Robert Jeremy Lane Smith v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00326-CR
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ROBERT JEREMY LANE SMITH, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23-378036
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Robert Jeremy Lane Smith guilty of the class A misdemeanor

offense of assault causing bodily injury against a family member. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 22.01(b). On appeal, Smith argues that insufficient evidence supports

his conviction because the State failed to prove that Smith caused bodily injury and

that the State further failed to prove that bodily injury was caused in the manner

charged in the information. Because there was sufficient evidence to sustain the

conviction, we affirm.

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Background

After Jane interviewed Smith for a job, the pair began dating. 1 After continued

arguments with Smith, Jane moved in with Julia Rosheger, believing it would give

the couple space while continuing to be together. However, Smith moved into Julia’s

home with Jane despite Julia’s disapproval. Julia described Jane and Smith’s

relationship as “explosive” because the couple “fought constantly.” Julia was very

often concerned for Jane’s safety.

In the early morning hours of June 8, 2023, Julia called police because she

was concerned for Jane’s safety. Julia was prompted to call the police after she heard

Jane yelling for help from the opposite side of the house. She heard Jane tell Smith,

“You are hurting me, stop hurting me[.]” Smith and Jane were arguing nonstop in

the three days leading up to the assault.

After hearing Jane call for help, Julia went to Jane’s bedroom to check on her.

Julia opened the door and discovered Smith had pinned Jane down to the bed. Smith

leaned over Jane, wrapping his arms around Jane’s legs as he held her hands together

against her chest. Jane’s knees were drawn to her chest, and she could not get up.

After warning Smith that she would call the police if he did not let go of Jane, Julia

1To protect the identity of the victim, we use a pseudonym for her name. See

Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal
justice process”). The first time a pseudonym is used for a person’s name, we
indicate a pseudonym is being used with italics.
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left the bedroom. When Julia came back to the bedroom door, Smith “still had ahold

of [Jane], only this time it was a little more intense.” Jane was lying on her back with

her “head [] up off the pillows a ways” and her knees bent. Smith was standing,

leaning over Jane with his hands around Jane’s throat. Jane didn’t say anything when

Smith’s hands were around her throat, but Julia observed Jane’s “mouth was kind of

open and her face was beet red. She looked like she could not – she looked like she

was hurt, like he was hurting her and she could not breath[e].” Julia immediately

called 911 after seeing Smith’s hands around Jane’s neck.

Deputy John Garcia with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office responded

to the call. When he arrived on scene, he looked for Smith on the scene but could

not find him. Smith had left the residence shortly before deputies arrived. Garcia

observed Jane to be “a little agitated, seemed emotional, seemed upset.” Jane

initially talked to Garcia, but she soon became “dodgy” and refused to give details

about what happened. Garcia observed older scratches on both of Jane’s outer

forearms as well as red marks around her chest area and on both sides of her neck.

Moreover, Garcia suspected that Jane urinated on herself in fear as he observed the

backside of Jane’s pants were wet. Based on his conversations with Jane, Garcia

determined Smith was the primary aggressor.

Julia also testified that when deputies arrived, she observed red marks around

Jane’s throat and the upper part of her body. The next day, Julia noted that these red

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marks had turned into bruises. Julia saw bruises on Jane’s upper torso, around her

rib cage, on her arms, on her wrists, and around her neck.

Detective Joshuah Boone with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office was

assigned the case for further investigation. He testified that Garcia’s report

documented scratches and red marks to Jane’s chest and neck area. Boone explained

that red marks are considered bodily injury. He interviewed Jane, who told him that

“she felt pain during the physical contact, during the physical assault[]” and that

Smith caused this pain.

Jane testified at trial that she and Smith were probably arguing all day leading

up to the assault. She admitted that Smith had physically assaulted her, but it was

because she hit him. She couldn’t remember how she hit Smith but said she “had to

have done something like that in order for him to retaliate[.]” She remembered Smith

was holding her down, but she couldn’t recall what part of his body made contact

with her body. She could not remember whether Smith choked her but stated that

“he probably did, his hands were around my neck[.]” She could not recall if she had

any marks or bruises on her body after Smith held her down. She explained that she

peed on herself because of her age.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

To sustain a conviction for assault, the State must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury

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to another[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1). Bodily injury means “physical

pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8). Other courts

have concluded the State proved bodily injury where a victim complained of pain,

had “fresh scratch marks[,]” or had bruising. See Settlemyre v. State, 489 S.W.3d

607, 609 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, pet. ref’d); Nunez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 309,

323 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (“Bruising is evidence of physical

pain sufficient to show ‘bodily injury.’”).

The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and the weight

to be given to that evidence. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020). As such, the jury is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, is

free to believe some, all or none of a witness’s testimony, and may assign as much

or as little weight to a witness’s testimony as it sees fit. Id. Jurors may also draw

reasonable inferences from the evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007). “[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts

and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. at 16.

When examining whether a criminal conviction is supported by legally

sufficient evidence, we compare the evidence to the elements of the offense as

defined by a hypothetically correct charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We consider all the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict, along with the inferences that could reasonably be drawn

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from the evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We do not assess the credibility of

the evidence, reweigh the evidence, nor substitute our judgment for that of the jury.

See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction if any rational trier

of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). “Each fact

need not point directly and independently to a defendant’s guilt, as long as the

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the

conviction.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(citation omitted); see also Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761-62 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2023) (citation omitted) (“A proper review of evidentiary sufficiency considers

the cumulative force of the evidence.”).

The elements of the offense are defined by the hypothetically correct jury

charge. Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A

hypothetically correct jury charge (1) accurately sets out the law, (2) is authorized

by the indictment, (3) does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or

unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and (4) adequately describes

the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Dunham v. State, 666

S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “[A] hypothetically correct charge need

not incorporate allegations that give rise to immaterial variances.” Johnson v. State,

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364 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d

243, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).

Analysis

Smith argues there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction because the

State failed to prove the manner and means of the assault alleged in the information:

“pushing [Jane] with his hands and grabbing [Jane’s] wrist with his hands, and

holding [Jane] down with his hands[.]” However, the State was not required to prove

the manner and means of causing the injury alleged in the information. See Johnson,

364 S.W.3d at 298-99 (holding that the State was not required to prove the allegation

in the indictment for aggravated assault that the defendant hit the victim with his

hand or twisted the victim’s arm with his hand because any variance between the

allegation and proof at trial would be immaterial); see also Hernandez v. State, 556

S.W.3d 308, 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “The manner and means of the bodily

injury alleged is not an essential element of the offense and therefore is not included

within the hypothetically correct jury charge.” Thomas v. State, 303 S.W.3d 331,

333 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). In this case, a hypothetically correct jury

charge for the offense of assault would ask whether Smith intentionally, knowingly,

or recklessly caused bodily injury to Jane. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1);

Thomas, 303 S.W.3d at 333. As a result, any variance between a non-statutory

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allegation in the information and the proof at trial is immaterial and “should be

disregarded in a legal-sufficiency analysis.” Hernandez, 556 S.W.3d at 327.

After reviewing the entire record under the hypothetically correct jury charge,

we conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support Smith’s conviction. The

State presented evidence that Smith physically pinned Jane on the bed with her hands

crossed over her chest and her knees drawn up to her chest. Julia and Jane testified

Smith’s hands were around Jane’s neck. Although Jane did not testify at trial that

Smith’s actions caused her to feel pain, she told Detective Boone that she was in

pain during the assault, and other witnesses testified that they saw red marks and

scratches around Jane’s chest and neck immediately after the assault. Julia also

testified that she observed bruises on Jane’s body in the days following the assault.

Moreover, Julia testified that she heard Jane yell “you are hurting me, stop hurting

me” to Smith during the altercation.

The jury, as the sole trier of fact, was free to weigh the witnesses’ credibility

and resolve conflicts in the evidence. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750; Hooper, 214

S.W.3d at 13. The evidence showed that during the assault Jane suffered pain and

sustained scratch marks that later turned into bruises, satisfying the “bodily injury”

element. See Settlemyre, 489 S.W.3d at 609; Nunez, 117 S.W.3d at 323. Based on

the evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

Smith knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly caused Jane bodily injury, and that

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they were in a dating relationship. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(8), 22.01(a).

Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to support Smith’s conviction. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318-19; Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We

overrule Smith’s sole issue.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS
Justice

Submitted on June 25, 2025
Opinion Delivered July 2, 2025
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.

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