Joseph Micah Quintela v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed June 26, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00130-CR
__________

JOSEPH MICAH QUINTELA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 441st District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR50092

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Joseph Micah Quintela, appeals the revocation of his community
supervision. On September 13, 2018, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement,
Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of the third-degree felony offense of failure
to appear. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.10(a), (f) (West 2016). The trial court
found Appellant guilty of both counts, sentenced him to confinement for a term of
five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
for each count, and assessed a $1,000 fine. However, the trial court suspended the
imposition of the sentences and placed Appellant on community supervision for a
period of five years.
Appellant’s community supervision was modified twice; once after the State
filed a motion to revoke in March 2022, and again after the State filed a second
motion to revoke in September 2022.
This appeal arises from the hearing on the State’s third motion to revoke. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community
supervision on both counts and sentenced him to confinement for a term of five years
in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on each
count.
In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court violated his due process
rights when it failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its decision to revoke his community supervision. In his second issue,
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community
supervision because there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to establish
that Appellant violated the terms and conditions by a preponderance of the evidence.
We affirm.
Background Facts
In its third motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision, the State
alleged that Appellant committed five violations of the terms and conditions of his
probation. The State alleged that each violation occurred on November 15, 2022.
The State alleged that Appellant failed to abide by the requirement that he “shall
commit no offense against the laws of this State or any other State or of the United
States” when he (1) intentionally fled from a Midland police officer who was
lawfully attempting to arrest or detain him with the knowledge that the police officer
was a peace officer attempting to arrest or detain him; (2) intentionally and
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knowingly by force, intimidation, or deception restrained Stephanie Gomez without
her consent by “cornering her and physically blocking her from moving and exiting
the bedroom”; (3) intentionally and knowingly prevented and interfered with
Stephanie Gomez’s ability to place a 9-1-1 emergency telephone call and to request
emergency assistance “by following, interrupting, and attempting to take the phone”
from her; (4) threatened to commit murder against Stephanie Gomez, a member of
his family and/or household, with the intent to place her in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury; and (5) intentionally and knowingly caused bodily injury to Stephanie
Gomez, a member of his family and/or household and with whom he has had a dating
relationship, by grabbing her from behind and “forcefully turning her body and
limbs,” having been previously convicted of an offense against a member of his
family and/or household and with whom he has had a dating relationship. See PENAL
§§ 20.01(1)(A), 20.02(a), 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2024), § 22.07(a)(2),
(c)(1) (West 2019), §§ 38.04(a), 42.062(a) (West 2016).
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke on May 11, 2023. At
the outset of the hearing, the State informed the trial court that it was abandoning the
first allegation concerning the claim that Appellant evaded arrest or detention.
Appellant pleaded “not true” to the remaining four allegations.
The State called Stephanie Gomez to testify about her relationship with
Appellant and the events that took place on November 15, 2022. Gomez testified
that she and Appellant were in a dating relationship for nine years and had three
children together. Gomez ended the relationship in April 2022 after Appellant hit
her multiple times with a closed fist and attempted to choke her. Gomez testified
that Appellant had a pending assault charge against him as a result of the April 2022
incident.
After the April 2022 incident, Gomez started a new dating relationship and
began living at a different address with her boyfriend. On November 15, 2022,
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Gomez allowed Appellant to spend the night at her home because he had recently
been released from jail and his family would not let him stay at their house. Three
of Gomez’s children were at the home. Gomez’s boyfriend was working out of town
and was not aware that Appellant was in the home.
Gomez slept in the children’s bedroom because she did not “trust” Appellant.
Appellant was “supposed to sleep on the couch” but “ended up going into the
[children’s] bedroom” and woke Gomez up. Gomez went into the living room with
Appellant and had sex with him. Gomez then went back into the children’s room.
Appellant came into the room “trying to have more,” and Gomez told Appellant that
she did not want to. Gomez left the children’s bedroom and went into her bedroom.
Appellant followed, and Gomez told him to get out of her bedroom. Appellant
refused to leave and started “getting angry.” Appellant threw Gomez’s dresser onto
the floor.
Gomez testified that she went to the corner of her bed “because that’s [her]
thing. [She] always [has] to hide in the corner with him.” Appellant was “slamming
his hand on the bed” and screaming at Gomez to “stop cheating on him.” Gomez
said that Appellant was “screaming and screaming and that he’s going to kill [her]
and he’s going to ruin everything, that he hates [her], and that he wants [her] dead.”
Gomez testified that she felt like Appellant would “follow through” with his threat
to kill her and that she felt threatened by him. Gomez testified that she could not
leave the room because Appellant was “right there at the edge of the bed.”
Gomez told Appellant that she would call the police if he did not stop, but he
continued “screaming and screaming and going on and on.” Gomez said that she
called 9-1-1 and that Appellant was still screaming as she was telling the dispatcher
what was happening. Gomez testified that it seemed like Appellant did not believe
she was on the phone with 9-1-1 at first and that he started apologizing once she put

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the dispatcher on speakerphone. Gomez continued telling Appellant to get out of
her bedroom, but he was “still not listening.”
Gomez tried to leave the apartment while she was on the phone with 9-1-1,
but Appellant “grabbed” her, turned her around, and tried to take the phone from her
hand. Gomez testified that Appellant squeezed her hand when he tried to take the
phone from her, causing her pain, and that Appellant was aware she was on the phone
with 9-1-1 when he did so. Gomez started screaming and Appellant let go, allowing
Gomez to run outside.
Two police officers arrived soon after Gomez ran outside. After speaking to
both Appellant and Gomez, the officers arrested Appellant for “terroristic threat,
assault family violence, [and] interfering with a phone call.” Gomez testified that
this was one of many times that Appellant assaulted her while he was on community
supervision.
Appellant testified in his defense. Appellant said that his relationship with
Gomez had its “[u]ps and downs, just like a normal marriage.” Appellant testified
that he and Gomez began arguing in 2021 because Gomez started working and
“seeing other people.” Appellant said that he was upset because “dangerous” people
who “were on drugs” and “dealing drugs” began coming to their house “with guns
and all kinds of stuff.” Appellant testified that he never physically attacked Gomez
while they were arguing and that he never assaulted Gomez during their relationship.
Appellant testified that Gomez asked him to come over on November 15,
2022, because she was “getting rid” of her boyfriend after “he had stuff thrown all
over the apartment where he was being abusive.” Gomez’s boyfriend “started
friction” that evening because he had called Gomez and had shown up at the home,
even though he was supposed to be at work. Appellant and Gomez argued in her
bedroom that night, but it was “[n]onviolent.” Appellant testified that he never
prevented Gomez from leaving the bedroom and that, while he asked Gomez to hang
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up the phone when she called 9-1-1, he never put his hands on her to prevent her
from making the call.
Appellant confirmed on cross-examination that one of the violations in the
State’s second motion to revoke was based on assaulting Gomez in April 2022, but
testified that “that one was dismissed” and that he did not plead true to the allegation.
When asked if he recognized his signature on waiver and stipulation forms
confirming that he was pleading true to the State’s motion to revoke, Appellant said,
“I recognize my signature, but that kind of looks off.”
After brief closing arguments from both parties, the trial court addressed
Appellant and said the following:
I fear, sir, that your children have seen the violence and the abuse
in your family, because if they have, you have created children that will
probably be abusers. They will probably commit violence. And that’s
what all the studies show. And as a Judge and as a lawyer, that’s what
I’ve seen over my whole life since I was a young guy.

And so what you’ve done is much more serious than just doing
it to the person that loves you and has children with you. It’s doing it
to the children, because the pattern that you set because they will -- they
will have a hard time breaking from your mold. And that’s sad. And I
hope you’re sad about that.

I want you to know that I use a term that’s very harsh, and that’s
called a family terrorist. Terrorism is when you cause fear. We hear
about terrorism about buildings falling and about bombs on television
and things like that. And that terrorism is simply actions that cause fear
in people. And what you did caused fear in your loved one and fear in
your -- the mother of your children. And that won’t go unpunished in
this court.

....

The Court finds that you violated the terms and conditions of
your probation as set forth in the documents. The Court revokes your
probation because of that violation, and it’s based on a preponderance
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of the evidence, which means it’s more likely that it occurred than it
didn’t occur. That’s the standard. It’s the lowest standard. It’s easily
met in this particular case.

The trial court revoked Appellant’s community supervision and sentenced him to
confinement for a term of five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice on both counts. The trial court’s judgments of
conviction also ordered Appellant to pay the remaining balance of the $1,000 fine
previously assessed. The trial court reiterated that Appellant’s sentence was based
on his original plea bargain for community supervision, the “credible evidence”
presented, and the trial court’s finding that Appellant “violated the terms and
conditions of probation as set forth in allegations 2, 3, 4, and 5.” Appellant did not
request on the record that the trial court enter written findings of fact and conclusions
of law in support of his decision to revoke Appellant’s community supervision, and
the clerk’s record does not contain a written request that the trial court do so.
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the “verdict
in this cause are [sic] contrary to the law and the evidence.” Appellant also filed a
motion titled “Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” which asked
the trial court to “make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
following motion filed by defendant: Motion for new trial” (emphasis added). The
trial court granted Appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding Appellant’s motion for new trial but denied the motion for new trial. The
clerk’s record does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
Appellant’s motion for new trial, despite the trial court’s order granting the motion.

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Analysis
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
and denied him his due process rights when it revoked his community supervision.1
Due process in the revocation context requires a hearing, written notice of the
claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, an opportunity
to be heard and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, a neutral hearing
body, and “a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the
reasons for revoking probation.” Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)).
When the trial court revokes a defendant’s community supervision, due
process requires specific written findings of fact if a defendant requests findings of
fact be made. See Whisenant v. State, 557 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
However, the trial court is not required to issue separate findings if the judgment or
revocation order discloses the grounds for revocation found by the court. Smith v.
State, 587 S.W.3d 413, 421–22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.); see also
Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Reasor v. State, 281
S.W.3d 129, 136 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding that the trial
court orally specifying which allegations it found to be true and a written judgment
reflecting that the trial court found certain alleged violations “as set out in the State’s
motion to revoke” to be true complied with due process); Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d
627, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that handwritten
notations on the trial court’s order revoking community supervision, “[w]hile

1
Ordinarily, we would address an issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence first. But
because Appellant’s evidentiary challenge in his second issue is based, in part, on his assertion that he “has
never been told what violations of [his] probation were found to be true by the Trial Court,” we will initially
address his first issue.
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perhaps not a model example of findings of fact,” adequately communicated the
grounds on which it found the appellant violated his community supervision).
Appellant asserts that the trial court did not articulate which allegations it
found to be true and “ignored” his request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law, thereby leaving Appellant “to guess at what evidence the Trial Court based the
grounds for revocation on” and preventing him from “effectively prosecut[ing] an
appeal.” The State asserts that “Appellant cannot now complain about the trial
court’s failure to make detailed findings as to the revocation evidence because he
did not request findings.”
The only request for findings of fact and conclusions of law found in the
record is Appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
his motion for new trial. Appellant asserts that, “[e]ven if one argues that the
Findings of Fact filed is limited to the issue of the Motion for New Trial, the motion
was summarily denied without explanation, despite the Court’s contrary order
granting the request for findings of fact.” But Appellant is not asserting that the trial
court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for new trial. Rather, Appellant
is asserting that the trial court violated his due process rights and prevented him from
adequately pursuing an appeal because it failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law showing the grounds for the trial court’s revocation of his
probation. Appellant does not expound upon the effects, if any, the trial court’s
failure to enter findings of fact regarding the denial of his motion for new trial would
have on his due process rights. Regardless, even if Appellant had requested that the
trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law showing the grounds for the
trial court’s revocation of his probation, Appellant’s due process rights were not
violated.
Appellant’s assertion that the trial court never articulated the grounds upon
which it revoked his probation is incorrect. The facts in Reasor are similar to the
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facts currently before us. See Reasor, 281 S.W.3d at 136. Here, the trial court orally
found that Appellant violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision
“as set forth in the documents.” The trial court also explained to Appellant at the
hearing that his sentence was based on the “credible evidence” presented by the State
at the hearing and the trial court’s finding that Appellant “violated the terms and
conditions of probation as set forth in allegations 2, 3, 4, and 5.” The trial court’s
written judgments state that the trial court’s findings are: “True to all allegations
with the State abandoning Allegation One.” The judgments also state that “the Court
is of the opinion and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated the terms and conditions of community supervision while they were in full
force and effect as set out in the document attached hereto.” A copy of the State’s
allegations in its motion to revoke is attached to each judgment. Accordingly,
Appellant was provided adequate notice of the grounds underlying the trial court’s
revocation, and his ability to prosecute an appeal was not diminished by the absence
of further findings. Id; see Smith, 587 S.W.3d at 421–22.
Appellant also notes that the clerk’s record contains a waiver and stipulation
form signed by the trial court stating that Appellant was pleading true to the State’s
motion to revoke and that he intended to judicially confess his guilt. Appellant
asserts that the trial court’s signature on a document “contrary to the balance of the
record” makes “a finding of fact on the record [] vital to the Appellant receiving due
process.” Notably, the form is only signed by the trial court—the signature lines for
Appellant, his attorney, and the State’s attorney are all left blank.
While we agree with Appellant’s assertion that the trial court’s signature on
the waiver and stipulation form is contrary to the balance of the record, the record
contains ample evidence indicating that the trial court was not under the mistaken
impression that Appellant was pleading true to the allegations in the State’s motion
to revoke. The combination of (1) the absence of any additional required signatures
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on the waiver and stipulations form, (2) Appellant pleading “not true” to each of the
State’s allegations at the hearing on his motion to revoke, and (3) the judgments
revoking Appellant’s community supervision reflecting that Appellant pleaded “not
true” to the State’s allegations all point to the trial court’s signature on the form
being a clerical error.
Further, as we previously discussed, the trial court found on the record that
Appellant violated his probation as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke, with the
exception of the allegation abandoned by the State. Further, the judgments included
the trial court’s written findings that Appellant violated the terms and conditions of
his community supervision as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke. These matters
clearly show that the trial court found each of the alleged violations in the State’s
motion to revoke to be true by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, we do
not believe that the trial court’s likely accidental signature on a waiver and
stipulations form confuses the record to the point where Appellant is unable to
effectively appeal the revocation of his community supervision.
The record of the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke and the trial court’s
written judgments reflect that the trial court found Allegation Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 to
be true as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke. Accordingly, the trial court did
not violate Appellant’s due process rights when it failed to enter written findings of
fact and conclusions of law regarding its decision to revoke Appellant’s community
supervision. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
in revoking his probation because the evidence presented at the hearing was “both
legally and factually insufficient to establish which, if any, violation”2 was proven
true by a preponderance of the evidence. We will construe Appellant’s assertion as

2
Appellant reasserts that he “has never been told what violations of [his] probation were found to
be true by the Trial Court.”
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a claim that the State failed to prove Allegation Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 in its motion to
revoke by a preponderance of the evidence.
Given the unique nature of a revocation hearing and the trial court’s broad
discretion in the proceedings, general standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence do not apply. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Miles v. State, 343 S.W.3d 908, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011,
no pet.). Instead, we review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision
under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
The State must prove a violation of the terms and conditions of community
supervision by a preponderance of the evidence, and proof of any one of the alleged
violations is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s decision to revoke. Garcia v. State,
387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“proof of a single violation will support
revocation”); Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493 (burden of proof is by a preponderance
of the evidence); Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel. Op.]
1980); Jones v. State, 472 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d).
The trial court abuses its discretion by revoking community supervision if the
State failed to meet its burden of proof. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94;
Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). “[A]n order
revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence; in other
words, that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable
belief that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation.” Scamardo, 517
S.W.2d at 298. The trial court is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight given to their testimony. Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d
583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). An appellate court must view the
evidence presented at a revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the trial

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court’s ruling. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1981).
Gomez and Appellant were the only witnesses to testify at the revocation
hearing. Gomez’s testimony supported each of the State’s allegations. While
Appellant’s testimony contradicted Gomez’s testimony, it was solely within the trial
court’s authority to determine the credibility of Gomez and Appellant and to decide
what weight to give their testimony.
Allegation No. 2 stated that Appellant intentionally and knowingly by force,
intimidation, or deception, restrained Gomez without her consent by “cornering her
and physically blocking her from moving and exiting the bedroom.” Gomez testified
that Appellant was in her bedroom despite her repeatedly telling him to get out.
Gomez said that she moved to the corner of her bed after Appellant threw her dresser
onto the floor. Gomez said that she had to be “smart” about trying to leave her
bedroom because Appellant was “right there in [her] way, so [she] didn’t try to [exit
the room].” Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support that Appellant
restrained Gomez without her consent by cornering her and physically blocking her
from being able to move off of the bed or exit the bedroom. See PENAL
§§ 20.01(1)(A), 20.02(a).
Allegation No. 3 stated that Appellant intentionally and knowingly prevented
and interfered with Gomez’s ability to place a 9-1-1 call and to request emergency
assistance. Gomez testified that Appellant tried to take the phone from her hand by
squeezing her hand and causing her pain while she was on the phone with a 9-1-1
dispatcher and after she put the call on speakerphone; he only let go when she
“started screaming.” Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to find that
Appellant intentionally or knowingly interfered with Gomez’s ability to request
emergency assistance. See PENAL § 42.062(a).

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Allegation No. 4 stated that Appellant threatened to murder Gomez with the
intent to place Gomez in fear of imminent serious bodily injury and that Gomez was
a member of Appellant’s family and/or household. Gomez testified that Appellant
told her he was going to “kill” her and that she felt like Appellant was going to
“follow through” with his threat. Gomez also testified that she and Appellant were
in a dating relationship for nine years, that they lived together during their
relationship, and that she and Appellant had three children together. Appellant
testified that he and Gomez were “common law married” and were “coparenting”
their children. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to find that (1) Appellant
threatened to murder Gomez with the intent to place her in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury, and (2) that Gomez was a member of Appellant’s family. See PENAL
§ 22.07(a)(2), (c)(1), (f)(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2019).
Allegation No. 5 stated that Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused
bodily injury to Gomez, a member of his family and/or household and with whom
he has had a dating relationship, by “grabbing [her] from behind and forcefully
turning her body and limbs” and that he had previously been convicted of an offense
against a member of his family or household or with whom he had had a dating
relationship. We have already determined that there was sufficient evidence that
Appellant and Gomez were family, and both Gomez and Appellant testified that they
had some form of a dating relationship. Further, Gomez testified that Appellant
“grabbed me like this” and tried to take her phone from her hand, causing her pain.
While we are unable to determine from the record what Gomez specifically meant
when she said Appellant grabbed her “like this,” Gomez later said that, “when I
turned, that’s when he pulled me.” The State offered, and the trial court admitted,
the previous judgments modifying Appellant’s community supervision, wherein
Appellant pleaded “true” to the allegation that he had committed an assault against
Gomez and had previously been convicted of assault family violence in trial court
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cause number 120336 on or about May 21, 2008 in Midland County, Texas.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to find that Appellant intentionally and
knowingly caused Gomez, a member of his family and a person with whom he had
a dating relationship, by grabbing her from behind and forcefully turning her body
and limbs, and that Appellant had been previously convicted of assault family
violence as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke. See PENAL § 22.01(a)(1),
(b)(2)(A)(i).
There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the State
proved Allegation Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in revoking Appellant’s community supervision. See id. We overrule Appellant’s
second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

June 26, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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