Christopher Stafford Peaden v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00045-CR

CHRISTOPHER STAFFORD PEADEN, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Carson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 7345, Honorable Dale A. Rabe, Presiding

August 19, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Christopher Stafford Peaden, pleaded guilty to possessing

methamphetamine with intent to deliver and received deferred adjudication community

supervision. Subsequently, the State moved to adjudicate Appellant’s guilt. Appellant

pleaded true to the alleged violations, and the trial court sentenced him to 50 years of

confinement in prison.
The order deferring adjudication imposed an $8,000 fine and ordered $180 in

restitution. At the punishment phase of the adjudication hearing, however, the trial court

did not orally impose a fine or restitution. The written judgment includes restitution of

$180 and a fine of $8,000; the bill of costs charges Appellant $35 for a precept. Through

three issues, Appellant argues that the judgment should be modified to remove the non-

pronounced restitution order and fine, and that the precept charge should be $8 instead

of $35. The State does not oppose the relief Appellant seeks.

Analysis

A court of appeals possesses authority to modify an incorrect judgment when we

have the necessary information to do so. Campos-Dowd v. State, No. 07-20-00342-CR,

2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4553, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 9, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam)

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

1993)). “Without the record establishing that Appellant had an opportunity to object to the

imposition of court costs in the trial court, we agree that he may present his complaint for

the first time on direct appeal.” Paredes-Malagon v. State, No. 07-22-00016-CR, 2023

Tex. App. LEXIS 228, at *18 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 12, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).1

Appellant’s first and second issues argues that the $180 restitution and $8,000 fine

imposed on him should be removed from the judgment and bill of costs because the trial

court did not orally pronounce them when imposing sentence. Restitution and fines are

1 Similarly, see London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[W]e have
consistently held in the context of court-cost challenges that an appellant may not be faulted for failing to
object when he or she was simply not given the opportunity to do so.”).

2
punitive in nature and must be included in the oral pronouncement of a sentence. 2 See

Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A trial court’s

pronouncement of sentence; the written judgment, including the assessed sentence, is

merely the declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement. Ex parte Madding,

70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Therefore, when a written judgment differs

from the oral pronouncement of sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. Id.

Here, the trial court did not orally pronounce a restitution order or fine when

adjudicating Appellant’s guilt. Therefore, they are not a part of Appellant’s sentence. See

Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502. We sustain Appellant’s first two issues, and modify the

judgment and bill of costs to remove the $180 restitution order and $8,000 fine.

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the bill of costs should charge $8.00 for a

precept rather than $35.00. While court costs are mandatory under Article 42.16 of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, courts may only impose costs that are statutorily

authorized. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42.16, 103.002; Johnson v. State, 423

S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Texas Government Code authorizes an $8

fee for issuing subpoenas and writs, which we interpret to include precepts.3 TEX. GOV’T

CODE ANN. § 51.318(b) (1–2). We are not aware of any authority authorizing a $35 charge

for issuing a precept.

2 Including fines or restitution in a deferred adjudication order is insufficient under these
circumstances, as no sentence is imposed at that time. If the court later adjudicates guilt, it sets aside the
entire deferred adjudication order, including any previously imposed fine or restitution. See Taylor v. State,
131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
3 “A precept is ‘[a] writ or warrant issued by an authorized person demanding another’s action, such

as a judge’s order to an officer to bring a party before the court.’” Briceno v. State, 675 S.W.3d 87, 98 n.2
(Tex. App.—Waco 2023, no pet.) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (8th ed. 1999)).

3
We sustain Appellant’s third issue. Because the bill of costs states a charge of $35

for issuing a precept, we modify it to reflect an $8 charge.

Conclusion

Having sustained Appellant’s three issues and modifying the judgment accordingly,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

Lawrence M. Doss
Justice

Do not publish.

4