Hanna Springstead v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00300-CR
No. 02-24-00301-CR
No. 02-24-00302-CR
No. 02-24-00303-CR
No. 02-24-00304-CR
___________________________

HANNA SPRINGSTEAD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. CR23-0489, CR23-0490, CR23-0491, CR23-0492, CR23-0493

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Hanna Springstead challenges her sentences of fifty years’

incarceration for possession with intent to deliver between 4 and 400 grams of

psilocin and between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine.1 See Tex. Health &

Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.112(d), .113(d). In a single issue, Springstead asserts that her

sentences are grossly disproportionate to her offenses. We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the morning of January 6, 2023, police officers were dispatched to a one-

vehicle crash on Highway 199 in Azle. When officers arrived on the scene, they found

a gray Chevrolet Impala rolled over on its passenger side up against a barbed-wire

fence approximately thirty to forty feet off the highway. Springstead was standing

outside the vehicle, and she told the officers that her three children were still inside.

Officers used a glass punch to remove the back windshield, and the children were

removed from the vehicle uninjured.

To assist in removing the children, Corporal Christopher Javarone climbed

inside the vehicle through the driver’s side door. After helping to safely extract the

children and exiting the vehicle himself, Corporal Javarone was alerted that he had

1
As discussed below, Springstead was charged with—and pled guilty to—three
additional offenses, but on appeal she challenges only the sentences that she received
for her two possession-with-intent-to-deliver offenses.

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something caught on his duty belt. Upon closer inspection, he realized that it was a

baggie containing several “[c]ounterfeit fentanyl pills.”

Once the vehicle was flipped back onto its wheels, an officer searched it and

found an open bottle of Fireball Whisky. He also found a backpack between the front

passenger seat and the center console that contained marijuana, a jar of pills, a

notebook detailing drug transactions, $873 in cash, Springstead’s driver’s license, and

two bank cards bearing Springstead’s name.

Upon further examination of the backpack’s contents, officers determined that

it contained psilocin, MDMA, methamphetamine, marijuana, hydrocodone pills, and

codeine pills. Lab testing eventually confirmed that Springstead possessed 0.535 grams

of MDMA, 125.082 grams of methamphetamine, 34.337 grams of psilocin,

14.881 grams of hydrocodone, 1.134 grams of fentanyl, and 1.505 grams of codeine.

Because of the large quantity of drugs found in the vehicle and Springstead’s

failure of five different field sobriety tests, she was placed under arrest for possession

of controlled substances and driving while intoxicated. Investigator Christopher

Lockett with the Parker County Sheriff’s Office interviewed Springstead after her

arrest. Springstead told Investigator Lockett that she had been partying at her friend’s

house the night before the arrest and had taken her children with her. She said that

while partying, she had had four or five shots of Fireball and had used MDMA and

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marijuana. She also admitted to selling MDMA, psilocin, hydrocodone, THC pens,

counterfeit Percocet pills,2 and LSD.

Ultimately, Springstead was charged by indictment with five offenses:

(1) possession of less than 1 gram of MDMA (Count One), (2) possession with intent

to deliver between 4 and 400 grams of psilocin (Count Two), (3) possession with

intent to deliver between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine (Count Three),

(4) possession of 1 to 4 grams of fentanyl (Count Four), and (5) driving while

intoxicated with a child passenger (Count Five).3 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§§ 481.112(d), .113(d), .115(c), .116(b); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.045(a). She pled

guilty to all five counts without a plea agreement.4 Following a bench trial on

punishment, the trial court sentenced Springstead to two years in a state jail facility on

2
The record suggests that these counterfeit Percocet pills contained fentanyl.
3
The trial court established separate cause numbers for each of the five counts.
Although Springstead filed a separate notice of appeal in each case, her sole appellate
issue challenges only the punishments that she received for Counts Two and Three.
To the extent that she intended to complain about the punishments that she received
for the remaining offenses, she has forfeited any such complaints due to inadequate
briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011); Abernathy v. State, Nos. 02-24-00001-CR, 02-24-00002-CR,
02-24-00003-CR, 02-24-00004-CR, 2024 WL 3978049, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
4
Count Five contained a deadly-weapon enhancement, and Springstead pled
“true” to that enhancement as well. Accordingly, the punishment range for Count
Five was elevated to that of a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 12.35(c)(1), 49.045(b); Villanueva v. State, No. 12-11-00039-CR, 2012 WL 4951127,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).

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Count One, fifty years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(TDCJ) on Counts Two and Three, ten years’ incarceration in the TDCJ on Count

Four, and ten years’ incarceration in the TDCJ plus a $10,000 fine on Count Five.5

Springstead objected to these sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds and filed a

motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of law. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

In a single issue, Springstead argues that her sentences for Counts Two and

Three—despite being well within the statutory limits 6—are grossly disproportionate

to the offenses. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

“Generally, punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive,

cruel, or unusual punishment.” Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2005, no pet.) (first citing Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App.

1973); and then citing Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2001, no pet.)). Indeed, a trial court has “essentially ‘unfettered’” discretion to impose

any sentence within the prescribed statutory range, Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.

5
The trial court ordered that Springstead’s sentences would run concurrently.
6
Counts Two and Three are first-degree felonies. See Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. §§ 481.112(d), .113(d). Thus, the punishment range for these offenses is
five to ninety-nine years or life in prison and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 12.32.

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Crim. App. 1990)), and any sentence within the statutory limits is virtually

“unassailable” on appeal provided that it is based upon the sentencer’s informed

normative judgment. Id. at 324. But a narrow exception to this general rule exists: the

Eighth Amendment prohibits noncapital punishment within the statutory limits if the

sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–

60, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021–22 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–1001,

111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702–05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment); State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Although the

“precise contours [of the gross-disproportionality exception] are unclear,” one thing is

certain: it applies “only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at

998–1001, 111 S. Ct. at 2703–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment); see also Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23; Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323–24.

To determine whether a noncapital sentence qualifies for this uncommon and

“somewhat amorphous” exception, we engage in a three-step review beginning with a

threshold analysis comparing the gravity of the offense to the severity of the sentence.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Chavez,

213 S.W.3d at 323–24. Assessing the gravity of the offense requires us to consider

(1) the harm that the defendant caused or threatened to the victim and to society,

(2) the defendant’s culpability, and (3) the defendant’s prior adjudicated and

unadjudicated crimes. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. We weigh these factors against

the defendant’s sentence, looking to precedent for guidance as to the constitutional

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limits of proportional severity. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75, 102 S. Ct. 703,

705–06 (1982) (per curiam) (chastising lower courts for extending gross-

disproportionality exception beyond the limits of precedent); McGruder v. Puckett,

954 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding sentence was not grossly-disproportionate

in light of both the Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s precedent). In the rare

case in which this threshold analysis indicates gross disproportionality, we proceed to

steps two and three by comparing the defendant’s sentence with those received by

similar offenders in this jurisdiction and with those imposed for the same crime in

other jurisdictions. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

296–300, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3012–15 (1983) (applying steps two and three).

B. Threshold Analysis

Springstead’s gross-disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold

test. Indeed, considering the factors set forth above, see Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323, we

conclude that the sentences that Springstead received for Counts Two and Three are

well within constitutional bounds.

First, the offenses underlying Springstead’s challenged sentences caused or

threatened significant harm to society. In her briefing, Springstead attempts to

minimize her offenses’ degree of harm by focusing on their nonviolent nature and by

emphasizing the fact that no one—including her children—was actually harmed in the

car wreck that led to the discovery of the illegal drugs. But as this court has

recognized, “Texas law classifies the distribution of illegal drugs as a grave harm to

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society.” Bolar v. State, 625 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.)

(quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part

and concurring in judgment)). Indeed, “numerous courts have recognized that the

‘[p]ossession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent[s] one of the greatest

problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.’” Id.; see, e.g., Zavala v.

State, No. 13-09-188-CR, 2010 WL 1138445, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Mar. 25, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Thomas

v. State, 916 S.W.2d 578, 583–84 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Further,

“the greater the amount of illicit drugs possessed, the more likely use is widespread

and delivery to others is intended, and the greater the harm to society.” Bolar,

625 S.W.3d at 670 (quoting Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 212 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2005, no pet.)).

Here, based on the amount of drugs in Springstead’s possession and her

“sophisticated” ledger of drug transactions, Investigator Lockett concluded that she

was “a prolific dealer.” And the trial court noted during sentencing that he had

“personally seen more drugs in [Springstead’s] case than [he had] seen in the [twelve]

years that [he had] been on the bench.” Thus, the degree of harm caused or

threatened by Springstead’s possession-with-intent-to-deliver offenses was substantial.

See id.

Second, Springstead’s moral culpability—her blameworthiness for the

offenses—was high. See id. at 666. “In analyzing a defendant’s culpability, we consider

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factors such as the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, h[er] motive and intent

to commit the crime, h[er] role as the primary actor or as a party to the offense, and

h[er] acceptance of responsibility.” Id. Having pled guilty, Springstead does not

dispute that her moral culpability weighs against her disproportionality argument. See

Saravia v. State, No. 02-22-00138-CR, 2023 WL 2805902, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Wade v. State,

No. 02-21-00206-CR, 2023 WL 1859797, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). And the record clearly shows that

she possessed psilocin and methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it; that she

was an adult at the time of the offenses; and that she was the primary actor, not an

accomplice. See Bolar, 625 S.W.3d at 666. Further, although Springstead correctly

points out that her guilty pleas—at least when viewed in isolation—showed

acceptance of responsibility, the record also reflects that she repeatedly failed to

comply with her bond conditions while awaiting trial and that her bond was ultimately

revoked. These violations of her bond conditions undermine her claim that she

accepted responsibility for her actions. See U.S. v. Humphreys, 108 F. App’x 329,

330 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that appellant’s illegal drug use and other violations of her

bond conditions were “inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility”); U.S. v. Red

Horse, 30 F. App’x 680, 680–81 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that district court had

“appropriately considered” appellant’s bond violations when determining that her

sentence should not be reduced based on acceptance of responsibility).

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Finally, although Springstead does not have a prior criminal history, the

offenses upon which her challenged prison sentences are based were not the only

offenses associated with this incident. As noted, Springstead was also charged with—

and pled guilty to—possessing two additional controlled substances and driving while

intoxicated with a child passenger. Thus, this factor lessens her offenses’ gravity only

slightly, if at all. See Abernathy, 2024 WL 3978049, at *4.

Taking all of these factors together and affording proper deference to the

legislature and the trial court to create and assess Springstead’s punishment, we cannot

say that her fifty-year sentences for Counts Two and Three, which are well within the

statutory range for the charged offenses, give rise to an inference of

disproportionality. 7 Accordingly, we overrule Springstead’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Springstead’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

7
Because Springstead’s disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold
test, we need not compare her sentences to others for the same offenses in Texas and
elsewhere. See Bolar, 625 S.W.3d at 666; see also Nunnally v. State, No. 03-19-00807-CR,
2021 WL 4995502, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).

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/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 21, 2025

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