Richard Jones v. Alliance Credit Union (CFO)

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00071-CV

RICHARD JONES, APPELLANT

V.

ALLIANCE CREDIT UNION (CFO), APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 72nd District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2024-CV-1593, Honorable John C. Grace, Presiding

June 18, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Appellant Richard Jones,1 proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment dismissing

his claims against appellee Alliance Credit Union pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 91a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a (authorizing dismissal of cause of action on

ground that it has no basis in law or fact). We affirm.

1 Appellant also identifies himself as Richard M. Jones, Richard-M:Jones, and Richard-Myron:

Jones.
In August of 2024, Jones completed an application for a vehicle loan for

$99,122.74 from Alliance. Nothing in the record indicates that Alliance approved or

otherwise acted on the application. Jones then filed a lawsuit against Alliance alleging

that he had “tendered a negotiable instrument,” and that Alliance “refused to carry out

fiduciary duties” for Jones and “also refused to carry out the accord and satisfaction

performance.” Alliance filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 91a asserting

that no facts supported a breach of contract claim or a breach of fiduciary duty claim. The

trial court granted the motion and Jones appealed.

We construe an appellant’s pro se brief liberally. See Giddens v. Brooks, 92

S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (“pro se pleadings and briefs

are to be liberally construed”). Even so, pro se appellants are held to the same standards

as appellants who are represented by counsel. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573

S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). The failure to provide citations, argument, and analysis

as to an appellate issue may waive the issue. Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462

S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015).

In his one-page argument to this Court, Jones makes five assertions, which we

recite here verbatim: “(1) TRCP 91a Was Improperly Applied to a Case Requiring Fact-

Finding, (2) The Court Ignored Unrebutted Evidence, Making the Dismissal Improper, (3)

The Court Failed to Acknowledge Federal and Commercial Law, (4) The Bank Was

Required to Accept Appellant’s Application, and (5) Alliance Credit Union Violated Federal

Reserve Act Section 16.” None of these issues is supported by record references,

citations to legal authority, or meaningful analysis, which Jones had the burden to provide.

2
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring briefs to include “a clear and concise argument for

the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”).

Given the absence of both analysis and authority, we conclude that Jones has

presented nothing for our review on appeal and has waived review of his complaints. 2

See Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994)

(point may be waived due to inadequate briefing). Accordingly, we overrule Jones’s

issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker
Justice

2 After Jones filed his first brief, we notified him that the brief was deficient and directed him to file

an amended brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jones then filed an amended
brief, but it too is deficient.

3