Colby Nicholas Arnold v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00279-CR
___________________________

COLBY NICHOLAS ARNOLD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 355th District Court
Hood County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR16435

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Colby Nicholas Arnold was charged by indictment with one count of

fraudulent use or possession of fifty or more items of identifying information; one

count of possession of a controlled substance—morphine—in an amount of one

gram or more but less than four grams; and one count of possession of a controlled

substance—methamphetamine—in an amount of less than one gram. A jury

convicted him on all three counts and assessed his punishment at eighty years’

imprisonment on the first count, twenty-five years’ imprisonment on the second

count, and two years’ imprisonment on the third count. The trial court sentenced him

accordingly. Arnold now appeals the trial court’s judgment, arguing in three issues

that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that was seized pursuant to an

unlawful search. Because the complained-of search and seizure were lawful, we will

affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Prior to trial, Arnold filed a motion to suppress,1 and the trial court held a

hearing on the motion. Because all the testimony pertinent to our resolution of

1
In his motion, Arnold did not allege any specific facts as grounds for
suppressing the evidence against him, but he did allege that “[t]he actions of the
Granbury Police Department violated [his] constitutional and statutory rights” and
that “[a]ny tangible evidence seized in connection with this case . . . was seized
without warrant, probable cause[,] or other lawful authority . . . pursuant to the

2
Arnold’s appellate issues was received by the trial court at that hearing, we limit our

summation of the background facts of Arnold’s case to the evidence at the hearing.

A. Testimony at the Suppression Hearing

Officer Patrick Wilson with the Granbury Police Department testified that on

March 3, 2024, he was dispatched to a residential address in Granbury2 to investigate

the theft of a cell phone. According to Officer Wilson, the residents at that address

“kept trying to shift blame to the neighbor, [Arnold,] saying that it was probably him.”

Detective Richard Branum went next door to speak with Arnold. Officer Wilson

testified that, as he walked up, Detective Branum “was visiting with them”3 and that

Arnold’s mother “granted consent to . . . enter [a] shed.” On cross-examination, he

testified that he believed that Arnold’s mother owned the outbuilding4 “based [on the

fact] that she granted consent.”

Detective Branum testified that the owner of the residence to which police had

been dispatched “kept telling [the police] that the phone [wa]s probably next door,

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
[and] Article I, Sections 9, 10[,] and 19 of the Constitution of the State of Texas.”

Although the record contains the specific address, we omit such sensitive data
2

from our opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).

From the context of the record, it appears that by “them,” Officer Wilson
3

meant Arnold and his mother.
4
Throughout the record, both parties referred to the structure that was
eventually—and, according to Arnold, unlawfully—searched as a “shed” and an
“outbuilding” interchangeably.

3
that the person that lived over there was a tech guy and that was what he was into,

you know, he was into computers . . . and phones, so [the police] should probably

check over there.” Based on that, Detective Branum testified, “once we kind of

slowed down and w[ere] wrapping up everything at [the residence], I went next

door . . and knocked on the door.” He witnessed a man identified as Arnold exit a

shed on the property. Detective Branum informed Arnold that he was investigating

the theft of a cell phone. According to Detective Branum, Arnold “said he

understood, and he made the comment that, ‘I have a lot of phones. I’ll show a

couple of them to you, but let me go get my mom. This is her property.’” Detective

Branum claimed that “the fact that [Arnold] said, [‘]I have a bunch but I’ll show you a

few,[’] kind of just made it a little suspicious.”

Arnold then went and brought his mother out from the residence. While

Detective Branum was informing Arnold’s mother why the police were there, Arnold

“was back and forth out of house, out of the shed.” He testified that Arnold’s mother

“pretty much gave [him] consent to search whatever [the police] wanted to on the

residence. She began opening up shed doors that were locked,” but he “told her at

that time that wouldn’t be necessary[; he] was really interested in the area where her

son had been in and out of.” Detective Branum testified that Arnold’s mother told

him that that shed was Arnold’s “office[-]type deal” and “was kind of evasive about

exactly what the shed was being used for.” Detective Branum testified that he then

asked Arnold, “Hey, can we go in there and take a look in that shed?” and Arnold’s

4
response was “Well, that’s my mother’s property, so you’ll have to talk to her,” at

which time Detective Branum asked Arnold’s mother for her consent again, and she

said, “Yeah, that’s fine.” Arnold then led Detective Branum into the shed.

Detective Branum testified that, as he entered the shed, he initially saw “a

checkered-looking fanny pack that was open with some tools and other things in it,

and sticking out of the top of it was a used meth pipe or a glass pipe used to smoke

methamphetamine.” Detective Branum stated that he then went around a corner and

saw a small office area with computers running and a “roll-up desk.” On the desk, he

saw a woman’s wallet with a badge holder clipped on it. He stated he also saw an ID

on top of the badge holder that did not belong to anyone at the scene. Detective

Branum stated he then “picked it up and flipped it over” and saw another ID that

belonged to an elderly male who was not at the scene either. He testified that he also

saw a whiteboard that had notes consistent with identity theft or fraud written on it.

After observing the pipe, IDs, and the notes on the whiteboard in plain view,

Detective Branum asked Arnold “to sign a consent to search and, like, actually allow

[the police] to search the property.” Arnold declined and was placed under arrest for

possession of the meth pipe and the drugs that were in it. The police then applied for

a search warrant for Arnold’s residence.5 During the search of Arnold’s property,

5
At some point, Detective Branum applied for a second search warrant. He
testified that the first search warrant “was for drugs and identifying information.”

5
officers found “an enormous amount of identifying information from other

individuals.”

On cross-examination, when asked, “So whenever you sought consent to enter

this building from Ms. Arnold and Mr. Arnold, it was for this red iPhone. Correct?”

Detective Branum responded in the affirmative. He described the object that he had

picked up and examined in the shed as “a wallet, but there was, like, . . . a clear badge

holder connected to it, and it had an ID that was visible that didn’t belong [to

anybody who] was at the residence.” Detective Branum admitted that there was

nothing that was immediately apparent to be incriminating “specifically by itself”

about the ID that would warrant him to pick up the wallet, look through it, or seize it.

Detective Braden Bozer testified that he became involved in the investigation

regarding Arnold when Detective Branum needed help securing the first search

warrant. He also assisted in searching Arnold’s shed. Detective Bozer then stated

that based on the items he saw during the search, he obtained the second search

warrant “specific[ally] for the electronics” in Arnold’s shed and that, after he had

obtained the second search warrant, he seized the physical computers and electronic

devices.

On cross-examination, Detective Bozer acknowledged that the second search

warrant was an evidentiary search warrant secured under Article 18.02(a)(10) of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. A copy of that search warrant was admitted in

evidence without objection.

6
Arnold then testified. He recalled that on March 3, 2024, he did receive a visit

by law enforcement officers who were looking for an iPhone. Arnold said that he

then “grabbed all the iPhones” that he had. He testified that after he had helped the

officers, they told him that they wanted to enter the outbuilding from which he had

retrieved the iPhones. Arnold explained that he and his mother used the shed for

storage and that he used it as an office. He also stated that it was “getting renovated”

because they had had tenants living there in the past.

Arnold testified that he was asked for his consent to enter the shed “[l]ike four

times” and that he denied consent “[e]very time except for the last time.” As Arnold

explained it, after he had denied consent the first few times, the officers then asked

Arnold’s mother for consent. Arnold stated that his mother showed Detective

Branum the property line and “told them that they could search the property line”

and that “she showed them a little bit inside of one of the other sheds on the

property, and [Detective Branum] just poked his head in[ and] looked around just a

second.” However, Arnold claimed that his mother consistently denied consent to

search the shed that he used as an office. Arnold averred that there was “a feeling of

pressure to consent after [he] had already denied consent and the officers sought

consent from other parties.”6 Arnold testified that, at some point, he did grant

6
Although he used “officers” and “other parties” in the plural, Arnold testified
that Detective Branum was the only officer present when consent was requested to
search the shed. Arnold also testified that, at the time, he and his mother were the
only two who were living at that property.

7
Detective Branum consent “to look for a cell phone, an iPhone.” He further testified

that there had been tenants living in the outbuilding in the past, that he also had

people that regularly frequented the shed, and that it was possible that one of these

many people had left an ID or other items behind.

On cross-examination, Arnold admitted that his mother gave Detective

Branum consent to look around “[t]he property.” He acknowledged that there was a

meth pipe located in the shed. He also testified that there was no identifying

information on the whiteboard and that the pouch with the ID observed by Detective

Branum was inside a cubby hole in the desk.

B. The Trial Court’s Rulings

Arnold argued to the trial court that the consent that Detective Branum

received “was limited to [searching for] a red iPhone.” Arnold separately argued that

his personal writings were seized in violation of Article 18.02(a)(10) of the Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.02(a)(10) (“A search

warrant may be issued to search for and seize . . . property or items, except the

personal writings by the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting

evidence tending to show that a particular person committed an offense . . . .”). The

trial court denied the motion to suppress “[o]n the first issue [of] the initial consent

search or what [the parties were] calling a consent search” but reserved ruling on the

8
personal writings issue.7 Prior to trial, the trial court signed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Among its fact findings were the following:

8. [Arnold’s mother] owns the property [that was searched].

9. [Arnold’s mother] told Detective Branum he could search the
property and outbuildings for the missing cell phone.

10. Detective Branum asked [Arnold’s mother] for permission to
enter the shed Mr. Arnold had come in and out of.

11. [Arnold’s mother] gave Detective Branum permission to enter the
shed but stated that Mr. Arnold used the shed as an office.

12. Detective Branum asked Mr. Arnold for permission to enter the
shed.

13. Mr. Arnold gave Detective Branum permission to enter the shed.

14. Mr. Arnold led Detective Branum into the shed.

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Detective Branum received

consent from both Arnold’s mother and Arnold himself “to enter the shed in which

contraband was discovered” and that “[t]he evidence was discovered pursuant to a

consensual search.”

7
After the jury trial commenced but before opening statements, the trial court
held a hearing outside the presence of the jury solely on the issue “of whether the
taking of the writings were valid under that warrant.” After hearing the arguments of
counsel, the trial court denied Arnold’s motion to suppress his personal writings that
were seized, implicitly ruling that the items at issue were not personal writings.
Arnold then asked for and was granted “a running objection to any of the evidence
that is introduced that was pursuant to the search warrant, which came about because
of . . . the illegal entry into the shed, which precipitated both the search of the shed
and the house.” On appeal, Arnold abandoned his Article 18.02(a)(10) argument, and
we therefore will not analyze it.

9
III. DISCUSSION

In his first issue, Arnold argues that the trial court erred when it determined

that the warrantless search of the shed was consensual. In his second issue, he argues

that, if the search was consensual, then it was nonetheless improper because it went

beyond the scope of his consent. And in his third issue, he argues that the two search

warrants would not have been obtained if not for the illegal search and that therefore

the trial court erred in allowing the evidence obtained from those warrants to be

admitted.

A. Standard of Review

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

Because the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility

and the weight to be given their testimony, Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007), we defer almost totally to a trial court’s rulings on questions of

historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on evaluating

credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions

that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 281.

When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports

those findings. Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We then

review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are

10
supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly,

204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

B. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures

by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. A

defendant seeking to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds bears the

initial burden to produce some evidence that the government conducted a warrantless

search or seizure that he has standing to contest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,

104–05, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980); State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2019). Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to

prove either that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or, if

warrantless, was otherwise reasonable. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d at 623.

Whether a search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances is a

question that we review de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–99,

116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661–63 (1996); Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62–63 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004). In the process, we must balance the public interest and the individual’s

right to be free from arbitrary detentions and intrusions. Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63. A

warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception

to the warrant requirement.8 State v. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Tex. Crim. App.

8
Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution does not require that a search or
seizure be authorized by a warrant; therefore, a search or seizure that is otherwise

11
2018). “One recognized exception is when a voluntary consent to search has been

given.” Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

A person is free to limit the scope of the consent that he gives. Valtierra v.

State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A “consent search” is a limited

and conditional search only insofar as the consenting party has expressly stated or,

under the “reasonable man” standard in the light of all the existing circumstances, is

deemed in fact to have impliedly attached, certain limitations under which the officers

are authorized by him to search. Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 446 n.30 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007) (quoting State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 868 (Me. 1974)). “The character

of the search is determined by the scope of the authorization as understood by

reasonable men having knowledge of all the existing factual circumstances, and not by

any limitational rule of law applicable to all consent searches.” Id. Thus, “the

standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of

‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have

understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Meekins v. State,

340 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,

251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803–04 (1991)).

“When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify

a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require

reasonable does not violate that provision simply because it was not authorized by a
warrant. Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

12
that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of

duress or coercion, express or implied.” Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 817–18 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041,

2059 (1973)). The validity of a consensual search is a question of fact, and the State

bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that consent was obtained

voluntarily.9 Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 686–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Because issues of consent are necessarily fact-intensive, “a trial court’s finding of

voluntariness must be accepted on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” Meekins,

340 S.W.3d at 460.

C. Analysis

1. Arnold’s first issue: the consent search of the shed10

9
Although the federal constitution only requires the State to prove the
voluntariness of consent by a preponderance of the evidence, the Texas Constitution
requires the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was
freely given. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If the
record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that consent to search was
free and voluntary, then we will not disturb that finding. Id.
10
Before analyzing the trial court’s ruling on the consent search of Arnold’s
shed, we pause to note that it is not clear that Arnold has preserved his first issue for
our review. To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to
the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific
grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Most
complaints, “whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are forfeited by failure to
comply with Rule 33.1(a).” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004). Error is also forfeited when the complaint made on appeal does not
comport with the complaint made in the trial court. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333,
339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

13
Arnold’s first issue has no merit. He relies on his testimony that he was asked

four times for his consent to enter the shed before he granted it and argues, “Asking a

person the same question multiple times until you get the answer you want is a

coercive act.” The Court of Criminal Appeals has said the exact opposite; “repeatedly

asking for consent does not result in coercion, particularly when the person refuses to

answer or is otherwise evasive in his response. . . . Indeed, there is indication from

the Supreme Court that asking repeated questions or talking at a non-responsive,

uncooperative suspect is not a coercive technique.” Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 464 (first

citing United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1157 (5th Cir. 1980); and then citing

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386–87, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010)). In Meekins,

an officer asked the appellant six times whether he would consent to a search of his

car. 340 S.W.3d at 461. The appellant repeatedly stalled and evaded the question

before finally saying, “Yes” or “I guess.” Id. The Meekins Court upheld a trial court’s

finding that the appellant voluntarily consented to a search of his car. Id. at 465. Like

the appellant in Meekins, Arnold “has presented no evidence of factors that would

tend to show coercion, such as an officer’s display of a weapon, threats, promises,

deception, physical touching, or a demanding tone of voice or language.” Id. at 464.

In the trial court, Arnold argued that “whenever it came to the consent that
was given to enter the home, it was limited to a red iPhone.” But in his first issue on
appeal, he contends “that the search of his shed was unlawful because the consent he
gave to Detective B[ranu]m was coerced.” These complaints do not comport with one
another. In an abundance of caution, however, we will address the merits of Arnold’s
first issue.

14
Besides that, the trial court found that Arnold’s mother gave Detective Branum

permission to enter the shed and told him that he “could search the property and

outbuildings for the missing cell phone,” and Arnold does not challenge this finding.

Detective Branum testified that Arnold’s mother gave him consent to search the

property, including the shed.11 “The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid

warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of

an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in

common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.”

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1518 (2006). Therefore, the

trial court did not err when it determined that Detective Branum’s warrantless search

of the shed was consensual. We overrule Arnold’s first issue.

2. Arnold’s second issue: scope of consent

In his second issue, Arnold argues that if he gave consent to search the shed,

then his consent was expressly limited in scope to search for a red iPhone and that

“[o]nce Detective Branum entered the shed[,] his legal authority to search was limited

to looking for a red iPhone[;] anything else was beyond the scope [of consent]

allegedly granted by [Arnold].” He thus contends that Detective Branum’s picking up

the wallet and flipping it over was improper and violated the “plain view” doctrine.

11
In addition, Detective Branum stated in his affidavit that was admitted in
evidence without objection at the hearing as part of Defendant’s Exhibit 1, that
Arnold’s mother “provided consent to search the residence and buildings on the
property.”

15
The “plain view” doctrine requires that (1) law enforcement officials must

lawfully be where the object can be plainly viewed, (2) the incriminating character of

the object in plain view must be immediately apparent to the officials, and (3) the

officials must have the right to access the object. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

“Immediately apparent” has been defined to mean “without the necessity of any

further search.” See State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Therefore, so long as probable cause to believe that items found in plain view

constitute contraband arises while police are still lawfully on the premises, and any

further investigation into the nature of those items does not entail an additional and

unjustified search of—or unduly prolonged police presence on—the premises, the

Fourth Amendment allows those items to be seized. Id. at 185.

Arnold claims that Detective Branum “admitted [at the hearing] that there was

nothing about [the wallet with a badge holder clipped to it] that made it immediately

apparent to be incriminating evidence,”12 and therefore, “because it was not

immediately apparent to Detective Branum that the wallet and badge holder w[ere]

evidence[,] he was legally prohibited from picking [them] up and flipping [the wallet

12
At the suppression hearing, when asked, “So whenever you picked up [this]
ID, at that point, without . . . understanding whether or not it belonged to a past
tenant, without understanding whether or not it belonged to a deceased person,
someone under 18, this ID was just immediately apparent to you to be incriminating
evidence?” Detective Branum testified, “Not immediately, no, sir.”

16
and badge holder] over.” The State counters that Arnold’s point is moot. It contends

that “Detective Branum received general consent from [Arnold’s mother] to search

the shed” and that “[s]he never placed any limitations on the scope or duration of the

search.” The State invites us to “infer a blanket consent to search the shed based on

those circumstances[,] which permitted Detective Branum to investigate, even by

picking up, the identification badge.”

When viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence

supports a finding that Arnold’s mother did not place any limitations on her consent

for Detective Branum to enter and search the shed.13 But even if both Arnold’s and

his mother’s consent to enter and search the shed was limited to Detective Branum’s

searching for a red iPhone, Detective Branum did not exceed the scope of that

consent by picking up and flipping over the wallet and attached badge holder. A

reasonable person would have understood that, in searching the shed for the missing

13
The trial court did not explicitly make this finding, but it conspicuously did
not qualify its findings that Arnold’s mother “told Detective Branum he could search
the property and outbuildings for the missing cell phone,” that Detective Branum
received consent from both Arnold and his mother to enter the shed, and that the
evidence that Arnold sought to suppress “was discovered pursuant to a consensual
search.” When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or when
there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and
conclusions from the trial court, we infer the necessary fact findings that would
support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. Johnson, 414 S.W.3d at 192; Kelly,
204 S.W.3d at 818–19.

17
iPhone, Detective Branum would pick up and move items within the shed.14 Indeed,

it is reasonable to think that if Detective Branum was exceeding the scope of Arnold’s

or his mother’s consent when he picked up the wallet and badge holder and flipped

them over, then Arnold or his mother would have said something or otherwise let

Detective Branum know that they had not consented to that action. See Meekins,

340 S.W.3d at 463–64 (“Mere acquiescence may constitute a finding of consent.”);

14
Our sister court in Texarkana analyzed a similar scope-of-consent issue in
Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d). A detective
investigating a murder had asked Flowers, “[S]o do you mind if we go through your
phone to get his [alibi witness’s] number?” to which Flowers had replied, “Oh no, it’s
saved under ‘T–Will.’” Id. at 100. But the police did not limit their search of the data
on Flowers’s cell phone to obtaining the alibi witness’s telephone number; rather, they
accessed, reviewed, and photographed Flowers’s telephone call history as well. Id. At
trial, Flowers objected to the introduction of certain anticipated evidence against him.
Id. He argued that the scope of the permission he had given to the police regarding
the data on his cell phone was limited to obtaining his alibi witness’s telephone
number and that the police exceeded the scope of the permission by reviewing the
phone calls made on that cell phone and photographing his call history list. Id. at
100–01. The trial court overruled Flowers’s objections. Id. at 101.

As our sister court explained,

The expressed object of the search was to obtain [the alibi witness’s]
telephone number, and Flowers informed the police exactly where that
could be found. While an objectively reasonable person would not
expect the search to involve all areas of the phone, an objectively
reasonable person would expect the search might include either the
contacts list, the call history list, or both such lists. . . . The United States
Supreme Court has emphasized that limitations imposed by the
defendant in assenting to a request must be explicit. See Jimeno, 500 U.S.
at 251, 111 S. Ct. [at 1804].

Id. at 108–09. Here, Arnold placed no explicit limitations on the consent that he gave
Detective Branum to search the shed for the missing iPhone.

18
Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 449 (stating that “a person’s silence in the face of an officer’s

further actions may imply consent to that further action”). The trial court could have

inferred from Arnold’s silence or acquiescence that Detective Branum was operating

within the scope of the consent that Arnold and his mother had granted him when he

picked up the wallet and badge holder and flipped them over. We overrule Arnold’s

second issue.

3. Arnold’s third issue: his running objection

In his last issue, Arnold challenges the trial court’s “overruling” of his running

objection. We interpret this as a blanket challenge to the trial court’s admission of all

the evidence that was seized pursuant to the two search warrants. However, Arnold

argues no separate ground for the inadmissibility of this evidence and makes no

argument in his third issue that he did not make in his first two issues. Having

overruled Arnold’s first two issues, we overrule his duplicative third issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of Arnold’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 11, 2025

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