Jesus Meza A/K/A Jesus Meza Hernandez v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed September 18, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00081-CR
__________

JESUS MEZA A/K/A JESUS MEZA HERNANDEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 161st District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. B-23-0390-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jesus Meza a/k/a Jesus Meza Hernandez, was indicted for the
felony offense of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance,
namely fentanyl, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.1123(d) (West Supp. 2024). He entered an
open plea of guilty to the charged offense, waived his right to a jury trial, and
requested that the trial court determine his punishment. After a punishment hearing,
the trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at thirty-seven years’ imprisonment
in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, and
a $10,000 fine, and sentenced him accordingly.
In a single issue, Appellant contends that he was denied due process because
the trial court was biased and assessed a disproportionate and arbitrary sentence that
was intended to “send a message to the federal government.” We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Appellant was arrested on February 6, 2023, during an undercover drug sting
operation conducted by the Odessa Police Department, and a substantial amount of
fentanyl and cash were seized by law enforcement. As a result, indictments were
filed against Appellant in federal and state court for drug-related offenses that arose
from this arrest.
Initially, Appellant was indicted in federal court for the offense of conspiracy
to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute a quantity of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl. Appellant pled guilty to
this offense, and he was sentenced to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment in the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. Appellant was indicted in the above cause for the instant
offense, which arose from related conduct that culminated in his arrest, namely,
possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance—fentanyl—in an amount
of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. Id.; see Gamble v. United States,
587 U.S. 678, 681, 687–89 (2019) (under the dual-sovereignty doctrine, an accused
may be prosecuted by the federal and state authorities for the same criminal conduct,
and the multiple prosecutions do not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment); see also

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Atkins v. State, No. 11-18-00056-CR, 2020 WL 1294743, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Mar. 19, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
On March 25, 2024, the day that Appellant’s case was set for a jury trial, he
entered his plea of guilty to the charged offense; the trial court admonished
Appellant, accepted Appellant’s plea, and the punishment hearing proceeded before
the trial court later the same day. At the punishment hearing, the State presented
three witnesses, Officer Bailey Thurman, Officer Joe Galindo, and Detective Ronny
Tarango, all of whom are employed by the Odessa Police Department; it also offered
nine exhibits. Appellant presented no direct evidence.
As part of the undercover drug operation, Officer Thurman testified that he
arranged via an Instagram post to purchase fentanyl from Appellant. After Appellant
and his codefendant attempted to flee from the agreed-upon location, Appellant was
arrested and approximately fifty grams, or 444 pills, of fentanyl and a large sum of
cash in Appellant’s possession were seized. Officer Galindo and Detective Tarango
were also present when the arrest and seizure were made.
Detective Tarango testified that fentanyl is a dangerous and lethal substance,
the consumption of which has resulted in several people, the majority being children,
overdosing. His investigation revealed that Appellant would use “younger kids to
help distribute these pills because they had -- they had the whereabouts and the ins
and outs on how to get other kids that liked doing percs or M30 pills, and it was
easier to sell.” During Detective Tarango’s testimony, the trial court intervened and
asked him about the amount of fentanyl that was currently being distributed locally,
whether there had been an increase in fentanyl distribution, and, if so, when the surge
in distribution began. Detective Tarango responded that the “uptake” began around

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2020 or 2021, which the trial court commented rhetorically was “[a]bout the time
some other administration took over?”
After the parties closed, the trial court stated that those who distributed
fentanyl had “no care for human life, obviously, because they can make so much
money off so little fentanyl.” The trial court convicted Appellant of the charged
offense, and in pronouncing Appellant’s sentence, stated, “Well, all we can do is --
this Court can do is send a message to the feds and to [Appellant] and to every other
fentanyl dealer. . . . [“The feds”] gave you 37 months [for trafficking fentanyl],
Texas will give you 37 years.”
II. Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that he was denied due process because
(1) the trial court exhibited judicial bias when it commented that it desired to “send
a message” to the federal government when it sentenced Appellant, and (2) the
sentence imposed by the trial court was arbitrary and unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the charged offense.
A. Judicial Comments and Bias
The judicial officer who presides over a defendant’s trial must be neutral,
detached, and willing to consider the evidence presented and the full range of
punishment when determining a defendant’s punishment. Brumit v. State, 206
S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
786 (1973)). A trial court’s arbitrary refusal to do so constitutes a denial of due
process. Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Jaenicke v.
State, 109 S.W.3d 793, 796–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d).
Thus, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
was neutral, detached, and considered the full range of punishment in determining a

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defendant’s punishment. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645; Jacobs v. State, No. 11-
23-00269-CR, 2025 WL 2346890, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 14, 2025, no
pet. h.); Newman v. State, No. 11-22-00076-CR, 2024 WL 847671, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Feb. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
see also Jaenicke, 109 S.W.3d at 796.
It is also presumed that the trial court’s actions during trial were correct, and
a clear showing of bias is required to overcome this presumption. Tapia v. State,
462 S.W.3d 29, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645; Barron v.
State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 406 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). Therefore, to
constitute reversible error because of an alleged improper judicial comment, it must
be shown that (1) some form of judicial impropriety was committed, and (2) such
impropriety resulted in probable prejudice to the complaining party. Barron, 630
S.W.3d at 406 (citing Dockstader v. State, 233 S.W.3d 98, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)). However, remarks made by the trial court during trial
that are perceived to either disapprove or be critical of the defendant or his case
typically will not support a bias or partiality challenge. Id. (citing Trung The Luu v.
State, 440 S.W.3d 123, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.)).
Contrary to Appellant’s contention, there is no indication in the record of
judicial bias. The trial court considered all the punishment evidence presented, the
range of punishment for the charged offense, and Appellant’s lack of a criminal
history in its sentencing determination. The record shows that Appellant is a self-
admitted drug dealer who dispensed fentanyl pills, one of which could conceivably
result in a person’s death, and he was in possession of more than 440 of such pills
when arrested. Moreover, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of
imprisonment—thirty-seven years—that is clearly within the parameters of the

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statutory range of punishment for the charged offense. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 481.1123(d) (Delivery of fentanyl is punishable by imprisonment for life, or for a
term that is not less than ten years or more than ninety-nine years.). As the State
argues, the trial court’s comment of which Appellant complains was an indication
of its attempt to impose a sentence, based on the evidence presented and the
applicable range of punishment, that it believed was directly proportionate to the
seriousness of the charged offense; a point that the trial court noted and believed the
federal government seemed to disregard in Appellant’s federal court prosecution and
sentencing.1
Relying on United States v. Grinnell Corp., Appellant contends that the
sentence imposed by the trial court was improperly influenced by, and its “send a
message” comment stemmed from, an extrajudicial source that “result[ed] in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the [trial court] learned from
his participation in the case.” 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (emphasis added) (citing
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921)). However, Appellant’s reliance on
Grinnell Corp. is misplaced and his argument that flows from it is unavailing. In
this case, the trial court’s knowledge of the disposition of Appellant’s federal court
prosecution, which is the primary focus of Appellant’s complaint, was derived solely
from the evidence that was presented to it during Appellant’s trial—namely,
Detective Tarango’s testimony and Appellant’s federal judgment of conviction.

1
We recognize that in some instances, such as the matter before us, there may be a noticeable
disparity in the applicable sentencing ranges between the federal statute of conviction and the attendant
sentencing guidelines and the statutory punishment range as enacted by the Texas legislature for the same
or similar offense. Compare HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.1123(d), with 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846
(providing a sentence of up to twenty years in the Bureau of Prisons for conspiracy to commit drug
trafficking absent aggravating factors), and U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (Unlawful
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These
Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy), Ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2024).

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Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s isolated, “send a
message” comment either undermined the fairness of Appellant’s trial or was
sufficient to rebut the presumption of neutrality. As such, there was no due process
violation as Appellant suggests.
B. Disproportionate and Arbitrary Sentence
Next, Appellant advances the bare assertion that the sentence imposed by the
trial court was disproportionate to the charged offense, arbitrary, and “violates the
principle of proportionality” set forth in Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas
constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13. At the outset, we note that Appellant
neither cites nor directs us to any case law or other binding authority to support his
argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.(i) (Appellant’s brief must contain appropriate
citations to authorities to support the contentions made.).
As a threshold matter, the State contends that Appellant waived his objection
to the alleged unconstitutional disproportionality of his sentence because he failed
to object to or complain about this issue in the trial court. We agree.
To preserve error for appellate review, a party must make a timely objection
to the trial court, state the specific grounds for the objection, and obtain a ruling.
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Therefore, to preserve a complaint that an imposed sentence
is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the charged offense, as Appellant asserts, a
defendant must first raise the issue in the trial court. See Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d
574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Here, Appellant did not assert any such objection
in the trial court, either at the time his sentence was imposed or in any posttrial
motion. Further, Appellant did not object on constitutional or other grounds,
including the grounds that he now asserts on appeal, that the sentence imposed by
the trial court was disproportionate to sentences others had received for the same or

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similar offense. Therefore, his proportionality complaint presents nothing for our
review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 119–20 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (the failure to raise sentencing issues in the trial court or in a motion for new
trial will not preserve error for appeal); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (holding that sentencing issues are subject to the error preservation
rule and are forfeited if not raised in the trial court); Alvarez v. State, 525 S.W.3d
890, 892 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d).
Notwithstanding the waiver of Appellant’s complaint, we conclude that the
sentence imposed by the trial court in this case is not unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the charged offense. In reviewing a trial court’s sentencing
determination, we note that trial courts are afforded “a great deal of discretion” in
sentencing decisions. Renfroe v. State, 529 S.W.3d 229, 233 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984)). Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court’s decision as to the punishment
assessed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and harm. Id. (citing Jackson,
680 S.W.2d at 814).
Although Appellant challenges the imposition of the trial court’s sentence
under Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas constitution, we recognize that both the
United States Constitution and the Texas constitution include protections against
cruel, unusual, and disproportionate punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;
TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13. In this regard, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that
there is no significant difference between these constitutional protections. See
Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

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Punishment is generally not considered to be unconstitutional if the imposed
sentence falls within the charged offense’s statutory range of punishment. State v.
Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Sneed v. State, 406 S.W.3d
638, 643 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.). However, a narrow exception to this
rule exists: when the imposed sentence is grossly disproportionate to the charged
offense, even if it is within the offense’s statutory range of punishment. Renfroe,
529 S.W.3d at 233 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983)); Sneed,
406 S.W.3d at 643; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004–05 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Nevertheless, “[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will
be] exceedingly rare.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 289–90 (alterations in original) (quoting
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
To evaluate the proportionality of a sentence, we must first make a threshold
comparison between the gravity of the charged offense and the severity of the
sentence imposed. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322; Renfroe, 529 S.W.3d at 234;
Sneed, 406 S.W.3d at 643; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. When we analyze the
gravity of the charged offense, we review the harm caused or threatened to the victim
and the culpability of the offender. Renfroe, 529 S.W.3d at 234. Only if we
determine that the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the charged
offense will we compare the imposed sentence to other sentences that were assessed
in Texas for the same or similar offense. Id.; Sneed, 406 S.W.3d at 643. But, if we
do not find a gross disproportionality, our analysis ends there. See Renfroe, 529
S.W.3d at 234 (citing Bradfield v. State, 42 S.W.3d 350, 353–54 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2001, pet. ref’d)).

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As we have said, the punishment range for the offense that Appellant
judicially confessed to committing, is either imprisonment for life or for a term of
not less than ten years but no more than ninety-nine years. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 481.1123(d). In this case, the punishment assessed by the trial court—thirty-seven
years’ imprisonment—is well within the applicable range for the charged offense; it
also falls toward the lower end of the punishment range. We cannot ignore what we
and the Court of Criminal Appeals have consistently held: punishment that is
assessed within the statutory range prescribed by the legislature is not violative of
the federal and state constitutions. See Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[A] punishment that falls within the legislatively
prescribed range, and that is based upon the sentencer’s informed normative
judgment, is unassailable on appeal.”); Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (It is well-settled that a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
provided the imposed sentence falls within the applicable statutory range of
punishment.); Samuel v. State, 477 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972);
Alvarez, 525 S.W.3d at 892–93; Sneed, 406 S.W.3d at 643.
Detective Tarango testified that the fentanyl possessed by and seized from
Appellant is a dangerous and often, when consumed, lethal substance. People,
including mostly children, who use fentanyl will commonly overdose. Moreover,
according to Detective Tarango, Appellant was recruiting and using young children
to “help distribute the [fentanyl.].” By all accounts, and as we have held, Appellant
committed a serious offense; the gravity of his conduct was significant and its effect
on the public has been, and would be, irreparable. See, e.g., Alvarez, 525 S.W.3d at
893 (holding that a defendant who pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, in an amount of forty-two grams of methamphetamine, with the intent to

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deliver, committed a serious offense); Sneed, 406 S.W.3d at 643 (“[P]ossession of
over six grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver is a serious offense.”) (emphasis
added).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us. Considering the gravity
of the offense committed by Appellant and the sentence that the trial court imposed
in this instance, which is on the lower end of the applicable punishment range for
such an offense, we cannot say that Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate
to the offense for which he was charged. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion, nor did it violate Appellant’s constitutional rights, when
it assessed Appellant’s punishment for this offense at thirty-seven years’
imprisonment. 2 Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

September 18, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

2
Even if we concluded, and we do not, that Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to the
offense for which he confessed, Appellant presented no evidence for us to consider and compare his
sentence to those received by others in other jurisdictions for the same or similar offense, such that we
could evaluate and determine whether the sentence imposed by the trial court in this case is
unconstitutionally disproportionate. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; Bradfield, 42 S.W.3d at 353–54.

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