William Trent Whitman v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 21, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00215-CR
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WILLIAM TRENT WHITMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 39th District Court
Stonewall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2005

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Appellant William Trent Whitman
pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of child pornography, a third-degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(a), (d) (West Supp. 2024). The trial
court accepted Appellant’s plea and, in accordance with the agreement, placed him
on community supervision for a period of eight years. Three months later, the State
filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision. Following a hearing
on the State’s motion, the trial court found the State’s allegations to be true, revoked
Appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced him to eight years’
imprisonment. See id. § 12.34(a) (West 2019). In one issue, Appellant argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
In its motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision, the State alleged
that Appellant had violated two conditions of his probation, namely: (1) that
Appellant failed to perform 300 hours of community service at a rate of no less than
twenty hours per month in April and May 2023, or alternatively, to make a donation
to the Stonewall County Food Bank; and (2) that Appellant failed to participate in a
sex offender treatment program with a licensed sex offender therapist.
At the hearing on the State’s motion, Appellant pleaded “not true” to the
allegations, and the trial court heard testimony from three witnesses: Alicia
Langford, a former community supervision officer; Deborah Larue, Appellant’s
mother; and Appellant.
Langford testified that she reviewed Appellant’s probation conditions with
him, and that Appellant was aware of those conditions and what was required of
him. Shortly after the trial court placed Appellant on community supervision,
Appellant requested that he be allowed to live with his mother and grandmother in
Taylor County, so Appellant’s community supervision was transferred to Taylor
County. Langford explained that the transferor office receives progress reports from
the transferee office throughout the probationer’s term. According to Langford,
from the time Appellant was placed on community supervision on March 28, 2023,
to when the motion to revoke was filed on June 27, 2023, Appellant had failed to
complete any community service hours or, in the alternative, make the required
donation. Langford testified that, during that same time period, a required polygraph
examination was administered as part of Appellant’s sex offender treatment
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program. After this examination, Appellant was unsuccessfully discharged from the
program for “failing his . . . polygraph.”
Appellant reportedly answered the following questions “with deception”:
Q. Did you download the child pornography images on that laptop?
A. No.
Q. Did you cause the child pornography to be on your laptop?
A. No.
Q. Did you know there was child pornography images on your laptop
before the police were involved?
A. No.
Langford noted that in contravention of Appellant’s polygraph examination
responses, Appellant signed a stipulation of the evidence as part of his plea bargain
agreement, admitting that he possessed child pornography.
Appellant maintained throughout the revocation hearing, however, that he had
answered the questions truthfully during the polygraph examination and attributed
any finding of “deception” to his early onset Parkinson’s diagnosis and high blood
pressure1—conditions he made known to the polygraph administrator. When asked
how he would answer if given an opportunity to answer the same questions again,
Appellant stated he would answer them “the same as [he] did before . . . because
that’s what happened.” Appellant denied ever seeing the child pornography found
on his laptop and testified that he did not have any knowledge of how those images
got there. Langford testified that participants in the sex offender treatment program
must take responsibility for their actions and “acknowledge that [they] did them.”
Appellant acknowledged that, to successfully complete the program, it would “be
incumbent upon [him] to accept responsibility for this conviction.”

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Appellant’s mother also testified to Appellant’s medical conditions.
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Regarding his community service hours, Appellant contended that it was
“hard for sex offenders to do community service” and that it was difficult for him to
find places that would allow him to do community service. Appellant did not testify
as to any community service opportunity that he actually applied for and for which
he was turned down. A receipt indicating that Appellant had made a payment of
$300 to the food bank on July 6 after the motion for revocation had been filed, in
lieu of performing community service, was admitted into evidence. 2
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, meaning the “greater weight of the credible evidence
which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition
of his probation.” Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(quoting Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); Guillory v.
State, 652 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). Proof of the
violation of a single condition of community supervision is sufficient to support a
trial court’s decision to revoke. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Zapata v. State, No. 11-22-00346-CR, 2024 WL 5160466, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Dec. 19, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 (citing Rickels, 202
S.W.3d at 763). “[T]he trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. We view the evidence adduced in
a revocation proceeding in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

The trial court’s order required Appellant to donate $1,500 to the local food bank if he wished to
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make a donation, rather than perform his community service hours.
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Analysis
On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the
trial court’s findings on each of the State’s allegations. Appellant contends that,
because his “community service was up to date,” 3 there was “nothing more than the
failure of the . . . polygraph against Appellant” to revoke his community supervision.
Embedded in his sufficiency argument, however, is a challenge to the trial court’s
consideration of the polygraph examination as its “basis of revocation.” Citing to
Leonard v. State, which reiterated that the results of a polygraph examination are
“inadmissible over proper objections because the tests are unreliable,” Appellant
asserts that, as a result, there was “no basis” for the trial court to revoke Appellant’s
community supervision, and the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. See
Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
As an initial matter, we disagree with Appellant’s contention that the
polygraph examination results were inadmissible pursuant to Leonard because, in
this case, Appellant failed to object to the polygraph evidence. “Polygraph evidence
is generally excluded from courtrooms because the reliability of such tests remains
unproven.” Ex parte Bryant, 448 S.W.3d 29, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Leonard, 385 S.W.3d at 577–81, 583). However, the “failure to object to polygraph
evidence waives the error.” See Sanchez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2006, no pet.); Jasso v. State, 112 S.W.3d 805, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding appellant waived challenge to polygraph
examination testimony by failing to make timely objection); see also Willis v. State,
No. 05-13-00530-CR, 2014 WL 5475490, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 30, 2014,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Pereida v. State, No. 13-

Appellant does not expound on his claim that his “community service was up to date.” He is
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presumably referencing the $300 payment made in lieu of performing monthly community supervision
hours.
5
09-354-CR, 2010 WL 2783743, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
July 15, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same);
Whitton v. State, No. 14-08-00611-CR, 2010 WL 307911, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (same).
In Leonard, the State sought to revoke the appellant’s probation, alleging the
appellant had been unsuccessfully discharged from his sex offender treatment
program after failing a polygraph examination. 385 S.W.3d at 576–77. The court
concluded that the results of a polygraph examination were “inadmissible over
proper objection because the tests are unreliable,” and held that the trial court abused
its discretion by adjudicating the appellant guilty based on this evidence. Id. at 577,
583. Here, unlike in Leonard, Appellant asserted no objection to any testimony
concerning the polygraph examination, and when Appellant testified, he was
questioned at length by his trial counsel about the veracity of his responses to the
polygraph examination questions. Because Appellant did not object at any point to
the admissibility of the testimony on the polygraph examination, Appellant cannot
now argue that the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating him based, in part,
on this evidence. See Sanchez, 222 S.W.3d at 90; cf. Leonard, 385 S.W.3d at 577.
Having concluded that it was proper for the trial court to consider the
polygraph evidence in adjudicating Appellant, we analyze the sufficiency of the
evidence in support of one of the allegations that the trial court found to be true. See
Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. To be clear, the State alleged that Appellant violated the
condition of his community supervision that required him (1) “to attend and
participate in a sex offender treatment program with a licensed Sex Offender
Therapist as directed by the [probation] officer,” and (2) to “keep all appointments,
follow all rules and regulations, and participate in [the] program” until he was
released by the trial court. In support of this allegation, Langford testified that
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Appellant was ordered to participate in the sex offender treatment program as an
alternative to incarceration, and she made Appellant aware of this condition.
Langford further explained that Appellant’s participation in the sex offender
treatment program was predicated on passing a polygraph examination, which
Appellant failed because his responses were deemed “deceptive.” Appellant’s
answers were determined to be deceptive because they ran contrary to his prior guilty
plea and signed stipulation of the evidence in support of his possession-of-child-
pornography conviction.
Appellant agreed that taking responsibility for one’s actions is an essential
part of a sex offender treatment program and that the purpose of the polygraph was
to determine whether he could, in fact, accept responsibility. Appellant nonetheless
maintained that he had responded truthfully when he denied committing the
underlying offense. Appellant further attributed any “deceptive” finding to his
medical history and the testing conditions. Irrespective of Appellant’s insistence
that (1) he did not commit the underlying offense and (2) consequently, he did not
lie on the polygraph examination when asked about whether he had downloaded
child pornography or knew that there was child pornography on his laptop, the trial
court, in assessing Appellant’s credibility, could have reasonably inferred that
Appellant’s responses were untruthful and belied Appellant’s prior guilty plea. See
Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Barton v. State, No. 06-23-00006-CR, 2023
WL 3491767, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 17, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (concluding that the trial court could weigh discrepancies
between an appellant’s statements during a post-polygraph interview to determine
whether the appellant gave deceptive responses in the polygraph examination).
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to show that Appellant did not follow all rules and
regulations and participate in the sex offender treatment program as ordered, and
thereby violated a condition of his community supervision. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d
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at 865; see also Zapata, 2024 WL 5160466, at *7 (holding that failure to complete
the sex offender treatment program as ordered is sufficient to support the revocation
of community supervision); Carroll v. State, No. 11-10-00326-CR, 2011
WL 4136539, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 15, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (same).
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that
Appellant violated at least one of the conditions of his community supervision, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s community
supervision. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

February 21, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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