Clifford Eddie Johnson, Jr. v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00362-CR

CLIFFORD EDDIE JOHNSON, JR., APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas 1
Trial Court No. 1745955, Honorable Wayne Francis Salvant, Presiding

June 8, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant Clifford Eddie Johnson, Jr. appeals from his convictions for two counts

of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 2 By his two issues, he challenges his

convictions by arguing: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for

1 Because this cause was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2).
violation of his right to a speedy trial and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence

of extraneous offenses. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant and Caitlyn Cobb were in a romantic relationship and had a child

together. On August 20, 2022, they traveled from Lubbock to Fort Worth to celebrate

Cobb’s birthday. En route to meeting up with some friends, their vehicle experienced tire

trouble, leaving them stranded on the shoulder of Interstate 35W at approximately 1:00

a.m. While Cobb searched for her tire lock, Appellant used Cobb’s phone to obtain a

rideshare. As he attempted to do so, he noticed a social media post by Cobb that he

interpreted as Cobb giving her telephone number to another man.

Presumedly enraged by the post, he charged Cobb and shoved her over a

concrete barrier along the highway. He continued to hit and stomp on her as she lay on

the ground, attempting to shield her face and head. A late-night cookie delivery driver,

Meckayla Ramirez, who observed this altercation, called 911 and stopped to assist.

Believing Ramirez to be the rideshare, Cobb collected her scattered belongings, ran

toward Ramirez’s vehicle, and got in the back seat. When Ramirez observed Appellant

holding a gun, she sped away from the scene, exclaiming “He has a gun! He has a gun!”

Four gunshots and the women’s reactions can be heard on the audio recording of the 911

call. Later inspection of the vehicle would reveal that at least two bullets struck the car.

Appellant was indicted on two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

in connection with discharging his firearm against Cobb and Ramirez at the scene of

Appellant’s and Cobb’s initial altercation. The Tarrant County jury found Appellant guilty

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of both counts and sentenced him to forty-five years’ imprisonment for each count,

running concurrently.

ANALYSIS

Issue One—Right to a Speedy Trial

In his first issue, Appellant complains that he was denied his right to a speedy trial.

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.05.;

Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). He asserts the trial court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. We

disagree.

In determining whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial, we

employ a balancing test “in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant

are weighed.” Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530,

33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972)). We consider the following factors in our analysis:

(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of

his speedy trial right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Id.

“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s federal constitutional speedy trial claim,

we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual

components, and a de novo standard for the legal components.” Zamorano v. State, 84

S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Fuller v. State, 624 S.W.3d 855, 863 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d).

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A. Length of Delay

We first measure the length of delay. The right to a speedy trial attaches at the

time of arrest or formal accusation, whichever occurs first. See Cantu v. State, 253

S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (observing that right attaches when a person

becomes an “accused”). We then evaluate the delay between attachment of the right and

either decision on the motion for speedy trial or commencement of trial. See id. at 313–

14. Generally, a delay approaching one year will trigger enquiry into the remaining Barker

factors.

Here, Appellant was originally arrested on August 21, 2022. He was formally

indicted on November 7, 2022. He filed his motion for speedy trial on September 10,

2025, which was heard and denied on September 25, 2025. The three-year delay

between August 21, 2022, 3 and the denial of his motion for speedy trial is sufficient to

warrant consideration of the remaining Barker factors and weighs in favor of Appellant’s

contention that he was denied a speedy trial. See Fuller, 624 S.W.3d at 864.

B. Reason for Delay

Our evaluation of this second factor uses a sliding scale by which we assign

different weights to different reasons for the delay. Fuller, 624 S.W.3d at 864 (citing

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).

3 Following his initial arrest, Appellant was released on bond, but he failed to appear, forcing an

additional arrest date. In the interest of justice, we have considered the length of delay using the greatest
possible time span. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 549 S.W.3d 688, 698 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.).

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The record before us establishes that sixteen months of the thirty-seven-month

delay is attributable, at least in part, to Appellant’s conflict with his original appointed

counsel, appointed on August 21, 2022. Indeed, Appellant filed his declaration of conflict

with appointed counsel and motion seeking appointment of substitute counsel in

December 2023. 4 The trial court granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw about

one month later. Newly appointed counsel appeared on January 22, 2024, and the trial

court granted Appellant a reset on February 24, 2024. Effectively, the conflict and

resulting withdrawal of counsel set the case back to the very beginning with new counsel.

Though possibly warranted and within his rights to seek, the appointment of new counsel

affected a significant portion of the delay. See Harper v. State, 567 S.W.3d 450, 460

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.) (concluding that delays associated with appellant’s

seeking several changes of counsel were attributable to appellant in speedy-trial

analysis); Porter v. State, 540 S.W.3d 178, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet.

ref’d) (observing that appellant’s conflicts with counsel and resulting three appointments

of counsel caused “much of the delay”).

Additionally, when this case began, Texas courts were still operating under years

of COVID emergency orders. In re Fifty-Seventh Emergency Order Regarding the

COVID-19 State of Disaster, 683 S.W.3d 776 (2022). Tarrant County’s backlog was

4 At the same time, Appellant filed pro se motions invoking his right to a speedy trial. While we

acknowledge that Appellant’s motions could be seen as an assertion of such right, nothing in the record
suggests that (1) those motions were presented to the trial court such that it could be said that the trial court
was aware of the assertion, and (2) Appellant unambiguously asserted his right to a speedy trial. When he
filed the motions, Appellant was represented by his original counsel. Even if it were clear from the record
the trial court was aware of the motions, it had no duty to consider and act on those motions. There is no
right to represent oneself in part, while also being represented by counsel; there is no general right to hybrid
representation in Texas. Schindley v. State, 326 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.)
(citing Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
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considerable, seemingly prompting the creation of an auxiliary court system. The record

suggests that this case was transferred to that auxiliary court, which was thereafter

dissolved. Thus, this case had to be transferred back to the Criminal District Court No.

2, causing additional delay. Texas courts have acknowledged the delays and

administrative frustrations associated with the COVID pandemic. See Laird v. State, 691

S.W.3d 30, 40 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet. ref’d). Though it does not supersede

constitutional mandate, a “declaration of a state of disaster may [and did] impact the

judiciary and its disposition of cases pending before it.” Flowers v. State, No. 07-21-

00276-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5193, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 26, 2022, pet.

ref’d). To the extent that the pandemic and related court closures weigh against the State,

they do so but slightly. Laird, 691 S.W.3d at 40; accord Lovelace v. State, 654 S.W.3d

42, 49 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.).

Further, during the pendency of the case, the originally presiding judge of the trial

court retired, and the current judge was elected to take his place. Courts generally

consider such a delay as also more neutral in nature, weighing only slightly against the

State. See Ussery v. State, 596 S.W.3d 277, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,

pet. ref’d); Emery v. State, No. 07-07-0238-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1865, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Mar. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.

30, 38, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970) (“Crowded dockets, the lack of judges or

lawyers, and other factors no doubt make some delays inevitable.”). “A more neutral

reason [for the delay] such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less

heavily [than should a deliberate attempt to delay] but nevertheless should be considered

since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government

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rather than with the defendant.” Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). The weight we assign to these reasons is less substantial given the neutral,

nigh-inevitable delays when dealing with such developments.

Overall, a significant portion of the delay here is attributable to Appellant’s

relationship with his first appointed counsel and his affirmative efforts in seeking

appointment of new counsel. Such reasons weigh against a finding that Appellant’s right

to a speedy trial was violated. However, we attribute some of the delay to the State in

that the backlog in cases, administrative handling, and judicial transition, while more

neutral in nature, are rightly assigned to the government, but only slightly. On balance,

the reasons for the delay weigh against Appellant’s speedy-trial claim.

C. Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial

Although the defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, he does have a

responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Harrison v. State, 282 S.W.3d 718, 721

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (citing Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282).

As we previously noted, Appellant filed pro se motions in December 2023 (seeking

a trial be set and the case dismissed) and in August 2025 (seeking only dismissal) in

which he invoked the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We credit these only

slightly in favor of his claim, if at all, given that (1) the record fails to show the motions

were presented to the trial court and (2) he was represented by counsel at the time and

had no right to hybrid representation. See supra note 4.

Aside from the pro se filings asserting his right to a speedy trial, his second

appointed counsel filed his Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation on September
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10, 2025, months after trial had been set for October 27, 2025. The motion was heard

and denied on September 25, 2025. Notably, in this motion, Appellant sought only

dismissal of a cause that was set to go to trial in approximately one month, a request

which weighs against his assertion. See Harrison v. State, 282 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (citing Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283, in support of proposition

that “filing for a dismissal before seeking a speedy trial generally weakens a speedy-trial

claim because it indicates a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one”); see also

Cain v. State, 747 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no pet.) (citing Phillips

v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983), for observation that a

defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than prompt trial is relevant and may

sometimes diminish the strength of his claim).

Considering only the motion filed in September 2025 by counsel, we assign

negligible weight to his motion as it relates to his assertion of his right to a speedy trial.

Similarly, to the extent Appellant’s pro se motions filed in December 2023 and August

2025 could have been considered by the trial court, their value likewise lends only minimal

weight to a finding of a speedy-trial violation.

D. Prejudice from Delay

Reviewing courts assess prejudice in light of the interests the right to a speedy trial

was designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize

anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be

impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.

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At the hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss, counsel explained that Appellant’s

continued incarceration was oppressive in that he was also incarcerated on a parole

violation warrant, which, per defense counsel, prevented him from making bond.

However, as the State argued, Appellant would likely be incarcerated on his parole

violation regardless of the promptness of trial on the pending charges of aggravated

assault. While we decline the State’s invitation to conclude, contrary to Purgason v. State,

405 S.W.3d 171, 180 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. ref’d), that this fact weighs against

Appellant’s speedy-trial claim, we likewise refuse to treat it as weighing in Appellant’s

favor in terms of oppressive incarceration. 5

As another form of prejudice, Appellant also cites to his anxiety leading up to trial

because of his “extensive incarceration.” Evidence of generalized anxiety, though

relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no

greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or

investigation. Sample v. State, 653 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. ref’d)

(citing Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286). Appellant proffered no proof that his anxiety and

concern exceeded what would ordinarily flow from serious criminal charges.

Most critical to our analysis, Appellant failed to show that the delay impaired his

ability to defend himself, and he does not argue on appeal that his defense was

hampered. See Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting

that, of three considerations in prejudice determination, “the most important” is “limiting

5 Our research yields no case from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals that directly speaks to the

State’s position on the significance, if any, of a defendant being incarcerated for a reason apart from
pending charges, such as a parole violation, during the period of delay in a speedy-trial analysis. That
being so, we will abide by Purgason’s rejection of the position.
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the possibility that the defense will be impaired”). Here, the witnesses to the events were

available and did not testify to having any memory loss of the events of August 20, 2022.

Further, other evidence, such as Ramirez’s 911 call and unfired ammunition, remains

unaffected by the delay. Appellant proffered no evidence that the delay prejudiced his

defense, and nothing in the record before us establishes prejudice under this final prong

of the Barker test. We weigh this factor against Appellant’s claim.

Thus, having considered the factors relevant to a claimed violation of the right to a

speedy trial, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Appellant’s right to

a speedy trial was not violated and accordingly, in denying Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss

for Speedy Trial Violation. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Issue Two—Admission of Extraneous Offense Evidence

In his second issue, Appellant complains of the trial court’s admission of evidence

of extraneous offenses, namely three prior physical assaults against Cobb. Again, the

indictment alleges aggravated assault against both Cobb and Ramirez. The charge

associated with Cobb included the additional allegation of family violence. 6 He asserts

the trial court erred in its admission of this evidence of extraneous offenses under Rule

403. We disagree.

6 Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court must enter an affirmative finding of

family violence in its judgment if, in the trial of an offense against a person, the court determines that the
offense involved family violence as defined by the family code. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.013;
Thomas v. State, 150 S.W.3d 887, 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d). Included in the statutory
definition of family violence is an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the
family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, or assault. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 71.004(1). The statutory definition of “family” includes individuals who are the biological parents of the
same child, without regard to marriage. See id. § 71.003; Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 888.

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In a hearing and witness examination outside the presence of the jury, the trial

court considered the State’s evidence of extraneous offenses. Defense counsel objected

based on Rule 403 and requested the trial court to give a limiting instruction should the

evidence be admitted. Ultimately, the trial court determined that the evidence detailing

prior assaults by Appellant against Cobb was admissible under article 38.371. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.371. Article 38.371 expressly allows “evidence of all relevant

facts and circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor

committed the offense . . . including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of the

relationship” between the accused and the complainant. Id. art. 38.371(b), (c); James v.

State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 545–46 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.).

During trial and before Cobb’s testimony regarding Appellant’s three prior assaults

against her, the trial court issued a limiting instruction:

You are further charged that if there is any evidence before you in this case
tending to show that the defendant committed a crime, wrong, or act other
than the offense alleged in the indictment, you cannot consider said
evidence for any purpose unless you first find and believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed said crime, wrong, or act, if
any.

If you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, wrong, or act, you may then consider the same in
determining the purpose for which it was introduced, namely the nature of
the relationship of the parties, and for no other purpose. 7

Appellant maintains that, even if Rule 404(b) and article 38.371 operate to permit

admission of the evidence, the trial court still abused its discretion nonetheless because

7 The trial court issued similar instructions in its charge to the jury.

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such evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more

of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,

or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403; see James, 623

S.W.3d at 546. Therefore, we specifically address his Rule 403 challenge to the

evidence.

Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that

relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d

372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). It is the burden of the party opposing the

admission of the evidence to overcome this presumption by showing that the probative

value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or by

the other dangers listed in Rule 403. James, 623 S.W.3d at 547.

When considering if evidence is admissible over a Rule 403 objection, the trial

court must conduct a balancing test. Id. (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389). In

conducting the balancing test, a court must consider (1) the inherent probative force of

the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence and

balance those factors against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on

an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from

the main issues, (5) any tendency that a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the

probative force of the evidence would give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood that

presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat

evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006); James, 623 S.W.3d at 547. We review the trial court’s admission of evidence

for an abuse of discretion, which the record will support only when the ruling falls outside
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the zone of reasonable disagreement. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016); James, 623 S.W.3d at 541.

A. Probative Force of Evidence and the State’s Need for It

Because no evidence was presented before trial or to the jury that would allow a

factfinder to infer that the extraneous offenses happened chronologically near to the

offense for which Appellant was being tried, Appellant contends that the probative value

of the extraneous-offense evidence was limited. To support this position, he cites to Kiser

v. State, 893 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d). The

chronological proximity between the extraneous offense and the charged offense is more

relevant to the analysis of probative value apart from character conformity under Rule

404(b). Kiser addresses that very consideration in connection with its Rule 404(b)

analysis, and a similar stance could undermine the probative value in a Rule 403 analysis.

However, it does not do so on our facts. Here, the extraneous offense evidence

was relevant to depict the charged offense as being a part of a pattern—an escalation,

even—of physical abuse by Appellant, illuminating the assaultive nature of the

relationship over time. And for that purpose, a permissible one pursuant to article 38.371,

the evidence held probative value.

Appellant also challenges the State’s need for the extraneous-offense evidence,

maintaining that the jury could have decided the case based solely on other admissible

evidence, including the testimony of both Cobb and Ramirez. In essence, per Appellant’s

argument, the State had “other compelling or undisputed evidence to establish” what the

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extraneous-offense evidence “goes to prove.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641; James,

623 S.W.3d at 547.

However, extraneous-offense evidence can be probative to rebut a defensive

theory. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 548. At trial, it appeared Appellant sought to

undermine the identification of Appellant as the shooter and the memory and/or vision of

Ramirez and Cobb. While Ramirez could testify to the facts underlying the charges

against Appellant and physical evidence was also available to prove the underlying

offense, defense counsel specifically challenged Cobb’s memory of the night. He

intimated that alcohol consumption may have affected her memory, emphasizing Cobb

could not testify that she saw Appellant with the gun and was uncertain as to the direction

in which shots were being fired. Thus, the extraneous-offense evidence, as it depicted

the nature of the Appellant’s relationship with Cobb, was probative to rebut the implied

defensive strategy that undermined the witness accounts of Cobb and Ramirez.

Evidence of the abusive nature of Appellant’s relationship with Cobb made it less likely

that someone else happened upon the scene and fired the shots or that the assault

happened differently than how Cobb and Ramirez testified. Though the State did have

other sources of evidence to prove the charged offense, the extraneous-offense evidence

remained probative. We weigh the specific, probative value of the evidence in favor of its

admission.

B. Tendency to Suggest Decision on Improper Basis

Rule 403 refers to the danger of “unfair prejudice,” meaning “a tendency to suggest

[a] decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”

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Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Rule 403 does not exclude evidence if it is merely

prejudicial; “all evidence against a defendant is . . . designed to be prejudicial.” Pawlak

v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see James, 623 S.W.3d at 549.

Rule 403 is concerned not with prejudicial evidence but with evidence that is unfairly

prejudicial. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 549.

Assuming arguendo that the trial court could have determined that Appellant’s prior

violence toward Cobb could suggest a decision by the jury on an improper basis, the trial

court’s limiting instructions minimized this risk. The trial court issued a limiting instruction

before the evidence was admitted and again in the jury charge. We presume that the jury

followed the trial court’s limiting instruction. See Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Nothing in the record before us suggests otherwise, and

Appellant does not contend otherwise. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 549; see also Baxter

v. State, No. 02-22-00258-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8944, at *31 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Nov. 30, 2023, pet. ref’d) (noting that appellant bears burden to rebut the

presumption that jury followed instruction and concluding, in that case, appellant “has not

pointed to any evidence that demonstrates that the jury failed to follow the trial court’s

limiting instruction”). We weigh this consideration in favor of admission of the evidence.

C. Tendency to Confuse or Mislead

As to this element, we consider the evidence’s tendency to confuse or distract the

jury from the main issues in the case. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641.

Evidence of Appellant’s three assaults of Cobb prior to August 20, 2022, would not

appear to be easily confused with the events of that night. One of the assaults involved

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Appellant and Cobb inside a bar. Appellant slapped Cobb when she said something that

angered him. The second assault involved Appellant throwing a breast milk pump at

Cobb, resulting in a cut to her head and several stiches. The third assault involved

Appellant striking and threatening Cobb in their home when he was unable to locate his

keys and wallet.

While these acts are still relevant to the nature of the couple’s relationship, the

place, time, and players involved in these prior assaults distinguish them from the one

before us. Here, the assault involved a firearm, occurred in a different city, and included

a well-intentioned stranger who stopped to help. With these distinct facts, it is unlikely

that the jury would confuse the main issue before it—whether Appellant shot four times

at Ramirez’s car with the two women inside it—with the prior assaults against Cobb

individually. We weigh this consideration in favor of admission of the evidence.

D. Undue Delay or Needless Repetition

The final factor concerns Rule 403’s “fifth and sixth key phrases, ‘undue delay’ and

‘needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’” See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641.

This factor focuses on how efficient the trial is, not on the risk of an erroneous verdict. Id.

Here, the evidence of the extraneous offense was relatively brief, primarily

comprised of testimony from Cobb. She did not elaborate upon the details of the prior

offenses, and she only testified to the basic facts such that the jury could distinguish the

prior assaults from the charged offense. In the record, Cobb’s testimony on the prior

assaults took less than three pages of testimony; the entire trial resulted in over three

hundred pages. Over the course of a day and a half of trial, the extraneous offenses were

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not given an inordinate amount of time or attention at trial. See Stone v. State, 635

S.W.3d 763, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d). We also weigh this

factor in favor of admitting evidence of the prior assaults.

In light of the relevant considerations in the Rule 403 balancing test, we conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the extraneous-offense

evidence. That said, we overrule Appellant’s second and final issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s two issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments of conviction.

Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice

Do not publish.

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