In the Interest of B.C., a Child v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00305-CV
___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF B.C., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV21-0450

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

In 2013, Appellee Mother1 filed a suit affecting the parent–child relationship

(SAPCR), asking the trial court to appoint her and Appellant Father as joint managing

conservators of their child B.C., who is severely autistic and nonverbal. Two years

later, Mother and Father entered an agreed order under which Mother had the

exclusive right to designate B.C.’s primary residence within a geographic restriction of

Johnson County and contiguous counties.2

Six years later, Mother filed a petition to modify or lift the geographic

restriction to accommodate her upcoming move to Florida. Father counterpetitioned,

seeking, among other things, to modify the restriction to Parker County, Hood

County, and their contiguous counties. Around five months later, after a

temporary-orders hearing, Mother filed a notice of her intent to move to Florida

1
We identify the child’s family by their relationship to him and the child by his
initials. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d).
2
The parties did not offer into the record a copy of their 2015 agreed order, but
the trial court took judicial notice of its file, and Mother states in her appellee’s brief
that the previous geographic restriction was to Johnson County and its contiguous
counties. Under Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(g) and 38.2(a)(1), we will accept
this fact as true because Father has not contradicted it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g),
38.2(a)(1). As relevant below, we also will take judicial notice that Johnson County is
contiguous with Parker, Hood, and Somervell Counties. See North Central Texas
Council of Governments (NCTCOG), DFW Maps, https://www.dfwmaps.com (last
visited Mar. 6, 2026); see also Tex. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (allowing a court to take judicial
notice of a fact that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned).

2
within sixty days so that B.C. would “have access to much better therapy centers and

schools.” In the notice, she also stated, “In the hearing that took place on

April 7, 2022[,] it was determined that [Father had] moved outside of the geographic

restriction and [that] the judge ha[d] ruled to lift [Mother’s] geographic restriction per

current orders.”

A year and a half later—at trial—the parties read into the record their partial

agreement and asked the trial court to decide the geographic-restriction and

travel-expense-payment issues. At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court expanded the

geographic restriction to “the continental 48 states” and ordered Mother to pay travel

expenses. Around a year and a half after the trial, the trial court signed the thirty-page

judgment, which included these terms.

As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court’s judgment designated Mother as the

conservator with the exclusive right to designate B.C.’s primary residence within a

geographic restriction of “the continental United States.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 153.134(b)(1)(A)–(B) (stating that in rendering a joint-managing-conservatorship

order, the trial court shall either “establish, until modified by further order, a

geographic area within which the conservator shall maintain the child’s primary

residence” or “specify that the conservator may determine the child’s primary

residence without regard to geographic location”). The judgment also ordered Father

to purchase round-trip airfare for himself and B.C. “no later than fourteen days in

advance,” with “the right to purchase any class of airline ticket he so chooses but any

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costs that exceed[] $800.00 per ticket above basic economy he shall be responsible

for,” and ordered Mother to reimburse Father for the tickets within thirty days of

their purchase.

Father has appealed, complaining in a single issue that the evidence is legally

and factually insufficient to support the geographic restriction. Because the record

reflects no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we overrule Father’s sole issue and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

II. Discussion

We begin with the standard of review and applicable law, followed by the

parties’ arguments, the case’s proceedings, and then our analysis.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

Geographic restrictions fall within the ambit of conservatorship orders, which

we review for an abuse of discretion. See In re E.D., No. 02-20-00208-CV, 2022 WL

60781, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). No abuse of

discretion occurs when the trial court decides an issue based on conflicting evidence,

so long as some substantive and probative evidence supports its decision. In re S.C.,

No. 02-23-00121-CV, 2024 WL 637250, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 15, 2024,

no pet.) (mem. op.).

In family-law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with the

traditional sufficiency standards of review; thus, legal and factual insufficiency are not

independent reversible grounds but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial

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court abused its discretion. Id. To determine whether there has been an abuse of

discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial

court’s decision, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) did the trial court have

sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) did the trial court err

in its application of that discretion? Id. The applicable sufficiency review comes into

play in the first question. Id. We then proceed to determine whether, based on the

elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id.

With regard to legal sufficiency, there is no evidence when (1) the record bears

no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from

giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence

offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence

establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645,

658 (Tex. 2018). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to

support a finding. S.C., 2024 WL 637250, at *4. On the other hand, no more than a

scintilla exists when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak that it creates

no more than a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence. McAllen Hosps., L.P. v.

Lopez, 576 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. 2019).

As to factual sufficiency, we will set aside a finding only if, after considering

and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible

evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming

weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered.

5
Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g). We must be

cognizant that the trial court is in a better position to decide custody cases because it

faced the parties and their witnesses, observed their demeanor, and had the

opportunity to evaluate each parent’s claims. C.B. v. A.B., No. 02-19-00041-CV,

2020 WL 241382, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

When, as here, the trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law,

we imply that it made all findings necessary to support its order.

E.D., 2022 WL 60781, at *11.

Texas does not have a specific statute regarding custody-case residency

restrictions, but the supreme court set out factors in Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 14–16

(Tex. 2002), to give meaning to Family Code Section 153.001’s public-policy

imperative. See C.B., 2020 WL 241382, at *6 & n.1 (discussing Lenz). Section 153.001

recites that the state’s public policy is to (1) assure that children will have frequent and

continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the child’s best

interest; (2) provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and

(3) encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after they

have separated or dissolved their marriage. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.001(a)(1)–(3).

The child’s best interest “shall always be the primary consideration of the court in

determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”

Id. § 153.002(a).

6
In Lenz, the supreme court listed as relevant to determining whether a

geographic restriction is in a child’s best interest the following nonexclusive factors:

(1) the reasons for and against the move, including the parents’ good-faith motives in

requesting or opposing it; (2) health, education, and leisure opportunities afforded by

the move; (3) the degree of economic, emotional, and educational enhancement for

the custodial parent and child; (4) the effect on extended family relationships;

(5) accommodation of the child’s special needs or talents; (6) the effect on visitation

and communication with the noncustodial parent to maintain a full and continuous

relationship with the child; (7) the possibility of a visitation schedule allowing the

continuation of a meaningful relationship between the noncustodial parent and child;

and (8) the ability of the noncustodial parent to relocate. See C.B., 2020 WL 241382,

at *6 (summarizing factors from Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16). The supreme court

recognized that these cases are intensely fact-driven and require balancing these

factors. Id.; see Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16.

B. The parties’ arguments

Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion by enlarging the

geographic restriction to the continental United States because no evidence or

insufficient evidence was presented to support its determination that Mother should

be allowed to establish the child’s residence beyond the parties’ agreement that a

restriction would be in place that would include Texas (where he resides) and Manatee

County, Florida (where she resides).

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Mother responds that the trial court acted within its discretion by effectively

eliminating any meaningful geographic limitation based on (1) Father’s relocation

outside of the prior geographic restriction, which she claims lifted the restriction

under the 2015 agreed order’s terms; (2) Father’s representation at trial that no

restriction was required if his travel expenses were addressed; and (3) Mother’s

relocation, which was based on B.C.’s needs. She also points out that on this record,

even if the prior restriction had remained in effect, “or if both parties had not

requested that no restriction be imposed, [Father’s] consistent pattern of missed

visitations and unpaid support obligations significantly undermines any claim that the

absence of a geographic restriction has harmed or would harm the parent–child

relationship.”

C. The case’s proceedings

We summarize the proceedings to provide context for the trial court’s decision.

1. April 7, 2022 temporary-orders hearing and April 11, 2022 notice

At the April 2022 temporary-orders hearing, 3 Father recalled that when

Mother’s counsel deposed him the preceding December, he had testified that he did

not have an address for his residence but that he had been living in a recreational

vehicle between Granbury and Glen Rose near his construction-superintendent job in

Somervell County. By April 2022, however, he had been living in Stephenville (Erath

3
The parties each changed counsel more than once during the four years in the
trial court. Father’s first motion to substitute counsel was granted a month before the
April 2022 hearing.

8
County) at his girlfriend’s home for “roughly a month, month and a half” and had

been receiving his mail there. He denied that he had tried to hide where he was living

from Mother.

We take judicial notice that Granbury is located in Hood County and that

Glen Rose is located in Somervell County; as noted above, both counties are

contiguous to Johnson County. See NCTCOG, DFW Maps,

https://www.dfwmaps.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2026); see also Tex. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

Johnson County and Hood County are contiguous to Parker County, where B.C. lived

with Mother when she filed the SAPCR and a motion to transfer the SAPCR from

Johnson County to Parker County. See NCTCOG, DFW Maps,

https://www.dfwmaps.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2026). However, Erath County is not

contiguous to Johnson County or Parker County. See id.

Four days after the hearing, Mother filed the relocation notice in which she

asserted that “it was determined that [Father had] moved outside of the geographic

restriction” and that the trial court had lifted it.

2. September 25, 2023 trial

At trial, Mother’s counsel read into the record the parties’ partial agreement

that the 2015 order’s terms would remain in effect with minor modifications,

including the geographic restriction to include Mother’s “current residence in the

[S]tate of Florida.” Two of the remaining issues for the trial court to determine were

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the “[g]eographic restriction of the parties within the parameters of this agreement”

and “payment of airfare for long[-]distance travel.”

After Mother’s counsel read the parties’ agreement into the record, Father’s

counsel stated, “We would agree to no geographical restriction on [Mother] if she

would pay the travel” for B.C. and his chaperone. He concluded, “So if the court is

inclined to do that, we agree there doesn’t need to be a geographical restriction on the

child.”4

Mother’s counsel replied that payment of travel costs was “the subject of

ongoing negotiation in this case.” He disagreed that it should be coupled to the

geographic restriction but also noted, “[T]hat’s in the purview of this [c]ourt.” The

trial court then told Mother’s counsel to call his first witness.

a. Mother’s testimony

Mother testified that then-ten-year-old B.C. had severe autism and was

nonverbal, requiring extensive supervision and a communications app to express his

needs. In Florida, he was attending a private education center for special-needs

children where he also received Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy. Mother

had been covering B.C.’s health insurance, first under her new husband’s employer’s

plan and ultimately through a Florida policy that she described as “very robust”

because it covered B.C.’s ABA therapy with no age limit or cap on how many sessions

he could have.

Father changed counsel around a year before the September 2023 trial.
4

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Mother and her new husband had married in June 2022. She asked the trial

court to consider imposing no geographic restriction because her understanding was

that she had been allowed to move to Florida after Father had moved outside of the

2015 agreed order’s geographic restriction. According to Mother, limiting them to

Manatee County (in the Tampa area) would be a hardship if she and her husband had

to move to a different area in Florida, such as the Miami area, but such a move would

not impose any additional flight obligation on B.C. or Father.

Regarding Father’s proposal of no geographic restriction in return for Mother’s

paying all travel costs, Mother testified in the following colloquy that it would be fair

for her to pay part of the travel expenses but not “100 percent” of them:

Q. Okay. I’m certain that you heard [Father’s counsel] discuss the ideas
that [Father] wouldn’t have a residency restriction issue if you paid for all
of the flights. Did you hear him say that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think it’s appropriate in this case that you pay for all of
the flights for [B.C.]?

A. I can definitely understand since I am the one who did choose
to move to Florida, but given the situation, I don’t believe it’s fair for me
to have to pay 100 percent of them.

Q. Well, please give me more of that. Why?

A. Well, [B.C.]’s [private-school] tuition . . . we paid out of pocket
for.[5]
And I understand that moving forward we will still be, you know,

5
Mother testified that the annual tuition for B.C.’s private school in Florida was
$12,000 but that B.C. had received a scholarship for the 2023–2024 school year that
reduced the tuition burden to around $100 per month.

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responsible -- or, I’m sorry, I will still be responsible for that, which I am
glad to pay. . . .

Q. . . . [W]hy should the [c]ourt consider not ordering you to pay
all of the travel expenses associated with [B.C.’s] visitation with his
father? So I’m going to cut to the chase and assume that educational
costs that you’re obligated to pay should be considered, is that one?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Are there any others?

A. Well, the amount of child support because we did do a -- we
filed a petition in 2021 to increase child support and that has not taken
place. So definitely an increase in child support to the current guidelines,
and then also health[-]insurance reimbursement.[6]

Mother expressed concern about obligating herself to pay for Father’s flights in

light of his having previously failed to regularly pay child support or to exercise all of

his periods of possession with B.C. from 2015 until she filed her petition to modify in

2021. Specifically, she testified that from 2015 to 2020, despite their living in the

same geographic area, Father had exercised one summer period of possession and

that his weekend possession was “hit or miss” until she filed her petition. On

cross-examination, she conceded that since 2021, Father had been current on his child

support and had been exercising regular visitation before she and B.C. had moved to

Florida.

6
Mother also testified that although B.C. was able to use a toilet to urinate, he
required “pull-ups” for his bowel movements; his pull-ups cost $120 per month, and
his wipes cost $30 per month. B.C. was also on a special doctor-recommended diet,
which was more expensive than “typical” groceries. These were facts that Mother
wanted the trial court to consider in allocating travel expenses and determining child
support.

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b. Father’s testimony

Father testified that B.C. was his only minor child and that they had had four

visits since B.C.’s move to Florida. He testified that when B.C. stayed with him over

the summer in Parker County, B.C. had learned “to know when he has to poop” but

was still “really dependent o[n] the [pull-ups].” He also stated that B.C. was close with

his girlfriend’s eleven-year-old daughter.

Regarding the travel expenses, Father testified as follows:

Q. [(by Mother’s counsel)] Now, as far as the expense of travel from
Texas to where [B.C.] lives[,] wherever he may live, are you asking the
[j]udge to have [Mother] reimburse all that travel?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And why?

A. Due to the geographical restrictions being lifted and she
decided to move to Florida and put the distance between us, again, it
puts a financial burden on me for having to pay for all of that cost for
something she made the decision to do without prior agreement.

Q. Okay. And then, sir, once the [c]ourt is able to calculate child
support based on the financial information the [c]ourt has, are you also
asking the [c]ourt to possibly give you a little bit of a break on your
child[-]support obligation because of this extensive travel?

A. That’s correct. [Emphasis added.]

During Mother’s counsel’s questioning, Father also testified as follows:

Q. Isn’t it true that your actions lifted the geographic restriction?

A. No.

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Q. So you did not move outside of the geographic restriction
first?

A. I did not.

Q. But that’s what was found at the temporary[-]orders hearing;
isn’t that correct?

A. That’s what was assumed, correct.

Q. Okay. Did you keep [Mother] up-to-date with your addresses?

A. No.

Q. Isn’t it true that you refused to give her your address for a
five-year period?

A. I don’t know that it was a five-year period.

Q. For some time period?

A. For some time, yes.

....

Q. [Father], does that testimony look familiar to you? That’s the
temporary[-]orders transcript. Where did you say you were living at that
time?

A. Well, it doesn’t say I was living. It said I was staying. Living
and staying [are] two different things.

Q. What’s the difference between living and staying?

A. Well, the staying -- or living would be that I took residency
there, and I did not take residency staying at -- per these orders -- per
this deal was it was there for the night. And I explained to [Mother’s
counsel] that --

Q. Okay. So you would just stay there one night?

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A. I stayed there on weekends, and there’s nothing in the
geographic restrictions that says I can’t do that.

Q. And what address were you using on your bank statements? I
believe you have a few of them in front of you.

A. Yes. So when I changed the bank statement or when I
changed all the banking information --

[Mother’s counsel]: Objection; nonresponsive.

THE COURT: Sustained. Just answer the question, sir.

[Father’s counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to this line of
questioning. We’ve agreed she can live in Florida.

THE COURT: I was wondering. What do you say?

[Mother’s counsel]: Your Honor, it goes towards the blaming it on
her when he -- when his actions are the ones that lifted the geographic
restriction.

THE COURT: I would disagree. I think it was the [c]ourt’s
action that lifted the geographic restriction.

Father also denied that he had been delinquent in paying child support “[e]xcept at

the very beginning.” By the time of the trial, Father had lost his job as a construction

superintendent and had become self-employed as a handyman.

c. Rendition

At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court announced that it would order “that the

residency restriction [was] going to be the continental 48 states and [that] [M]other

[was] going to pay for the travel expenses for child and for whoever that chaperone of

15
the child would be for the visitation that was previously announced to the court.”

Father did not object to the restriction at trial.

3. Subsequent proceedings

On December 28, 2023, Father filed a motion to enter final order with a draft

order attached and asked the trial court to grant his motion and to sign the attached

order. Father’s draft order stated that Mother would have the “exclusive right to

designate the primary residence of the child within the continental United States” and

that the child’s primary residence would

be within the continental United States, and the parties shall not remove
the child from continental United States for the purpose of changing the
primary residence of the child until this geographic restriction is
modified by further order of the court of continuing jurisdiction or by a
written agreement that is signed by the parties and filed with that court.

The draft order provided for Father to buy round-trip airfare for himself and B.C. and

for Mother to reimburse him for those tickets within thirty days of purchase.

Mother then filed a motion to reconsider the reimbursement provision because

Father had booked flights that were more expensive than she felt necessary and asked

the trial court to render an order that she should be B.C.’s escort and should be

responsible for booking the flights.

a. March 4, 2024 hearing on motion to reconsider and motion to
sign

Mother, who was pregnant at the time of the hearing, testified that B.C. would

never be able to travel as an unaccompanied minor because of his disabilities. She

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presented to the trial court a comparison of her travel costs with Father’s, and the

exhibit was admitted as a summary of her testimony.

Mother explained to the trial court that Father had been flying from Texas to

Florida to pick up B.C., flying with B.C. to Texas, and then flying with B.C. back to

Florida before returning to Texas. She proposed an alternative arrangement: she

could fly to Texas with B.C.; stay in Texas with her mother while B.C. visited Father;

and then fly back with B.C., reducing parent travel from two roundtrips to one. She

asserted that Father would benefit from her proposal because he would have more

time with B.C. by not having to take off the Friday each month from work to travel to

Florida to pick up B.C. and that their time together could be spent doing something

more fun than traveling all day on a Saturday. She also complained that Father was

paying $450 per month in child support while his travel expenses, for which she had

to reimburse him, were four or five times that amount.

Several months later, Father filed another motion to sign. He attached a draft

order to the motion and asked the trial court to sign it. The draft order contained the

same provisions as his earlier proposed order.

In April 2024, Mother’s counsel withdrew. A few months later, Mother filed a

pro se motion, complaining that Father had been refusing to purchase “basic

economy” flights because the order did not require booking those. In May 2024, the

trial court granted Father’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. New counsel entered an

appearance for Father in September 2024.

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b. January 2, 2025 hearing on motion to reconsider and motion to
sign

Mother appeared pro se at the January 2025 hearing, and Father appeared with

his new counsel. Father’s counsel summarized Mother’s request as essentially asking

that Father “book[] the cheapest flight available,” but he did not raise any challenges

to the geographic restriction. Mother told the trial court the amount that Father had

paid for plane tickets in September, October, November, and December 2024 and

how much less he could have paid for basic-economy fares.

Father’s counsel then explained that booking seats closer to the bathroom

made travel better for B.C., so Father had been booking “probably the one that’s right

below the first class, to get you, you know, somewhere mid to upper part of the

airplane” with more leg room. The parties also put their remaining insurance issue

before the trial court, and Mother testified that B.C. was on an insurance plan with

her husband and their new baby. Father’s counsel informed the trial court that Father

was “soon to be married” and then would have insurance coverage available for B.C.

through his fiancée’s employment.

At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court clarified its order, stating that Father

could continue to book flights but would be responsible for “up to an $800 difference

between basic economy and whatever else he books.” Two months later, the trial

court granted another motion by Father to substitute counsel.

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In March 2025, after Father substituted new counsel, Mother filed a motion to

sign and enter the final order and attached a draft order. As with the earlier draft

orders, this one contained the same “continental United States” geographic restriction

but added, per the last hearing, that Father could purchase “any class of airline ticket

he so chooses but any cost[] that exceeds $800.00 per ticket above basic economy he

shall be responsible for.”

Two days later, Father’s new counsel, who represented him through entry of

the judgment and who represents him in this appeal, filed a motion to enter final

order and attached a draft order to his motion. His draft order contained the same

geographic-restriction and ticket-reimbursement language as Mother’s, and he asked

the trial court to enter the order “in the form attached to this motion” and for his

motion to “be in all things granted.”

c. March 20, 2025 hearing on motion to sign and enter

At the March 20, 2025 hearing, Father’s counsel announced that they had

prepared a final order and that the only issue remaining was B.C.’s health insurance.

The geographic restriction was not addressed by either party.

d. Final order and motion for new trial

On March 31, 2025, the trial court signed an order with the same terms as

addressed at the January 2025 hearing and draft orders proffered by the parties. The

next month, Father’s counsel filed a motion for new trial, complaining that the trial

court had erred “by implicitly finding that the modification of the geographic area for

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the primary residence of the child from Parker County . . . to the continental United

States” was in the child’s best interest “because there is no evidence or, in the

alternative, insufficient evidence to support that finding on the issue of modifying the

restriction on the area within which the child’s primary residence may be designated.”

The motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law.

D. Analysis

We begin by observing that “a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial

court took a specific action that the complaining party requested, a doctrine

commonly referred to as ‘the invited error’ doctrine.” Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp.,

171 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2005). “[I]t is clear in Texas law that for a party to be

estopped from asserting a position in an appellate court based on actions it took in

the trial court, the party must have ‘unequivocally taken a position in the trial court

that is clearly adverse to its position on appeal.’” In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 488

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (quoting In re Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

273 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)); see Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.

Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 589 (Tex. 1975) (holding that “[o]ne of the requirements for

application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is that the statement must be

deliberate, clear, and unequivocal”); cf. SISU Energy LLC v. Hartman, No. 02-19-00436-

CV, 2020 WL 4006725, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (holding invited-error doctrine did not apply when nothing in the record showed

that the appellants had asked the trial court to sign the complained-of order).

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At trial, Father offered no geographic restriction in exchange for payment of

his travel expenses. The trial court then determined that the geographic limitation

would be the “continental 48 states” and that Mother would pay the travel expenses.

Despite his frequent changes in legal representation, Father remained consistent in,

without objection, setting out the “continental United States” geographic restriction in

his motions to enter a final order and the draft orders he attached to those motions

and asked the trial court to sign. The trial court signed an order containing these

terms. Father raised no complaints about them until he filed his new-trial motion,

which was overruled by operation of law.

However, even if Father did not invite the trial court to commit what he now

contends on appeal was error, the record does not reflect an abuse of discretion under

the relevant Lenz factors.

Mother testified that B.C.—who was ten years old and suffered from severe

autism—had access to a special school and behavioral therapy in Florida. Father

presented no evidence at trial (or at any subsequent hearing) that B.C. had the same or

better educational and therapy options in Texas. Similarly, Mother testified at trial

about B.C.’s “very robust” Florida insurance policy that covered his ABA therapy

without a cap on the number of sessions, while Father testified that he did not have

21
health insurance for B.C. at the job he had lost in July 2022. 7 Mother’s testimony

presented evidence upon which the trial court could determine the health and

education opportunities offered by the move, the degree of educational enhancement

for B.C., and the accommodation of B.C.’s special needs. See C.B., 2020 WL 241382,

at *6 (summarizing Lenz factors).

Further, Mother also asked the trial court to consider imposing no geographic

restriction because limiting her, as the custodial parent, to Manatee County would

present a hardship if she and her new husband had to move to a different area of

Florida, whereas such a move would not impose any additional flight burden on

Father and B.C. Father testified that he had become self-employed as a handyman,

and the trial court could have inferred that Father could do that type of work from

anywhere, even though Father did not mention whether he had considered relocating

to Florida. The trial testimony presented evidence upon which the trial court

(1) could assess reasons for and against imposing any restriction, including

extrapolating a future in which Mother and her new husband might find a state other

than Florida or Texas with even better opportunities for B.C., and (2) could determine

that it would be in B.C.’s best interest to avoid another four years of litigation to

facilitate that move. See E.D., 2022 WL 60781, at *11 (requiring the appellate court to

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Father’s counsel stated at a later hearing that B.C. would have access to
insurance when Father married his fiancée, but no details were provided about that
insurance plan.

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imply that the trial court had made all findings necessary to support its order when no

fact findings were filed).

While Father testified that B.C. was close to his girlfriend’s eleven-year-old

daughter, the trial court could have reasonably determined that the opportunities

presented to B.C. by the move outweighed his relationship with Father’s girlfriend’s

child. The trial court also had before it Mother’s testimony that Father had previously

failed to pay child support or to exercise regular visitation with B.C.—despite their

geographic proximity—between 2015 and 2021. It also had Father’s denial that he

had refused to give Mother his address for five years and his insistence—with regard

to whether he had violated the previous, more limited, geographic restriction—that

“living and staying” were “two different things.” The trial court could have

considered this in its determination of whether Father had a good-faith motive in

opposing any of Mother’s requests.8 See C.B., 2020 WL 241382, at *6–9 (applying

Lenz factors).

In light of the trial court’s assessment of travel expenses against Mother for a

visitation schedule that would allow the continuation of a meaningful relationship

between Father and B.C. wherever B.C. might be in the continental United States, we

cannot say that the trial court had legally or factually insufficient evidence upon which

to make its decision or that the trial court abused its discretion by doing so.

The trial court was aware of the parties’ contentious history, noting at one
8

point during trial, “[O]bviously, y’all aren’t getting along because y’all are here in the
courtroom.”

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Accordingly, to the extent that Father did not invite the error of which he now

complains, see Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 862, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by enlarging the geographic restriction to the continental United

States, and we overrule Father’s sole issue.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled Father’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel
Justice

Delivered: March 12, 2026

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