case is “set in an amount greater than necessary to satisfy the

government’s legitimate interests” and that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Goering’s writ of habeas corpus. Beard, 92 S.W.3d at

573. We sustain Goering’s sole issue and reverse the trial court’s order denying

the writ of habeas corpus. We remand this case to the trial court to set a

reasonable bail in accordance with this opinion, determine what reasonable

terms and conditions of bail, if any, should be imposed, and to allow the State

and Goering an opportunity to present additional relevant evidence or

argument to aid in its decision. See Ex parte Brooks, 376 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d).

Conclusion

Having sustained Goering’s sole issue on appeal, we reverse the trial

court’s order denying her writ of habeas corpus and remand this case to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 14
STEVE SMITH
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 4, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Reversed and remanded
Do Not Publish
OT06

Ex parte Janette Marie Goering Page 15