Philip J. Emerson, Jr. v. Holly Lake Ranch Association, Inc.

NO. 12-23-00304-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

PHILIP J. EMERSON, JR., § APPEAL FROM THE 402ND
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HOLLY LAKE RANCH
ASSOCIATION, INC., § WOOD COUNTY, TEXAS
APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM

Philip J. Emerson, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal challenging the denial of a
motion for partial summary judgment from July 2020, according to his notice of appeal. On
December 18, 2023, this Court notified Emerson that the notice of appeal failed to show the
jurisdiction of the Court, namely, there is no final judgment or appealable order contained
therewith. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.2. We further notified Emerson that the appeal would be
dismissed unless the information was amended on or before December 28 to show the
jurisdiction of the Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. Emerson filed various motions, but none
establish the jurisdiction of this Court.
Unless specifically authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only to
review final judgments. McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex.
2018). The Wood County online records do not reflect a final judgment in this case. Moreover,
an order denying a motion for a summary judgement is not a final judgement and is therefore
generally not appealable. See Sorrow v. Harris County Sheriff, 622 S.W.3d 496, 508 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (citing Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927
S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996)). Nor is the interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary
judgment in this case authorized by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014
(West Supp. 2023) (appeal from interlocutory order). We also note that Emerson filed his notice
of appeal on December 7, 2023, long after the time expired for filing a notice of appeal (or
extension of time to file a notice of appeal) from a 2020 order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (time to
perfect appeal in civil cases); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3 (extension of time). Because the order
of which Emerson complains is not a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order, we lack
jurisdiction over his appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
We also note, that in August 2020, the 402nd District Court of Wood County found
Emerson vexatious pursuant to Section 11.101 of the civil practice and remedies code. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.101(a) (West 2017) (court may enter order prohibiting
person from filing, pro se, new litigation in a court to which order applies without permission of
appropriate local administrative judge if court finds person is vexatious). The order prohibits
Emerson from filing, pro se, new litigation in the 402nd District Court without permission of the
appropriate local administrative judge. However, a prefiling order entered by a district court
applies to each court in this state. Id. § 11.101(e). A vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling
order is prohibited from filing, pro se, new litigation in a court to which the order applies without
seeking the permission of:

(1) the local administrative judge of the type of court in which the vexatious litigant intends to file,
except as provided by Subdivision (2); or

(2) the local administrative district judge of the county in which the vexatious litigant intends to
file if the litigant intends to file in a justice or constitutional county court.

Id. § 11.102(a) (West 2017). A clerk of a court may not file a litigation, original proceeding,
appeal, or other claim presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order unless
the litigant obtains an order from the appropriate local administrative judge described permitting
the filing. Id. § 11.103(a) (West 2017). Here, Emerson has not provided this Court with an order
from the local administrative judge permitting the filing of the appeal. See id. § 11.1035(b)
(West 2017) (court shall dismiss litigation unless plaintiff obtains order from appropriate local
administrative judge permitting filing of litigation); see also Reule v. Chism, No. 12-23-00080-
CV, 2023 WL 3157978, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 28, 2023, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)
(dismissing for want of jurisdiction appeal by vexatious litigant for failure to obtain permission
from local administrative judge); Yazdchi v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 01-17-00301-

2
CV, 2017 WL 2255773, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2017, no pet.) (per
curiam) (mem. op.) (same).
Nevertheless, even with an order granting him permission to appeal, this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment or appealable interlocutory
order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction and overrule all pending
motions as moot.

Opinion delivered January 3, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

3
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JANUARY 3, 2024

NO. 12-23-00304-CV

PHILIP J. EMERSON, JR.,
Appellant
V.
HOLLY LAKE RANCH ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Appellee

Appeal from the 402nd District Court
of Wood County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 2020-059)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the appellate record, and the same
being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that it is without jurisdiction of the appeal, and
that the appeal should be dismissed.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that
this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and that this decision
be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.