Anthony F. Vaccaro, Jr. v. the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00113-CV
___________________________

ANTHONY F. VACCARO, JR., Appellant

V.

THE LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 236th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 236-354720-24

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a post-judgment Order Appointing Turnover Receiver

in the 236th District Court that appointed a receiver and ordered all of Vaccaro’s

non-exempt property held in custodia legis as of the date of the order. Vaccaro contends

that the trial court erred because it: (1) appointed a receiver over his property without

jurisdiction because another court—the 67th District Court—had already appointed a

receiver over his property, and (2) granted a post-judgment turnover order without

jurisdiction because another court—the 67th District Court—had already appointed a

receiver of his property. We will overrule both of Vaccaro’s issues and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

I. Background

The sequence of events underlying this appeal is as follows:

* January 3, 2022: In the 67th District Court of Tarrant County,
Raymond James & Associates obtained its first Order for Turnover Relief and
Appointment of Receiver against Vaccaro.1 This order directed the receiver to
“take possession of and sell the leviable, non-exempt assets of” Vaccaro,
imbued the receiver “with the power and authority to take possession of and
sell all leviable property of” Vaccaro, and specified that with respect to any
such assets, “all such property shall be held in custodia legis” “as of the date of”
the order.

* October 13, 2022: This court reversed the January 3, 2022, Order for
Turnover Relief and Appointment of Receiver and remanded the case to the

1
Raymond James had secured a foreign judgment against Vaccaro for
$1,742,973.53 (less a $200,000 credit) and domesticated it in the 67th District Court
on August 27, 2021.

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trial court. Vaccaro v. Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 655 S.W.3d 485, 493 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.).

* June 20, 2023: After remand to the 67th District Court, Raymond
James obtained a new Order Appointing Receiver on June 20, 2023, set to
expire on October 18, 2023, giving the receiver the authority to take possession
of Vaccaro’s non-exempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to Raymond
James, among other powers.

* July 5, 2023 through February 11, 2025: Raymond James obtained an
Amended Order Appointing Receiver, set to expire on December 27, 2023 and
an order extending the receivership on June 7, 2024. A second amended order
appointing a receiver followed on December 3, 2024, a Third Amended Order
Appointing Receiver on February 11, 2025, and another order extending the
receivership on June 2, 2025. None of the Raymond James orders after the
original January 3, 2022 order contain any language regarding Vaccaro’s assets
being held in custodia legis or otherwise deemed to be in the possession of the
new receiver or court. The February 11, 2025 order (the competing order) gave
the receiver the authority to take possession of Vaccaro’s non-exempt assets
and sell them, among other powers. This competing order was extended on
May 30, 2025, to expire on November 29, 2025.

* February 14, 2025: After domesticating its own foreign judgment
against Vaccaro, Appellee The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company
obtained its Order Appointing Turnover Receiver against Vaccaro in the 236th
District Court of Tarrant County. 2 In contrast to the competing order (and
prior iterations thereof other than the January 2022 one reversed on appeal),
Appellee’s turnover order expressly provides that all of Vaccaro’s nonexempt
assets “shall be held in custodia legis of [Appellee’s] Receiver as of the date of the
Order” even before the receiver took actual possession of any property.

2
On June 4, 2024, the Allen County, Indiana Superior Court, rendered a
judgment for Appellee against Vaccaro for $1,242,792.77, 8.5% pre-judgment interest
on the judgment starting on September 22, 2022, post-judgment interest under
Indiana law, and $35,149.37 in attorney’s fees and costs. On July 22, 2024, Appellee
domesticated its judgment against Vaccaro in Texas in the action below. Vaccaro has
never appealed or otherwise challenged this judgment.

3
It is from the turnover order and order appointing a receiver in the 236th

District Court that Vaccaro appeals. 3

II. Analysis

Vaccaro raises two issues on appeal:

1. The district court committed reversible error in appointing a receiver
without jurisdiction because another trial court had already appointed a receiver
over Vaccaro’s property.

2. The district court committed reversible error in granting a
post-judgment turnover order without jurisdiction because another trial court
had already appointed a receiver over Vaccaro’s property.

Vaccaro first relies on the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction to support his

contention that only the 67th District Court had jurisdiction over his non-exempt

property. He argues that the Raymond James foreign judgement was domesticated

first in time in the 67th District Court, so that court acquired dominant jurisdiction to

the exclusion of the 236th District Court. But the question of dominant jurisdiction

“only arises ‘[w]hen an inherent interrelation of the subject matter exists in two

pending lawsuits.’ If such an inherent interrelationship exists, we then assess

dominant jurisdiction. But if not, then dominant jurisdiction is not an issue, and both

suits may proceed.” In re J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Wyatt v.

Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1988)). In this case, no such inherent

3
All of the turnover orders and orders appointing receivers in both courts were
issued pursuant to the Texas Turnover Statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 31.002.

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interrelation exists; there are simply two independent collection cases brought by two

separate creditors on separate debts against a common debtor. As a result, no

dominant jurisdiction analysis is necessary. See id. at 294 n.21.

The real crux of Vaccaro’s argument is based on the principle of custodia legis—

that because the 67th District Court first appointed a receiver over his non-exempt

property and issued a turnover order for that property, the 236th District Court had

no jurisdiction to subsequently appoint a different receiver or issue a turnover order

over that same non-exempt property. Vaccaro relies primarily on First Southern

Properties Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1976), a pre-turnover statute case,

brought by a court-appointed trustee to set aside a foreclosure sale under a deed of

trust. Id. at 340. The court, quoting Hacker v. Hacker, 4 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—

Galveston 1928, no writ), described the custodia legis rule:

We agree with appellant that the sale under the trust deed was
unauthorized and did not pass appellant’s title to the defendant
Schwiekart, because the property at the time of the sale was in custodia
legis. The district court of Harris [C]ounty having acquired jurisdiction
over the property by the divorce proceeding, and having appointed a
receiver to take charge of it and dispose of it in accordance with the
decree of that court, no valid sale of the property could be made under
process from any other court without the consent of the court in which the
receivership was pending, and for a stronger reason a sale by a trustee
foreclosing a lien would not affect the title held by the receiver.

Vallone, 533 S.W.2d at 341–42 (emphasis added).

From this we conclude that the competing order from the 67th District

Court—the last order issued before the order in the 236th District Court—placed

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Vacarro’s non-exempt property in custodia legis of the 67th District Court regardless of

the fact that its order did not specifically state that the property was being held in

custodia legis. M&E Endeavours LLC v. Air Voice Wireless LLC, Nos. 01-18-00852-CV,

01-19-00180-CV, 2020 WL 5047902, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27,

2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Once a turnover order appointing a receiver is signed, all

of the judgment debtor’s non-exempt property becomes property in custodia legis.”)

(emphasis added); Tex. Am. Bank/W. Side v. Haven, 728 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1987, no writ). However, “[a] court is not deprived of jurisdiction over

controversies concerning property in the custody of another court in so far as it can

exercise such jurisdiction without disturbing the possession of such other court.” Kull

v. Brown, 165 S.W.2d 1011, 1014 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1942, no writ) (quoting

21 C.J.S. Court § 495). For example, consent by the court holding property in custodia

legis allows other courts to dispose of such property. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d at 341–42.

Thus, the 236th District Court had jurisdiction to issue the February 14, 2025 order so

long as the order did not interfere with the 67th District Court’s jurisdiction.

Applying the reasoning above, Vaccaro’s issues fail for several reasons. First,

Vaccaro is not entitled to the benefit of the custodia legis doctrine and therefore cannot

seek relief based on that argument. By analogy,

as a general rule, Texas courts will not allow a judgment debtor to use the
doctrine of in custodia legis to protect funds from garnishment. The doctrine
[custodia legis] was not formulated to protect any party claiming entitlement to the
funds. Rather, the doctrine is enforced by the courts to preserve the
jurisdiction of the court administering the property in issue. Its purpose

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is to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction from one court to another and to
insure orderly judicial procedure in the administration of funds.

Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372, 383 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992,

writ denied) (emphases added); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Watson, 413 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ). The same rationale would apply here because

Vaccaro is attempting to utilize the custodia legis principle to protect his assets. Since

Vaccaro is not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of custodia legis, he is not entitled

to relief on appeal in this case because he is not injuriously affected. See Tex. Workers’

Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 988 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. 1999); Jackson v. Fontaine’s

Clinic, 499 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1973). He is the judgment debtor in two cases, and his

non-exempt property has been made the subject of turnover and receivership orders

in both cases. So his non-exempt property, to the extent of the amount of the debts in

the two cases, is going to be leaving his custody and control and going to his

judgment creditors regardless of which order prevails. And, here, there is no actual

conflict between the two courts demonstrated by the record.

Second, even if Vaccaro were entitled to raise the doctrine of custodia legis, there

was no violation demonstrated in the record. As observed by the court in In re

deShetler, No. 09-17-00031-CV, 2017 WL 1173811, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

March 30, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.),

[t]urnover orders are governed by Section 31.002 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 31.002 (West 2015). Section 31.002(a) affords a judgment creditor aid
from a court of appropriate jurisdiction through injunction or other

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means to reach property to obtain satisfaction of a judgment if the
judgment debtor owns property that cannot readily be attached or levied
on by ordinary legal process, and is not exempt from attachment,
execution, or seizure. Id. § 31.002(a). The purpose of the turnover
proceeding is merely to ascertain whether or not an asset is in the
possession of the judgment debtor or subject to the judgment debtor’s
control. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991).
The purely procedural nature of the turnover statute is well settled, and
the statute does not allow for a determination of the substantive rights
of the involved parties. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Millard, 825 S.W.2d 780,
783 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). When
there is a factual dispute as to the ownership interest of the judgment
debtors, the trial court needs to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to
entering a turnover order to establish the ownership. Plaza Court, Ltd. v.
West, 879 S.W.2d 271, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig.
proceeding).

Additionally, turnover orders do not transfer anything where they merely authorize

the receiver to take possession of the debtor’s leviable assets. Flooring Systs., Inc. v.

Chow, No. 4:12-CV-475, 2013 WL 4674667, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2013), aff’d sub

nom., In re Poston, 765 F.3d 518 (5th Cir.)). Therefore, the mere issuance of the

February 14, 2025 order by the 236th District Court did not, in and of itself, interfere

with the jurisdiction of the 67th District Court and its competing order.

We overrule Vaccaro’s two issues on appeal.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

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/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice

Delivered: January 8, 2026

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