Tyron Dyeralle Davis v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed July 18, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
___________

Nos. 11-24-00162-CR & 11-24-00163-CR
___________

TYRON DYERALLE DAVIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 118th District Court
Howard County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 16816 & 16817

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Tyron Dyeralle Davis, pleaded guilty to two possession-of-
methamphetamine offenses, each enhanced to a first-degree felony based on his plea
of “true” to the State’s enhancement allegation. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 481.115(d) (West Supp. 2023); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b) (West
2019). Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain agreement between Appellant and the
State, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years’ imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in each case and
ordered that Appellant’s sentences be served concurrently. Appellant filed a pro se
notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgments. We dismiss the appeals.
When these appeals were docketed, we notified Appellant that, in each case,
the trial court had certified that (1) this is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has
no right of appeal, and (2) Appellant had waived his right of appeal. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West
2018). We requested that Appellant respond and show grounds to continue these
appeals. Appellant has responded, but he has not shown grounds upon which these
appeals may continue.
Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment
imposed does not exceed the punishment agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may
appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on
before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the
specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); see
also CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02. Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here.1
We further note that Rule 25.2 does not permit a plea-bargaining defendant to appeal
matters related to the voluntariness of his plea unless the defendant has obtained the
trial court’s permission to appeal. See Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001); Carender v. State, 155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no
pet.).
The documents on file show that, in each case, Appellant entered into a plea
bargain agreement, his punishment was assessed by the trial court in accordance with
the parties’ agreement, and he waived his right of appeal. Further, in each case, the
trial court certified that Appellant has no right of appeal and that he waived this right.

To the extent that Appellant states that he appeals the trial court’s “rulings” on his pro se
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motions that he filed while represented by court-appointed counsel, it does not appear from his response
or the documents on file with this court that the trial court ruled on the pro se motions. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
2
The trial court’s certifications were signed by Appellant, Appellant’s trial counsel,
and the presiding judge of the trial court. The documents on file in this court support
the trial court’s certifications. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613–14 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we must dismiss these appeals without further
action. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
We dismiss these appeals.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

July 18, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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