Johnny Leroy Campbell Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed December 18, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00280-CR
__________

JOHNNY LEROY CAMPBELL JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 385th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR57601

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Johnny Leroy Campbell Jr., was indicted for the first-degree felony
offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.02(b), (h) (West Supp. 2025). The jury convicted him of the lesser-included
offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B). The jury
assessed his punishment at confinement for nine years in the Institutional Division
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In two issues on appeal, Appellant
asserts that the trial court erred in allowing “extraneous conduct testimony” and that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
The Trial Court’s Order Sealing the Entire Appellate Record
Before we can analyze Appellant’s issues on appeal, we must first address the
trial court’s order sealing the entire clerk’s record and the entire reporter’s record.
Because the sealing of the entire appellate record impacts this court’s ability to
address the issues raised by the parties without violating the trial court’s
sealing order, we address the propriety of the trial court’s sealing order. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief
as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition
of the appeal.”), 47.3 (“All opinions of the courts of appeals are open to the public
and must be made available to public reporting services, print or electronic.”).
On December 11, 2023, the trial court signed an order sealing “all volumes of
the Reporter’s Record and the entire Clerk’s Record” in this case, citing Rule 9.10
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure as authority for its order. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.10. The trial court’s order further provided that the record was “only to be
released and/or viewed by the Appellate Attorneys of record.” The record does not
contain a motion from either party seeking the entry of the sealing order.
While Rule 9.10 permits portions of the record to be sealed, it does not permit
the entire appellate record to be sealed. See id. The Tenth Court of Appeals has
recognized that no statute or rule permits the entire appellate record to be sealed.
See Modester v. State, No. 10-22-00142-CR, 2023 WL 2601362, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Waco Mar. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We agree
with our sister court.
We understand the concern for protecting the privacy rights of crime victims,
but there is no legal authority to support sealing the entire record in this case. See
id. Article 38.45 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides specific rules
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for sealing a portion of the record with respect to evidence depicting or describing
abuse of or sexual conduct by a child or minor. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.45 (West Supp. 2025); see TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(g) (materials required by
statute to be sealed, redacted, or kept confidential, such as those items set out in
Article 38.45, must be treated in accordance with the pertinent statutes). This statute
prohibits the copying or dissemination to the public of the material protected by the
statute. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.45. In this regard, Article 38.45 prohibits a court from
making certain property or material available to the public or available for copying
and dissemination to the public, namely: (1) child pornography and certain visual
material depicting a minor, and (2) the recording of a child victim’s forensic
interview or other oral statement made by the child. Id.; see CRIM PROC. art. 38.071,
§§ 2, 5 (West 2023); PENAL §§ 43.26(a-1)(1), (a-2)(2), 43.261. While Article 38.45
directs that the trial court “place [the] property or material described [above] under
seal of the court on conclusion of the criminal hearing or proceeding,” the statute
does not permit sealing the entire appellate record. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.45. And
Article 38.45 does not preclude the issuance of an appellate court opinion that
complies with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 1
As noted previously, the court of appeals must issue a written opinion that is
available to the public that addresses every issue raised and necessary to the
disposition of the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.3. To the extent that the trial
court’s order precludes us from addressing Appellant’s issues and issuing an
opinion, we set it aside.

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In compliance with the trial court’s order, we will continue to keep the clerk’s record and the
reporter’s record filed under seal in this cause, protected from copying or dissemination to the public. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(g). We are only disclosing those portions of the record that are necessary to issue the
appellate opinion in this cause.

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Background Facts
The victim in this case, B.S. 2, was eleven years old at the time of trial. When
she was a toddler, B.S. and her twin brother (Brother) lived with their mother
(Mother) and Mother’s boyfriend, Appellant. B.S. and Brother went to stay with
their paternal grandmother after Mother began losing her vision and Appellant
developed health issues. The children’s father (Father) obtained custody of them,
and B.S. and Brother then lived with Father and Stepmother. Mother had visitation
rights with B.S. and Brother.
While living with Father and Stepmother, B.S. told Stepmother that she
needed to talk to her about something. B.S. then confided to Stepmother that
Appellant had touched her private areas. She also said that Appellant had used a
“toy” to touch her private areas. She described the “toy” as a “boy part” that was
plastic and a pink or purple color. B.S. told Stepmother that it happened every time
she went to Mother’s for visitation. Father and Stepmother contacted law
enforcement, and B.S. was taken to the Children’s Advocacy Center in Waco for a
forensic interview.
B.S. testified that Appellant had abused her in a “sexual way.” She said that
Appellant used a purple object that looked like a “boy’s private” to touch her private
area. She explained that Appellant would tell her to remove her pants and underwear
and lie down on the bed. Then Appellant would spread her legs and use the object
to “do it like sex.” She described that the object had a power button and an “up and
down” button. She said Appellant would “push the up button” and “do it like sex”
and that it “burned” when he used it. B.S. testified that this happened every time she
went to Mother’s home for visitation. According to B.S., she told Mother what
Appellant had done, but Mother did not believe her.

To protect the identity of the victim, we use initials to refer to her. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3).
2

We also identify B.S.’s family members by their relationship to her.
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At trial, Brother testified that one day while at Mother’s residence, he went
inside and knocked on the bedroom door, but no one responded. He heard “weird
noises” that sounded like wrappers, and he looked under the crack at the bottom of
the door. According to Brother, he saw B.S.’s pants and underwear on the floor. He
also saw a box for what he described as that “little thingy” that looked like a boy’s
private. Brother could hear B.S. in the bedroom saying “stop” multiple times.
Brother said that he went and told Mother what he had seen and that she then told
Appellant to stop. Brother recalled that after Mother told Appellant to stop, it
happened again on that same day. Mother again told Appellant to stop, and Brother
was not aware of it happening again.
Dr. Soo Battle, a pediatrician who works as a child sexual abuse examiner,
performed a “delayed outcry medical exam” on B.S. Dr. Battle prepared a written
report based upon her examination of B.S., and the report was admitted into evidence
without objection. Dr. Battle referred to her report during her testimony. She said
B.S. told her that Appellant was “doing sexual stuff” with her. B.S. told Dr. Battle
that Appellant used a “big thing” that “looked like a man’s part” and that he would
“put it in” her. B.S. explained to Dr. Battle that Appellant would have her take her
pants and underwear down to her ankles and then spread her legs. Dr. Battle testified
that B.S. recounted that Appellant would then put “that thing” inside of her “no-no
spot.” Dr. Battle clarified that B.S. was pointing to her “front genitalia area” and
stating that it was “[i]n the middle.” B.S. said that it happened every time she went
to visit Mother. B.S. also told Dr. Battle that Appellant would “show [her] videos
of him and other girls doing the same stuff.”
Analysis
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting
Dr. Battle’s testimony of his “extraneous conduct.” In his second issue, he contends

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that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We will first address his
sufficiency issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted.
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be
afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to
that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
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liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
tried.” Id.
A person commits the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child if he
intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a child by
any means. PENAL § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). Appellant contends that “no rational trier
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense
due to the lack of physical, forensic, or medical evidence to corroborate the
allegations.” Specifically, Appellant directs his evidentiary challenge toward the
element of penetration.
Appellant acknowledges that the uncorroborated testimony of a child victim
is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. See
CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07; Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2022, pet. ref’d). Appellant argues, however, that B.S. did not testify that Appellant
penetrated her sexual organ.
Penetration may be established through circumstantial evidence. Villalon v.
State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The slightest penetration
is sufficient to uphold the conviction. Luna v. State, 515 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (quoting Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972)). Penetration includes pushing aside and reaching beneath a natural fold of
skin into an area of the body not usually exposed to view even when one is naked.
Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
“The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has for decades recognized that child
victims cannot be expected to testify with the same clarity and ability that is expected
of mature and capable adults.” Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 328 (citing Villalon, 791
S.W.2d at 134). B.S. testified that Appellant had her lie down on the bed and spread
her legs. She further testified that Appellant used an object that looked like a “boy’s
private” and that it had a power button. B.S. testified that Appellant would “push
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the up button” and “do it like sex.” When asked what she “could feel” when “he
was using that object,” B.S. replied that it burned. The Seventh Court of Appeals
recognized in Green v. State that a child experiencing pain, specifically burning, in
her female sexual organ can constitute evidence of penetration. 209 S.W.3d 831,
832–33 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. ref’d).
In addition, Dr. Battle testified that B.S. told her Appellant used a thing that
looked like a man’s part and put it “inside her no-no spot.” (Emphasis added).
Dr. Battle noted that B.S. was referring to her genitalia. The factfinder is permitted
to make reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Although B.S. did not specifically testify
that Appellant penetrated her sexual organ, based upon the testimony of B.S. and
Dr. Battle, a reasonable factfinder could have logically inferred that Appellant
penetrated B.S.’s sexual organ.
Appellant maintains that there was no physical, forensic, or medical evidence
to corroborate the allegations of penetration. Dr. Battle testified that B.S.’s physical
exam was normal as expected because “90 to 95 percent of those exams are going
to be normal.” We further note that several years transpired between the alleged
assault and Dr. Battle’s examination of B.S.
Corroboration of the victim’s testimony by medical or physical evidence is
not required to obtain a conviction for a sexual offense. Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 328.
We hold that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational
jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant was guilty of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
Dr. Battle’s Testimony Regarding the Defendant’s Conduct
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting
Dr. Battle’s testimony with respect to Appellant showing B.S. videos. After
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Dr. Battle testified about B.S.’s statements describing the sexual assault, the State
asked if B.S. told Dr. Battle anything else. Dr. Battle responded by reading from her
report, “She did note, quote, [h]e used to show me videos of him and other girls
doing the same stuff.” Appellant objected that the testimony about the videos was
irrelevant.3 The trial court asked the State if this was information “that’s on the
record that’s already been admitted.” The State responded affirmatively, and the
trial court allowed the testimony.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We
uphold the trial court’s decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
We will also uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of
law that finds support in the record. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 125–26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2015, no pet.).
The State asserts that Appellant did not preserve error because Appellant did
not object when Dr. Battle’s report was admitted without objection prior to the
admission of Dr. Battle’s complained-of testimony. The record shows that
Dr. Battle’s complained-of testimony about the videos was a direct quote from her
report. Any error in admitting evidence will not result in reversal when other such
evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of
ruling. Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 282. Thus, even if Dr. Battle’s testimony was

3
Appellant’s trial counsel also asserted that the testimony about the videos violated the trial court’s
order granting Appellant’s motion in limine. Appellant does not assert on appeal a violation of the limine
order other than to assert that the prosecutor acknowledged a violation. See Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d
650, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (explaining that an objection asserting a claimed violation
of an order granting a motion in limine preserves nothing for appellate review).
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erroneously admitted, any error was harmless because the report containing the
complained-of evidence was admitted without objection. See id.
Moreover, the only objection that Appellant made at trial was that the
evidence of the videos was not relevant. 4 To be admissible at trial, evidence must
be relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. The record
does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling Appellant’s
relevancy objection to evidence about Appellant’s conduct with the same child
victim that involved activities of a similar nature. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s first issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

December 18, 2025

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

4
Appellant has briefed numerous other grounds for excluding Dr. Battle’s testimony about the
videos, including the hearsay rule, Rule 403, and Rule 404 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R.
EVID. 403, 404, 803. However, these grounds were not preserved for appellate review by an objection at
trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

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