MFRE v. Saratoga Springs

2026 UT App 26
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
MFRE RIVER JORDAN M INK R ANCH S OUTH SLLC, MFRE LLC,
MFRE RIVER JORDAN M INK R ANCH NORTH SLLC,
JOSHUA M CL ACHLAN , AND S COTT M CL ACHLAN ,
Appellants,
v.
C ITY OF S ARATOGA S PRINGS ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20250146-CA
Filed February 20, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen
No. 240401411
Scott O. Mercer and J. Adam Knorr,
Attorneys for Appellants
Barton H. Kunz II and Kevin S. Thurman,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	The above-captioned appellants (collectively, MFRE1) seek
interlocutory review of the district court’s denial of their motion
to dismiss the eminent domain action brought by the City of
Saratoga Springs (the City) to acquire land owned by MFRE.
Specifically, MFRE argues that the court erred in holding that the
City satisfied its statutory disclosure obligations at least 30 days
prior to filing suit and that MFRE’s statutory right to notice and
1. For simplicity, this opinion also attributes any actions taken by
individual appellants to MFRE, collectively.

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20250146-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 26
to be heard at the City’s public meeting was not violated. We
agree with the district court and accordingly affirm its denial of
the motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND2
¶2 	The City purchased a well and various easements located
on MFRE’s property. It subsequently constructed a well pump
house and made other site improvements, which were completed
in late 2023. Although the pump house is operational, it is not
connected to the City’s water distribution systems. The City now
seeks to acquire, in fee simple, just shy of one acre of land
surrounding the well and two permanent and two temporary
utility easements from MFRE. These acquisitions will facilitate
installation of power lines and pipelines necessary to connect the
pump house to the City’s pressurized irrigation, storm water, and
culinary water distribution systems.
¶3 	The 	City 	served 	MFRE 	with 	the 	statutorily 	required
statements and notices through letters dated November 16, 2023
(the November Letter); February 27, 2024 (the February Letter);
and March 22, 2024 (the March Letter). The November Letter
included 	a 	written 	statement 	regarding 	MFRE’s 	rights 	and
remedies, as required by Utah Code section 78B-6-505(2)(b)(ii).3
2. “Because this case comes to us on an interlocutory appeal, the
allegations we recite have not been tried and therefore remain
allegations. Accordingly, we recount the facts as alleged and in a
light most favorable to the ruling below.” Wild Country Holdings,
LLC v. WE Five, LLC, 2025 UT App 54, n.1, 570 P.3d 373 (quotation
simplified).
3. The November Letter had contained language asking MFRE to
“review all the enclosed documents” and had referenced an
(continued…)

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20250146-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 26
¶4 	The February Letter and the March Letter, which were
nearly 	identical, 	did 	not 	repeat 	the 	subsection 	505(2)(b)(ii)
statement. Rather, both letters informed MFRE that the city
council (the Council) would hold a public meeting to vote on a
resolution initiating eminent domain proceedings on MFRE’s
property (the Resolution), and a copy of the Resolution was
included with each letter.4 The two letters also stated that as the
fee simple owner of the subject property, MFRE had “the right to
attend the . . . Council’s public meeting and to be heard by the
Council on the proposed condemnation action” and “may attend
and speak to the Council” at the meeting if MFRE so desired.
Lastly, both letters included “a complete printed copy of the
materials 	provided 	on 	the 	Office 	of 	the 	Property 	Rights
Ombudsman website . . . regarding the acquisition of property for
a 	public 	purpose 	and 	a 	property 	owner’s 	right 	to 	just
compensation” (the Ombudsman’s Materials), as required by
Utah Code section 78B-6-505(2)(b)(i).
¶5 	The public meeting in question was held on April 9, 2024.
The publicly-noticed agenda for the meeting (the Agenda) set
“Ombudsman’s 	Acquisition 	Brochure—Your 	Guide 	to 	Just
Compensation” as one such inclusion. But the copy of the
November Letter in the record does not include a copy of that
brochure, which the City was required to provide MFRE pursuant
to Utah Code section 78B-6-505(2)(b)(i). The City represented to
the district court that although the copy of the November Letter
in the record did not include the required brochure, the physical
copy sent to MFRE did include it. MFRE disagrees. In any event,
the February Letter and the March Letter both included the
required brochure.
4. The March Letter differed from the February Letter in two
respects: (1) the date of the public meeting was updated to April
9, 2024 and (2) a sentence was added informing MFRE that it
could request a copy of the engineer’s memorandum.

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20250146-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 26
apart time for “Public Input,” which was “for the public to express
ideas, concerns, and comments for subject matter not listed as a
public hearing on this agenda.”5 The Agenda also categorized the
items to be addressed at the meeting as “Business Items,”
“Consent Items,” or items to be addressed at the “Public Hearing”
portion of the meeting. The Agenda defined Consent Items as
those “[t]he Council may approve . . . without discussion or public
comment.” But the Agenda further indicated that the Council
“may remove an item to the Business Items for discussion and
consideration.” Business Items were items that the Council would
discuss and may approve, also “without public comment.” But as
for the items slated for the Public Hearing portion of the meeting,
the Agenda indicated that “[t]he Council will accept public
comment and may approve” those items. The Agenda listed the
Resolution as a Consent Item, meaning that it was subject to
neither discussion by the Council nor public comment.
¶6 	MFRE did not attend the public meeting. At the meeting,
after apparently realizing the mistake on the Agenda, the Council
moved consideration of the Resolution from the Consent Item
category to the Business Item category. And when the time came
to discuss the Resolution, the City’s mayor invited MFRE to
speak, but no one responded. The Council did, however, enter
into the record and discuss a letter MFRE’s attorney submitted to
the Council prior to the meeting. The Council unanimously voted
to pass the Resolution.
¶7 	On April 12, 2024, the City initiated eminent domain
proceedings in district court to acquire MFRE’s property. MFRE
moved to dismiss the complaint under rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the City had failed to
comply with two statutory prerequisites: (1) Utah Code section
78B-6-505(3), because the City initiated suit less than 30 days after
5. The Agenda listed only one unrelated item as subject to the
Public Hearing.

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20250146-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 26
providing MFRE with the March Letter, and (2) Utah Code section
78B-6-504(4)(a),6 	because 	the 	Agenda’s 	initial 	listing 	of 	the
Resolution as a Consent Item deprived MFRE of its right to be
heard at the public meeting.
¶8 	The district court denied the motion. It ruled that the City
did not initiate suit prematurely because, even without the March
Letter, the required section 78B-6-505(2)(b) disclosure materials
were 	provided 	“months 	and 	months” 	in 	advance 	in 	the
November Letter and the February Letter. The court stated that
when read together, subsections 505(2)(b) and 505(3) refer to
“notice,” and not “the last notice.” The court also ruled that
MFRE’s right to be heard at the public meeting was not violated
because, despite the mischaracterization on the Agenda of the
Resolution as a Consent Item, MFRE was given an opportunity to
speak at the meeting, and the Council discussed the letter MFRE’s
attorney submitted.
¶9 	MFRE petitioned for interlocutory review of the district
court’s denial of its motion to dismiss, which this court granted.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 	MFRE challenges the district court’s denial of its motion to
dismiss. Specifically, it argues that the court erred in holding that
(1) the November Letter and the February Letter satisfied Utah
Code section 78B-6-505(3)’s timing requirement for providing the
disclosure materials and (2) MFRE’s statutory right to notice and
to be heard at the public meeting was not infringed. We review a
district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for correctness,
6. At the time, the relevant provision was codified at Utah Code
section 78B-6-504(2)(c). Because the statute remains substantively
unchanged, we cite the current version of this and all other
relevant provisions of the Utah Code for convenience.

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according “no deference to the court’s decision.” Wild Country
Holdings, LLC v. WE Five, LLC, 2025 UT App 54, ¶ 16, 570 P.3d 373
(quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Timing of Disclosure Requirements
¶11 	Utah Code section 78B-6-505 outlines the negotiation and
disclosure requirements that must be met before an eminent
domain action may be filed in district court. Subsections 505(2)
and 505(3) focus on the timing and content of the required
disclosures. Subsection 505(2) requires that prior to voting on
whether to file an eminent domain action to acquire property, a
political subdivision must “make a reasonable effort to negotiate
with the fee simple owner for the purchase of the property,” Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2025), and provide
certain disclosure materials to the fee simple owner, see id.
§ 78B-6-505(2)(b). 	These 	materials 	are 	(1) 	the 	Ombudsman’s
Materials, which are “a complete printed copy of the materials
provided on the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman
website . . . regarding the acquisition of property for a public
purpose and a property owner’s right to just compensation,” id.
§ 78B-6-505(2)(b)(i), and (2) a written statement, “in substantially”
the same form as the one called for in the statute, that informs the
fee 	simple 	owner 	of 	additional 	rights 	and 	remedies, 	id.
§ 78B-6-505(2)(b)(ii).7
7. Subsection 505(2)(b)(iii) sets forth the written statement of
rights and remedies that must be provided to a “claimant,” see
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(b)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2025),
which is defined as “a person who is a record interest holder of
real property sought to be condemned” but not “a fee simple
owner,” id. § 78B-6-505(1)(a)(i)–(ii)(A). Because MFRE is the fee
(continued…)

MFRE v. Saratoga Springs
20250146-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 26
¶12 	Both sets of disclosure materials must be provided “as
early in the negotiation process . . . as practicable, but no later than
14 days before the day on which a final vote is taken to approve
the filing of an eminent domain action.” Id. § 78B-6-505(2)(b).
Subsection 505(3) further directs that the eminent domain action
may not be initiated “until 30 days after the day on which the
disclosure and materials required in Subsections (2)(b)(ii) and (iii)
are provided to the fee simple owner and each claimant.” Id.
§ 78B-6-505(3). Only “upon a showing of exigent circumstances
and for good cause” may a district court “shorten” these 14-day
and 30-day waiting periods. Id. § 78B-6-505(5).
¶13 	On appeal, MFRE does not assert that the City failed to
provide 	it 	with 	any 	of 	the 	statutorily 	required 	disclosure
materials. Rather, its challenge focuses on the timing of the March
Letter. MFRE contends that because the March Letter preceded
the City’s filing of the eminent domain action by less than 30 days,
the City failed to satisfy the timing requirement of subsection
505(3). It further argues that the district court erred in concluding
that the November Letter and the February Letter nevertheless
satisfied the 30-day waiting period because, in MFRE’s view, “the
City restarted the statutory timeline” by sending the March Letter,
and it therefore “could no longer rely on” the February Letter.8
simple owner of the subject property, the statement the City was
required to provide MFRE is governed by subsection 505(2)(b)(ii).
8. MFRE also asserts that the March Letter “contained new
information,” but it does not elaborate on this point. As discussed
above, the purpose of the February Letter and the March Letter
was to inform MFRE of the upcoming public meeting at which the
Council was to vote on whether to initiate eminent domain
proceedings. The February Letter and the March Letter were
nearly identical except that the March Letter updated the date of
the public meeting to April 9, 2024, and added a sentence
(continued…)

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Additionally, 	MFRE 	asserts 	that 	the 	November 	Letter 	“is
inapposite” 	because 	it 	did 	not 	include 	the 	Ombudsman’s
Materials. See supra note 3.
¶14 	“Our 	primary 	goal when 	interpreting 	a 	statute 	is to
ascertain the legislature’s intent,” “the best evidence” of which “is
the plain language of the statute itself.” McKitrick v. Gibson, 2024
UT 1, ¶ 31, 541 P.3d 949 (quotation simplified). Thus, “wherever
possible, we give effect to every word of a statute, avoiding any
interpretation 	which 	renders 	parts 	or 	words 	in 	a 	statute
inoperative or superfluous.” Turner v. Staker & Parson Cos., 2012
UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (quotation simplified). “When the
meaning of a statute can be discerned from its language, no other
informing MFRE that the engineer’s memorandum was available
upon request. See supra note 4. Although section 505 directs that
the disclosure materials be provided at least 14 days prior to the
public meeting (which timeline the March Letter did satisfy), see
Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	78B-6-505(2)(b) 	(LexisNexis 	Supp. 	2025),
MFRE’s reliance on this provision is misplaced. It is subsection
504(4) rather than section 505 that governs the specific notice
requirements a political subdivision must give regarding the
public meeting. Subsection 504(4) directs that the notice must be
mailed “at least 10 business days before the public meeting.” Id.
§ 78B-6-504(4)(b)(ii). And here, the City mailed the March Letter
at least 10 business days prior to the public meeting. Indeed, the
purpose of the March Letter appears to have been to comply with
subsection 504(4)’s notice requirements, and the inclusion of the
Ombudsman’s Materials appears to have been made out of an
abundance of caution.
Lastly, 	as 	for 	the 	additional 	sentence 	regarding 	the
engineer’s 	memorandum 	being 	available 	upon 	request, 	that
information is not a disclosure required under section 505. See id.
§ 78B-6-505(2)(b)(i)–(ii).

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20250146-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 26
interpretive tools are needed.” Brindley v. Logan City, 2023 UT App
46, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d 557 (quotation simplified).
¶15 	Subsection 505(3) directs that “the entity involved in the
acquisition of property may not bring a legal action to acquire the
property under this chapter until 30 days after the day on which
the disclosure and materials required in Subsections (2)(b)(ii) and
(iii) are provided to the fee simple owner and each claimant.”
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(3) (emphasis added). Thus, as
concerns fee simple owners, the 30-day waiting period applies
only to subsection 505(2)(b)(ii)’s written statement informing fee
simple 	owners 	of 	certain 	rights 	and 	remedies—not 	the
Ombudsman’s Materials, which are required to be provided
pursuant to subsection 505(2)(b)(i). The sole timing requirement
governing the Ombudsman’s Materials is the 14-day window
preceding the public meeting at which the vote to initiate eminent
domain proceedings takes place. See id. § 78B-6-505(2)(b).
¶16 	Here, the February Letter and the March Letter included
only the Ombudsman’s Materials, which the City was required to
provide 	pursuant 	to 	subsection 	505(2)(b)(i). 	Neither 	letter
included the subsection 505(2)(b)(ii) statement. The subsection
505(2)(b)(ii) statement, which was the only disclosure subject to
the 	30-day 	waiting 	period, 	was 	provided 	to 	MFRE 	in 	the
November Letter—well over 30 days prior to the filing of the
present action. And as for the Ombudsman’s Materials, even the
March Letter satisfied the applicable 14-day waiting period.
¶17 	Further, 	nothing 	in 	section 	505 	suggests 	that 	the
Ombudsman’s 	Materials 	and 	the 	subsection 	505(2)(b)(ii)
statement must be provided simultaneously—a point MFRE has
not contested on appeal. In fact, while both sets of disclosures are
subject to a 14-day waiting period under subsection 505(2)(b),
subsection 505(3)’s additional 30-day requirement applies only to

MFRE v. Saratoga Springs
20250146-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 26
the subsection 505(2)(b)(ii) statement, thereby contemplating that
the materials may be sent separately.9
¶18 	For these reasons, the City complied with all of the timing
requirements of section 505. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in its conclusion.
II. Notice and Hearing Requirements
¶19 	Utah Code section 78B-6-504 directs that “[p]roperty may
not be taken by a political subdivision of the state unless the
governing body of the political subdivision approves the taking.”
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2025). It further
imposes notice and hearing requirements regarding the political
subdivision’s vote:
Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an
eminent domain action, the governing body of each
political subdivision intending to take property
shall 	provide 	written 	notice 	to 	each 	owner 	of
property to be taken of each public meeting of the
political subdivision’s governing body at which a
vote on the proposed taking is expected to occur and
allow the property owner the opportunity to be
heard on the proposed taking.
9. While the Ombudsman’s Materials include a recitation of
rights, some of which overlap with the subsection 505(2)(b)(ii)
statement, MFRE has not addressed whether this overlap is
“substantial” enough to satisfy both subsections simultaneously.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(b)(ii) (requiring a statement
“in substantially the following form”). Because MFRE has not
briefed whether the initial materials fulfilled these requirements,
we 	do 	not 	reach 	its argument 	that 	the March 	Letter 	reset
subsection 505(3)’s 30-day waiting period.

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20250146-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 26
Id. § 78B-6-504(4)(a). A political subdivision must strictly comply
with these notice and hearing requirements. Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Kunz, 2020 UT App 139, ¶ 34, 476 P.3d 989. The notice requirement
“is satisfied by the governing body mailing the written notice” to
the property owner’s address shown on county records “at least
10 business days before the public meeting.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-504(4)(b)(i)–(ii).
¶20 	In the March Letter, the City informed MFRE of the April
9, 2024 public meeting at which the Council would vote on the
Resolution and of MFRE’s corresponding “right to attend the City
Council’s public meeting and to be heard by the Council on the
proposed condemnation action.” MFRE does not contend that the
March Letter itself was deficient, nor does it dispute that the
March Letter was mailed at least 10 business days in advance of
the public meeting. Rather, it argues that “the notice failed to meet
the requirements of the statute because the Agenda explicitly
indicated that MFRE might not have the opportunity to discuss or
comment on the matter.” MFRE asserts that the Agenda, which
mistakenly had the Resolution categorized as a Consent Item,
“could mislead a reasonable landowner into believing it likely
could not speak at the relevant hearing in violation of” subsection
504(4)(a).10 We disagree.
¶21 	As an initial matter, the City strictly complied with both
the notice and hearing requirements of subsection 504(4)(a).
Subsection 504(4)(b) expressly states that the notice requirement
is “satisfied” so long as notice of the public meeting is mailed to
the owner’s address of record no fewer than 10 business days
prior to the public meeting. It is uncontested that this occurred
here. As for the hearing requirement, when it came time to discuss
the Resolution at the public meeting, MFRE was invited to speak;
10. MFRE’s argument on appeal focuses on whether the City
strictly 	complied 	with 	the 	statutory 	notice 	and 	hearing
requirements; it does not raise a due process challenge.

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when MFRE did not answer, the Council nonetheless entered into
the 	record 	and 	discussed 	the 	letter 	MFRE’s 	attorney 	had
submitted prior to the meeting. This certainly constituted an
“opportunity 	to 	be 	heard 	on 	the 	proposed 	taking.” 	Id.
§ 78B-6-504(4)(a).
¶22 	We also disagree with MFRE’s contention that a reasonable
person could have misconstrued the Agenda to suggest that the
property owner would not, in fact, be given an opportunity to be
heard at the public meeting. Regardless of what was stated in the
Agenda, which was issued to the general public, MFRE was
specifically sent the March Letter which, again, informed it, with
our emphasis, that it had “the right . . . to be heard by the Council
on the proposed condemnation action.” Reasonable persons
would credit the March Letter specifically directed to them over
any suggestion in the Agenda posted at city hall that the property
owner might not be given an opportunity to be heard. And as
discussed during oral argument before this court, a property
owner who was confused on that point would reasonably be
expected to show up at the hearing, letter in hand, and request the
opportunity to be heard if no such invitation was made, although
the opportunity was in fact offered in this case.
¶23 	Moreover, although the Resolution was miscategorized as
a Consent Item on the Agenda, meaning it was subject to approval
“without discussion or public comment,” the Agenda further
indicated that the Council “may remove an item to the Business
Items for discussion and consideration.” And although Business
Items 	were 	generally 	exempt 	from 	public 	comment, 	they
remained subject to the Council’s discussion. Property owners
receiving the March Letter could reasonably expect that, pursuant
to their statutory right to be heard, the Council would move the
Resolution to the Business Items category and invite them to
speak, as happened here. This holds true regardless of whether
the general public was permitted to comment on such items. And
as a last resort, MFRE could have addressed the Council during

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the Public Input portion of the meeting, which set aside time “for
the public to express ideas, concerns, and comments for subject
matter not listed as a public hearing on” the Agenda.
¶24 	For these reasons, we conclude that the City strictly
complied 	with 	subsection 	504(4)(a)’s 	notice 	and 	hearing
requirements.
CONCLUSION
¶25 	The 	City 	timely 	provided 	MFRE 	with 	the 	statutorily
required disclosure materials, and it satisfied the statutory notice
and hearing requirements. Thus, the district court correctly
denied MFRE’s motion to dismiss the City’s eminent domain
action.
¶26 	Affirmed.