Abdelgader v. Department of Transportation

2026 UT App 50
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
M OHAMED O SMAN A BDELGADER ,
M ARIAM HAMID, AND DINA LUKA,
Appellants,
v.
U TAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20240638-CA
Filed April 2, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Amber M. Mettler
No. 200906404
Sherri L. Walton and Diana J. Huntsman,
Attorneys for Appellants
Derek E. Brown and Peggy E. Stone,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Ahmed Abdelgader died from injuries sustained in a traffic
accident on a highway in northern Utah. Following Abdelgader’s
death, Mohamed Osman Abdelgader, Mariam Hamid, and Dina
Luka (collectively, the Estate) filed a wrongful death action
against the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). UDOT
moved 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	arguing 	that 	under 	the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the Act), it was immune
from suit. The district court granted UDOT’s motion. The Estate
now appeals, and we affirm.

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20240638-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 50
BACKGROUND1
The Accident
¶2 	On October 10, 2018, Abdelgader, a licensed commercial
truck driver, was hauling a fully loaded trailer northbound on US-
89 (the highway) up through Logan Canyon and down toward
Garden City, Utah. During the descent from the summit of the
canyon into Garden City, Abdelgader experienced “brake fade”
from overheated brakes.2 As a result, he was unable to bring the
truck to a stop at the bottom of the hill at the T-intersection of the
highway and SR-30, and the trailer overturned and slid into a
building. Abdelgader was fatally injured in the crash and died a
short time later.
The Summit to Garden City Project
¶3 	Between 2000 to 2004, UDOT designed and planned an
improvement project on a portion of the highway, called the
Summit to Garden City Project (the Project). The purpose of the
Project was to bring that stretch of “the highway up to current
1. “In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite the
facts accordingly.” Genesis Aggregates B, LLC v. Toll Sw. LLC, 2025
UT 28, n.2, 574 P.3d 87 (quotation simplified).
2. Brake fade “is the reduction in stopping power that can occur
after repeated or sustained application of the brakes of a vehicle,
especially in high load or high speed conditions. . . . Brake fade is
caused by a buildup of heat in the braking surfaces and the
subsequent 	changes 	and 	reactions 	in 	the 	brake 	system
components . . . . Brake fade occurs most often during high
performance driving or when going down a long, steep hill.”
Brake fade, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brake_fade
[https://perma.cc/K9RF-W6KW].

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20240638-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 50
standards.” Randy Jefferies was UDOT’s design engineer of
record for the Project.
¶4 	The highway has a long history of controversy between
groups opposing further highway construction (on grounds of
environmental and aesthetic harm) and construction proponents
seeking changes (for better safety and utility of the road). Before
designing the Project, UDOT conducted an environmental impact
study, which was completed in 1994. During an environmental
impact study, “the purpose and need for [a] project” along with
“the 	potential 	environmental 	impacts” 	of 	the 	project 	are
identified. Alternatives that will “meet [the] purpose and need”
of 	the 	project 	are 	also 	identified, 	including 	“a 	preferred
alternative.” An evaluation of “safety features” is conducted “[a]s
part of identifying the needs for the project.” This part of the
evaluation typically looks at “crash data” and “traffic volume
data” and “reviews highway geometry to identify substandard
elements.”
¶5 	After the environmental impact study in this matter was
completed, a final environmental impact statement (the EIS) was
published. The EIS “identified the scope of the [P]roject” and “was
quite detailed as to which improvements would be made and
what 	direction 	the 	design 	should 	take.” 	The 	identified
improvements “included reconstructing the road, widening the
pavement, [and] addressing and correcting the tight curves.” The
following year, in 1995, the EIS was approved by UDOT, the
Federal Highway Administration (the FHWA), and the United
States Forest Service through a record of decision (the ROD) as the
“preferred alternative” for the Project.
¶6 	For nearly the next decade, various groups met to design
the Project. The EIS and the ROD served as “a starting point” for
the Project’s design. The Project’s design had to comply with the
guidance in the EIS and the ROD or “have less impacts.”
¶7 	In 	October 	2002, 	experts 	from 	UDOT’s 	various
departments conducted a “scoping meeting” to determine what
“the more specific needs of [the Project] would be, taking the [EIS]

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as 	the 	starting 	point.” 	UDOT’s 	experts 	were 	tasked 	with
evaluating traffic information and crash data, and based on those
evaluations, 	the 	experts 	recommended 	that 	certain 	design
elements be included in the scope of the Project. Jefferies was then
responsible for ensuring that “whatever scope [was] designed
[met] the AASHTO standards.”3
¶8 	In November 2002, UDOT conducted a public meeting and
collected 	numerous 	comments 	regarding 	the 	anticipated
construction. That same month, a Cooperating Advisory Team
comprised of representatives of federal, state, and local agencies,
as 	well 	as 	private 	stakeholders 	and 	advocacy 	groups, 	was
assembled to discuss the Project’s design and obtain input. In
early 2003, UDOT conducted an “alternative review meeting” to
discuss alternatives to design issues and “narrow the field to one
or two for each section” to present to the Cooperating Advisory
Team for a final decision.
¶9 	In January 2004, an Operational Safety Report evaluating
the accident history on the relevant portion of the highway was
completed for the three-year period of 2000 through 2002. In
March 2004, the FHWA and UDOT completed a re-evaluation of
the EIS. As part of this evaluation, all “current AASHTO [and]
UDOT standard[s] [were] considered.”
¶10 	The Project’s final design did not include a runaway truck
ramp. Jefferies explained that based on the crash data that had
been collected and “reviewed throughout the environmental
process as well as later reviews,” there were “no indications”
found by UDOT’s traffic safety division that such a ramp was
needed.
3. “AASHTO is the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, which publishes guidelines to highway
agencies to promote adequate highway design and highway
safety.” Doutre v. Box Elder County, 2024 UT App 58, ¶ 52 n.9, 548
P.3d 914 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 554 P.3d 1096 (Utah
2024).

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The Highway Safety Improvement Program
¶11 	UDOT 	participates 	in 	the 	FHWA 	Highway 	Safety
Improvement Program (HSIP) “to fund projects that advance
roadway safety goals in Utah.” “[T]he purpose of the HSIP is to
achieve a significant reduction in traffic fatalities and serious
injuries on all public roads . . . through the implementation of
infrastructure-related highway safety improvements . . . .” The
HSIP 	is 	“the 	primary 	source” 	of 	funds 	for 	UDOT’s 	safety
improvement projects. HSIP funds are limited. Prior to 2018, the
UDOT region where the highway is located had a $4 million to $5
million 	annual 	budget 	for 	HSIP 	projects. 	While 	UDOT 	is
accountable to the FHWA for ensuring that HSIP funds are used
properly, UDOT is “given considerable flexibility to determine
how to best implement the HSIP.” There is no evidence that HSIP
funds are rolled over from year to year.
¶12 	HSIP 	infrastructure 	projects 	are 	planned, 	analyzed,
prioritized, programmed, implemented, and evaluated in a six-
step process that involves collaboration between the UDOT
Traffic & Safety Division, the FHWA, UDOT region offices, and
other public and private stakeholders. Potential safety projects are
identified in the first step of this process—the “Planning” step.
¶13 	The initial tasks in the Planning step include “the collection
and analysis of crash, traffic, and roadway attribute data, as well
as solicitation of locations from the UDOT region offices and other
safety partners.” UDOT uses statewide “hot spot and systemic
modeling to pinpoint locations where crashes have occurred or
where the models suggest crashes are likely to occur in the
future.” Determinations as to which projects to fund are not made
in this initial step.
¶14 	The second step of 	the HSIP funding process is the
“Analysis” step. Here, each potential project location is subject to
a “more extended analysis.” “Benefit-to-cost ratios are calculated
for each location based on the crash history, the expected decrease

Abdelgader v. UDOT
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in crashes for a potential mitigation measure, and the cost of that
mitigation measure.”
¶15 	Projects that make it past the Analysis step move to the
“Prioritization” step. Projects are prioritized based on several
factors, including “greatest benefit to reduce fatal and serious
injury crashes,” “benefit-to-cost ratio,” “timeline to completion,”
and “coordination with other projects.”
¶16 	Thereafter, projects move through the final three steps:
“Programming,” 	“Implementation,” 	and 	“Evaluation.” 	These
steps include assigning the project “to the three-year planning
horizon,” designing and constructing the project, and analyzing
crash data after the completion of the project.
¶17 	Prior to 2018, no potential truck safety improvement
projects on the highway were identified or analyzed by UDOT.
The Estate Files Suit
¶18 	In October 2020, the Estate sued UDOT, asserting a claim
for wrongful death.4 The Estate alleged that the stretch of the
highway where the crash had occurred was unsafe for semi-truck
drivers and that UDOT had breached its “duty to design and
build, inspect, repair, maintain, warn, provide mechanisms to
rectify the defects, and ameliorate the unsafe design and dangers
of the highway.”
¶19 	In September 2022, the Estate served its expert witness
disclosures. The Estate disclosed that its engineering expert
(Expert) 	was 	“a 	licensed 	professional 	engineer 	and 	senior
consultant at [an engineering firm] with experience, education,
and 	training 	in 	the 	fields 	of 	civil 	engineering, 	forensic
engineering, and transportation safety.”
4. Several other defendants were also named in the complaint.
Those other defendants are not participants in this appeal.

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¶20 	In April 2023, after deposing Expert, UDOT filed a motion
in limine seeking to disqualify Expert on the grounds that he was
“not qualified as a roadway design expert” and that his testimony
was “unreliable.” The Estate opposed the motion. In July 2023, the
district court heard oral argument on the motion. The following
month, the court granted the motion in limine and excluded
Expert.
UDOT Moves for Summary Judgment
¶21 	In July 2023, while the motion in limine was pending,
UDOT moved for summary judgment. In that motion, as relevant
here, UDOT argued that the case should be dismissed because
UDOT was immune from suit under the Act and, even if it was
not immune, the Estate could not establish that UDOT had
breached a duty of care in “the design and condition of” the
highway.
¶22 	Thereafter, 	the 	Estate 	filed 	an 	opposition 	to 	UDOT’s
motion for summary judgment.5 As pertains to governmental
immunity, the Estate argued that UDOT was not immune because
its failure “to collect and evaluate the crash and traffic data on [the
highway], and then to analyze that data using the standards and
engineering judgment, which would have led to feasibility studies
and ultimately to truck safety projects being added to [the
highway],” was “not on a policy making level” but was instead
an “operational level” decision.
5. Two days before filing this opposition, the Estate filed a motion
pursuant to rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to alter
or amend the district court’s ruling and order excluding Expert.
The court heard argument on both the rule 59 motion and UDOT’s
motion for summary judgment at the same hearing and then
issued a single ruling addressing both motions. The court denied
the rule 59 motion, and the Estate has not appealed that portion
of the court’s ruling.

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¶23 	Following oral argument, the district court issued a written
ruling granting UDOT’s motion for summary judgment. The
court agreed with UDOT that the Estate’s negligence claim was
barred by governmental immunity, reasoning that “UDOT’s
decisions concerning the safety features on [the highway were]
discretionary acts shielded from liability under the [Act].” The
court further concluded that the Estate’s negligence claim failed
as a matter of law because the Estate “lack[ed] any evidence that,
absent 	UDOT’s 	alleged 	negligence, 	[Abdelgader’s] 	accident
would not have occurred.”
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶24 	The Estate now appeals, challenging the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to UDOT. The Estate argues that the
court erred in determining that UDOT’s decisions regarding truck
safety features on the highway were discretionary acts shielded
from liability under the Act.6 Summary judgment is appropriate
where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “We review a district court’s legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness.”
R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2022 UT App 141, ¶ 13, 525
P.3d 100 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
¶25 	The Act immunizes governmental entities from suit in
certain situations. The Act first grants general immunity from suit
to governmental entities “for any injury that results from the
6. The Estate also takes issue with the district court’s decision to
exclude Expert and with the court’s conclusion that the Estate
could not state a prima facie negligence claim. But because our
conclusion that UDOT was immune from suit under the Act is
dispositive, we do not address these additional claims.

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exercise of a governmental function.” Utah Code § 63G-7-201(1).7
But this general immunity is waived under the Act in certain
circumstances, 	including 	where 	an 	injury 	is 	caused 	by 	“a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway.” Id.
§ 63G-7-301(2)(h)(i). However, the Act also contains exceptions to
this express waiver wherein the government retains its immunity.
As relevant here, one such exception to the waiver of immunity is
the discretionary function exception:
A 	governmental 	entity, 	its 	officers, 	and 	its
employees are immune from suit, and immunity is
not waived, for any injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment, if the injury arises
out of or in connection with, or results from . . . the
exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or
perform, a discretionary function, whether or not
the discretion is abused . . . .
Id. § 63G-7-201(4).
¶26 	“The 	discretionary 	function 	exception 	allows 	the
government to retain immunity for high-level policy decisions
regulated by the political process.” Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013
UT 75, ¶ 14, 322 P.3d 669 (quotation simplified). Our supreme
court 	“has 	distinguished 	between 	discretionary 	and
nondiscretionary decisions on the basis of whether the decision in
question involves the formulation of policy or the execution of
already-formulated policies.” Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 623
(Utah 1995). The exception has always been read “narrowly” and
“should 	be 	applied 	only 	when 	a 	plaintiff 	is 	challenging 	a
governmental 	decision 	that 	involves 	a 	basic 	policy-making
function,” Johnson v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 19, 133
7. The Act has been amended since the time the Estate commenced
this suit. The provisions controlling our decision, however, have
remained substantively the same. For the convenience of the
reader, we cite the version of the Act currently in effect.

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20240638-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 50
P.3d 402 (quotation simplified), and it should not be “extended to
those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level
which 	concern 	routine, 	everyday 	matters, 	not 	requiring
evaluation of broad policy factors,” Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623
(quotation simplified). Discretionary function immunity shields
governmental acts and decisions that impact many people “in a
myriad of unforeseen ways” from legal actions. Id. (quotation
simplified). The “continual threat” of suit, in those circumstances,
“would 	make 	public 	administration 	all 	but 	impossible.” 	Id.
(quotation simplified).
¶27 	To analyze whether a decision is one of policy and ensure
narrowly tailored application of immunity, in Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), our supreme
court adopted a four-part test:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy,
program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of
that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one
which would not change the course or direction of
the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and
expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess
the 	requisite 	constitutional, 	statutory, or lawful
authority and duty to do or make the challenged act,
omission, or decision?
Id. at 51 (quotation simplified). “When all of the questions are
clearly answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act,

Abdelgader v. UDOT
20240638-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 50
omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance,
be classified as a discretionary governmental process.” Kerr, 2013
UT 75, ¶ 18 (quotation simplified).
¶28 	Applying the Little test to the undisputed facts in this case,
the district court answered each part of the test in the affirmative
and found that UDOT was entitled to discretionary function
immunity for its decisions related to truck safety features on the
highway. On appeal, the parties do not dispute that UDOT has
met parts one and four of the test. That is, “public safety on the
roads is a basic governmental policy,” Johnson, 2006 UT 15, ¶ 24,
and UDOT possesses the requisite authority to make decisions
concerning safety features on the roads, see Utah Code § 72-1-
201(1)(a), (d). However, the Estate argues that the district court
erred in answering parts two and three of the Little test in the
affirmative. We address each of these questions in turn.
I. Essential to the Realization of the Objective
¶29 	The second question of the Little test asks whether the
“act, omission, or decision [is] essential to the realization or
accomplishment 	of 	[the] 	policy, 	program, 	or 	objective” 	in
question. Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983) (quotation simplified). We conclude that this question
is answered in the affirmative here.
¶30 	Before turning to our analysis, we address the Estate’s
framing of the “act, omission, or decision” at issue. Id. (quotation
simplified). In its motion for summary judgment, UDOT argued
that it was entitled to discretionary function immunity over
decisions related to truck safety features on the highway—both
those made during the Project and those made in using HSIP
funds 	after 	the 	Project’s 	completion. 	On 	appeal, 	the 	Estate
acknowledges 	that 	“the 	general 	design, 	construction 	and
improvements to [the highway] were possibly [d]iscretionary.”
(Emphasis omitted.) However, the Estate asserts that UDOT’s
negligence was not the result of its “general decision to change the
highway” but was instead due to UDOT’s employees “failing to

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review truck crashes” that had previously occurred on the
relevant 	portion 	of 	the 	highway, 	which 	review, 	the 	Estate
contends, “would have led to reviews of truck safety needs on [the
highway] and the addition of truck safety features.”
¶31 	Framing the questioned conduct in this manner, the Estate
posits 	that 	UDOT’s 	failure 	or 	negligence 	occurred 	at 	the
operational level because collecting crash data and reviewing
truck safety is a “routine” activity, Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618,
623 (Utah 1995) (quotation simplified), that goes into the planning
of every highway improvement project and its “‘omission’ . . . was
not essential to the realization or accomplishment of UDOT’s
safety policy.” (Emphasis omitted.) But construing each routine
component 	of 	a 	deliberative 	process 	that 	culminates 	in 	an
overarching discretionary decision as a separately actionable act
or omission for which governmental immunity has been waived
would undoubtedly result in discretionary function immunity
becoming 	unavailable 	in 	a 	large 	swath 	of 	cases 	involving
ultimately discretionary governmental decisions. Accordingly,
our immunity inquiry focuses on the entire process that UDOT
undertakes when deciding whether to add safety features to Utah
roads. See Jenson v. Scribner, 789 P.2d 306, 309 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) (“In our view, data collection is merely a function of
planning and is, thus, a part of the State decision-making process.
It is not the implementation of a decision.”). Our inquiry does not
allow a plaintiff to flyspeck the entire discretionary process for an
alleged failure in a purportedly operational component of that
broader process. Where the ultimate decision is grounded in
policy, discretionary function immunity is not defeated merely
because a component or potential component of the decision-making
process could have been included or conducted differently.
¶32 	Here, UDOT’s decisions concerning the inclusion of truck
safety features on the highway occurred during two periods of
time: at the time the Project was designed and after the Project’s
completion through the use of HSIP funds. We conclude that
UDOT’s ultimate decisions regarding whether to include truck
safety features on the highway during both periods of time were

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essential to the realization of UDOT’s policy of safety on public
roads.
¶33 	As concerns the safety features initially included as part of
the Project, the EIS and the ROD served “as a starting point for the
design.” UDOT was required to stay within the guidelines
contained in these documents, and if the design did not comply,
the new design had to have “less impacts” on the canyon. Adding
additional safety features that were not called for in the Project’s
design—and that were not required by AASHTO standards or
warranted based on any existing crash data—prevented those
improvements from being made to the highway. Given this
limitation, the decision to not add truck safety features at that time
was essential to UDOT’s ability to complete the Project and “bring
the highway up to current standards,” thus improving safety on
Utah roads. That some safety features would be left out in favor
of environmental concerns is, in retrospect, unfortunate. But the
development of the scope of the Project was quintessential
discretionary decision making.
¶34 	And the decision of whether to add truck safety features to
the highway after the Project’s completion using HSIP funds was
likewise essential to UDOT’s policy of public safety on the roads.
The stated “purpose of the HSIP is to achieve a significant
reduction in traffic fatalities and serious injuries on all public
roads.” (Emphasis added.) Because HSIP funds are limited, it is
imperative that UDOT be allowed to identify and prioritize, on a
statewide basis, which safety improvements to fund. Enabling
UDOT to act in this manner ensures that the projects that would
yield the greatest “reduction in traffic facilities and serious
injuries” are selected and is therefore essential to UDOT’s policy
objectives. See Johnson v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 26
n.10, 133 P.3d 402 (recognizing that “the government may qualify
for the discretionary function exception by demonstrating that a
particular allocation of funds was based on an analytical project
prioritization”).

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II. Exercise of Basic Policy Function
¶35 	The third question of the Little test asks whether the “act,
omission, or decision require[s] the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise.” Little v. Utah State Div. of
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) (quotation simplified).
Once again, we conclude that UDOT has satisfied this part of the
test.
¶36 	“The 	key 	to 	distinguishing 	policy 	decisions 	from
operational decisions is evaluating whether the government
actually exercises a level of discretion in a manner that implicates
policy-making and thrusts the decision into the political process.”
Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, ¶ 21, 322 P.3d 669 (quotation
simplified). 	Policy-based 	decisions 	result 	from 	“serious 	and
extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous
areas of concern,” Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 625 (Utah 1995)
(quotation simplified), whereas operational decisions involve
“the ministerial implementation of that basic policy,” Johnson v.
Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 31, 133 P.3d 402 (quotation
simplified).
¶37 	The Estate argues that UDOT’s “decision/omission to not
gather and analyze truck crash data” on the highway was not a
policy decision because there is no evidence that it “was the
subject of intense scrutiny and review.” This argument misses the
mark, however, because the Estate once again fails to place the
challenged conduct or omission within the full context in which it
took place.
¶38 	As already explained, the Project’s ultimate initial design as
a whole, including which specific safety features should be
constructed, was the result of “serious and extensive policy
evaluation, 	judgment, 	and 	expertise 	in 	numerous 	areas 	of
concern.” Keegan, 896 P.2d at 625 (quotation simplified). It is
undisputed that the Project’s design process spanned decades and
involved government agencies on the federal, state, and local
levels, as well as private stakeholders and advocacy groups. As

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noted by Jefferies during his deposition, an “environmental
impact statement is the highest level [environmental study] with
the most detail, and it’s used for the more complicated, larger
projects.” Following the conclusion of the environmental impact
study, the EIS was finalized and was subsequently approved in
the ROD, which dictated the scope of the Project’s design and
identified the particular sections of the highway that were to be
improved as well as how they would be improved.8 Then, it was
the job of experts in UDOT’s various departments to meet and
determine what “the more specific needs of [the Project] would
be, taking the [EIS] as the starting point.” And as part of this
design process, Jefferies was responsible for “making sure that the
[P]roject would meet current [AASHTO and UDOT] standards . . .
in effect at the time.” Because the highway as initially constructed
complied with AASHTO standards—a fact which the Estate does
not contest—and because the Project’s entire design was crafted
at the policy-making level, UDOT is entitled to discretionary
immunity for decisions regarding which specific analyses it
elected to undertake as part of that process. In other words, it is
not this court’s job, with the benefit of hindsight, to second-guess
the manner in which UDOT exercised its discretion. See Little, 667
P.2d at 51. The fact that additional or different crash data could
8. The Estate contends that it was inappropriate for UDOT and the
district court to reference and rely on the EIS as proof that UDOT
considered truck safety features during the Project’s design
because it was not provided to the Estate and is not in evidence.
But this argument again conflates the notion that UDOT was
required to conduct a specific analysis during the design process
in order to qualify for discretionary immunity with the reality that
so long as the ultimate “decisions were the result of serious and
extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous
areas of concern, the duties imposed upon UDOT in relation to
those decisions are truly discretionary functions and are therefore
protected by governmental immunity.” Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d
618, 625 (Utah 1995) (quotation simplified). There is ample record
evidence detailing the EIS process and, in general terms, the
contents of the EIS.

Abdelgader v. UDOT
20240638-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 50
have been collected does not defeat immunity where the decision
to construct the selected safety features was the subject of intense
scrutiny and review.
¶39 	So too with UDOT’s decisions concerning the addition of
safety features using HSIP funds after the Project’s completion.
HSIP funds are limited. The funds are allocated based on region,
and UDOT’s administration of the funds is overseen by the
FHWA. As illustrated by UDOT’s infrastructure projects process
flow chart that was in the record and also provided to this court
by the Estate during the oral arguments in this case, the decision
about which safety projects to fund using HSIP funds involves a
multi-step 	process 	that 	includes, 	among 	other 	things, 	the
identification of potential projects, the preparation of a cost-
benefit analysis, and the prioritization of identified projects. There
is no evidence that UDOT rolls over any HSIP funds from year to
year. Where each approved project goes through a multi-step,
specific analysis to identify the best-suited projects within the
region, UDOT cannot be faulted for the manner in which it ranks
potential projects and allocates limited funds. While UDOT, of
course, has a duty to construct highways that comply with basic
safety standards, decisions about which additional features to
include in its highway designs are inherently discretionary.
“Every 	highway 	could 	probably 	be 	made 	safer 	by 	further
expenditures, but we will not hold UDOT . . . negligent for having
to strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety and
the burden of funding improvements.” Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624
(quotation simplified).
CONCLUSION
¶40 	The district court correctly granted summary judgment to
UDOT. As long as the highway’s design meets basic safety
standards, UDOT’s decisions regarding inclusion of additional
truck safety features on the highway are discretionary decisions
entitled to immunity under the Act. We therefore affirm.