Frederic Rodriguez A/K/A Freddie Rodriguez v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 14, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00187-CR
__________

FREDRIC RODRIGUEZ A/K/A FREDDIE RODRIGUEZ,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court
Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR28979

MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant, Fredric Rodriguez a/k/a
Freddie Rodriguez, of evading arrest with a vehicle, a third-degree felony. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2024). After finding the
enhancement paragraph to be true, the trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment
at confinement for fifteen years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice. Appellant challenges his conviction in four issues asserting that
the trial court erred by denying his request to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial and
by admitting evidence of extraneous acts. We affirm.
Background Facts
Appellant was on parole and under the supervision of the Brownwood District
Parole Office of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Because Appellant had
violated the conditions of his parole, a warrant had been issued for his arrest.
Appellant reported to the parole office on April 21, 2022, and the Brownwood police
were notified so that they could take him into custody. A parole officer attempted
to stall Appellant until police were able to arrive. The parole officer asked Appellant
to come to the back area of the office to clean his GPS monitor, but Appellant said,
“I don’t think so,” and left out of the front door of the office. The parole officer
informed others in the office that Appellant was “running.” Another parole officer
went out of the back door of the building and observed Appellant get into the driver’s
side of a “SUV type” vehicle. The parole officer provided law enforcement with a
description of the vehicle including the vehicle’s license plate number.
Brownwood Police Officer Jayme Bowman initially responded to a call to go
to the parole office for warrant service but then was informed that the suspect had
left the building. Officer Bowman was given a description of the vehicle and the
license plate number. Officer Bowman located the vehicle and activated his
overhead lights in an effort to stop the vehicle. When the vehicle did not stop,
Officer Bowman activated his siren. According to Officer Bowman, he pursued the
vehicle for approximately fifty minutes before disengaging for safety reasons.
While in pursuit of the vehicle, Officer Bowman observed the driver slow
down and throw something from the window. Another officer responded to that

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location and found three baggies with a white substance inside of them and a
methamphetamine pipe. The substance in the baggies was later determined to be
methamphetamine in an amount of 0.71 grams. Officer Bowman later identified
Appellant as the driver of the vehicle.
Appellant’s case was set for a jury trial on July 10, 2023. On July 7, 2023, he
appeared before the trial court to waive his right to a jury trial. Appellant informed
the trial court that he had talked with his attorney and that he “intentionally,
knowingly, and voluntarily” waived his right to a jury trial. Appellant indicated that
he had graduated from high school and that he could read and write the English
language. Appellant’s counsel stated that Appellant was competent, and the trial
court agreed. Appellant, his trial counsel, the State, and the trial court all signed the
written waiver of jury trial.
The bench trial was scheduled for July 27, 2023. On July 26, 2023,
Appellant’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw the waiver of jury trial and a
motion to withdraw as counsel. On the day of trial, the trial court heard both
motions. Appellant contended that he did not fully understand the consequences of
waiving a jury trial and that his trial counsel did not fully advise him of those
consequences. Appellant testified at the hearing and acknowledged that he had
previously waived his right to a jury trial. He stated that he had talked with his trial
counsel about a jury waiver but that he was not aware of all of the consequences.
He also said that he did not understand that the waiver was irrevocable. Appellant
explained that he had been preparing for trial and that he wanted to withdraw the
waiver. Appellant asserted that he did not agree with his trial counsel’s strategy on
how to handle the case. Appellant agreed that the trial court informed him that he
had a right to a jury trial and that he waived that right.

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The State opposed Appellant’s withdrawal of his waiver of a jury trial. The
prosecutor informed the trial court that all of its witnesses were there and that two
of the witnesses had come from out of town to be there on that day. The prosecutor
explained that it would be detrimental to the witnesses if the trial did not go forward
on that day. The prosecutor further explained that because of the limited number of
settings, it could be months before the case was able to go to trial.
The trial court denied both the motion to withdraw Appellant’s waiver of jury
trial and the motion to withdraw as counsel. In doing so, the trial court stated that
“there are witnesses ready to go, out-of-town witnesses, and I just think that after
hearing the evidence presented, I’m not inclined to grant it.”
Appellant’s position at trial was that the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence to establish his identity as the person that evaded arrest. At the conclusion
of the evidence, the trial court found Appellant guilty of evading arrest.
Analysis
Waiver of Jury Trial
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his
request to withdraw his waiver of jury trial. He asserts that there was no evidence
that the granting of his request to withdraw his jury waiver would interfere with the
orderly administration of the business of the trial court, result in unnecessary delay
or inconvenience to witnesses, or prejudice the State.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “The right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1.12 (West 2005). Therefore, a defendant in a criminal prosecution has an
absolute right to a trial by jury. Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). However, a defendant may waive that right. See CRIM. PROC.

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art.1.14(a). “But once the defendant validly waives his right to a jury trial, he does
not have an unfettered right to reassert that right.” Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 197. “As
the party who seeks to alter the status quo, the defendant bears the burden when he
seeks to withdraw a valid jury-trial waiver.” Sanchez v. State, 630 S.W.3d 88, 95
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
We review a trial court’s refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw his waiver
of right to a jury trial for an abuse of discretion. See Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 198. A
trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules and
principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
A defendant who wishes to withdraw his waiver of right to trial by jury must
“establish, on the record, that his request to withdraw his jury waiver has been made
sufficiently in advance of trial such that granting his request will not: (1) interfere
with the orderly administration of the business of the court, (2) result in unnecessary
delay or inconvenience to witnesses, or (3) prejudice the State.” Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d
at 197–98. If a defendant meets that burden and “the defendant’s claims are rebutted
by the State, the trial court, or the record itself, the trial judge does not abuse his
discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the waiver.” Id. at 198.
Appellant appeared in open court on July 7, 2023, for the purpose of proving
up his written waiver of jury trial. The trial court noted at this hearing that the case
was scheduled for “next week” for a jury trial. After admonishing Appellant as to
his right to a jury trial, the trial court accepted his waiver. In accepting his waiver,
the trial court informed Appellant that “there will be no more trial by jury. That’s
been waived. [Appellant] still [has] a right to a trial, but it would be a trial in front
of a Judge rather than a jury” and the trial court confirmed that Appellant understood
the consequences of his waiver. According to the record, the State did not offer any
plea bargain to Appellant in exchange for his jury trial waiver, nor was Appellant

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anticipating such an agreement when he waived his right to a jury trial. In this
regard, the trial court admonished Appellant that he retained the right to “work . . .
out” a plea bargain with the State, but that the trial court was signing the jury waiver
for both parties on that date and it noted that the parties were working with the court
coordinator to obtain a trial date. The case was then set for an open plea to the trial
court to occur on July 27, 2023.
Appellant filed his motion to withdraw his waiver of jury trial on July 26,
2023 (the day before trial), and the trial court heard the motion on July 27, 2023 (the
day of trial). Appellant contends that “the trial court had no occasion to make
‘credibility determinations’ or ‘reasonable factual findings to support its rulings’
because there was no evidence adduced regarding those matters.” However,
Appellant testified during the hearing and he explained that he did not understand
the consequences of the waiver or that the waiver was irrevocable. At the end of
Appellant’s testimony, the trial court asked if, and Appellant denied, that any other
evidence or witnesses would be called in support of his motion. Thus, Appellant
was able to testify and present evidence in support of his motion to withdraw his
waiver of jury trial.
The State opposed the withdrawal of waiver because its witnesses, including
out-of-town witnesses, were present and ready to testify at the trial. The State argued
that allowing Appellant to withdraw his waiver would inconvenience the witnesses.
Appellant contends that the witnesses were not inconvenienced because they were
State employees who regularly testified as part of their job descriptions. However,
Appellant did not offer any evidence at the hearing to show that granting his request
would not inconvenience the State’s witnesses.
“The control of the business of the court is vested in the sound discretion of
the trial judge.” Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

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Appellant did not meet his burden to show that, among other things, the withdrawal
of the jury waiver would not interfere with the orderly administration of the business
of the court. See id. In denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his waiver, the trial
court specifically noted that the witnesses were present and ready for trial. On the
record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying Appellant’s request to withdraw his waiver of jury trial.
We are mindful of the outcome in Sanchez v. State, a case that originated from
this court. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined in Sanchez that the trial court
abused its discretion by overruling the defendant’s request to withdraw his waiver
of jury trial. 630 S.W.3d at 90. We conclude that the holding in Sanchez is
distinguishable from the facts in this case. The defendant in Sanchez was
“ambivalen[t]” about his desire to waive a jury trial at a plea hearing wherein his
waiver of jury trial was presented to the trial court, to the point that he effectively
withdrew it on the same day that he executed it. Id. at 96. The court characterized
the withdrawal of the waiver as occurring “immediately.” Id. at 97. Further, the
defendant in Sanchez was set for a jury trial to have occurred approximately ten days
after this hearing. Id. at 96. Thus, the timing of the defendant’s withdrawal of his
jury trial waiver in Sanchez was a significant element to the court’s analysis. See id.
at 96–97.
Here, Appellant did not immediately attempt to withdraw his waiver of jury
trial. At the time that the waiver of jury trial was filed, the case was set for jury trial
to proceed three days later on July 10, 2023. Appellant did not seek to withdraw his
wavier prior to this jury trial setting, but rather waited until over two weeks later on
the day before the case was set for an open plea. Accordingly, the facts in this appeal
are materially different than those in Sanchez. See id. We overrule Appellant’s first
issue.

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Admission of Extraneous Evidence
In his second, third, and fourth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court
erred by admitting evidence of extraneous acts during the guilt-innocence phase of
trial. The State offered evidence that Appellant threw something from the window
of his vehicle while being pursued by law enforcement. Law enforcement searched
the area and found three baggies containing a white substance, that was later
determined to be methamphetamine, and a methamphetamine pipe. The State also
offered evidence that Appellant had a curfew violation while on parole. Appellant
complains that the evidence violated both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling under an abuse of discretion
standard. Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “A trial
judge abuses his discretion when his decision falls outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We
will uphold the trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence if the
ruling was proper under any legal theory or basis applicable to the case. Devoe v.
State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Extraneous-offense evidence is admissible under both Rule 404(b) and
Rule 403 if that evidence satisfies a two-prong test: (1) “whether the extraneous
offense evidence is relevant to a fact of consequence in the case apart from its
tendency to prove conduct in conformity with character”; and (2) “whether the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.”
Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also De La Paz v.
State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If the evidence satisfies
this two-prong test, a trial court’s ruling is generally within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344.

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Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of extraneous-offense evidence at the
guilt phase of a trial to prove that a defendant committed the charged offense in
conformity with bad character. Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 469 (citing TEX. R.
EVID. 404(b)). However, extraneous-offense evidence may be admissible when it
has relevance apart from character conformity. Id. (citing Moses v. State, 105
S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). Such evidence “may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R. EVID.
404(b)(2). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401.
In his second and third issues, Appellant asserts that the testimony about
finding the baggies and determining that they contained methamphetamine was not
relevant to the charged offense of evading arrest. The State responds that the
evidence was admissible as same-transaction contextual evidence and also to show
Appellant’s motive for committing the offense of evading arrest.
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or act other than the offense charged is not
admissible to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with his character but
may be admissible for other purposes. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). These purposes include
proving intent and motive as well as illustrating other aspects of an “indivisible
criminal transaction,” also known as same-transaction contextual evidence.
Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Same-
transaction contextual evidence “illuminate[s] the nature of the crime alleged.” Id.
(citing Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). A
factfinder “is entitled to know all the facts that are ‘blended or closely interwoven’
with a continuous criminal episode.” Id. (citing Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295,
301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). Same-transaction contextual evidence must be

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necessary to the factfinder’s understanding of the offense such that the charged
offense would make little sense without the same-transaction evidence. Id.
Appellant reported to the parole office and then left in a vehicle after a parole
officer asked him to come to the back area. Officer Bowman followed Appellant
and activated his overheard lights to initiate a stop. Appellant did not stop. Evidence
that Appellant was in possession of, and discarded methamphetamine provided a
motive for Appellant to flee from law enforcement. See Phillips v. State, 534 S.W.3d
644, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). In McDaniel v. State, we
addressed evidence that the defendant fired a weapon from a moving vehicle while
committing the offense of evading arrest. 698 S.W.3d 625, 641–42 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d). We held that a criminal offense committed while evading
arrest was “inextricably intertwined” with the offense of evading arrest, and we
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence
as same-transaction contextual evidence. Id. at 642 (quoting Worthy v. State, 312
S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).1 The same rationale applies to the facts in
this case. See id.
Further, the State offered, without objection, the in-car video of Officer
Bowman’s pursuit of Appellant. That video showed objects being thrown from
Appellant’s vehicle. The complained-of testimony provided additional facts to aid
the factfinder’s understanding of the video and the offense. See Inthalangsy, 634
S.W.3d at 756.

1
In McDaniel, we discussed Webb v. State, No. 08-02-00142-CR, 2003 WL 22162337 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Id. at 640–41. In Webb, the court noted
that evidence of drug paraphernalia and contraband in a motel room was admissible as same-transaction
contextual evidence for the offense of evading arrest because it “help[ed] explain why [the man] fled from
the police and in turn, what may have motivated Appellant to assist [the man] and thereby commit the
charged offense of evading arrest.” 2003 WL 22162337 at *2. The court in Webb further noted that the
drug evidence made it more probable that the defendant was intentionally fleeing from a police officer that
he knew was trying to detain him. Id.

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Even if extraneous-offense evidence is relevant under Rule 404(b), the trial
court may exclude it under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. TEX. R. EVID. 403; see Martin, 173
S.W.3d at 467. Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a
presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. See
Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Casey v. State, 215
S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it
has the undue tendency to suggest an improper basis for reaching a decision.
Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Render v. State, 347
S.W.3d 905, 921 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d).
In reviewing a trial court’s determination under Rule 403, a reviewing court
is to reverse the trial court’s judgment “rarely and only after a clear abuse of
discretion.” Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389). When conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the trial
court must balance:
(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence
along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any
tendency of the evidence to suggest [a] decision on an improper
basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the
jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be
given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate
the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that
presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of
time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Rule 403,
however, does not require that the balancing test be performed on the record.
Greene v. State, 287 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d).
In applying the factors listed above, we conclude that the admission of the
evidence about Appellant discarding the items, the search for and recovery of those

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items, and the forensic analysis determining that the items were methamphetamine
did not violate Rule 403. The evidence was probative to show Appellant’s motive
for fleeing from police. The record does not show that the evidence consumed an
inordinate amount of time. Moreover, any prejudicial effect of the admitted
evidence is mitigated here because the trial was to the trial court. See Corley v. State,
987 S.W.2d 615, 621 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (“[W]hen a case is tried to
a trial court rather than to a jury, the danger that the trier of fact will consider
extraneous offense evidence for anything other than the limited purpose for which it
is admitted is reduced, and the likelihood that the extraneous evidence will unfairly
prejudice the defendant is diminished.”). We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of evidence. We overrule
Appellant’s second and third issues.
In his fourth issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing
testimony that he violated his curfew while on parole.
The State asked Amanda Spruill, the parole supervisor for the Brownwood
District Parole Office, if Appellant had a curfew violation in April 2022. Appellant
made a Rule 404(b) objection, and the trial court initially sustained the objection.
The State then explained that the curfew violation resulted in a phone call from the
parole office to Appellant less than a month before the evading arrest offense. The
State asserted that Appellant would have been aware that he had a curfew violation,
and that the violation resulted in a warrant. Thus, according to the State, the
evidence provided a motive for Appellant to flee from law enforcement. The trial
court then clarified that the State could not ask about the circumstances surrounding
the curfew violation but could ask whether or not Appellant had a curfew violation
and about any communications from the parole office after the violation. Spruill
then testified without further objection that on April 9, 2022, Appellant had a curfew

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violation and that the parole office tried to call him two times about the violation.
Appellant did not answer or return the phone calls, and he did not report to the parole
office until the incident on April 21, 2022.
As noted above, the trial court allowed Spruill to testify whether or not
Appellant had a curfew violation. Appellant did not object to that testimony.
Therefore, Appellant has not preserved his complaint for review. See TEX. R.
APP. 33.1; Hernandez v. State, 825 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no
pet.) (holding that defendant was required to renew his objections to rephrased
questions in order to preserve error).
Moreover, even assuming Appellant preserved error, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Evidence that Appellant had a curfew
violation resulting in a warrant for his arrest was admissible to prove his motive to
flee from law enforcement. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
Appellant did not make a Rule 403 objection to the evidence of the curfew
violation. A Rule 403 objection is not implicitly contained in relevancy or
Rule 404(b) objections; rather, a specific Rule 403 objection must be raised to
preserve error. Lopez v. State, 200 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 388). Accordingly,
Appellant has not preserved error regarding his Rule 403 complaint with respect to
the curfew violation. Moreover, even if Appellant preserved error, we conclude that
the admission of evidence about his curfew violation did not violate Rule 403. The
evidence was probative to show Appellant’s motive for fleeing from police. The
record does not show that the evidence consumed an inordinate amount of time or
repeated evidence already admitted. Moreover, any prejudicial effect of the
admitted evidence is mitigated here because the trial was to the trial court. See
Corley, 987 S.W.2d at 621. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

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discretion in admitting the complained-of evidence. We overrule Appellant’s fourth
issue.

This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

August 14, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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