In the Interest of M.S., a Child v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00526-CV
___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.S., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 231-661682-19

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2019, the trial court signed an agreed order establishing the parent–child

relationship between M.S. (Matthew) and R.S. (Father) and appointing Father and

Appellant J.F. (Mother) as Matthew’s joint managing conservators.1 In 2025,

following a deterioration of Mother’s mental health, the trial court modified the

conservatorship of Matthew by appointing Father as sole managing conservator and

appointing Mother as possessory conservator with supervised visitation.

In her sole issue,2 Mother argues that because the evidence was factually

insufficient to show a material and substantial change in her circumstances, the trial

court abused its discretion by modifying the 2019 order and appointing her as

possessory conservator with supervised visitation. Because the trial court could have

reasonably found that Mother’s deteriorating mental health was a material and

substantial change to support modification, we will affirm.

1
We use the alias “Matthew” to identify the child and refer to his family
members by their relation to him. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R.
App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
Although Mother’s brief purports to present two issues, she effectively
consolidated her factual sufficiency and conservatorship and access issues into one
legal analysis and argument—and we will do the same.

2
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother are the parents of Matthew, a six-year-old boy with high-

functioning autism and delayed speech. In 2019, following a petition to establish the

parent–child relationship, the trial court signed an agreed order that, among other

things, appointed Father and Mother as joint managing conservators of Matthew and

gave Mother the exclusive right to determine Matthew’s primary residence.

Sometime in the summer of 2024, Mother began experiencing episodes of

delusions and paranoia,3 and she was prescribed various medications.4 In

October 2024, she abruptly stopped taking the medications and instead began treating

her mental-health issues with meditation and guidance from tarot cards. Mother’s

episodes of psychosis increased in frequency.

In December 2024, pursuant to a mental-health warrant, Mother was

involuntarily transported to John Peter Smith Hospital (JPS) for evaluation. While at

JPS, Mother made several concerning statements to medical providers—including that

she had cameras in her eyes and had died at six years old—and she was admitted for

psychiatric treatment for nine days. During her JPS stay, the Texas Department of

Family and Protective Services (the Department) opened an investigation. A

3
There is no evidence that Mother experienced these episodes of psychosis
prior to the trial court’s 2019 order appointing her and Father as joint managing
conservators.
4
Mother’s prescribed medications included Xanax, Ambien, Zofran, Pristiq,
phentermine, Soma, and Tylenol 3.

3
caseworker with the Department spoke with Father—who currently had physical

possession of Matthew—and discovered that Mother had become obsessed with

conspiracy theories and reading tarot cards and that her mental health had

deteriorated since the Department’s last investigation.5 Father also explained that

Mother had hidden weapons in their apartment, that he and Mother had recently

ended their relationship, and that he had moved out of the apartment. Following

Mother’s release from JPS, she and Father got into an argument, and he allowed

her—despite her mental-health issues—to take Matthew.

Consequently, the Department filed an original petition for protection of a

child, for conservatorship, and for termination in suit affecting the parent–child

relationship. Following the petition, the trial court appointed the Department as

temporary managing conservator of Matthew, appointed an attorney ad litem for him,

and appointed CASA of Tarrant County to act as a court-appointed special advocate.

The Department created service plans for Father and Mother, and Mother’s service

plan included “[m]ental health assessment with either MHMR or JPS, individual

5
Between October 2024 and November 2024, the Department received two
intakes for Mother’s neglectful supervision of Matthew. The first intake followed law
enforcement’s welfare check on Mother because she was found wandering around a
store with Matthew. The second intake followed Father’s contacting an employee
assistance program regarding his concerns for Mother’s erratic behavior and
Matthew’s safety. Mother had stopped eating, sleeping, and taking care of herself and
Matthew, and she had begun excessively reading tarot cards, giving away large sums of
money—$6,000 to someone she did not know—and making videos of herself with
Matthew in public streets, stating that everyone was out to kill them.

4
counseling, parenting classes, co-parenting classes with [Father], refraining from

criminal activity, visitation with [Matthew], communication with [the Department],

housing, and employment.”

In February 2025, at the Department’s request, the trial court appointed Father

as temporary possessory conservator of Matthew. In September 2025, the

Department moved to modify the managing conservatorship of Matthew—requesting

that the trial court remove the Department as temporary managing conservator,

appoint Father as permanent sole managing conservator, and appoint Mother as

possessory conservator.

In October 2025, the case was called to trial. The trial consisted of the

admission of one exhibit—Mother’s December 2024 JPS records; the testimony of

Mother, the caseworker, and Father; and statements from Matthew’s attorney ad litem

and the court-appointed special advocate.

The admitted JPS records include the following relevant excerpts:

• [Mother] is a 46[-year-old] female with a past psychiatric history of
anxiety, psychosis, schizoaffective disorder who is admitted to
TSP on OPC for psychosis, delusions, and concern for harm to
self and harm to others. The patient required emergency
medication at the PEC due to disruptive behavior.

• Thought process is illogical, disorganized, tangential, and
circumstantial. Reports passive SI “I rather die tha[n] have to live
like this” and depressive symptoms including hopelessness,
helplessness, isolation, sadness, mood swings, irritability and
racing thoughts.

5
• [Mother] states that she knows that there are cameras in her
apartment that have been watching her and her son for the past 4
years, however, she just found out recently on Facebook about
these cameras. When this provider mentions that this sounds like
the movie “The Truman Show”, patient states “exactly! That’s
how Hollywood gets their ideas.” Also states that she has
cameras in her eyes that other people can watch and can see what
she is seeing, states she knows this because people were post[ing]
about what they [saw] on Facebook.

• States that everybody in her family is out to kill her because she is
said to inher[it] a lot of money from her grandfather. Says that all
of this started because her husband asked her “why does
everybody want to kill [you]?”

• Discussed getting labs and getting head imaging, [Mother] states
that she has already had imaging of her head which shows a bullet
hole in the front of her skull from her last death.

• “Repeated mention of her death in present and past lives.
Constant reference of the matrix and false realities, mood swings
happy then angry. Claims she is god chosen one to see the world.
Has accused everyone of trying to kill her. Very delusional in her
texts and [Facebook] posts. She’s always been unable to stay on
task. Would rather watch tarot cards. She’s obsessed with tarot
cards and they are in control of her mind. . . . Believes she has
died. Writes all over the living room floor and draws symbols,
drawings, reference of her own demise. . . . She thinks people are
watching her at home and basically a kill or be killed. No sleep,
no food and she stopped taking her meds.”

• [Mother] spoke to how she has experienced ego death which has
[led] to “the downloads coming” and that she has died multiple
times and speaks about how she can just die again given her
multiple previous deaths. [Mother] believes that she actually died
at age 6 in Colorado and that she is being used as a tool by the
powers at be to unify everyone. [Mother] reports this is true
because she has knowledge of a space craft and thinks that her
dying may be tied to human trafficking. [Mother] states she was
supposed to receive a multi million dollar inheritance that people

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in her life have taken from her, and while sharing information
about this inheritance she reveals she [is] connected to several
powerful companies/people such as Merrill Lynch, the
Kennedy’s, and Bank of America. [Mother] says she feels when
she is sleeping someone is inhabiting her body and that she is
being raped over and over again, and that people have been
inhabiting the body of her 5[-]year[-]old son when he is sleeping
as he has started acting like he doesn’t know her. . . . [Mother]
also reports how she “knows too much” and this puts her in a
“weird position” as she has been chosen by everyone’s ancestors
to stop the country from being run by the government. When
asked about writing symbols in her residence [Mother] states she
spends most of her day “running calculations and solving
problems.”

Mother testified and denied telling medical providers that cameras were in her

eyes, that other people could watch and see her, or that she was dead and had died

many times. But when confronted with the JPS records of her making these

statements, Mother stated, “They would be lying. Because, no, I did not state that.”

When asked why Matthew was removed from her care, Mother responded, “I believe

because [Father] was upset at the fact that I had spoken to one of my exes[,] and he

got upset with that. And also I believe, again he’s -- he is working with my parents

and is part of stealing some of my inheritance, and I’ve got proof of that.”

With respect to her employment status, Mother claimed to “do stuff on the

side for the government,” such as working on “[s]pecial projects.” Mother explained

that she worked on “undercover stuff” for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and

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that she was currently investigating her sizable stolen inheritance.6 When asked why

the DEA was interested in her inheritance, Mother contended that “the entire

government [was] because it’s a big, big inheritance that was left to me[,] and it was

stolen.”

Regarding her service plan, Mother conceded that she had not (1) reviewed the

permanency report, (2) attended parenting classes, (3) participated in a mental-health

consultation with MHMR or JPS, (4) engaged with a counselor that was provided by

the Department, or (5) regularly visited with Matthew. As for Father’s supervision of

Matthew, Mother agreed that Matthew was a happy, healthy child. Finally, Mother

denied experiencing any psychosis since December 2024.

The caseworker testified and explained that the Department’s primary concern

with Mother was her mental health and that she had not substantially engaged in her

service plan. Mother had not completed any kind of mental-health treatment, failed

to engage in individual counseling, and repeatedly denied the Department entry to her

apartment. And despite the Department’s providing transportation and alternative

meeting locations for her, Mother missed several visitations—including for a period

of three months—with Matthew. When asked why the Department was requesting

that Father be appointed as sole managing conservator, the caseworker explained,

“[Matthew] has been in his care since February. He’s done well with [Matthew’s]

Mother offered no evidence in support of her claim that she was employed by
6

the DEA.

8
treatment, enrolling [him] in school, continuing his education, getting services started

up for speech therapy and play therapy. He’s addressed all the needs for [Matthew].

The Department still has concerns for [Mother’s] mental health.” With respect to

whether Mother’s mental health had improved since the beginning of the case, the

caseworker responded, “I haven’t seen improvement.”7 Although Mother did

complete a psychological evaluation, the caseworker explained that the results of that

evaluation “[c]ontinued the [Department’s] concerns.”

Unlike Mother, Father had substantially engaged in his service plan. He

completed a psychological examination, participated in counseling, attended parenting

classes, remained employed, and maintained housing. The Department had no

concerns regarding Father. Thus, the Department requested that Father be appointed

as sole managing conservator of Matthew and requested that Mother be appointed as

possessory conservator with supervised visitation. And although Matthew was

bonded to both of his parents, the caseworker explained that she believed the

requested conservatorship was in Matthew’s best interest because (1) Mother’s

mental-health issues had not been addressed, (2) the plan would keep Matthew “safe

and free from danger or harm,” and (3) the parents might have trouble co-parenting.

7
During the pendency of the case, Mother told the caseworker that “this CPS
case is illegal[] and that she has special investigators that are investigating CPS and
[Father].”

9
Father testified that when the Department began its investigation, he had

concerns about Mother, including her deteriorating mental health, constantly reading

tarot cards, and hiding of weapons.8 When asked whether he had observed an

improvement in Mother’s mental health since the start of the case, Father testified, “I

cannot say I have.” Father went on to say, “I unfortunately still don’t trust her. I’m

just not comfortable with her.”

Father confirmed that Matthew was doing well in his care and that he was

receiving all of the necessary services for his diagnoses. And because Father and

Mother did not see eye-to-eye on things, he agreed with the caseworker’s assessment

that he and Mother would have trouble co-parenting. Father requested to be

appointed as Matthew’s sole managing conservator and requested that Mother have

supervised visitation.

The attorney ad litem for Matthew addressed the trial court and explained that

it was her belief that it was in Matthew’s best interest “for Father to have sole

managing conservatorship and Mother to have supervised visitation only.” The court-

appointed special advocate also briefly discussed her observations of Father and

Mother, stating that in her opinion, “it is in [Matthew’s] best interest to remain in the

stable home with his father.”

8
Father explained that “[Mother], because of her paranoia, would strategically
place [their] large kitchen knives under -- between cushions in the couch and on top
of the fridge, in cabinets in the restroom, and the closets. And there was a gun in the
house[,] and it could not be found.”

10
After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court found that “it is in [Matthew’s]

best interest to appoint [Father] as [his] sole managing conservator.” The trial court

then signed the final order, appointing Father as sole managing conservator of

Matthew and appointing Mother as possessory conservator with supervised visitation.

Mother filed this appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court has broad discretion when determining family law matters

involving custody, support, visitation, and possession. In re P.J., No. 02-24-00236-CV,

2025 WL 807494, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.);

In re A.I.M., No. 01-22-00409-CV, 2023 WL 8192530, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Nov. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). The best interest of the child is the

trial court’s primary consideration in determining such matters. A.I.M., 2023 WL

8192530, at *5. The trial court has substantial latitude when making its

determinations. Id.

We review conservatorship and visitation issues for an abuse of discretion.

Kazmi v. Kazmi, 693 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet. denied); In re

E.S.S., 658 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.); In re R.R.K., No. 02-

20-00302-CV, 2022 WL 1257136, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to

any guiding rules or principles—that is, when its decision was arbitrary or

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unreasonable. In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no

pet.).

In family-law cases, the abuse of discretion standard overlaps with the

traditional sufficiency standards of review; thus, although legal and factual

insufficiency are not independent reversible grounds of error, they are relevant factors

in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Kazmi, 693 S.W.3d at 566;

Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). When a

trial court relies on legally or factually insufficient evidence, it abuses its discretion.

P.J., 2025 WL 807494, at *5; E.S.S., 658 S.W.3d at 616.

When assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in a

light most favorable to the ruling to determine whether there is more than a scintilla

of evidence to support it. P.J., 2025 WL 807494, at *5; E.S.S., 658 S.W.3d at 616. For

factual sufficiency, we consider and weigh all of the pertinent evidence to determine

whether the credible evidence supporting the challenged finding is so weak or so

contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it must be set aside. P.J.,

2025 WL 807494, at *5; E.S.S., 658 S.W.3d at 616.

Throughout our review, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. P.J., 2025 WL 807494, at *5. If there is

conflicting evidence, it is the trial court’s prerogative to resolve the conflict and

believe one witness over another. Id.

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IV. DISCUSSION

In her sole issue, Mother contends that because the evidence was factually

insufficient to show a material and substantial change in her circumstances, the trial

court abused its discretion by modifying the 2019 order—wherein she was named a

joint managing conservator—and appointing her as possessory conservator with only

supervised visitation.9 We disagree.

A. APPLICABLE LAW

A trial court may modify conservatorship of and possession of or access to a

child if the modification is in the child’s best interest and the circumstances of the

child or a conservator have materially and substantially changed since the rendition of

the existing order.10 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(1); In re A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d

404, 409 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).

In deciding whether a material and substantial change of circumstances has

occurred, a fact finder is not confined to rigid or definite guidelines; instead, the

determination is fact specific and must be made according to the circumstances as

9
She does not challenge the trial court’s awarding Father the exclusive right to
determine Matthew’s primary residence.
10
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a material and
substantial change but does not challenge or discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to
show that the modification was in Matthew’s best interest. Therefore, we will limit
our discussion to the issue of whether the evidence showed a material and substantial
change in Mother’s circumstances since the rendition of the 2019 order. See Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1

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they arise. See In re H.C.C., No. 01-16-00876-CV, 2017 WL 6520228, at *9 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). To demonstrate that a

material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred, the evidence must

show the conditions that existed at the time of the entry of the prior order as

compared to the circumstances existing at the time of the trial on the petition to

modify. In re L.C.L., 396 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

A parent’s deteriorating mental health can qualify as a material and substantial

change that supports modification of conservatorship or limits on possession or

access to the child. See In re J.H.W., No. 14-03-00024-CV, 2004 WL 1263254, at *2–3

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 10, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a

mother’s threat to kill herself and a child, coupled with the mother’s history of

psychological issues, qualified as a material and substantial change); see also In re

O.E.W.-K., No. 02-10-00199-CV, 2011 WL 1225470, at *26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Mar. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing that a parent’s mental instability may

contribute to a finding that a parent could endanger a child); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d

851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ) (explaining that a parent’s mental

illness is a relevant factor on issues related to the care and custody of a child).

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MODIFICATION

Mother argues that “the only evidence presented at trial was that [she] had a

psychotic episode wherein she was involuntarily committed at JPS for nine days in

December, 2024.” But Mother’s framing of her mental health belies the record.

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The extent of her mental-health issues was not limited to an isolated episode.

Rather, the evidence showed that Mother’s mental health had deteriorated for months

leading up to her involuntary commitment at JPS and that her mental health had not

improved by the time of trial. Thus, as we discuss below, the record supports the trial

court’s finding that the circumstances of Mother’s mental health had materially and

substantially changed since the rendition of the 2019 order. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 156.101(a)(1).

The trial court admitted Mother’s JPS records. The records establish that

Mother was admitted to JPS on a mental-health warrant for evaluation and treatment

and show that prior to her admission, she had stopped sleeping, eating, and taking her

medication and that she believed people were watching her in her home. The records

also establish other matters illustrating Mother’s mental-health issues, including her

belief that she had “a bullet hole in the front of her skull from her last death,” that she

had “been chosen by everyone’s ancestors to stop the country from being run by the

government,” “that people ha[d] been inhabiting the body of [Matthew],” and “that

she ha[d] cameras in her eyes [so] that other people c[ould] watch and . . . see what

she is seeing.”

Mother’s testimony at trial illuminated the Department’s and Father’s

continuing concerns for her mental health. First, she disavowed the aforementioned

statements contained in the JPS records, going as far as to claim that the medical

providers were lying. Second, she denied experiencing any psychosis since her

15
discharge from JPS in December 2024 while simultaneously maintaining her supposed

active employment with the DEA in an undercover capacity to investigate her stolen

inheritance. Third, she maintained that Father was stealing her inheritance, that she

did not understand why she was admitted to JPS, and that she felt fine following her

discharge and did not seek further mental-health treatment.

Despite Mother’s perception of her mental health, the caseworker testified that

the results of Mother’s mental-health assessment—rather than alleviate concerns for

her mental health—had “continued the [Department’s] concerns.” In the same vein,

Father testified that he still did not trust Mother and was “not comfortable with her.”

The caseworker and Father both testified that they had not observed an improvement

in Mother’s mental health since the beginning of the case.

Although Mother denied experiencing any psychosis since her discharge from

JPS in December 2024, the trial court was not required to believe her. See P.J.,

2025 WL 807494, at *5. Instead, the trial court could have believed the caseworker’s

and Father’s testimony that they had not noticed an improvement in Mother’s mental

health. See id. The trial court could have also considered Mother’s persistence in

disavowing her statements contained in the JPS records, downplaying the severity of

her mental health, and maintaining her supposed undercover employment with the

DEA. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.)

(“The trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor and personalities of

16
the witnesses and can ‘feel’ the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be

discerned by merely reading the record.”).

Thus, the trial court could have reasonably found that the evidence proving a

deterioration of Mother’s mental health, her denial about that deterioration, and her

refusal to obtain mental-health treatment and counseling qualified as a material and

substantial change to support modification. See In re K.R., No. 02-14-00275-CV,

2016 WL 1393392, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding that the deterioration of appellant’s mental health after rendition of the

divorce decree and her denial about that deterioration qualified as a material and

substantial change to support modification).

We conclude that the record establishes that the evidence is factually sufficient

to support the trial court’s finding that there had been a material and substantial

change in Mother’s circumstances since the 2019 order appointing her and Father as

joint managing conservators. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(1); A.E.A.,

406 S.W.3d at 409. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by modifying the conservatorship of Matthew—appointing Father as sole

managing conservator and appointing Mother as possessory conservator with

supervised visitation. See P.J., 2025 WL 807494, at *5.

We overrule Mother’s sole issue.

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V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Mother’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker
Justice

Delivered: January 15, 2026

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