In the Matter of the Marriage of Saba A. Rizvi and Masi Khaja and in the Interest of D.K. and A.K., Children v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00069-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF
SABA A. RIZVI AND MASI KHAJA AND IN THE
INTEREST OF D.K. AND A.K., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT
OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Cron, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Appellant Masi Khaja appeals from the trial court’s entry of a final decree of divorce

from appellee Saba A. Rizvi. 1 By two issues, Khaja argues that the trial court erred by

1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-

equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 22.220(a)
(delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer
cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). We are
bound by the precedent of the transferring court to the extent that it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 41.3.
(1) signing a judgment that failed to conform with the parties’ settlement agreement and

(2) denying his motion to reopen the evidence. We affirm in part and reverse and render

in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Khaja and Rizvi were married and had two minor children. Rizvi filed for divorce in

2021. Prior to trial, the parties reached a partial mediated settlement agreement on some

child-related issues. On July 17, 2023, the parties proceeded to a bench trial on the

remaining child-related issues and certain property issues concerning their marital estate.

They owned several businesses in Colorado, including a majority share in DRK

Associates, LLC (DRK Associates). During trial, Khaja and Rizvi presented expert

witnesses who testified as to the value of the business assets. Rizvi’s counsel also asked

Khaja about the parties’ ownership interest in DRK Associates, “So according to this P-

63, right now, [Rizvi] has a 40 percent interest, whether it’s separate or community; you

have a 40 percent interest; [Dale] Beede has a 10 percent; and your brother, Mr. Khaja,

has a 10 percent interest, correct?” Khaja responded, “Yes.” 2 Khaja and Rizvi each

requested award of the remaining ownership interest in DRK Associates. On the third day

of trial, the parties announced they had reached an agreement on the remaining child-

related issues and property issues. The parties further announced that they would like to

attend mediation on the issues related to the transfer of DRK Associates. Rizvi’s counsel

elicited the following testimony in open court from Rizvi concerning the parties’ agreement

and the specific issues that would be mediated:

[Rizvi’s counsel]: [P]er the terms of the spreadsheet that’s

2 The record indicates that Beede is a “commercial real estate broker by trade” who owns a minority

share in DRK Associates.
2
attached to [Joint Exhibit 1], the gist of it is that
you’re awarded [DRK Associates]. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And that’s an 80 percent interest. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And then you’re awarded the marital residence.
Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And then . . . each of you is taking your own
debts or assets. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And at the end, . . . there’s an approximate
$252,000 note that you will pay to [Khaja].
Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And we are going to go to mediation to
determine how to address the security for that.
Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And you agree that the note will either be
secured by the house or the interest in DRK
Associates. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And then [Khaja] is going to . . . communicate
with the bank in transferring the . . . shares in
DRK Associates to you. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And you have agreed to refinance the marital
residence within 24 months and provide

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notification to [Khaja]. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

....

[Rizvi’s counsel]: Now, one of the things that we didn’t have time
to address today—but you’re going to go to
mediation to address—details regarding the
securities, indemnities, protections, and
documents in you assuming DRK Associates.
Correct?

[Rizvi]: Yes.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And we’re asking that if we can’t agree on all
forms that we [would] be allowed to reappear
before Judge . . . to address the form of those
documents. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And then the parties will direct [Beede] to
continue to run the day-to-day operations of the
company and to pay expenses for the company
but only company expenses as they become
due. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And no other distributions or payments to be
made after today. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Correct.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And then [Khaja] will turn over the checks and
payment instruments in his possession within
three business days. Correct?

[Rizvi]: Yes.

....

[Rizvi’s counsel]: So we [have] had significant discussion—you
understand that in taking on DRK Associates,

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we talked about the risks, and you’re safe
assuming those risks and taking on that asset.
Correct?

[Rizvi]: Yes.

[Rizvi’s counsel]: And are you asking the [trial c]ourt to approve
your agreement and grant your divorce?

[Rizvi]: Yes, sir.

Khaja’s counsel agreed and the following exchange occurred:

[Khaja’s counsel]: [Khaja], did you hear—or did you see the terms
that we agreed to that we looked at in [Joint
Exhibit 1]?

[Khaja]: Yes, I did.

....

[Khaja’s counsel]: And as it relates to the property division that was
in [Joint Exhibit 1] we looked at earlier that’s now
been marked, do you think that’s a just and right
division of the community estate?

[Khaja]: Yes, I do.

[Khaja’s counsel]: And are you asking the [trial c]ourt to finalize a
divorce consistent with those terms and to
pronounce the divorce effective today?

[Khaja]: Yes, I do.

....

THE COURT: Okay. So I’m going to [send the] parties to
mediation re[garding] security—

....

[Rizvi’s counsel]: Securities, indemnities, protections, and
documents in [Rizvi] assuming DRK
[Associates] . . . .

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The parties also admitted “Joint Exhibit 1,” which was an email sent by Rizvi’s counsel to

Kimberly Edgington, a paralegal at the firm representing Rizvi. The email stated in part:

“The parties shall attend mediation to address the details regarding securities,

indemnities, protections and documents in [Rizvi] assuming DRK [Associates].” The email

further stated:

The parties agree that if they cannot agree on the terms of the note they
shall re-appear before Judge . . . to address that dispute. Parties to direct
[Beede] to continue to run the day-to-day operations of the company and to
pay expenses for the company for only company expenses as they become
due. No other distributions/payments to be made. [Khaja] to turn over all
checks/payment instruments within three business days.

The email was not signed by either Khaja or Rizvi, nor was it signed by their respective

attorneys.

On November 3, 2023, Khaja filed a “Motion to Sign,” requesting the trial court to

sign the proposed final decree of divorce “attached to [his] petition.” On November 8,

2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on said motion. On the same day but before the

hearing, Khaja filed his “Amended Motion to Sign and Motion to Reopen the Evidence.”

During the hearing, Khaja argued the evidence should be reopened to address his

concerns of whether Rizvi would have to refinance DRK Associates and his motion was

denied. The trial court and the parties also specifically discussed in open court what terms

should be included in the final decree of divorce at the hearing. Rizvi objected to specific

language in Khaja’s proposed decree that restricted the distributions related to DRK

Associates on the basis that such language was inconsistent with the parties’ Rule 11

agreement. The trial court agreed with Rizvi and entered a final decree of divorce without

the language. There was no further clarification by either party regarding the distributions.

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The final decree of divorce stated, in pertinent part, the following:

As of the Effective Date[:] (i) [Khaja] hereby conveys, assigns, and/or
transfers to Rizvi all of [Khaja]’s right, title, and interest in and to his
membership interests and/or membership units in [DRK Associates], which
is forty percent (40%) of the ownership interest in [DRK Associates], or 80
total units, free and clear of all encumbrances (other than any lien or
encumbrance that may exist[] against these membership interests and/or
membership units as a result of financing through the Bank of Colorado,
loan numbers x8503, x8504[,] and x0805 and restrictions on subsequent
transfers under applicable securities laws or other legal requirements);
(ii) [Khaja] hereby agrees to fully withdraw as a Member of [DRK
Associates] and resign as Manager of [DRK Associates;] (iii) Rizvi hereby
accepts the transfer, assignment, and/or conveyance of all of [Khaja]’s right,
title, and interest in, as well as any debt and other obligations, related to his
membership interests and/or membership units in [DRK Associates] (the
membership interests and/or membership units in [DRK Associates] that
[Khaja] is hereby transferring, assigning, and/or conveying to Rizvi is
hereinafter referred to as “the Assigned Interest”); and (iv) pursuant to
Section 3.2 of the Second Amended Operating Agreement, Rizvi is hereby
appointed as, and she accepts the appointment of, Manager of [DRK
Associates].

The agreed final decree of divorce was signed on November 15, 2023, and did not include

any information regarding distributions from DRK Associates. This appeal ensued.

II. DIVORCE DECREE

Khaja first argues that the trial court erred by signing a decree of divorce that

contained terms not agreed to by the parties. He specifically contends that the trial court

erroneously signed the final decree of divorce regarding DRK Associates “[b]ecause the

[trial c]ourt signed [Rizvi]’s version of the decree that included a corporate assignment

with no restriction on distributions.”

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s division of property under an abuse of discretion standard.

Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018). A trial court has wide discretion

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in making a just and right division, and we presume the trial court properly exercised its

discretion. Banker v. Banker, 517 S.W.3d 863, 869–70 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2017, pet. denied) (citing Handley v. Handley, 122 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.)). Generally, a trial court abuses its

discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without any reference to guiding

rules and principles. In re K.L.C., 672 S.W.3d 734, 743 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2023, no pet.). However, the “determination of whether the property division

decreed in a divorce constitutes an abuse of discretion presents a legal rather than a

factual question for appellate review,” for which “the trial court is entitled to no deference.”

Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d at 543 (quoting Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. 1980)).

That is because the “trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying

the law to the facts.” Id. (quoting In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex.

2017)).

Pursuant to the Texas Family Code, “[i]n a decree of divorce . . . , the court shall

order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right,

having due regard for the rights of each party.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. “[T]he

phrase ‘estate of the parties’ encompasses the community property of a marriage.”

Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). “Although a trial court

does not have to divide the marital estate equally, it must do so equitably.” Kaftousian v.

Rezaeipanah, 511 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.); see also

Resendiz v. Martinez, No. 13-22-00060-CV, 2023 WL 4782675, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Jul. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699

(Tex. 1981) (listing non-exclusive factors a trial court considers in an unequal division of

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the marital estate). “There is generally no abuse of discretion on grounds of insufficiency

if some probative evidence supports the trial court’s findings.” Banker, 517 S.W.3d at 869;

see also B.K. v. T.K., No. 02-19-00472-CV, 2021 WL 2149621, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Evidence is legally insufficient to support a

decree’s property division when no evidence of the divided property’s value is adduced.”).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states that “[u]nless otherwise provided in these

rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be

enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or

unless it be made in open court and entered of record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. “To be ‘entered

of record’ includes the dictation of the agreement into the trial court record.” Kanan v.

Plantation Homeowner’s Ass’n, 407 S.W.3d 320, 328 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2013, no pet.). “Specifically, the requirements for a Rule 11 agreement are

satisfied ‘when the terms of the agreement [are] dictated before a certified shorthand

reporter, and the record reflect[s] who [is] present, the terms of the settlement, and the

parties’ acknowledgement of the settlement.’” Id. (quoting Cantu v. Moore, 90 S.W.3d

821, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied)).

To be effective, a written Rule 11 agreement must be “complete within itself in

every material detail . . . and . . . contain[] all of the essential elements of the agreement.”

Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Tex. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 540 S.W.3d

553, 561 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460

(Tex. 1995). “The purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure that agreements of counsel affecting

the interests of their clients are not left to the fallibility of human recollection and that the

agreements themselves do not become the sources of controversy.” Kanan, 407 S.W.3d

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at 327. The trial court has a ministerial duty to enforce a valid Rule 11 agreement.

Shamrock, 540 S.W.3d. at 560; In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d 118, 129 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); Tex. Tax Sols., LLC v. City of El Paso, 593

S.W.3d 903, 912 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).

We construe Rule 11 agreements under the same rules that we apply to construe

contracts. Shamrock, 540 S.W.3d at 560; Transam. Corp v. Braes Woods Condo Ass’n,

580 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Our primary

objective in construing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as

expressed in the contract. U.S. Polyco, Inc. v. Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp., 681 S.W.3d

383, 387 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam) (quoting URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755,

763 (Tex. 2018)). We determine the scope of a Rule 11 agreement by examining the

words used, the surrounding circumstances, the allegations in the pleadings, and the

attitude of the parties with respect to the issues. In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d

at 129; In re Hulcher Servs., Inc., 568 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,

orig. proceeding); Lesikar v. EOG Res., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 457, 458–59 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2007, no pet.).

“The issue of whether a Rule 11 settlement agreement fails for lack of an essential

term is generally a question of law to be determined by the court.” Kanan, 407 S.W.3d at

330. “As long as the parties agree as to the essential or material terms of a contract, the

agreement may leave other non-essential provisions open for future adjustment and

agreement.” Id.

“An agreed judgment based upon a settlement agreement must be in strict or literal

compliance with the terms of that agreement, and the judgment may not supply terms,

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provisions, or conditions not previously agreed upon by the parties.” Hudson v. Aceves,

516 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.). Further,

“[w]hen a consent judgment is rendered without consent or is not in strict compliance with

the terms of the agreement, the judgment must be set aside.” Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209

S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006).

B. Analysis

We begin by examining whether the parties’ agreement announced in open court

was an enforceable Rule 11 agreement. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. In this regard, the

dispositive issue is whether the record contained the essential elements of the parties’

Rule 11 agreement. Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460. We determine whether a term is essential

or material considering the circumstances surrounding the agreement. Amedisys v.

Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Tex. 2014); Jennings v.

Jennings, 625 S.W.3d 854, 862 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, pet. denied). Essential

terms are those that the parties would reasonably regard as vitally important elements of

their bargain. Boozer v. Fischer, 674 S.W.3d 314, 324 (Tex. 2023); Jennings, 625 S.W.3d

at 862; Kanan, 407 S.W.3d at 330. Whether a term is essential is a question of law and

subject to de novo review. Jennings, 625 S.W.3d at 862; Sharifi v. Steen Auto., LLC, 370

S.W.3d 126, 142 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

Because neither the parties’ nor their attorneys signed the email admitted into

evidence as “Joint Exhibit 1,” the only evidence in the record before us regarding the Rule

11 agreement consists of the statements made in open court by Khaja’s and Rizvi’s

counsel. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (explaining that to be enforceable, a Rule 11 agreement

must either be “in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or . . . be

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made in open court and entered of record”). Here, the terms of the parties’ Rule 11

agreement were dictated on the record in open court before a certified shorthand reporter,

both parties were present, and the terms of the agreement and the parties’

acknowledgement of the agreement were put on the record. See Kanan, 407 S.W.3d at

328. Furthermore, the parties’ representations on the record in open court included

references to all essential terms of their agreement, including securities, indemnities,

protections, and documents and whether the trial court or the mediator would make that

determination. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460. We thus conclude that the requirements

for a Rule 11 agreement were satisfied and the agreement was enforceable. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 11; see Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460.

Because Khaja and Rizvi entered a valid Rule 11 agreement, the parties’ final

decree of divorce must be in strict or literal compliance with the terms of their agreement.

See Hudson, 516 S.W.3d at 538. Here, the final decree of divorce signed by the trial court

omitted a term that was previously agreed upon by the parties. See id. On July 19, 2023,

the parties agreed in open court regarding distributions from DRK Associates. When

asked by Rizvi’s counsel, “And no other distributions or payments to be made after today.

Correct?” Rizvi responded, “Correct.” Khaja also agreed in open court to the terms of the

agreement. The final decree of divorce did not contain this agreed upon term. Thus, the

decree was not in strict compliance with the parties’ settlement agreement. See id.

Rizvi responds that “[t]he circumstances surrounding the [s]ettlement

[a]greement . . . clearly indicate[] that [the] purported restriction on distributions was only

intended to continue until the finalization of the final order and relevant documents.” In

support of her argument, Rizvi contends that “[i]n construing a written contract, a court is

12
charged with a duty to ascertain and give effect to the intentions the parties have

objectively manifested in the written instrument,” and she directs us to the paragraph

regarding the distributions from DRK Associates located in “Joint Exhibit 1.” However,

because this exhibit was not signed by either party nor their respective attorneys, it does

not constitute a valid Rule 11 agreement. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. We confine our review

of Khaja’s issue to the only valid Rule 11 agreement involved in this case—the agreement

that was pronounced in open court. See id. The record demonstrates that the parties’

valid Rule 11 agreement in open court did not include language limiting the disputed

term’s duration. Accordingly, we reject Rizvi’s argument that the disputed term was not

meant to be part of the final decree of divorce.

We conclude that the trial court erred in signing the final decree of divorce that did

not contain the omitted agreed upon term. See Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d at 98. Khaja’s first

issue is sustained.

III. REOPENING OF THE EVIDENCE

By his second issue, Khaja argues that the trial court erred by failing to reopen the

evidence to allow additional testimony from the parties and a representative from the

Bank of Colorado regarding the securities, indemnities, protections, and documents in

Rizvi assuming DRK Associates.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 270 allows a trial court to permit additional evidence

to be offered at any time when it clearly appears to be necessary to the due administration

of justice. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 270. Rule 270 allows, but does not require, the court to

permit additional evidence. See id.; see also Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 223

13
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.). In determining whether to grant a

motion to reopen, the trial court considers whether: “(1) the moving party showed due

diligence in obtaining the evidence; (2) the proffered evidence is decisive; (3) reception

of such evidence will cause undue delay; and (4) granting the motion will cause an

injustice.” See Rollins v. Tex. College, 515 S.W.3d 364, 371 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, pet.

denied). The decision to reopen the evidence “is within the trial court’s discretion and will

be disturbed on appeal only when clear abuse has been shown.” Lopez v. Lopez, 55

S.W.3d 194, 201 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (quoting Guerrero

v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., 598 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref’d

n.r.e.) (citations omitted)). However, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing

to reopen a case after evidence is closed if the party seeking to reopen has not shown

diligence in attempting to produce the evidence in a timely fashion. See id. “To show

diligence, a party must establish either that the evidence was previously unavailable or

that the party had no opportunity to present the proof to the court before judgment.”

Rollins, 515 S.W.3d at 371. “A trial court should exercise its discretion liberally in the

interest of justice to permit both parties to fully develop the case.” Karam v. Brown, 407

S.W.3d 464, 472 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).

B. Analysis

During the November 8, 2023 hearing, Khaja informed the trial court that “[he] has

several million dollars of personal guarantees associated with DRK [Associates]” and that

“it became apparent there wasn’t an agreement on this issue.” Khaja urged the trial court

to allow him to present additional testimony from himself regarding “when he called the

Bank of Colorado person” and testimony from a Bank of Colorado representative

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regarding his “financial state” and “debt-to-income ratio.” Specifically, Khaja wished to

elicit additional testimony regarding whether Rizvi would be required to refinance DRK

Associates. Khaja’s counsel informed the trial court that the refinancing of DRK

Associates is directly “related to the securities that was reserved from our announced

agreement.” The trial court specifically informed Khaja’s counsel that “[r]efinance is not

securities, indemnities, et cetera.” The trial court further stated that, “If you had intended

for her to refinance [DRK Associates], you should have said so. I don’t believe that

refinance is included, so I’m going to deny the Motion to Reopen the Evidence.”

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Khaja did not show

that he used diligence in attempting to produce the requested evidence in a timely fashion.

See Lopez, 55 S.W.3d at 201. The record shows that the petition for divorce had been on

file since 2021, and the trial concluded in July 2023. In addition, Khaja provides no specific

reasons in his “Motion to Reopen the Evidence” as to why the evidence he sought to

present was previously unavailable and does not argue that he did not have an

opportunity to present the evidence to the trial court before judgment. See Rollins, 515

S.W.3d at 371. In fact, the record shows that Khaja waited until the day of the hearing,

over four months after the trial court orally pronounced the divorce and divided the marital

estate, to urge the trial court to reopen the evidence. Khaja merely asserted in his motion

that “[he] was diligent in obtaining evidence” without any further elaboration or evidence

of same.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Khaja’s motion to present additional evidence based on his failure to diligently produce

such evidence. Khaja’s second issue is overruled.

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IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a judgment that conforms to the

parties’ Rule 11 agreement. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

CLARISSA SILVA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of December, 2025.

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