In the Interest of M.J., a Child v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00393-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., A CHILD

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Cron, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

The trial court terminated Mother’s 1 parental rights to M.J., designated the Texas

Department of Family and Protective Services as the child’s permanent managing

conservator, and continued the child’s placement with her foster parents. 2 Mother

1 We will use descriptive nouns and initials to identify the people involved in this case. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 9.8.

2 Father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he has not appealed the termination order.
preferred a different placement for M.J., an option the trial court considered, but ultimately

rejected. By a single issue on appeal, Mother complains that the trial court erred by

permitting the foster parents to intervene because they lacked standing and because their

“last-minute” intervention was prejudicial. The Department responds that, because she

failed to challenge the termination of her parental rights, Mother has no justiciable interest

in the trial court’s decision to allow the intervention. 3 Because we agree with the

Department, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

M.J. was born in October 2023. A few days later, the Department filed its “Original

Petition for Protection of a Child, for Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting

the Parent-Child-Relationship.” The termination proceeding was originally set for trial on

October 28, 2024, but the trial court extended the dismissal date and rescheduled the trial

for May 1, 2025, after T.J., Father’s adult child and M.J.’s half-sister, came forward as a

potential placement on the eve of the original trial setting. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.401(a), (b). The purpose of the extension was to provide the Department and M.J.’s

attorney ad litem an opportunity to evaluate the viability of this familial placement in the

event M.J. was not returned to her parents.

On April 28, 2025, the foster parents filed a petition seeking leave to intervene.

They alleged that they had standing under §§ 102.003(a)(12) and 102.004(b) of the Texas

3 The Department argues in the alternative that, regardless of whether the foster parents had
standing, any potential error was harmless because it had no bearing on the trial court’s jurisdiction to
terminate Mother’s parental rights or to appoint the Department as the child’s permanent managing
conservator. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a) (regarding reversible error in civil cases). The foster parents have
also filed a brief arguing in part that they had statutory standing to intervene and that the trial court did not
otherwise abuse its discretion in granting them leave to intervene. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 102.003(a)(12),
102.004(b), (b–1).
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Family Code because M.J. had been in their care since November 2, 2023, and “both

parents are highly likely to have their parental rights terminated.” They asked for the

opportunity to participate in the proceedings and express their view that it was in M.J.’s

best interest to remain with them, either through “unrelated adoption or unrelated

conservatorship.”

When the case was called for trial, M.J.’s attorney ad litem informed the trial court

that T.J. had yet to produce certain medical records that were necessary for him to

evaluate T.J. as a potential placement. Because T.J. expressed a willingness to produce

the records, the ad litem asked the trial court to begin the trial and then recess it until a

later date. Mother and Father, who both favored T.J. as the placement if M.J. was not

returned to them, agreed this was the best way forward. The trial court concurred.

The trial court then took up the foster parents’ request to intervene. No evidence

was presented during the hearing. The foster parents argued that they had standing to

intervene under the Texas Family Code and that it was in M.J.’s best interest for them “to

be a part of this case, if only to make sure the Court has all available information when

making those really important decisions.” They further explained that they became

concerned by the prospect that M.J. could be taken from them and placed with T.J.

Mother and Father opposed the intervention. Mother said that she was “raising a

defense of laches” because the foster parents “waited too long to enter” the case. She

suggested “that all foster parents know that whenever children come into their possession

that they may be returned one day,” and therefore, their eleventh-hour filing constituted

an unreasonable delay. She further argued that, although the foster parents were not

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strangers to the proceedings, “[i]f they had been a party earlier, we could have just done

normal discovery like anywhere else. So, we’ve been deprived of that option.” Finally,

Mother felt it was prejudicial to permit the foster parents to intervene because it would

provide “them an independent right for appeal and in other matters that even go beyond

this trial.”

The foster parents replied that “this is their first placement,” they did not have the

benefit of counsel to advise them of their rights, and “[t]hey got involved as soon as they

knew to.” They stressed that they were not attempting to delay the proceedings and that

“[i]f there’s any information that any party needs from [them], they will happily give it over

today to make sure that everybody has what they need.”

The attorney ad litem stated that he was not opposed to the intervention because

he failed to see the harm alleged by Mother. He observed that “the respondent parents

have known that the foster parents are potential witnesses in this case and could have

conducted whatever discovery they wanted while the case has been pending.” Likewise,

the Department was not opposed to the intervention. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court announced that it was granting the request because “it’s in the [child’s] best

interest that the intervention be allowed.” The trial court’s decision was not reduced to

writing, and no written findings of fact or conclusions of law were made with respect to

the intervention.

A bench trial began that day but, as previously agreed, the trial court called a

recess shortly after the Department’s caseworker began testifying. The trial resumed and

concluded on June 11, 2025. Despite the foster parents’ offer to produce “any information

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that any party needs from [them],” there is no indication from the record that Mother

sought discovery from the foster parents while the trial was recessed.

The foster parents participated in the trial through their counsel, but they did not

testify. Mother and Father testified that should their rights be terminated, they preferred

for M.J. to be placed with T.J. instead of the foster parents. Mother clarified that she

viewed any placement with T.J. as “temporary” and that she expected T.J. to place M.J.

in her care once she was “back on [her] feet.”

T.J., who had never met M.J., testified that it was important for the child to be

placed with family, but she was amenable to a transition period before becoming M.J.’s

sole caregiver. The Department had concerns about T.J.’s criminal record and mental

health history. According to the Department’s caseworker, T.J.’s prior felony conviction

for retaliation would prevent her from obtaining “licensing or assistance for [M.J.]” even

though the incident occurred approximately fifteen years earlier. Also, at the time of trial,

T.J. was being treated for “bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, and insomnia disorder,”

and both the Department and M.J.’s attorney ad litem had concerns that T.J. was not

taking her medications as prescribed. On the other hand, the Department felt that the

foster parents had provided M.J. with a loving and stable home environment for the

entirety of her life and would continue to do so in the future.

The Department’s recommendation to the trial court was to terminate Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights, to name the Department permanent managing conservator, to

continue M.J.’s placement with the foster parents, and for the foster parents to adopt M.J.

at a later date. The foster parents made the same recommendation. The attorney ad litem

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agreed that it was in M.J.’s best interest to continue her placement with the foster parents,

but he was open to the idea that, with a longer track record of complying with her

medication, T.J. could become an appropriate placement.

Ultimately, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on (D), (E), and (N)

grounds, appointed the Department as permanent managing conservator, continued the

placement with the foster parents, and placed the case “on the adoption track.” See id.

§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (b)(2), 161.207(a). This appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

“Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus.

v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). “Subject matter jurisdiction is

essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.” Id. “The mootness doctrine applies

to cases in which a justiciable controversy exists between the parties at the time the case

arose, but the live controversy ceases because of subsequent events.” Matthews v.

Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016). For example, an appeal

becomes moot when the appellant no longer has “a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.” Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex.

2022). “Put simply, a case is moot when the court’s action on the merits cannot affect the

parties’ rights or interests.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex.

2012). “Any ruling on the merits of a moot issue constitutes an advisory opinion, which

we lack jurisdiction to issue.” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021).

“[A]n order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent and the child

of all legal rights and duties with respect to each other,” except for the child’s right to

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inherit. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206(b). “By failing to appeal the trial court’s termination

findings, [Mother] is bound by them” and thus lacks “standing to complain of the foster

parents’ intervention in the termination suit.” In re R.A., Jr., No. 07-08-00884-CV, 2009

WL 77853, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 13, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re

M.M.S., No. 11-15-00009-CV, 2015 WL 4732904, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30,

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We are of the opinion that the mother lacks standing to assert

the complaints made in both of her issues because she has not contested the termination

of her parental rights and because she has no justiciable interest in the intervenors’

access to the child. By failing to challenge the termination of her parental rights, the

mother has become a former parent with no legal rights with respect to [the child].”); In re

O.J.P., No. 01-21-00163-CV, 2021 WL 4269175, at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Having no legal rights with respect to O.J.P., we

hold that mother lacks standing to challenge the portion of the trial court’s order appointing

[the Department] as sole managing conservator of O.J.P.”); In re Y.V., No. 02-12-00514-

CV, 2013 WL 2631431, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“Having no legal rights with respect to Y.V., Father lacks standing to attack the portion

of the termination order appointing the Department as permanent managing conservator

of Y.V.”). In other words, although a justiciable controversy existed between the

Department and Mother when the suit was filed, the sole issue Mother raised on appeal

became moot because she no longer has “a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

See N.J., 644 S.W.3d at 192.

Although the Department complains about Mother’s lack of standing, saying the

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appeal has become “moot,” it asks us to “affirm” the trial court’s termination order. We are

aware that our sister courts have “affirmed” termination orders under similar

circumstances. See In re R.A., Jr., 2009 WL 77853, at *2; In re M.M.S., 2015 WL

4732904, at *2. The proper remedy, however, is to simply dismiss the appeal. See Tex.

Quarter Horse Ass’n v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Tex., 496 S.W.3d 175, 185 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2016, no pet.) (“Because appellants lacked standing to bring their appeal, the

proper remedy is for us to dismiss this appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction

without disturbing the district court’s judgment.”); County of El Paso v. Ortega, 847

S.W.2d 436, 442 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ) (dismissing appeal because

appellant lacked standing to complain about the trial court’s judgment).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, without considering the merits, we dismiss Mother’s appeal for want

of jurisdiction.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
22nd day of January, 2026.

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