Lillie Faye Bills, Ola Lee Myers, and Vanquisha Everylee Jackson v. Oscar Eugene Mills and Antonio Lekeith English

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed August 22, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00413-CV

LILLIE FAYE BILLS, OLA LEE MYERS, AND
VANQUISHA EVERYLEE JACKSON, Appellants
V.
OSCAR EUGENE MILLS AND
ANTONIO LEKEITH ENGLISH, Appellees

On Appeal from the 95th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-18670

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Goldstein

Appellee Oscar Eugene Mills deeded his house to appellants—his daughters

Lillie Faye Bills and Ola Lee Myers,1 and his granddaughter Vanquisha Everylee

Jackson. Then Mills and his step-grandson, appellee Antonio Lekeith English, sued

1
For reasons explained in this opinion, Ola Lee Myers is not a proper party to this appeal. To the extent
the underlying judgment can be read to include Myers due to her interest in the voided deed, because she
was not served in the underlying proceeding and did not otherwise enter an appearance, the trial court’s
judgment is not binding on her, and her remedy, if any, is for another day and proceeding.
to void that deed. After a bench trial, the trial judge voided the deed. Appellants

timely appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to appellants Bills and

Jackson.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellees sued appellants, alleging that appellee Mills formerly owned title

to a certain house in Dallas (the “Property”); that appellee English was now the

rightful owner of the Property; and that Mills remained a life tenant of the Property.

They further alleged that, in September 2020, appellants visited Mills, got him

drunk, and caused him to sign both a gift deed conveying the Property to appellants

and a power of attorney naming appellants as Mills’s attorneys in fact. Appellees

asserted claims for declaratory judgment, fraudulent inducement, and fraud. They

requested, among other relief, a declaration that the gift deed was void and

unenforceable. Appellees’ petition also included a request for disclosure pursuant to

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2.

The docket sheet indicates that appellants Bills and Jackson were served with

process but appellant Myers was not. Bills filed an answer pro se.

The trial judge held a one-day bench trial via zoom. Bills and Jackson

appeared pro se; Myers did not appear. Appellants’ counsel stated on the record that

he was never able to serve Myers, and appellees proceeded forward with trial in

Myers’s absence. Mills and English were the only witnesses who testified.

–2–
After trial, the trial judge signed a judgment setting forth the parties to the

case as follows:

A Non-Jury Trial on this cause was held on March 28, 2023. The
Plaintiffs Oscar Eugene Mills and Antonio Lekeith English appeared
and announced to the Court that they were ready for trial, being
represented by counsel. Defendants Lillie Faye Bills and Vanquisha
Everylee Jackson appeared pro se and announced ready for trial.

The judgment ruled in appellees’ favor on claims for declaratory judgment,

trespass to try title, fraud, and fraud in the inducement. Specifically, the judgment

decrees that the deed from Mills to appellants is invalid and void. It also recites

findings that the deed is invalid because (1) it was executed fraudulently, (2) Mills

was fraudulently induced to sign the deed, (3) Mills signed the deed while he was

incompetent to do so, and (4) Mills signed the deed while he lacked capacity to

execute it. Finally, the judgment awards attorney’s fees, costs, and interest to

appellees. The judgment also recites that it is final, disposing of all parties and

claims, and is appealable. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested

or issued.

Appellants, now acting through counsel, joined in a timely notice of appeal.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Although appellants state four issues in the “Issues Presented” section of their

brief, they argue only three issues in the “Argument” section of their brief. Those

three issues, paraphrased, are:

1. The trial judge’s fraud and incapacity findings are supported by
insufficient evidence.
–3–
2. The judgment is void as to appellant Myers because she was
never served with process.

3. The trial judge erred by imposing death-penalty sanctions against
appellants in the form of excluding a witness they sought to call
at trial.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Issue One: Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first consider appellants’ argument that the evidence is legally insufficient

to support the judgment. Appellants argue specifically (1) there is no evidence that

appellants made any representations to Mills, and (2) there is no evidence that Mills

was consuming alcohol or was intoxicated when he executed the gift deed to

appellants.

1. Standard of Review

Because the trial judge did not issue findings of fact, we imply all findings

necessary to support the judgment. Ganguly Holdings, L.L.C. v. Ker-Seva Ltd., No.

05-21-00124-CV, 2022 WL 3024320, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.). An appellant may challenge those implied findings for legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence. Id. We may uphold the judgment on any theory

supported by the pleadings and the evidence. Id.

When an appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an

adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof, she must show that

no evidence supports the finding. Id. at *4. Evidence is legally sufficient if it suffices

to enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding under review. Id.

–4–
In a bench trial, the trial judge is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility,

and she may generally accept or reject all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Id. at

*3.

2. Implied Findings and Applicable Law

We conclude that the judgment implies findings on two distinct legal theories

of deed invalidity: (1) fraud in the inducement and (2) incapacity.2

A deed is voidable if it is procured by fraud. See Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem.

Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (“Deeds obtained by fraud are

voidable rather than void, and remain effective until set aside.”).

A deed is also voidable if the grantor lacked mental capacity when he executed

it. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tex. 2017) (“Documents executed

by one who lacks sufficient legal or mental capacity may be avoided.”); England v.

Cary, No. 05-17-00724-CV, 2018 WL 3342694, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying Kinsel in suit to void a deed); see also Van

Cleave v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 102 S.W.2d 1103, 1105 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1937,

writ dism’d) (noting that intoxication can make a legal instrument voidable). A

grantor has sufficient mental capacity if he appreciates the effect of what he is doing

and understands the nature and consequences of his acts and the business he is

2
These implied findings are consistent with statements found in the judgment. See Lee v. Paik, No. 05-
17-01406-CV, 2019 WL 1033869, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (although
findings should not be made in the judgment, such findings have probative value if the record does not
contain any additional findings of fact).
–5–
transacting. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 419. Expert testimony regarding mental

capacity is not required to prove incapacity. Anderton v. Green, 555 S.W.3d 361,

371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.).

3. Application of the Law to the Facts

The gift deed at the center of this litigation was admitted into evidence as

plaintiffs’ exhibit 2. It appears to be signed by Mills, and it bears a notarization

stating that Mills acknowledged the deed before a notary on September 24, 2020.

The handwritten date above Mills’s signature is difficult to read, but appellants’ brief

states that he signed the deed on or about September 24, 2020, and appellees agree.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) (providing that court of appeals will accept appellant’s

statement of facts as true if not contradicted by another party). The exhibit reflects

that the deed was recorded on September 25, 2020.

At the time of trial (March 2023), Mills was 92 years old. Thus, he was around

90 when he signed the gift deed in September 2020.

Mills testified that his daughters Lillie Faye Bills and Barbara Jean visited him

in September 2020. They were upset because in 2019 Mills had transferred the house

to English while retaining a life estate for himself. They talked to Mills about

transferring the house to them and giving them his power of attorney. Mills did not

agree to that because he thought English was taking good care of him.

Mills further testified that, during his daughters’ visit, they bought him some

alcohol and he got “pretty drunk.” He elaborated on this testimony as follows:

–6–
Q. Tell us about that, sir.

A. Well, they was—we was all riding around in the car. She bought
me two fifths of alcohol, and all I remember was—I remember I
got pretty drunk.

Q. Okay. And when you got drunk, do you remember what night
that was, or was that just some time during the visit?

A. I remember one time during the day in the evening because we
came home, and they had me signing my name, started signing
my name.

Q. Okay. And why did they have you sign your name? What were
they having you sign, if you know?

A. I—I don’t know. I ain’t going to lie to you.

Q. Okay. Did you have any understanding of why you were signing
your name?

A. I think they was trying to copy how I sign my name.

Q. Okay. They were having you sign your name over and over
again?

A. Yes, sir.

....

Q. Did you have any understanding that you were signing a deed or
any kind of power of attorney at any time?

A. No, sir, I didn’t.

Q. Okay. Did you intend to sign a power of attorney or a deed at any
time, sir?

A. No, sir.

Q. And they did—they had you do this while you were drunk?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They had you do this while you were essentially unable to know
what you were doing because you were drunk?
–7–
A. Right.

Q. And when did you learn, sir, that a deed transferring your home
from Mr. Antonio Lekeith English into Ms. Lillie Fay Bills, Ola
Lee Myers, and Vanquisha Everylee Jackson had been signed?
When did you learn about this deed, sir?

A. I think when I heard about it was when my grandson brought it—
told me about it, showed it to me or something.

Q. And do you have any memory of signing this deed, sir?

A. No, sir.

....

Q. Okay. And as far as this deed is concerned, sir, you know and
you’re telling the Court that you were in your not—you were not
in your right mind, you were drunk, and had no intention of ever
signing this deed, correct, sir?

A. Right.

Mills also testified that his visitors left on September 25, 2020, and had not returned

as of the time of trial.

English testified to the following facts. He was not present when the gift deed

was signed. He later discovered that the house was no longer in his and Mills’s

names, and he presented Mills with “the documents.” English further testified,

“[Mills] said, Tony, I have no idea what these are. I would never give my home to

them, so that—that’s how this came about.” Based on Mills’s testimony and on what

Mills otherwise told English, English believed that appellants took advantage of

Mills’s drunkenness and incapacitated state to have him sign the deed. He also

believed that when Mills signed the deed, he was intoxicated, not in his right mind,

–8–
and not able “to take care or make any decisions regarding his financial or property

affairs.”

Appellants urge that appellees introduced no credible evidence of incapacity,

pointing out that Mills’s testimony indicated that he did not remember signing any

of the documents involved in this case. They also assert that there was no testimony

that Mills was consuming alcohol or was intoxicated when he signed the gift deed.

Appellants also point out that Mills’s testimony consisted largely of answers to

leading questions.

We reject appellants’ arguments. They cite no authority for the premise that

testimony elicited by leading questions is less probative than other testimony, and

we are aware of none. Although appellants are correct that Mills testified that he did

not remember signing the gift deed, Mills also testified that appellants had him sign

the deed while he was drunk and essentially unable to know what he was doing. It

was the trial judge’s prerogative to assess the witnesses’ credibility and to decide

which testimony to accept. See Ganguly Holdings, L.L.C., 2022 WL 3024320, at *3.

We conclude that the evidence that Mills lacked capacity when he signed the gift

deed is sufficient to allow reasonable and fair-minded people to find in appellees’

favor on that issue. Accordingly, the evidence of incapacity is legally sufficient. See

id. at *4.

–9–
The foregoing analysis suffices to dispose of appellants’ first issue, so we need

not consider whether appellees also adduced legally sufficient evidence of fraudulent

inducement. We overrule appellants’ first issue on appeal.

B. Issue Two: Whether the Judgment Against Myers Is Void for Lack of
Service of Process

Next, we consider appellants’ argument that, because Myers was never served

with process, the judgment is void or, in the alternative, that remand for further

proceedings is appropriate. We disagree.

There is no dispute that Myers was never served with process. Indeed, at the

beginning of trial, appellees’ counsel advised the trial court on the record that he had

never been able to obtain service on Myers, and appellees do not dispute in their

appellate brief that Myers was never served. Instead, appellees argue on appeal that

Myers made an appearance in the case through Bills’s pro se answer because that

answer was purportedly filed on behalf of all defendants through the use of “et al.,”

the Latin abbreviation for “et alia” meaning “and others.” Et al., DICTIONARY.COM,

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/et-al (last visited July 31, 2024).

As a general rule, “[a] complete failure of service of process deprives a litigant

of due process and a trial court of personal jurisdiction; the resulting judgment is

void and may be challenged at any time.” Cato v. Smith-Cato, No. 05-22-00068-CV,

2023 WL 4092489, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

However, a defendant can waive service of process and subject herself to the trial

–10–
court’s jurisdiction by answering in the case. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 121 (providing that

an answer constitutes an appearance that makes service of citation unnecessary).

There is no evidence in this record that Myers made an appearance in this case

in any way or made an answer.3 For a judgment to be final, and thus appealable, it

must either (1) dispose of all claims and parties before the court or (2) state with

“unmistakable clarity” that it is a final judgment to all claims and parties. See In re

Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)

(quoting Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 442 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2012)).

Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds to judgment against served defendants

while another defendant remains unserved, the judgment against the served

defendants acts as a dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the unserved

defendant, and the judgment is final for purposes of appeal. Phila. Indem. Ins. Corp.

3
We are unpersuaded by appellees’ argument that Bills’s filing an answer with the phrase “et al”
purports to answer on behalf of all defendants. The record reflects that Jackson was served, did not file an
answer, and appeared at trial. The only response to the trial court relative to Myers was a representation
that she was never served. Counsel did not make the argument to the trial court that Bills’s answer was on
behalf of all defendants based upon the et al designation, and there is no signature other than Bills’s.
Counsel does not provide any authority for a pro se litigant to answer on behalf of other individuals, and
the law of this state expressly does not permit such non-lawyer representation. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 7 (“Any
party to a suit may appear and prosecute or defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of
the court.”); see also Kaminetzky v. Newman, No. 01-10-01113-CV, 2011 WL 6938536, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rule 7 applies only when the person is litigating his
rights on his own behalf, instead of litigating certain rights in a representative capacity). The final judgment,
with the styled caption including Myers as originally drafted, contains no textual representations or
inclusion of Myers; specifically, it identifies no basis for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over the
unserved defendant. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 124 provides that, except where otherwise expressly
provided by law, “[i]n no case shall judgment be rendered against any defendant unless upon service, or
acceptance or waiver of process, or upon an appearance by the defendant.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 124. Critically,
Myers is not named in the judgment as a party against whom execution can issue or the judgment can be
abstracted. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 629; TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.003. With no service or appearance, there is no
binding judgment against Myers.
–11–
v. Box, No. 05-02-01555-CV, 2003 WL 1589513, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.

28, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363

S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 459–60 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2000, pet. denied); First Dallas Petroleum, Inc. v. Hawkins, 715 S.W.2d

168, 169–70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ)). Thus, we conclude the underlying

judgment in this case served as a dismissal of appellees’ claims against Myers;

nevertheless, the judgment was final and appealable as to Bills and Jackson. See

Hawkins, 715 S.W.2d at 169–70. Because Myers was dismissed from the case and

was not a party to the judgment, she is not a proper party to this appeal. See Preston

v. Am. Eagle Ins. Co., 948 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ)

(appellants who were not parties to final judgment may not exercise right of appeal).

We conclude the trial court’s judgment in this case was not void as to Bills and

Jackson and, because Myers is not a proper party to this appeal,4 no remand is

necessary. We overrule appellants’ second issue.

C. Issue Three: Death-Penalty Sanctions

In their third issue, appellants argue that the trial judge improperly imposed

death-penalty sanctions against appellants by excluding all testimony from a witness

they wished to call—specifically, the notary public who notarized the deed.

Appellees respond that appellants’ basic premise is wrong—the exclusion of the

4
“[W]e must consider issues affecting our jurisdiction sua sponte.” State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562
S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2018). Based upon our review of applicable case law and the record, we conclude Myers
is not before us.
–12–
witness was not a death-penalty sanction but rather an automatic penalty levied

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 for failing to disclose the witness during

discovery.

We agree with appellees.

A death-penalty sanction is a sanction that adjudicates claims or defenses

based on how a party conducts discovery rather than on the merits. See Westfall Fam.

Farms, Inc. v. King Ranch, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993,

writ denied). Death-penalty sanctions are authorized by Rule 215 and commonly

consist of striking pleadings, dismissing an action, or rendering a default judgment.

See id. at 588 n.1. Such sanctions may be imposed only if, despite the imposition of

lesser sanctions, a party has so abused the procedural rules as to support a

presumption that the party’s position lacks merit and it would be unjust to allow the

party to present the substance of that position to the court. Id. at 591.

Rule 193.6, by contrast, prescribes the automatic exclusion of evidence and

witnesses that are not timely disclosed in response to discovery requests. F 1 Constr.,

Inc. v. Banz, No. 05-19-00717-CV, 2021 WL 194109, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.

20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rule 193.6 also contains its own exceptions for good

cause or the absence of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice. Id. Rule 193.6 sanctions

are not reviewed under the standards applicable to death-penalty sanctions. Id.

This case resembles F 1 Construction in that appellees did not invoke Rule

215 when they objected to testimony by appellants’ proposed witness. Nor did

–13–
appellees seek any of the typical death-penalty sanctions. Rather, appellees objected

to only one specific witness solely because appellants did not disclose the witness as

part of their Rule 194 disclosures. Accordingly, we review this issue under the rubric

of Rule 193 and not under the rules governing death-penalty sanctions. See id.

We review a Rule 193.6 sanction for abuse of discretion. Id. at *3. An abuse

of discretion occurs when either (1) the trial judge fails to analyze or apply the law

correctly, or (2) with regard to factual matters or matters committed to its discretion,

the trial judge could reasonably reach only one decision and failed to do so. VSDH

Vaquero Venture, Ltd. v. Gross, No. 05-19-00217-CV, 2020 WL 3248481, at *4

(Tex. App.—Dallas June 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The first question is whether appellants failed to disclose the witness “in a

timely manner.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a). Appellants point to Bills’s statements

on the record that she thought she had disclosed the witness to appellees and that she

“even sent the recording of her to him . . . with her—you know, her questioning my

dad.” But Bills did not say when she purportedly disclosed the witness to appellees.

And in any event, appellees’ counsel stated on the record that appellants had not

disclosed the witness before the day of trial. See Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270,

271–72 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (discussing circumstances under which unsworn

statements on the record are considered to be evidence). It was the trial judge’s

prerogative to assess the witnesses’ credibility. See Ganguly Holdings, L.L.C., 2022

–14–
WL 3024320, at *3. We conclude that the trial judge could reasonably decide that

appellants failed to timely disclose the notary public as a witness.

As for the exceptions to Rule 193.6’s rule of automatic exclusion, appellants

do not argue that they showed either good cause or the absence of unfair surprise or

unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1), (2). Accordingly, we do not

consider the exceptions. See Banda, 955 S.W.2d at 272 (court of appeals cannot

reverse judgment based on an argument not made by appellant).

For these reasons, we overrule appellants’ third issue on appeal.

IV. DISPOSITION

Myers is not properly before this Court as she was not served, and the trial

court had no jurisdiction over Myers at the time of final judgment. Therefore, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Bills and Jackson.

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
230413F.P05 JUSTICE

–15–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

LILLIE FAYE BILLS, OLA LEE On Appeal from the 95th District
MYERS, AND VANQUISHA Court, Dallas County, Texas
EVERYLEE JACKSON, Appellants Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-18670.
Opinion delivered by Justice
No. 05-23-00413-CV V. Goldstein. Justices Reichek and
Garcia participating.
OSCAR EUGENE MILLS AND
ANTONIO LEKEITH ENGLISH,
Appellees

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees Oscar Eugene Mills and Antonio Lekeith
English recover their costs of this appeal from appellants Lillie Faye Bills and
Vanquisha Everylee Jackson.

Judgment entered this 22nd day of August 2024.

–16–