In the Estate of Rolando Guerra v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00673-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO GUERRA, DECEASED

ON APPEAL FROM THE PROBATE COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijernia and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Appellant, Edward Roland Guerra, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from

an “Order of Sale of Real Property” rendered in a probate matter concerning the estate

of his late father, Rolando Guerra. Noel Guerra, Dependent Administrator of the estate

and appellee herein, has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Edward responds in his brief that the order is appealable because it “conclusively

adjudicated” his challenge to Noel’s application to sell the subject property. Because we

agree that the order of sale is not an appealable order, we grant the motion and dismiss
the appeal.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, an appeal may be taken only from final judgments. Bonsmara Nat. Beef

Co. v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Tex. 2020). Probate

proceedings are an exception to the one-final-judgment rule because they may involve

multiple orders on discrete issues, each of which may be final for purposes of appeal.

See In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021). To determine if an

order in a probate case is final for purposes of appeal, we first look to any controlling

statute “declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable.”

Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995). In the absence of such a

statute, an order is interlocutory and not subject to immediate appeal unless it disposes

of all parties or issues in a particular phase of the proceedings. De Ayala v. Mackie, 193

S.W.3d 575, 578–79 (Tex. 2006). Whether we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of an

appeal is a question of law. In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d at 924.

II. ANALYSIS

Chapter 356 of the Estates Code concerns the sale of estate property, and this

statute sets out a “comprehensive statutory scheme governing estate administration

proceedings to sell estate property and orders authorizing such sales.” In re Est. of

Bendtsen, 229 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). For instance, a

dependent administrator must first seek general authority from a probate court to sell real

property. TEX. EST. CODE § 356.256. Once the probate court grants an application to sell

real property—as occurred here—and the administrator finds a willing buyer, the

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administrator must then file a report with the court detailing the terms of the proposed

sale. Id. § 356.551. The sale is subject to final approval by the court, which considers,

among other things, whether the proposed sale “is for a fair price.” Id. § 356.556(a). “The

court’s action in approving or disapproving a report under Section 356.551 has the effect

of a final judgment. Any person interested in the estate or in the sale is entitled to have

an order entered under this section reviewed as in other final judgments in probate

proceedings.” Id. § 356.556(c).

Here, Edward is attempting to appeal an order that generally authorizes the sale

of the subject property under section 356.256, but the appellate record does not indicate

that Noel has filed a report seeking the probate court’s final approval of a pending sale,

or that the court had approved any such sale. Several appellate courts, including our own,

have dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction under these same circumstances. See In

re Guardianship of Landgrebe, No. 13-20-00476-CV, 2020 WL 7294613, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburgh Dec. 10, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dismissing

appeal for lack of jurisdiction because order granting application to sell real property was

interlocutory based on statutory scheme providing for appeal only from order approving

or disapproving report of sale); In re Est. of Hill, 09-13-00022-CV, 2013 WL 6044404, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Rawlins v. Weaver,

317 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (same); Okumu v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., No. 02-09-00384-CV, 2010 WL 87735, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 7,

2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same) In re Est. of Bendtsen, 229 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (same).

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 1

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
26th day of March, 2026.

1 All other pending motions are denied as moot.

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