Juan Alberto Salazar Meza v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 29, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00375-CR

JUAN ALBERTO SALAZAR MEZA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 219-82319-2022

OPINION
Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
Juan Alberto Salazar Meza appeals his continuous sexual abuse of a child

conviction. A jury convicted appellant and sentenced him to fifty years’

confinement. In two issues, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to submit

a lesser-included offense instruction to the jury, and the evidence is legally

insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND

In June 2022, appellant was charged by indictment with continuous sexual

assault of C.V., a child younger than fourteen, on or about the first day of November

2021 through the seventeenth day of March 2022.

At trial in March 2023, C.V. testified she was twelve years old at the time of

trial, and she lived in an apartment in Plano with her mother, nine-year-old sister,

I.V., and her younger brother. When C.V. first met appellant, she thought he was

her “mom’s friend,” but she also thought appellant and her mother were “dating”

because he would “stay over” at their apartment sometimes. C.V. thought appellant

was “cool” because he helped her with her homework, cooked food, and took C.V.

and her sister and brother for ice cream. At that time, C.V.’s mother worked two

jobs, and appellant usually came over on Thursdays at approximately 4:00 p.m.

when C.V.’s mother left for work. C.V.’s mother usually came home from work at

11:00 p.m., and appellant stayed the night.

C.V. moved to the Plano apartment in “early 2021.” Appellant sometimes

tickled C.V. and, when C.V. was eleven years old and living in the Plano apartment,

appellant was tickling C.V. on her tummy when he “decided to change it up a little”

and started “touching [C.V.’s] private” over her clothes. C.V. testified that her

“private” was her “front bottom” that girls use to “pee.” Appellant moved his hand

“up and down,” and C.V. felt “very uncomfortable” and “confused as to what

–2–
[appellant] was trying to do.” C.V. “moved away,” appellant stopped touching her,

and “[t]hings just went back to normal, I guess we stopped playing.”

In the apartment living room, there were two couches: a “gray couch and a

long brown [couch]” arranged in an “L form.” On another occasion, C.V.’s sister

was playing outside, her brother was asleep on the brown couch, and C.V. and

appellant were on the gray couch when appellant touched C.V.’s “front part” with

his hand moving “up and down” both “over and under” her clothes. C.V. was

wearing loose shorts, and appellant moved his hand up her thigh and under C.V.’s

underwear where he “started doing the same movement as he did over the clothes to

[C.V.’s] front private.” Appellant’s fingers went inside C.V.’s “front private part,”

and it felt “[w]eird but not in a good way and it kind of hurt.” Appellant moved his

fingers “[i]n and out” of C.V.’s private part for “30 seconds, a minute” and stopped

when C.V.’s brother “moved a little bit like he was about to wake up.” C.V.’s

brother “kind of went back to sleep,” and appellant touched C.V. again “in the same

way,” but this time appellant took C.V.’s hand and “forced [her] to touch” his private

part outside his pants.

When asked if there was a time when appellant touched C.V. and himself at

the same time, C.V. described an assault that occurred when she was watching

YouTube on her laptop in her top bunk bed. Appellant stood on the lower bunk bed

and reached up to “put his fingers inside of [C.V.’s] private part.” C.V. could tell

appellant was also touching himself because C.V. heard appellant’s “bracelets

–3–
jingling.” C.V. testified there were other times appellant touched her and himself at

the same time, but she did not remember the details.

C.V. testified there were also times when appellant put his mouth on her front

private part. These assaults happened in C.V.’s bunk bed and “especially in the

bedroom” on the queen-sized bed. C.V. described one instance in which appellant

climbed up on the top bunk with C.V., pulled C.V.’s shorts and underwear

“somewhere down [her] legs,” and licked C.V.’s private part. Similar assaults

occurred in the queen bed “[m]ore than five times probably” and in C.V.’s bunk bed

“more than once, less than five” times.

C.V. remembered one occasion when she was lying on her stomach and

watching YouTube on the queen bed. Appellant sat on the bed, lifted C.V. from the

hips, pulled down C.V.’s shorts and underwear, took out his private part, and “tried

to put it in [C.V.’s] private part.” This assault “hurt a lot,” and appellant was not

able to put his private part in C.V.’s private part. Nevertheless, appellant’s private

part contacted C.V.’s private part. Appellant “kept trying to, like, put it in” and kept

putting C.V. in “that position,” but eventually he “gave up.”

On more than one occasion in her mother’s bedroom, appellant tried

unsuccessfully to put his private part in C.V.’s “bottom,” which she identified as the

part she used for “[p]ooping.” C.V. testified appellant’s private part contacted her

bottom, and he tried to put his private part in the “hole.”

–4–
C.V. testified an assault occurred on the brown couch where appellant pulled

down her “pants or shorts or whatever [she] was wearing and [her] underwear,” took

out his private part, and touched himself. C.V. knew he was “messing with his

private part” because of “the bracelets.” C.V. felt “this warm temperature” in her

bottom and, when appellant left to go to the restroom, saw white liquid on her

bottom. Appellant “came back in with toilet paper and he wiped off the thing from

[her] bottom.”

Around February 2022, C.V. told her mother that appellant was touching her,

but appellant “lied” when C.V.’s mother talked to him. C.V.’s mother told C.V. “not

to tell anyone else about it,” and appellant continued to come over on Thursdays.

Appellant acted “normal for a little bit” but started “doing things” to C.V. again.

In March 2022, C.V. was called into the counselor’s office at school. C.V.

did not know, at first, why she was called into the office, but the counselor

“mentioned something” about how C.V.’s sister told the counselor “about the things

that were going on in the home.” C.V. testified she did not “remember everything

that [she] told the counselor,” but she remembered crying while talking to the

counselor and she “believed” she told the counselor what appellant was doing to her.

C.V. remembered that, after talking to the counselor, she was taken to “another

place” to do an interview.

Catie Daniels, a forensic interviewer at the Collin County Children’s

Advocacy Center, testified that some of the things an interviewer looks for in a

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forensic interview are general details, sensory details, consistency, chronological

order, and “red flags.” General details are the “who, what, where, how something

happened.” Sensory details are “things that you feel, you hear, you see, you taste”

and includes “things that you’ve really experienced.” Consistency is present when

the interviewer asks a child a question and the child gives the same answer even if

the interviewer has asked the question in a different way. Daniels described

chronological order as “being able to talk about something from the beginning to the

end.” “Red flags” are “things in the interview that arise that are questionable” such

as an inability to give the interviewer any type of details about the abuse.

Daniels testified she interviewed C.V. in March 2022. C.V. was “able to

describe things that amounted to sexual abuse,” she used age-appropriate terms, she

described the abuse and how it felt in detail, and she demonstrated “the position that

she would have to get in or that [appellant] would want her to be in” over the queen

bed during the abuse. During the interview, C.V. “talked about how her sister was

also aware of the situation” and knew her sister had told the counselor in the

beginning of the week which led to C.V.’s outcry to the counselor and the forensic

interview that followed. Specifically, C.V. “talked about how her sister had

witnessed seeing them under the blankets, the [appellant] and [C.V.], at times.” As

Daniels “talked through all of these things with [C.V.],” C.V. was able to remain

consistent in discussing the instances of abuse and gave chronological details and

sensory details.

–6–
C.V.’s sister, I.V., testified she initially liked appellant but stopped liking him

when she sometimes noticed that C.V. “had a blanket and [appellant] put, like, his

hand under the blanket.” I.V. did not know what was happening, and she asked C.V.

what was happening. At first, C.V. did not say what was happening, but the second

time I.V. asked C.V. told her “the truth.” C.V. told I.V. that appellant “used to like

touch her on her privates while he put his hand under the blanket.” One day at

school, a counselor came and gave a lesson about “nobody touch you on your parts.”

That same day, I.V. told her teacher what was happening. I.V. was “scared that they

would be mad at [her] for telling [her] teacher.” At the conclusion of the evidence,

the jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual assault of a child. This appeal

followed.

DISCUSSION

In his first issue, appellant complains the trial court erred in denying his

request to submit a jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of indecency with

a child by touching.

At the charge conference, appellant’s counsel requested “a lesser-included

offense of fondling.” Counsel continued, “if the jury were to conclude that

obviously he did not commit this more than one time, then, again, there has been

testimony that the jury could conclude that the hands under the blanket can be some

form of fondling.” The prosecutor responded:

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I think I would -- obviously if we’re going to put a lesser in the charge
we would need more specificity as to which lesser. Are you asking for
aggravated sexual assault by penetration of her vagina with his hand or
are you asking for indecency with a child by his hand contacting her
vagina? Just putting a lesser of fondling I don’t think is something we
can do.

Defense counsel answered that he had “no objections to the touching with the

hand of the vagina or -- they talked about the touching of the breast, there was breast

contact touching.” The prosecutor countered that “that wouldn’t be a lesser-included

because it’s not part of the continuous offense.” The trial court took the discussion

off the record. Back on the record, the trial court stated that both the State and the

defense had the proposed charge of the court. The trial court asked if either party

had “any objections, or requests for instructions to the charge” and both the State

and the defense stated they had no objections.

Appellant did not request a jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of

indecency with a child by touching. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (requiring a timely

request, objection, or motion to preserve a complaint for appellate review).

Appellant initially requested “a lesser-included offense of fondling” but after an off-

the-record discussion, affirmed that there were no objections or requests that

instructions be added to the charge following the charge conference. Unrequested

defensive instructions are still subject to ordinary rules of procedural default.

Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). A defendant cannot

complain for the first time on appeal about the lack of a defensive instruction absent

preservation of the error. Id. Moreover, specific to requests for lesser-included
–8–
offenses, the defendant must point to evidence in the record that raises the lesser-

included offense. Id. On this record we conclude appellant failed to preserve this

issue for our review. See id. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

show that he committed multiple instances of sexual abuse against C.V. over a

period of more than thirty days.1

The indictment charging appellant with continuous sexual abuse of a child

under 14, citing penal code section 21.02(b), alleged the abuse occurred “on or about

the 1st day of November, 2021 through the 17th day of March 2022” under Count I,

aggravated sexual assault of a child, and alleged appellant, “during a period that was

30 days or more in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against

[C.V.]” and alleged four types of acts.2 The indictment tracks the elements of an

offense of continuous sexual assault of a young child under section 21.02 of the

penal code. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b)(1).3 Appellant contends that C.V.

1
Appellant incorrectly states that he was indicted under section 22.01 of the penal code, “which requires
proof that two acts of sexual abuse occurred over a period of more than 30 days,” then argues the evidence
was legally insufficient under section 21.02 of the penal code. We discern the first penal code reference
was an inadvertent error and proceed with an analysis under section 21.02.
2
Count II of the indictment charged appellant with indecency with a child.
3
(b) A person commits an offense if:
(1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual
abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and
(2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or
older and the victim is:
(A) a child younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the victim
at the time of the offense; or

–9–
made a “clear allegation that an act of abuse occurred in 2021,” but there were not

sufficient allegations to show that any other incident occurred more than thirty days

after the first incident. In making this argument, appellant complains that evidence

of other incidents of abuse only alleged “‘something’ happening.” This is the

entirety of appellant’s argument, and it is not supported by the record.

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard

of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d

286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard,

we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State,

330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted

at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.

State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899;

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the

factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their

testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard is deferential

(B) a disabled individual.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b).
–10–
and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh

the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the

weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the

factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, if

the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved

the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson,

443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012);

Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and

circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v.

State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and

independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214

S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we treat

direct and circumstantial evidence equally, and we must consider the cumulative

force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.

2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi, 330

S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

–11–
A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if

(1) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more

acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed

against one or more victims and (2) at the time of the commission of each act of

sexual abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child

younger than fourteen years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of

the victim at the time the offense is committed. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b). “[A]ct

of sexual abuse” means an act that violates one or more enumerated penal laws of

section 21.02(c), which includes the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child

and indecency with a child by contact. Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4); see also id.

§§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021. Here, the indictment alleged appellant committed two or

more acts of sexual abuse against C.V. during a period of thirty or more days in

duration, to-wit: the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency

with a child by contact. See id. § 21.02(b).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has for decades recognized that child

victims cannot be expected to testify with the same clarity and ability that is expected

of mature and capable adults. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1990). Therefore, “[t]he legislature created the offense of continuous sexual

abuse of a child in response to a need to address sexual assaults against young

children who are normally unable to identify the exact dates of the offenses when

there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse.” Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex.

–12–
App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); see also Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 890 n.7

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring)).

The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for

continuous sexual abuse of a child. Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07; Villalon,

791 S.W.2d at 134. Furthermore, corroboration of the victim’s testimony by medical

or physical evidence is not required. Gonzalez Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 332

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); see also Cantu v. State, 366

S.W.3d 771, 775–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d

452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006). Thus, C.V.’s testimony, without more, can be sufficient to support a

conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271.

“[A]lthough the exact dates of the [sexual] abuse need not be proven, the

offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child does require proof that there were two

or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or more

days in duration.” Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561; see also Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d

41, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The jury was charged to

determine whether the abuse occurred “during a period that was 30 days or more in

duration.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b)(1). Here, appellant challenges only the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the duration element of the offense: he

–13–
contends that C.V.’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence for the jury to

reasonably infer that the sexually abusive acts he allegedly committed against her

occurred over a period of more than thirty days.

“Speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of the

facts and evidence presented.” Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). Conversely, “an inference is a

conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence

from them.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). “Juries are permitted to draw

multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence as long as each inference is

supported by the evidence presented at trial[.]” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at

15).

Although not cited by appellant, three cases from the Eastland court of appeals

addressed circumstances in which, although the child victims could not recall

specific dates that the alleged abuses occurred, that court affirmed the convictions

based on other benchmarks in the victim’s testimony that permitted the jury to infer

that the acts of sexual abuse spanned a period of thirty days or longer. See Wishert

v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d); Soto v. State,

No. 11-19-00214-CR, 2021 WL 3235881, *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2021,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Michell, 381 S.W.3d 554. These

benchmarks included the various addresses where the child victims lived when the

different abuses occurred, the sheer number of abuses, and testimony from the

–14–
victims about their ages when the acts of sexual abuse occurred. See Soto, 2021 WL

3235881, at *4–5; Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561. Finding this persuasive authority

applicable in the instant case, we proceed with an analysis of the benchmarks present

here.

C.V. testified she moved to the Plano apartment in “early 2021,” and appellant

contends in his argument that C.V. made a “clear allegation that an act of abuse

occurred in 2021.”4 Appellant sometimes tickled C.V. and, when C.V. was eleven

years old and living in the Plano apartment, appellant was tickling C.V. on her

tummy when he started “touching [C.V.’s] private” over her clothes. Appellant

usually came over on Thursdays at approximately 4:00 p.m. when C.V.’s mother left

for work. C.V.’s mother usually came home from work at 11:00 p.m., and appellant

stayed the night.

On another occasion, C.V.’s sister was playing outside, her brother was asleep

on the brown couch, and C.V. and appellant were on the gray couch when appellant

touched C.V.’s “front part” with his hand moving “up and down” both “over and

under” her clothes. Appellant moved his fingers “[i]n and out” of C.V.’s private part

for “30 seconds, a minute” and stopped when C.V.’s brother “moved a little bit like

he was about to wake up.” C.V.’s brother “kind of went back to sleep,” and appellant

4
Appellant appears not to dispute one clear allegation of abuse in 2021 but avers there were not
sufficient allegations to show that any other incident occurred more than thirty days after the first incident.
–15–
touched C.V. again “in the same way,” but this time appellant took C.V.’s hand and

“forced [her] to touch” his private part outside his pants.

C.V. testified about another incident that occurred in her top bunk bed.

Appellant stood on the lower bunk bed and reached up to “put his fingers inside of

[C.V.’s] private part.” C.V. could tell appellant was also touching himself because

C.V. heard appellant’s “bracelets jingling.” C.V. testified there were other times

appellant touched her and himself at the same time, but she did not remember the

details.

C.V. testified there were also times when appellant put his mouth on her front

private part. These assaults happened in C.V.’s bunk bed and “especially in the

bedroom” on a queen-sized bed. C.V. described an incident in which appellant

climbed up on the top bunk with C.V., pulled C.V.’s shorts and underwear down

“somewhere down [her] legs,” and licked C.V.’s private part. Similar assaults

occurred in the queen bed “[m]ore than five times probably” and in C.V.’s bunk bed

“more than once, less than five” times.

C.V. testified about an incident that occurred when she was lying on her

stomach and watching YouTube on the queen bed. Appellant sat on the bed, lifted

C.V. from the hips, pulled down C.V.’s shorts and underwear, took out his private

part, and “tried to put it in [C.V.’s] private part.” This assault “hurt a lot,” and

appellant was not able to put his private part in C.V.’s private part. Nevertheless,

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appellant’s private part contacted C.V.’s private part. Appellant “kept trying to, like,

put it in” and kept putting C.V. in “that position,” but eventually he “gave up.”

On more than one occasion in her mother’s bedroom, appellant tried

unsuccessfully to put his private part in C.V.’s “bottom,” which she identified as the

part she used for “[p]ooping.” C.V. testified appellant’s private part contacted her

bottom and he tried to put his private part in the “hole.”

C.V. testified an incident occurred on the brown couch where appellant pulled

down her “pants or shorts or whatever [she] was wearing and [her] underwear,” took

out his private part, and touched himself. C.V. knew he was “messing with his

private part” because of “the bracelets.” C.V. felt “this warm temperature” in her

bottom and, when appellant left to go to the restroom, saw white liquid on her

bottom. Appellant “came back in with toilet paper and he wiped off the thing from

[her] bottom.”

Around February 2022, C.V. told her mother that appellant was touching her,

but appellant “lied” when C.V.’s mother talked to him. C.V.’s mother told C.V. “not

to tell anyone else about it,” and appellant continued to come over on Thursdays.

Appellant acted “normal for a little bit” but started “doing things” to C.V. again. In

March 2022, I.V. told her teacher about the abuse, and C.V. made an outcry to a

school counselor. C.V. testified that the “last time something happened” with

appellant was the Thursday before the day she spoke to the counselor.

–17–
Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we have reviewed the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. C.V.’s testimony

encompassed multiple acts of sexual abuse that commenced early in 2021 and

continued until at least February 2022 when she told her mom that appellant “was

touching me” with the last time “something happened” being the Thursday before

she spoke to the counselor in March of 2022. C.V.’s testimony further provided that

appellant was there only on Thursdays when her mom left for work.5 C.V. testified

to multiple specific acts of sexual abuse, involving multiple orifices, occurring in

multiple locations in the apartment. At a minimum, C.V. testified appellant put his

fingers in C.V.’s private part on the gray couch and in C.V.’s top bunk bed; touched

C.V.’s private part and his private part “other times”; put his mouth on C.V.’s private

part more than five times; tried to put his private part in C.V.’s private part on the

queen bed; and more than once tried to put his private part in C.V.’s bottom. Further,

her “abuse” timeline was at least partially corroborated by other testimony, including

that of I.V. Considered as a whole, the cumulative force of the evidence was

sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant’s repeated acts of sexual abuse

against C.V. occurred during a period of thirty days or more in duration,

5
The record is clear that Thursday was the only day appellant was alone at the apartment with C.V.
and her siblings and the only day of the week that the abuse occurred. The jury was permitted to draw
multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence of the abuse occurring only on Thursdays and the sheer
number of assaults, as long as each inference was supported by the evidence presented at trial. The record
reflects testimony of at least six different, specific types of sexual assaults; only on one occasion did it
appear that two types of assault occurred on the same date. From this evidence, the jury could deduce the
logical consequence that the assaults occurred over more than thirty days.
–18–
commencing in 2021 and concluding in February or March of 2022. As such, we

conclude the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury

could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant

was guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child as charged in

the indictment. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 329.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
Publish JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
230375F.P05

–19–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JUAN ALBERTO SALAZAR On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
MEZA, Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 219-82319-
No. 05-23-00375-CR V. 2022.
Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Goldstein. Justices Reichek and
Garcia participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 29th day of July 2024.

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