Joseph Rozsa v. Justin Fleming and Anna Ogi

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00347-CV

JOSEPH ROZSA, APPELLANT

V.

JUSTIN FLEMING AND ANNA OGI, APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 250th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court No. D-1-GN-24-004244, Honorable F. Scott McCown, Presiding

December 6, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Joseph Rozsa, proceeding pro se, appeals from three trial court orders:

(1) Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remove Fraudulent Lien, (2) Order on Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, and (3) Interlocutory Default Judgment. 1 Because there is no final

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
judgment in this case and the orders presented are not immediately appealable, we

dismiss the appeal the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Background

Appellees, Justin Fleming and Anna Ogi, sued Rozsa and Launch Studios, LLC

for various claims arising from an alleged breach of a residential lease. By their suit,

Appellees also sought to remove Rozsa’s mechanic’s lien on the subject property. Rozsa

answered and moved to dismiss Appellees’ suit. By orders of October 2, 2024, the trial

court granted Appellees’ motion to remove the mechanic’s lien, denied Rozsa’s motion to

dismiss the lawsuit, and granted Appellees a no-answer, default judgment against Launch

Studios. These orders did not dispose of Appellees’ claims against Rozsa. Indeed, the

Interlocutory Default Judgment expressly states that it “shall be incorporated into the final

judgement when the case against Joseph Rozsa is resolved.”

Analysis

Appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments or from

interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex.

1998) (per curiam). “[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an

order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every

pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes

of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–206.

2
The Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remove Fraudulent Lien, Order on Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, and Interlocutory Default Judgment do not include any finality

language, nor do they resolve Appellees’ claims against Rozsa. See Lehmann, 39

S.W.3d at 205–06. Consequently, these orders are interlocutory, and we have found no

statutory authority permitting their appeal.

By letter of November 12, 2024, we informed Rozsa that it appeared we lacked

jurisdiction over this appeal. We directed him to demonstrate grounds for continuing the

appeal by November 22, 2024, or we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

To date, Rozsa has not responded to our letter.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that there is no final judgment or

appealable order presented for review. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Per Curiam

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