Gere Jay Minnick v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00404-CR

Gere Jay Minnick, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 33RD DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY
NO. 51969, THE HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING

ME MO RAN DU M O PI N I O N

Gere Jay Minnick appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and

adjudicating him guilty of the offense of repeated violation of a protective order. He argues the

trial court ran afoul of rules of evidence and his constitutional rights when it found he violated

certain conditions of probation—including those requiring reporting to the probation department,

paying court costs and fees, and prohibiting contact with the complainant. Because Minnick pled

true to the violation of a separate condition—and that violation is unquestionably free of

constitutional taint—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating guilt. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2021, Minnick pled guilty to a third-degree felony—repeated violation of a

protective order. See Tex. Penal Code § 25.072. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court deferred

adjudication and placed Minnick on five years’ community supervision. Three years in, the State
filed its first amended request for adjudication alleging violations of six discrete conditions of

probation. The trial court held a hearing, at which the State went forward on five of the six alleged

violations. At the beginning of the hearing, Minnick pled not true to all but one allegation. He

pled true to violating condition 13, which required that he perform community service. At the end

of the hearing, at which several witnesses including Minnick testified, and the trial court admitted

exhibits, the trial court found four of the five allegations that the State went forward on true. It

found Minnick

• failed to report to the probation officer (violating condition 5);
• failed to perform community service (violating condition 13);
• failed to pay delinquent court costs and fees (violating condition 14); and
• communicated with or contacted the complainant (violating condition 15).

It found the allegation that Minnick violated condition 11, which required he obtain

permission prior to any change of address, not true. The trial court adjudicated guilt and sentenced

Minnick to 5 years’ imprisonment.

ANALYSIS

Adjudication

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge

is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing conducted under Article 42A.751(d) in

a case in which the adjudication of guilt was not deferred.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.108(b).

The appellate standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hacker v. State,

389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court abuses its discretion if the State has

failed to meet its burden of proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App.

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1984); Wade v. State, 693 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.). The State’s burden

is to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer violated a condition of

community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. A fact is

proven by a preponderance of the evidence if the greater weight of the credible evidence created a

reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759,

764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial court at a probation revocation hearing “is the sole judge

of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Hacker,

389 S.W.3d at 865. The finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to

support revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Caballero v. State,

706 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.).

Application

Minnick challenges only three of the four findings of true. Minnick complains that

the trial court

• violated his due process rights because it failed to inquire into his ability to pay before
finding he violated condition 14 (the requirement to pay certain costs and fees);
• violated his confrontation rights and considered unreliable evidence—his probation
officer’s supervisor’s hearsay testimony—to find that he violated condition 5 (the
requirement to report to a probation officer); and
• abused its discretion in admitting and relying on unauthenticated and innocuous emails
Minnick wrote to the complainant in finding he violated condition 15 (the prohibition
barring communicating with or contacting the complainant).

Minnick does not challenge the true finding that he failed to perform community

service, violating condition 13, on any grounds. Minnick pled true to the violation. And Matt

Boultinghouse, Minnick’s probation officer, testified that Minnick, who was on his current

caseload, had “no reported community service hours worked.” The trial court—the sole judge of

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the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony—could have found

that testimony credible, especially considering Minnick’s admission. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865;

Wade, 693 S.W.3d at 864. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that violation true.

Again, the State needs to prove only a single violation to support a revocation.

Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26; Caballero, 706 S.W.3d at 566. An appellate court can rely on a single

violation in affirming a revocation of community supervision, so long as “the violation upon

which the reviewing court relies to uphold the trial court’s ruling is itself unquestionably free of

constitutional taint.” Dansby v. State, 398 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). And here, it

is. Minnick does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he violated condition 13 on sufficiency

grounds or otherwise claim the finding is somehow infirm. 1 And the record demonstrates the trial

court’s finding is supportable independent of the confrontation, evidentiary, and spirit-of-the-law

taints that Minnick argues inhere in the other findings. See id. at 241.

1
Minnick does argue, somewhat globally, that the trial court’s adjudication infringed upon
his due process rights. See Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). It did not.
Here, Minnick had written notice of the claimed violations of his probation and the
evidence against him via the State’s requests for adjudication. That notice set out the conditions
the State alleged he had violated and the specifics of each alleged violation. The final revocation
of probation was preceded by an adversarial hearing before a neutral fact finder—the trial court.
At that hearing the State put on evidence of the violations through two of Minnick’s probation
officers, Karen Cozby and Matt Boultinghouse; a third probation officer’s supervisor Alexis
Adams; and the complainant, who testified Minnick had repeatedly tried to contact her and sent
her texts—which were admitted into evidence. Minnick was represented by counsel and had the
opportunity to cross examine each witness and did so. Minnick himself testified. And the trial
court clearly articulated its rulings on the record. See id. at 41-42 (setting out the Gagnon v.
Scarpelli “minimum requirements of due process” which must be observed in probation revocation
hearings); Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520, 523–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (noting procedure for
revoking probation in Texas goes beyond that outlined in Gagnon v. Scarpelli because it affords
probationer right to adversary proceeding in which almost all rules of evidence and criminal
procedure apply and right to counsel).
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CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation and adjudicating

Minnick on the original offense. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 864; Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garcia,

387 S.W.3d at 26; Dansby, 398 S.W.3d at 240. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.2

__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: August 27, 2025

Do Not Publish

2
Minnick asks that, if we do not reverse the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and remand
for further proceedings, we modify the judgment to remove any probation violations unsupported
by sufficient evidence. We note that the probation violations are not listed in the judgment.
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