Angelos Kolobotos v. City of Dallas

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 12, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00069-CV

ANGELOS KOLOBOTOS, Appellant
V.
CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-13349

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
Angelos Kolobotos1 appeals the denial of his motion for new trial following

the trial court’s granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Dallas. In three

issues, Kolobotos argues: (1) no legally or factually sufficient evidence supported

the denial of Kolobotos’ motion for new trial; (2) due to the trial court’s error in

failing to grant the motion for new trial, Kolobotos should be granted a chance to

1
The record reflects that in the trial court there were two named plaintiffs, Stamatina Holdings,
LLC, and Tenants of 1918 Duluth Street. The City filed a counterclaim which named the original
plaintiffs, the property in rem, and Kolobotos (including several aliases) as counter-defendants.
On appeal, the only named party is Angelos Kolobotos.
respond to the City’s motion for summary judgment which he lost on default; and

(3) trial counsel was negligent and caused the default judgment by withdrawing on

the day a response was due to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment. We affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

The central dispute involves property conditions of an occupied multi-family

eight-unit apartment complex. The underlying facts are well known to the parties

and will only be set forth herein for purposes of the issues on appeal which relate to

the denial of the motion for new trial and Kolobotos’ averred inability to respond to

the City’s motion for summary judgment.

The last jury trial setting before rendition of summary judgment was August

30, 2022. The City filed its traditional motion for summary judgment on August 8,

2022, and it was set for hearing by submission on September 19, 2022. The record

is clear that Kolobotos received notice of the hearing on the motion for summary

judgment, and his knowledge of the filing and submission date is not disputed.

On September 13, 2022, trial counsel Leslie Adams filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel for Kolobotos and other named plaintiffs. On September 15,

2022, Kolobotos’ newly retained counsel, Marc Traynor, filed a letter of appearance

advising that prior counsel Adams had withdrawn seven days before the summary

judgment hearing and that “we have filed a motion for continuance.” The motion

for continuance of the hearing on the City’s summary judgment motion was file

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stamped September 20, 2022. The continuance motion recited that the motion for

summary judgment was pending, and prior trial counsel failed to respond to the

summary judgment motion within the statutory time. The motion further requested

an extension on the [continuance] ruling and time to respond to the City’s motion,

asked the trial court to reset the hearing currently set for September 19, and again

advised the court that Adams had withdrawn seven days before the current hearing

date. The City opposed the continuance as untimely, noting it was filed the day after

the hearing submission date.

The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on November

15, 2022.2 Kolobotos filed a motion for new trial and rehearing regarding the City’s

motion for summary judgment on December 2, 2022. The trial court denied

Kolobotos’ motion for new trial on January 12, 2023, and this appeal timely

followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial under an abuse of

discretion standard. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex.

2009) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable

2
The docket sheet reflects that a status conference was set for November 10, 2022, on the
City’s motion for summary judgment. Reference is made to the status conference in the motion
for new trial, but the appeal was submitted without a reporter’s record; therefore, there is nothing
for us to consider.
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or arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. K–

Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).

Kolobotos relies upon Craddock to support his argument that he is entitled to

a new trial. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).

Under Craddock, a movant for new trial must (1) establish that the failure to answer

was not intentional or due to conscious indifference, but rather, was due to mistake

or an accident, (2) set up a meritorious defense, and (3) demonstrate that the granting

of a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff. Craddock, 133

S.W.2d at 126.

The City contends that Craddock is inapplicable in a summary judgment

context. Specifically, the City relies upon Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons

Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002), wherein the Texas Supreme Court held that,

in a summary judgment default situation where the defaulting party failed to file a

timely response but had time prior to entry of the summary judgment to obtain leave

to file an untimely response or to obtain a continuance, Craddock did not apply.

“Our purpose in adopting the Craddock standard was to alleviate unduly harsh and

unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy

available.” Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (citing Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126). In

such situations, the court considers whether a party who files a motion for leave to

file a late summary judgment response establishes “good cause” by showing that the

failure to timely respond (1) was not intentional or the result of conscious

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indifference, but the result of accident or mistake, and (2) allowing a late response

will not cause any undue delay or otherwise injure the other party. Id. at 688. The

Carpenter court then held that

We do not decide today whether Craddock should apply when a
nonmovant discovers its mistake after the summary-judgment hearing
or rendition of judgment. But we disapprove of . . . court of appeals
decisions to the extent that they can be read to hold that all of the
Craddock factors must be met when a nonmovant is aware of its
mistake at or before the summary-judgment hearing and thus has an
opportunity to apply for relief under our rules.

Id. at 686.

As Kolobotos was aware of the failure to respond at or before the summary

judgment hearing, he had an opportunity to apply for relief under the rules. Id. at

685. (“Our summary-judgment rules afford a party in this situation an opportunity

to obtain additional time to file a response, either by moving for leave to file a late

response or by requesting a continuance of the summary-judgment hearing. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), 251.”). Kolobotos avers that his failure to respond was due

to his trial counsel’s withdrawal on the day the response was due. However, the

record reflects new counsel was retained and knew about the summary judgment

motion and hearing by the submission date. Kolobotos thereafter actually availed

himself of one of the remedies under the rules by requesting a continuance, albeit

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untimely, of the summary judgment hearing.3 As more fully addressed below, we

agree with the City that Carpenter applies.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: No legal or factually sufficient evidence supported denying Kolobotos’
Motion for New Trial

Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support the denial by
Court of Appellant’s Motion for New Trial; when it is clear Appellant
was legally checkmated and could not response [sic] to the Summary
Judgment Motion, that the MNT was regarding. Appellant’s attorney
of record, Leslie Adams, withdrew, the day the response was due,
Appellant’s new counsel Marc Traynor was not allowed to substitute in
as attorney of record by the Court, and the Court refused to allow
Appellant to respond pro se. Clearly, per Craddock, Appellant did not
show conscious indifference to the process, and should not lose on
default.

The chronology of events is not challenged. Kolobotos’ trial counsel Leslie Adams,

after sending his client the requisite notification letter for withdrawal on September

9, 2022, filed a motion to withdraw on September 13, 2022, with a proposed order.

Marc Traynor filed a notice of appearance with a proposed order granting

substitution of counsel. The notice of appearance acknowledged the pending

summary judgment hearing, stated a motion for continuance was filed, and the

failure to file a timely response was due to the withdrawal of prior counsel. The

3
Although no order granting the continuance is in the file, the record reflects a status
conference was held and the summary judgment signed thereafter. Despite purported confusion
relative to legal representation, the record does not reflect any ruling by the court or effort to bring
this issue to the trial court’s attention.
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motion for continuance was file stamped the day after the submission date for

summary judgment consideration with a proposed order granting the continuance.

The record does not reflect any actions taken to have the trial court rule on these

pending motions or proposed orders. Neither a motion for leave to file a late

response, nor a late filed response is in the record. Other than a letter to the court

regarding the continuance and the City’s response to the letter on September 23,

2022, in the almost two months between the summary judgment submission date,

the status conference, and the entry of summary judgment, the record is silent

concerning whether additional relief was sought under the rules for any pending

motion relative to counsel’s withdrawal, counsel’s substitution, or summary

judgment.

As stated above, Kolobotos erroneously relies upon the Craddock three-

pronged test to establish his entitlement to a new trial due to a default judgment,

when he knew summary judgment was pending and he had remedies under the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure before the hearing date and before summary judgment was

entered. This court’s precedent has followed Carpenter when presented with similar

or more compelling circumstances. See McCray v McCray, 2020 WL 831612 *5

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2020); see also Dugan v. Compass Bank, 129 S.W.3d 579 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Kolobotos is not entitled to rely on Craddock in the

summary judgment context because there were remedies available under the rules.

Kolobotos was required to and did seek a continuance, albeit a day after the hearing

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was set. Kolobotos, however, never received a ruling on the continuance motion

and never filed or sought leave to file a late response.4

In Carpenter, the supreme court articulated the following test where the

nonmovant has an opportunity to seek leave to file a late response to the motion for

summary judgment:

[A] motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response should
be granted when a litigant establishes good cause for failing to timely
respond by showing that (1) the failure to respond was not intentional
or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of accident or
mistake, and (2) allowing the late response will occasion no undue
delay or otherwise injure the party seeking summary judgment.

Id at 688. Neither a motion for leave to file, nor late summary-judgment response

was filed. New trial counsel made an appearance before the date set for hearing

and, although counsel advised the trial court in correspondence that Kolobotos “filed

a motion for continuance,” it was filed the day after the date set for summary

judgment submission. Notwithstanding that submission setting, a status conference

was set for the summary judgment motion, and the trial court did not rule on the

motion for summary judgment until November 15, 2022, almost two months after

the original setting. No response or motion for leave to file a late response was filed.

In fact, in the motion for new trial, counsel stated:

4
The motion to withdraw, the motion to substitute counsel and the motion for continuance
were never challenged for failure to rule. As no issue is raised, we do not further address these
issues.
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while a response to the pending motion for summary judgment could
have been filed before judgment was entered, it did not seem pressing,
given the course of dealings.
* * *

I am ready and able to respond to the City’s motion for summary
judgment, and many issues of fact and law are in dispute.

No good cause has been shown for failing to respond, or failing to file a motion for

leave to file a late response as permitted under the rules. Kolobotos failed to

establish—after the motion for continuance was filed, the submission date passed

without the trial court ruling, and a status conference was held—that the failure to

respond was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of

accident or mistake. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Kolobotos’ motion for a new trial. We overrule Kolobotos’ first issue.

Issue 2: Due to trial court’s error in failing to grant the Motion for New Trial,
Kolobotos should be granted a chance to respond to the City’s Motion for
Summary Judgment which he lost on default.

Our disposition of Kolobotos’ first issue is dispositive of his second issue.

Kolobotos failed to meet the standard set forth in Carpenter; therefore, the trial court

did not err in failing to grant the motion for new trial, and there is no further

opportunity under the rules to respond to the City’s motion. We overrule Kolobotos’

second issue.

Issue 3: Trial counsel was negligent and caused the default judgment by
withdrawing the day a response was due to the City’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.

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In his third issue, Kolobotos argues as follows:

Attorney Leslie Adams prejudiced his client in front of the Court, and
his actions led to Appellant’s default Judgment, when Adams failed to
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed against his client;
and failed to withdraw in a fair and equitable way. Appellant’s default
regarding Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment was due to
Attorney Leslie Adamass [sic] negligence regarding Appellant’s case
at the trial level.

We construe Kolobotos’ third issue as an argument that his trial counsel was

ineffective.5 “Generally, the right to the effective assistance of counsel does not

apply in a civil case.” Dugan, 129 S.W.3d at 582 (citing Approximately $42,850.00

v. State, 44 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)).

Dugan occurred in the context of a jury trial rather than a summary judgment

proceeding. Id at 581 (“lawyer abandoned their case and failed to represent them at

trial”). Kolobotos complains that Adams’ failure to respond by the summary

judgment deadline or to “withdraw in a fair and equitable way” led to the default

judgment.

Kolobotos first retained the attorney of his choice, Leslie Adams, who

withdrew on the eve of the statutory response date for the motion for summary

judgment. A new attorney was quickly retained, made an appearance, and advised

the court through written correspondence of the circumstances faced by his client,

including the desired continuance of the summary judgment proceeding. On this

5
To the extent Kolobotos is alleging a separate cause of action for negligence against trial
counsel, that issue is not properly before us on appeal.
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record, Carpenter applies to the circumstances here, and Kolobotos cannot rely on

Craddock. Given that the motion to withdraw, the motion for substitution of

counsel, and the belated filing of the motion for continuance had all been filed before

the rendition of summary judgment, it was incumbent on Kolobotos to challenge on

appeal the failure to rule or to grant the continuance, and he has failed to do so.6 We

overrule Kolobotos’ third issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE
230069F.P05

6
We note once again without further discussion the record shows there was a two-month delay
during which a status conference was conducted before summary judgment was entered. To the
extent the other pending motions and the trial court’s failure to rule on them are alleged to have
affected any additional filings, those have not been challenged in this appeal and cannot be
addressed.
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

ANGELOS KOLOBOTOS, On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial
Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-13349.
No. 05-23-00069-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice
Goldstein. Justices Reichek and
CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee Garcia participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee CITY OF DALLAS recover its costs of this
appeal from appellant ANGELOS KOLOBOTOS.

Judgment entered this 12th day of July 2024.

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