Alfredo Hinojos Harper v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 12, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00043-CR
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ALFREDO HINOJOS HARPER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 118th District Court
Howard County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 16314

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The jury convicted Appellant, Alfredo Hinojos Harper, of the offense
of aggravated sexual assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2025). After finding an enhancement paragraph
to be true, the jury assessed his punishment at confinement for fifty years in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In his sole issue
on appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence of penetration is insufficient to support
his conviction. We affirm.
Background Facts
When she was thirteen years old, N.H.1 went to a football game where she
saw Appellant, her cousin. N.H. left the football game with Appellant and his
girlfriend at the time, Monique. The three went to Monique’s aunt’s apartment
where they were all drinking alcohol. N.H. became intoxicated and vomited on
herself. Monique and her aunt helped N.H. take a shower, and they gave her some
clean clothes to wear.
According to N.H., she does not remember anything after taking a shower.
She testified that when she woke up, she was at Appellant’s apartment, and
Appellant was on top of her. N.H. said that she had on a shirt, but no pants or
underwear. N.H. described that Appellant “had his penis inside of [her].” When
asked to define “inside” of her, she said her “middle part, where [she] pee[s] from.”
N.H. further described her “middle part” as the place where she has her period.
N.H. testified that, when she woke up, she asked Appellant to stop; Appellant
stopped and left the room. N.H. dressed herself and attempted to leave. Appellant
initially would not let her leave, kept apologizing, and tried to “make [her] get in the
shower.” Eventually, N.H. was able to leave Appellant’s apartment.
Several days later, N.H. told her teacher at school what had occurred. Her
teacher testified that N.H. was crying and said that Appellant “rape[d]” her. N.H.’s
teacher reported the matter to Child Protective Services. The Big Spring Police
Department investigated the allegations. Detective Chase Clanton testified that N.H.
did not undergo a sexual assault examination. Detective Clanton collected the

1
We use initials to protect the identity of the child victim.

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clothes N.H. wore on the date of the incident and sent them to the Department of
Public Safety lab for testing. There was no semen detected on N.H.’s clothing.
Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. He asserts that “the testimony
regarding penetration was not sufficiently specific regarding the actuality or degree
of penetration.”
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted.
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be
afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to
that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

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We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
tried.” Id.
As relevant to this case, a person commits the offense of aggravated sexual
assault of a child if he intentionally or knowingly “causes the penetration of the . . .
sexual organ of a child by any means.” PENAL § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i).
The Penal Code does not define “penetration,” but the Court of Criminal
Appeals has provided the following explanation of the term:
In contexts like that of the Aggravated Sexual Assault statute,
“penetrate” may mean “to enter into” or “to pass through.” See, e.g.,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 1670 (Merriam–
Webster 1981). Thus, in common parlance, mere contact with the
outside of an object does not amount to a penetration of it. But pushing
aside and reaching beneath a natural fold of skin into an area of the
body not usually exposed to view, even in nakedness, is a significant
intrusion beyond mere external contact. Consequently, it is not
ungrammatical to describe [a]ppellant’s touching of complainant in this
case as a penetration, so long as contact with the injured part of her
anatomy could reasonably be regarded by ordinary English speakers as
more intrusive than contact with her outer vaginal lips.
Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Penetration may be
established through circumstantial evidence. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130,
133–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The slightest penetration is sufficient to uphold the
conviction. Luna v. State, 515 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (citing
Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).

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N.H. testified that Appellant’s penis was “inside of [her].” She clarified that
his penis was inside of her middle part where she urinates and has her menstrual
period. A reasonable jury could logically find that Appellant caused contact more
intrusive than contact with N.H.’s outer vaginal lips. See Vernon, 841 S.W.2d at
409.
Appellant cites Woodall v. State, 376 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2012, no pet.) and Prestiano v. State, 581 S.W.3d 935 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2019, pet ref’d) to support his contention that the State did not prove
penetration. The court of appeals in Woodall held that there was legally insufficient
evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a
child. 376 S.W.3d at 140. However, in that case, the child complainant denied that
the defendant touched her on the “inside of [her] private.” Id. at 139 (alteration in
original). The defendant admitted to touching the child outside her underwear. Id.
He said “he could feel the contours or the ridges” of the child’s exterior genitalia and
pushed down on it. Id. However, there was no testimony that the defendant’s fingers
went inside the child’s labia or that penetration otherwise occurred. In Prestiano,
when asked whether the defendant’s sexual organ went inside the child’s mouth, the
child testified that it touched her mouth only “a little bit.” 581 S.W.3d at 941. Thus,
the court of appeals concluded that “a factfinder could do no more than speculate as
to whether penetration or mere contact occurred.” Id. at 942.
Woodall and Prestiano are readily distinguishable from this case. Here, N.H.
testified that Appellant “had his penis inside of [her].” She further testified that
it was inside of her “middle part, where [she] pee[s] from.” Based on N.H.’s
testimony, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant penetrated her sexual organ. See Jackson, 443 U.S. 319; Isassi, 330
S.W.3d at 638; Vernon, 841 S.W.2d at 409.

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Appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient because there was no
sexual assault exam, DNA evidence, or direct testimony from a nurse or doctor to
corroborate N.H.’s testimony. However, “corroboration of the victim’s testimony
by medical or physical evidence is not required.” Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317,
328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). The uncorroborated testimony of a
child victim is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a
child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 2023); Wishert, 654
S.W.3d at 328. Further, “[t]he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has for decades
recognized that child victims cannot be expected to testify with the same clarity and
ability that is expected of mature and capable adults.” Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 327–
28 (citing Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134).
We defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury
is the “sole judge” of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their
testimony. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting
Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)); see Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. As the sole judge of a witness’s credibility, “the jury can believe all,
some, or none of a witness’s testimony.” Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855
(Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The jury’s determination to accept N.H.’s version of the
events was a decision based inherently on its evaluation of her credibility, a decision
that is within the jury’s sole province to resolve.
We hold that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a
rational jury could have logically found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
was guilty of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Accordingly, we
overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

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This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

February 12, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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