Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen

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2021 UT App 146
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LUNDAHL FARMS LLC, Appellant, V. DARWIN LAYNE NIELSEN, ZOE M. NIELSEN LIVING TRUST, AND DARWIN B. NIELSEN LIVING TRUST, Appellees.
Opinion No. 20190905-CA Filed December 30, 2021
First District Court, Logan Department The Honorable Kevin K. Allen No. 170100126
Michael J. Boyle, Attorney for Appellant Joseph M. Chambers, Josh M. Chambers, and J. Brett Chambers, Attorneys for Appellees
JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and SENIOR JUDGE KATE APPLEBY concurred.1
POHLMAN, Judge:
q1 Lundahl Farms LLC appeals a bench trial ruling in which the court concluded that Lundahl Farms and its predecessors in interest had acquiesced to a boundary, shared by Lundahl Farms' property and property owned by Appellees, that was different from the boundary described in various deeds. The dispute centers around two parcels that were once part of a larger parcel originally owned by a common ancestor of
1. Senior Judge Kate Appleby sat by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(7).

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Appellees and (through marriage) a manager of Lundahl Farms.
Over the years, various family members have lived in a house
and participated in farming operations on the properties. After a
bench trial and post-trial proceedings, the trial court concluded
that 	Appellees 	had 	proven 	a 	claim 	for 	boundary 	by
acquiescence, and the court issued an order demarcating the
precise boundary it recognized. But because we conclude that
certain findings the court made were clearly erroneous, and that
other 	determinations 	are 	not 	clearly 	and 	uncontrovertibly
supported in the record, we vacate the trial court’s decision and
remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND2
¶2 	In 1873, the great-grandfather of appellee Darwin Layne
Nielsen 	purchased 	a 	160-acre 	tract 	of 	land 	from 	the 	U.S.
Government. At some point, this tract was separated into several
smaller parcels, which were all conveyed to Layne’s3 great-
grandmother, Susannah Nielsen, in 1922. One of these parcels
included an “ancestral home,” which the original settlers built
and lived in and which several of their descendants would go on
to occupy for more than a century.
2. On appeal from a bench trial, we generally “view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and
therefore 	recite 	the 	facts 	consistent 	with 	that 	standard.”
Linebaugh v. Gibson, 2020 UT App 108, n.5, 471 P.3d 835 (cleaned
up). But we present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary
to address the issues raised on appeal. See id.
3. Appellee Darwin Layne Nielsen is known socially by his
middle name. And because most of the family members share
the same surname, we refer to them by their first names (or in
the case of Layne, his middle name) for clarity.

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¶3 	In 	1927, 	Susannah 	sold 	the 	largest 	of 	the 	parcels,
containing 25.82 acres and the ancestral home, to her eldest son,
Dewey Nielsen (who was Layne’s great-uncle). Although Dewey
lived in the ancestral home for a time after acquiring title, he
moved 	out 	in 	1935. 	But 	even 	after 	Dewey 	began 	living
elsewhere, 	he 	continued 	to 	use 	the 	land 	surrounding 	the
ancestral home throughout the rest of his life, working with his
younger brother Blaine Nielsen (who was Layne’s grandfather)
and 	other 	family 	members 	to 	support 	various 	livestock
operations.
¶4 	By 	the 	late 	1950s, 	the 	family 	had 	made 	several
improvements to the area south of the ancestral home in support
of ongoing farming activities, including livestock pens, fences,
and irrigation infrastructure. Also, at some point before 1959,4 a
fence was built to “keep[] everything out of [the] slough,” which
is a low-lying area south of the ancestral home that “collects”
irrigation runoff from adjacent fields.
¶5 	In 1963, the single tract containing the ancestral home and
the 	family’s 	farming 	operations 	was 	subdivided 	into 	two
parcels. 	Dewey 	and 	his 	wife 	conveyed 	the 	smaller 	of 	the
subdivided tracts, containing the ancestral home and “about an
acre” of immediately adjacent land, to Blaine and his wife, Ruby
(who were the primary occupants of the home at that point).
This 	parcel 	was 	later 	given 	an 	official 	county 	parcel
identification number of 03-060-0033; accordingly, we refer to
the parcel with the ancestral home as “Parcel 33.”
¶6 	The larger of the subdivided parcels, which Dewey and
his wife retained ownership of, comprises “about 20 acres” and
4. The exact year this fence was built is not in the record, but
evidence was presented at trial that it existed at least as far back
as 1959.

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the bulk of the farmland. This parcel was later given an official
county parcel identification number of 03-060-0034; accordingly,
we refer to it as “Parcel 34.”5
¶7 	Although 	the 	family 	farm 	had 	thus 	been 	formally
separated into two tracts following the 1963 conveyance, in
practice 	“nothing 	changed”; 	the 	family’s 	cattle 	operation
continued more or less as it had been. During the 1960s, Dewey
owned the equipment and most of the cattle kept on Parcels 33
and 34, which he used primarily for “breeding purposes.” At
that time, Dewey’s cattle operations “provided employment for
his brothers,” including Blaine. While Dewey continued “co-
occupying” the livestock area to some extent until his death, by
the 1980s the bulk of the cattle raised on Parcels 33 and 34
belonged to Blaine and his son, Darwin Blaine Nielsen (Layne’s
father)6—although Dewey continued to own at least some of the
cattle, equipment, and vehicles on the property.
5. 	Attached 	to 	this 	opinion 	as Appendix 	A 	are 	two 	maps
depicting Parcel 33, Parcel 34, and their shared boundary line.
The first map of Appendix A depicts a macro-level view of the
properties and the disputed boundary line, and the second map
depicts a closer view of the ancestral home, the livestock-raising
area, and the eastern and western roads providing access to the
livestock area. These maps were adapted from a map found in
the record, and are provided to the reader for reference only.
6. We recognize that the reader may have trouble keeping track
of the familial relationships relevant to this case. To reiterate,
Dewey Nielsen and Blaine Nielsen were brothers who, together
with each of their wives, owned Parcels 34 and 33, respectively,
at the time of the parcel split in 1963. One of Blaine’s sons,
Darwin Blaine Nielsen, eventually gained title to Parcel 33. Title
to Parcel 33 later passed to Darwin’s son, Darwin Layne Nielsen,
(continued…)

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¶8 	Also starting sometime in the 1970s or 1980s—“before
Dewey’s passing”—Parcel 34 was leased in its entirety to the
proprietors of a large local farming company, and later to that
company 	itself 	(collectively, 	Lessees). 	This 	“oral 	lease”
arrangement has continued into the present. Lessees use Parcel
34 primarily for raising crops to feed livestock Lessees keep
elsewhere. The portion of Parcel 34 that Lessees use is not the
same 	part 	of 	the 	property 	where 	the 	family’s 	livestock
operations have historically been located; the irrigated crop-
growing 	area 	is 	located 	south 	of 	the 	slough 	(whereas 	the
livestock area and ancestral home are north of the slough).
¶9 	Blaine passed away in 1983, followed by his wife Ruby in
1987, at which time Darwin acquired title to Parcel 33. The
ancestral home remained mostly vacant from the time of Ruby’s
death until Layne’s daughter, Tawnee Wood, began living there
in 1994. In 2006, Parcel 33 was conveyed in undivided one-half
interests to Darwin and his wife in their capacities as trustees of
the Darwin B. Nielsen Living Trust and the Zoe M. Nielsen
Living 	Trust 	(the 	Appellee 	Trusts). 	In 	2017, 	Parcel 	33 	was
conveyed to Layne in his personal capacity.
¶10 	Dewey also passed away in 1987, at which time Parcel 34
transferred to his daughter Mary Susannah Lundahl (Mary Sue),
who is also Layne’s cousin. In 1996, Mary Sue conveyed Parcel
34 to her husband, Carl Lundahl, as trustee of the Mary S.
Lundahl Family Trust. In 2009, Carl conveyed Parcel 34 to
Lundahl Farms—an entity of which he is a manager.
(…continued)
who is known as Layne. Each of these individuals—Dewey,
Blaine, 	Darwin, 	and 	Layne—raised 	livestock 	and 	kept
concomitant personal property in the disputed area at one time
or another.

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¶11 	In the summer of 2016, shortly after Carl became aware of
the deeded boundary between Parcels 33 and 34, Lundahl Farms
sent the trustees of the Appellee Trusts a “notice to remove
personal property,” informing them that they had until July 31,
2016 to remove all “outbuildings and or permanent fixtures”
located on Parcel 34. (Cleaned up.) After receiving the notice,
Layne asked Carl if Layne’s daughter Tawnee could continue
raising some calves on the disputed area of Parcel 34 for a short
while longer. Carl agreed to a short extension, but ultimately the
property was not removed and Lundahl Farms served two
additional notices to vacate in March and April 2017. When the
property was not vacated, Lundahl Farms filed a complaint for
eviction and writ of restitution, including claims for forced
eviction, unlawful detainer, and waste. In response, Appellees
asserted counterclaims for boundary by acquiescence, adverse
possession, prescriptive easement, and title acquisition by virtue
of the occupying claimant’s statute.
¶12 	A bench trial was held in November 2018, at which Carl,
Tawnee, 	and 	Scott 	Nielsen 	(Layne’s 	brother) 	testified 	for
Lundahl 	Farms, 	and 	Layne 	testified 	for 	Appellees. 	Several
exhibits were admitted into evidence, including deeds and other
conveyance documents, as well as historical aerial photographs
of the properties.
¶13 	Before the trial court, “neither [p]arty dispute[d] that
[Appellees] own Parcel 33” as that parcel was described in the
various conveyance instruments. The court thus framed the
dispute as hinging on the boundary between Parcel 33 and
Parcel 	34, 	and 	specifically 	whether 	the 	parties 	and 	their
predecessors in interest had acquiesced to a boundary different
from how it is described in the conveyance instruments.
¶14 	Scott testified that his father and grandfather (Darwin and
Blaine) had used the disputed area to raise cattle “for as long as
[he 	could] 	remember,” 	going 	back 	until 	at 	least 	the 	“late

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[19]60s.” He stated that he was unaware of any permission
Blaine had received to keep animals on the property, but that he
thought Darwin and Carl “had an understanding.” He also
testified about “various structures” on the property that were
used in his family’s farming operations, including corrals and a
feed yard. He explained that they had “[b]een there as long as
[he could] remember.” Scott himself kept horses in a corral on
the disputed area for many years, and stated that he had never
asked permission to keep them there because he had always
“assumed it was [his grandfather’s] land.” Scott also confirmed
that a fence ran along the southern part of the area where the
family kept cattle, which “had been . . . there for a long time”
and basically served to “keep everything out of the [slough].”
¶15 	As to Dewey’s use of the property, Scott suggested that as
long as he could remember, Dewey’s use was minimal, but he
did remember Dewey keeping “an old combine,”7 “all of his
tractors,” and other equipment in a shed in the same general
area as the cattle operations.
¶16 	Carl testified that, sometime “between 1960 and 1970,” a
few years after he had married Mary Sue, Dewey drove him
around to Dewey’s various properties so that Carl could “be
aware of the properties [the family] owned.” At that time, Carl
witnessed the farming operations going on in the disputed area
south of the ancestral home; he described facilities “adjacent” to
the ancestral home as being used primarily for breeding—there
being “designated” pens for a bull, “heifers,” and “summer
calves.” Carl also characterized the entire operation (as of the
1963 parcel split) as being led and owned by Dewey, noting how
7. “The modern combine harvester, or simply combine, is a
versatile machine designed to efficiently harvest a variety of
grain crops.” Combine Harvester, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Combine_harvester [https://perma.cc/DDE3-DTAB].

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Dewey had been “the main proprietor of the property and the
animals,” and that although Blaine, Darwin, and other family
members 	were 	“allowed 	to 	have 	some 	[of 	the 	animals]
themselves and to use the bull that Dewey owned,” they all
ultimately “worked for [Dewey].”
¶17 	Carl 	also testified 	about 	a 	conversation 	he 	had 	with
Darwin sometime in the 1980s, before Dewey died. In this
conversation, Carl told Darwin that it was Dewey’s “wish that
[Darwin] could continue to use the[] areas . . . as had been done
in the past” “because Darwin had been helpful in helping
Dewey feed the cattle when [Dewey] wasn’t capable.”
¶18 	With respect to the leasing arrangement with Lessees,
Carl indicated that it had always been an “oral lease” and that
the fees they paid in rent were based on having access to
“everything on Parcel 34”—“all 20 acres.” As for property taxes,
Carl testified that he had “continuously paid the taxes on Parcel
34” for as long as it had belonged to Mary Sue’s trust and
Lundahl Farms.
¶19 	Carl then testified about the two unpaved roads used to
access Parcel 34, which are located immediately to the east and
to the west of the Parcel 33 boundaries. According to Carl, at
some point after 1959 and prior to 1974, Blaine sold Lessees a
right-of-way on the western edge of Parcel 33 “that allowed
them quicker access to come into the silage pit”8 they were
operating on Parcel 34, and that Darwin had later partitioned a
sliver of land off Parcel 33 containing the western road, creating
a new parcel, which he then sold to Lessees. Accordingly, once
they acquired rights to use the western road, it became possible
for Lessees to access Parcel 34 via either the eastern or western
8. As described by Carl, silage is “chopped corn that’s aged for
cattle to eat.”

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roads, which connect on Parcel 34 just southwest of the ancestral
home. See Appendix A.
¶20 	Testimony was solicited from Carl regarding what could
be seen in four aerial photos proffered by Lundahl Farms, which
dated from 1959 to 2011. First, he described what could be seen
in 1959 (which was a few years before the parcels were split),
including a “storage garage at the end of th[e] driveway,” “the
pens that they raised the cattle in,” and “where the fences were.”
He also identified the dirt roadway “just east of the ancestral
home” and testified that it had been used to “access . . . the rest
of the farm” from the main road.
¶21 	Carl 	next 	described 	what 	was 	depicted 	in 	an 	aerial
photograph from 1974—just over a decade after Parcels 33 and
34 were split—pointing out that “the same roadway” to the east
of the ancestral home was still there. But the 1974 photo also
showed the new dirt road to the west of Parcel 33 used by
Lessees. The western road appeared to “connect[] up with the
road from the east,” and from this point another dirt roadway
extended to the south of the property, which “allowed a freer
flow of the equipment” and access for Lessees to the silage pit.
Carl then testified how both roadways could still be seen in the
1993 aerial photo, as well as in the 2011 photo, but he admitted it
was “a little less clear [from the 2011 photo] how far [the dirt]
road [went].”
¶22 	Carl also testified about the old fence at the slough. When
asked how long the fence had been there, he stated, “Oh my
gosh, forever,” and noted that it had been there “[a]t least since
1959” because it could be seen in the aerial photo from that year.
¶23 	On cross-examination, Carl described how Tawnee had
informed him in 2016 that the platted boundary for Parcel 33
went through the back of the ancestral home. But Carl added
that in actuality, the line went through “a kitchen area and a car
cover . . . to the south,” which were improvements that had been

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added on to the original structure. Although Carl admitted
that 	before 	2016 	he 	had 	not 	known 	exactly 	where 	the
boundary 	between 	Parcels 	33 	and 	34 	was 	located, 	he 	had
nevertheless 	“assumed 	the 	boundary 	of 	the 	property 	was
somewhere behind the house.” When asked if he had thought
the boundary “went to the fence line,” he answered, “No.”
When asked if he had thought the boundary “went to the
roadway,” he stated that he “wasn’t sure.” Later, the trial court
asked Carl to elaborate what he meant by “behind the house,”
and Carl indicated that he had thought it was somewhere “[t]o
the south of the carport.”
¶24 	Counsel for Appellees also asked Carl how often he
personally had accessed Parcel 34. While Carl conceded that he
“really didn’t have any need to go to the property” regularly, he
estimated that he went to Parcel 34 “once a year at least” to walk
the property with Lessees. During these visits, Carl said he
would typically drive into the property via the eastern road
entryway, 	although 	he 	did 	use 	the 	western 	road 	on 	some
occasions. Carl also acknowledged that in the years he had
visited the property since 1987, he had seen the “fence line and
the improvements” in the disputed area, as well as horses and
cattle, which he knew did not belong to Dewey (because he was
deceased) or Lessees, and which he “assumed” belonged to
Darwin or his descendants. Carl was then asked, “[A]fter you
drove in and would look at this with [Lessees], did you do
anything to indicate to Blaine or Darwin that they needed to
remove the cattle or pay you any rent?” He responded, “Not at
that time.”
¶25 	Carl conceded that he had been “aware of the occupancy
[on Parcel 34] in 1987,” after Dewey’s death, and had been
concerned 	enough 	that 	he 	consulted 	an attorney 	about 	the
matter around that time. But Carl ultimately “didn’t worry about
it” because he received advice from that attorney that as long he
was paying taxes on Parcel 34, he “[should not] worry about it.”

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¶26 	At the end of cross-examination, counsel for Appellees
asked 	Carl, 	“Is 	there 	any 	question 	in 	your 	mind 	that 	the
fences . . . 	around 	this 	property, 	the 	corrals, 	the 	buildings,
they’re all visible and observable to any person [who] walks on
that property?” Carl responded, “Yes.” Carl was then asked,
“Did you take any action that would be perceived from an
objective standpoint to assert or declare that was still your
property and not Darwin’s or Blaine’s?” Carl responded simply,
“No.”
¶27 	Tawnee testified about her time living in the ancestral
home on Parcel 33. In particular, she described a conversation
she had with Darwin (who was her grandfather) in 1994 when
she was “clear[ing] up the property to move in.” As part of the
cleanup efforts, she was moving a dead tree to an open area on
what she thought was part of Darwin’s property. When Darwin
saw she had done this, he informed her that the area she thought
was part of his property was not. Tawnee explained, “[Darwin]
wanted to verify that I wasn’t going to put any amount of trash
in any of those areas because it wasn’t his to be able to be
putting trash on. And he was very clear with that.”
¶28 	Layne testified on behalf of Appellees. Although he and
his father and the rest of the family did not live on-site, Layne
testified that, beginning with his earliest memories, which would
have been in approximately 1965, he went to the “property
behind the . . . ancestral home” “every day to do chores” to help
with his father’s and grandfather’s livestock activities. These
chores consisted of “all the workings of the farm,” including
moving and feeding the cattle and irrigation activities. Layne
also testified that he had personally kept “horses on every bit of
[the disputed area] since [he] was 14,” as well as some “[s]how
steers for a time.”
¶29 	Although Layne remembered there being a bull on the
property 	around 	the 	time 	he 	was 	ten 	years 	old 	that 	he

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acknowledged could have belonged to Dewey, he also indicated
that, from the time he was fourteen years old until Dewey’s
death, he had never observed any of Dewey’s cattle in the area
used by Darwin and Blaine.
¶30 	Layne affirmed that several structures marked the area of
the disputed parcel that he and his family used, including “a
foundation of the old garage,” “a tack room,” “an old granary,”
and “a little barn out to the southwest.” As to the visible fence
line, Layne drew lines on an image indicating the area his family
used, and specified that the lines he was drawing “primarily”
marked “the fence lines that have historically been there.” These
included not only the oldest fence bordering the slough, but also
several more recent additions.
¶31 	As a rebuttal witness, Carl reiterated that he had been
paying the taxes on “the entire area of Parcel 34” since 1963. He
also 	contradicted 	some 	of 	Layne’s 	assertions 	about 	certain
fencing, including disputing that there were fences in some of
the locations where Layne had stated there were and how old
other fences were.
¶32 	After the close of trial, the court issued a written ruling, in
which it concluded that Appellees had “demonstrated boundary
by 	acquiescence.”9 In 	addressing 	the 	required 	elements 	for
9. As to the other claims before the trial court, it held that
Lundahl Farms was unable to meet its burden of establishing
waste, delinquent rent, or unlawful detainer; that Appellees
could not establish adverse possession because they had not
paid any taxes on Parcel 34; that no “prescriptive easement
exists” over the disputed area because it had already concluded
that the same area had become the property of Appellees based
on boundary by acquiescence; and that it did not need to address
the occupancy statute claim because the “boundaries acquiesced
(continued…)

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Appellees’ boundary by acquiescence claim,10 the court first
found that, based on testimony at trial and the aerial photos
admitted into evidence, “a fence [had been] present since 1959,”
and 	the 	court 	concluded 	therefrom 	that 	Appellees 	had
“established . . . a visible line with the existing fence lines and
[Lundahl Farms’] right of ways on the existing roads.”
¶33 	Next, 	regarding 	the 	occupation 	element, 	the 	court
recognized 	that 	“there 	was 	some 	dispute 	over 	whether
[Appellees had] occupied land west and east of the existing
roads,” but found that, based on unspecified testimony, the
“portions west of [the] most western road were utilized and
rented out to tenants, not [the owners of Parcel 33].” The court
made no explicit resolution on the dispute over the eastern road.
The court then concluded that “evidence demonstrate[d] that
[Appellees] and their predecessors have occupied and used
horses on the portions of Parcel 34 for over sixty years,” and that
both parties were “clearly on notice of such occupation for quite
some time.”
¶34 	In addition, as part of its analysis on the occupation
element, the court noted that it was “clear the [p]arties were not
even aware of where the actual boundaries between Parcel 33
and 34 were until 2016.” But it also found that Lundahl Farms
had “recognized Parcel 34’s boundary with . . . Parcel 33 as the
visible fence line,” citing the following in support: “[Bench Trial]
at 4:30:37 PM–4:32:40 PM ([Carl] testifying that Parcel 34 as he
(…continued)
to by the [p]arties cover any improvements [Appellees] are
claiming.” None of the court’s rulings on these issues have been
challenged on appeal.
10. See infra ¶ 42 (listing required elements and evidentiary
standard for boundary by acquiescence in Utah).

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
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recognized it was up to the visible fence line that has historically
been there).”
¶35 	The court concluded that the twenty-year element had
been 	met 	because 	Appellees 	and 	their 	predecessors 	had
“occupied the portions of Parcel 34 up to that fence line for over
sixty years.” Regarding the mutual acquiescence element, the
court made no further references to the record, instead stating
only that “neither [p]arty contests that Parcel 33 and Parcel 34
are adjacent to one another,” and the court concluded therefrom
that “the [p]arties [had] mutually acquiesced to the boundary
between Parcel 34 and Parcel 33 as the visible fence line.”11
¶36 	The next month, Lundahl Farms filed a motion seeking
amended findings and judgment, pursuant to rule 52(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in which it challenged several
aspects of the court’s order. Among other things, Lundahl Farms
argued 	that 	several 	of 	the 	court’s 	factual 	findings 	were
erroneous and unsupported by the evidence. Regarding the
court’s identification of “existing roads” as part of the boundary,
Lundahl Farms asserted that “[t]he [c]ourt [did not] identify by
exhibit or testimony what it [found] to be ‘existing roads’” and
“[t]here [we]re no subsidiary facts to establish how the [c]ourt
determined where the ‘existing roads’ were located.” Lundahl
Farms also argued that the court needed to amend its findings to
recognize that “historical access to the southern and western
portion[s] of Parcel 34 was by the historic dirt road” to the east
of the ancestral home, and that “the historic dirt road was
entirely within the property of Parcel 34 and used by [Lundahl
Farms] and [its] predecessors in interest for decades.” Finally,
Lundahl Farms challenged the veracity of the court’s assertion
11. This order also included a map depicting the boundary that
the court concluded had been acquiesced to. This map has been
reproduced and attached to this opinion as Appendix B.

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
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that Carl had testified “that Parcel 34 as he recognized it was up
to 	the 	visible 	fence 	line 	that 	has 	historically 	been 	there,”
contending that Carl did not so testify; instead, Lundahl Farms
clarified that Carl had acknowledged that “an old wooden
fence” had “been there for a very long time,” but he never gave
any 	indication 	that 	he 	had 	recognized 	that 	fence 	as 	the
boundary.
¶37 	After hearing argument on the motion and Appellees’
opposition, the trial court issued an amended decision and order
that 	“clarifie[d] 	and 	supersede[d]” 	its 	prior 	order. 	But 	the
amended decision differed substantively from the original order
in only two respects: first, the court removed all references to the
eastern road that had been in the original order, leaving its
discussion on the occupation and use of the western road; and
second, 	the 	amended 	order 	more 	precisely 	described 	the
property to be included in the expanded Parcel 33, which the
court 	held 	Appellees had 	“acquired” 	through 	boundary 	by
acquiescence.12
¶38 	Following the issuance of the amended decision and
order, Lundahl Farms appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶39 	Lundahl Farms appeals the trial court’s determination
that Appellees proved their claim for boundary by acquiescence
by clear and convincing evidence. Lundahl Farms attacks the
12. The amended order included both a more precise metes-and-
bounds description of the boundary that the court recognized, as
well as a map depicting that boundary. The map and description
were created by a surveyor and submitted to the court by
Appellees, and that map has been reproduced and attached to
this opinion as Appendix C.

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	16 	2021 UT App 146
factual basis for several of the court’s findings, it challenges the
legal adequacy of the court’s findings to support its conclusions
on certain boundary by acquiescence elements, and it contests
the legal relevance of certain evidence relied on by the trial
court. These various challenges are, at times, intertwined, but we
do our best to understand and address each one.
¶40 	With regard to the factual findings that Lundahl Farms
challenges as unsupported by the evidence, we will not reverse a
finding made by the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.
RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 22, 96 P.3d 935. “To qualify as
clearly erroneous a trial court’s findings must be either against
the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Jacob v. Bate, 2015
UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346 (cleaned up). “But a finding is
not clearly erroneous if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s findings, the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the finding.” Id.
¶41 	To the extent Lundahl Farms challenges the adequacy of
the trial court’s factual findings, whether those findings are
adequate to support the court’s legal conclusions is reviewed
“for correctness as a question of law.” See Shuman v. Shuman,
2017 UT App 192, ¶ 2, 406 P.3d 258 (cleaned up). Similarly, to the
extent 	Lundahl 	Farms 	challenges 	the 	trial 	court’s 	legal
conclusions on whether Appellees proved their boundary by
acquiescence claim by clear and convincing evidence, we review
those conclusions for correctness, “according the trial court no
particular deference.” Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 22 (cleaned up);
accord Hansen v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, ¶ 20,
493 P.3d 1131.
ANALYSIS
¶42 	Utah’s “boundary by acquiescence doctrine requires a
claimant to show: (1) a visible line marked by monuments,

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	17 	2021 UT App 146
fences, buildings, or natural features treated as a boundary; (2)
the claimant’s occupation of his or her property up to the visible
line such that it would give a reasonable landowner notice that
the 	claimant 	is 	using 	the 	line 	as 	a 	boundary; 	(3) 	mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary by adjoining landowners;
(4) for a period of at least 20 years.” Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT
22, ¶ 31, 379 P.3d 1186; accord Linebaugh v. Gibson, 2020 UT App
108, ¶ 25, 471 P.3d 835. “To prevail . . . , a claimant must prove
each element by clear and convincing evidence.” Linebaugh, 2020
UT App 108, ¶ 25 (cleaned up).
¶43 	Under 	the 	occupation 	element 	of 	boundary 	by
acquiescence, a claimant must “occupy his or her property up to
a visible line in such a manner as to place the nonclaimant on
notice that he or she claims the property so occupied.” Anderson,
2016 UT 22, ¶ 26. Mutual acquiescence, in turn, occurs when the
claimant and the neighboring landowner “recognize and treat”
the 	visible 	line 	as 	the 	boundary 	dividing 	their 	respective
properties. RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 935
(cleaned 	up). 	“Acquiescence 	is 	a 	highly 	fact-dependent
question,” 	requiring 	the 	court 	to 	make 	“an 	objective
determination based solely on the parties’ actions in relation to
each other and to the line serving as the boundary.” Linebaugh,
2020 UT App 108, ¶ 26 (cleaned up). It “may be tacit and inferred
from evidence” of the landowner’s actions which tend to show
that the landowner “impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that
line as the demarcation between the properties.” Id. (cleaned up).
A landowner’s “subjective belief regarding the location of a
boundary may be evidence of mutual acquiescence, but only to
the extent that such understanding is based on the objective
actions of the landowners.” Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay,
2011 UT 71, ¶ 28, 270 P.3d 430. Finally, the claimant must show
that these elements were satisfied “for a period of at least 20
years.” Anderson, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 31. Once the first three elements
have been in place for the same twenty-year period, boundary
by acquiescence exists as a matter of law, and the landowner’s

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	18 	2021 UT App 146
subsequent actions do not extinguish the new boundary. See
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 31.
¶44 	Lundahl Farms challenges the trial court’s conclusion that
Appellees proved the occupation, mutual acquiescence, and time
period elements of boundary by acquiescence by clear and
convincing 	evidence.13 	We 	first 	address 	Lundahl 	Farms’
13. Lundahl Farms appears to concede that the first element,
establishing a visible line, was satisfied, stating in its opening
brief that it “is not challeng[ing]” the trial court’s conclusion that
there was sufficient evidence of “a visible line in the old fence
near the slough.” But at the same time, Lundahl Farms brings
what it presents as a standalone legal issue, arguing that the
boundary 	identified 	by 	the 	trial 	court 	was 	erroneous 	and
requires reversal because the “old fence line near the slough . . .
far exceeds the common boundary between the two properties”
and because the new boundary creates “a segmented parcel of
land” that is cut off from the rest of Parcel 34. In response,
Appellees argue that the court properly “adopted the drawings
and legal descriptions prepared by a licensed surveyor to ensure
that the order reflected the accurate boundaries between the
properties,” and that Lundahl Farms’ argument on appeal is
“contrary to the entire theory of the case” it advanced at trial.
Lundahl Farms provided no response to either of Appellees’
arguments in its reply brief, and it is not apparent from the
limited argument in Lundahl Farms’ opening brief that the court
erred in adopting the drawings and descriptions prepared by the
expert. 	Accordingly, 	Lundahl 	Farms 	has 	failed 	to 	meet 	its
burden of demonstrating error on this score.
Nevertheless, because we are remanding this case for
additional proceedings, we encourage the court on remand to
enter more detailed factual findings on the visible line element.
To satisfy this element, the claimant must establish the existence
of 	one 	or 	more 	“markers”—such 	as 	“monuments, 	fences,
(continued…)

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	19 	2021 UT App 146
contention that the court clearly erred in finding that Carl had
believed the old fence at the slough represented the boundary
between Parcel 33 and Parcel 34. We then consider its challenge
to the adequacy of the trial court’s findings in support of the
conclusion 	that 	Appellees 	had 	established 	boundary 	by
acquiescence. 	And 	finally, 	we 	consider 	Lundahl 	Farms’
challenge to the legal relevance of certain evidence considered
by the trial court in reaching its conclusion.
A. 	The Findings Challenged as Clearly Erroneous
¶45 	To begin, Lundahl Farms challenges as clearly erroneous
the trial court’s factual finding that Lundahl Farms “recognized
Parcel 34’s boundary with . . . Parcel 33 as the visible fence line.”
(…continued)
buildings, or natural features”—that together “create[] a clearly
visible line” delineating the “claimed boundary line.” See Hansen
v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, ¶ 31, 493 P.3d 1131
(cleaned up). In its amended order, the court concluded that
Appellees had “established that there was a visible line with the
existing fence lines and [Lundahl Farms’] existing road that
abuts [Parcel 33] to the west.” Yet, as far as we can tell based on
the evidence in the record and the map in the trial court’s
amended order, the old fence at the slough served as only a
portion of the southern part of the boundary identified by the
court. And while the eastern edge of the western road does
appear 	to 	define 	the 	entire 	western 	portion 	of 	the 	court’s
recognized boundary, it is unclear what markers—if any at all—
the trial court used to define the northern and eastern portions of
the new boundary. To enable meaningful appellate review, the
court 	should 	enter 	complete 	findings 	to 	support 	any
determination that Appellees have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, the existence of a visible line on each part
of the claimed boundary.

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	20 	2021 UT App 146
When evaluating whether a finding is clearly erroneous, we
“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s findings,” and consider whether the finding is “against
the clear weight of the evidence” or leaves us with “a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake [was] made.” Jacob v. Bate,
2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346 (cleaned up). Once we
determine 	that 	a 	finding 	is 	clearly 	erroneous, 	it 	is 	usually
“inappropriate” for this court to “disregard the [trial] court’s
findings of fact and to assume the task of weighing evidence and
making 	[our] 	own 	findings 	of 	fact”; 	rather, 	under 	such
circumstances we “normally remand the matter to the [trial]
court to make additional or new findings because of its unique
position to weigh the evidence” in the first instance. Gardner v.
Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 43, 294 P.3d 600 (cleaned up).
¶46 	In 	support 	of 	its 	finding 	that 	Lundahl 	Farms 	had
recognized the fence as the boundary, the court cited a point at
trial 	when 	Carl 	allegedly 	“testif[ied] 	that 	Parcel 	34 	as 	he
recognized it was up to the visible fence line that has historically
been there.”14 But Lundahl Farms contends that “no[]where
within the entirety of the trial transcript” did Carl make any
statements that could be construed as him stating that the
boundary of “Parcel 34 as he recognized it was up to the visible
fence line that has historically been there.”
¶47 	On our review of the record, Lundahl Farms is correct.
Carl 	did 	state 	that 	he 	had 	“assumed 	the 	boundary 	of 	the
property was somewhere behind the house,” but “didn’t know
exactly where.” And Carl admitted that there had been “fences”
“along the bottom of the slough” “since the [19]50s.” But when
14. In its decision, the trial court cited to two minutes of the trial
transcript as containing the relevant testimony from Carl on this
point. However, as Lundahl Farms points out, Carl was not even
testifying during the time period the court identified.

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	21 	2021 UT App 146
asked if he had thought the boundary “went to the fence line,”
he unambiguously answered, “No.” Thus, not only is there no
record support for the court’s finding that Carl had “recognized”
the boundary as being “up to the visible fence line that has
historically been there,” but Carl stated the exact opposite.
¶48 	Appellees 	nonetheless 	counter 	that 	this 	“constitutes
harmless error.” “[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it
affected the outcome of the proceedings.” State v. Evans, 2001 UT
22, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 888; accord In re Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT App
179, ¶ 13, 381 P.3d 1179. We do not share Appellees’ view. First,
the trial court’s findings on the issue of mutual acquiescence are
sparse. The court made several findings relating to Appellees’
occupation of the disputed area and Lundahl Farms’ awareness
of that occupation, but the court’s findings lack support for a
determination that the parties “recogniz[ed] and treat[ed]” the
old fence by the slough as the boundary dividing their respective
properties. See Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 24. Thus, it appears that this
finding carried weight in the court’s analysis, and we cannot say
that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the court’s
decision.
¶49 	Further, at oral argument, Appellees asserted that any
evidence of the parties’ “subjective acknowledgment” regarding
the claimed boundary is “really not relevant” because it is
ultimately “the totality of the [parties’] objective conduct” that
dictates whether there has been mutual acquiescence. But this
view constitutes a slight misreading of precedent. Although “a
party’s subjective intent has no bearing on the existence of
mutual acquiescence,” a party’s “subjective belief may have some
relevance to mutual acquiescence,” as long “as the belief is
supported or created by the objective actions of the parties.”
Essential 	Botanical 	Farms, 	2011 	UT 	71, 	¶¶ 	27–28 	(emphasis
added); accord Linebaugh, 2020 UT App 108, ¶ 27. This is because
“a 	subjective 	belief 	is 	merely 	an 	individual’s 	personal

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	22 	2021 UT App 146
understanding of a certain state of affairs and not a degree of
intent.” Essential Botanical Farms, 2011 UT 71, ¶ 28. Thus, while
“neither a subjective belief nor any level of intent” is required to
show mutual acquiescence, “a subjective belief regarding the
location of a boundary” may still be relevant in considering the
parties’ actions. See id. Therefore, on remand, the court may
consider 	Carl’s 	subjective 	belief 	regarding 	the 	boundary’s
location in evaluating mutual acquiescence (so long as Carl’s
subjective belief is supported by the parties’ objective actions),
but the court may not rely on its erroneous finding that Lundahl
Farms recognized the old fence by the slough as the boundary
line.
¶50 	In sum, Lundahl Farms has shown clear error. Even when
“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s findings,” it is evident to us “that a mistake [was] made”
regarding the finding that Lundahl Farms had “recognized” the
boundary as the slough fence, based on cited testimony that is
found nowhere in the record. See Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13
(cleaned up). In such situations, our only choice is to remand the
matter for “additional or new findings” that are not “in conflict
with the clear weight of the evidence.” See Gardner, 2012 UT App
374, ¶¶ 16, 43 (cleaned up).
B. 	The Adequacy of the Factual Findings
¶51 	Lundahl Farms next argues that several aspects of the trial
court’s 	findings 	render 	them 	inadequate 	to 	support 	its
conclusion that there was boundary by acquiescence. “Utah
appellate courts consistently stress the importance of adequate
findings of fact” because “if we are to determine whether the
evidence adduced at trial supports the trial court’s findings, the
findings must embody sufficient detail and include enough
subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they
are grounded.” Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (cleaned up); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (“In all

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	23 	2021 UT App 146
actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the court must
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law.”). In other words, the court’s findings “must show that the
court’s 	judgment 	or 	decree 	follows 	logically 	from, 	and 	is
supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.” Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 28, 70
P.3d 35 (cleaned up). “Otherwise, this court would be placed in
the awkward position of having to speculate about what the
[trial] court actually determined the facts to be, without benefit
of 	the 	guidance 	that 	proper 	factual 	findings 	are 	meant 	to
provide.” Woodward, 823 P.2d at 478 n.7.
¶52 	Lundahl Farms makes two primary complaints about the
legal 	adequacy 	of 	the 	trial 	court’s findings relevant 	to 	the
occupation and mutual acquiescence elements. It first complains
that the court failed to make findings regarding Lundahl Farms’
contention that Appellees had occupied the disputed area only
with its permission, not because the parties acquiesced to a new
boundary. Similarly, Lundahl Farms contends that the court
failed 	to 	make 	findings analyzing 	the 	co-occupation 	of 	the
disputed 	area 	by 	Lundahl 	Farms 	and 	its 	predecessors. 	We
address each argument in turn.
1. 	Evidence of Permission to Occupy
¶53 	Lundahl Farms concedes that the trial court was correct to
find 	that 	Appellees 	and 	their 	predecessors 	in 	interest 	had
occupied “the area of the cattle operation between the old fence
line and the old dirt road for decades,” but it contends that “at
no 	time 	within 	those 	decades 	of 	use” 	was 	the 	occupation
without 	permission. 	Lundahl 	Farms 	argues 	that 	any 	such
permission is relevant to whether the parties recognized or
treated the old fence line or the old dirt roads as boundaries, and
thus must be considered in evaluating whether Lundahl Farms

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	24 	2021 UT App 146
had been on notice that Appellees were purporting to occupy the
disputed area as their own and whether Lundahl Farms had
acquiesced in those boundaries. Lundahl Farms further argues
that, without findings on the question of permission, the trial
court could not conclude that the elements of boundary by
acquiescence had been met. We agree with Lundahl Farms on
each point.
¶54 	First, 	we 	agree 	that 	the 	evidence 	Lundahl 	Farms
presented on the issue of permission was relevant to the court’s
analysis of the occupation and acquiescence elements. Although
not 	expressly 	identified 	as 	part 	of 	the 	standard 	on 	these
elements, whether the owner gave permission allowing the
claimant to use the occupied area is relevant to whether the
owner “recognize[d] and treat[ed]” the purported visible line as
a boundary. See Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 24 (cleaned up). Indeed,
Utah 	precedent 	suggests 	that 	permission 	from 	the 	owner
allowing the claimant’s use defeats a claim that the parties
mutually acquiesced to the asserted boundary. See, e.g., Davis v.
Riley, 437 P.2d 453, 454–55 (Utah 1968) (reversing a ruling on
summary judgment and remanding for trial because certain
evidence “appear[ed] to raise an issue of fact as to whether the
[claimants’] use . . . was merely permissive; and that if this were
proved, that would preclude the establishment of a boundary by
acquiescence”); Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah 1966)
(suggesting 	that 	the 	owner 	giving 	adjoining 	landowners
permission to use a ditch on his land was one fact evincing lack
of mutual acquiescence to that ditch defining the boundary
between their properties); McElprang v. Jones, 2007 UT App
118U, 	para. 	6 	(affirming 	the 	trial 	court’s 	conclusion 	that
boundary by acquiescence had not been met based in part on the
trial court’s finding that the claimant’s use of the disputed area
had been “permissive”). And this makes sense, because giving a
neighboring landowner permission to use an area seems to be
“inconsistent 	with 	recognition 	of 	[the 	asserted] 	line 	as 	the

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	25 	2021 UT App 146
boundary” between the properties. See Linebaugh, 2020 UT App
108, ¶ 27 (cleaned up).
¶55 	Second, we agree with Lundahl Farms that it presented
evidence that Appellees’ use of the disputed area was with
permission, and to the extent the trial court found otherwise, it
was mistaken. Citing Carl’s testimony, the court found that
“[e]vidence was presented that at no given time, prior to . . . June
2016, had [Lundahl Farms] required any compensation, rent,
permission for land use, or permission to establish a fence or use
the corral on Parcel 34.” This finding is partially supported by
Carl’s testimony that, before 2016, he had never charged rent for
use of the property, never told Blaine or Darwin to tear down
any fence or corral or to remove their livestock, never wrote
them a letter “saying . . . you guys are using the property with
my 	permission,” 	and 	never 	asserted 	or 	declared 	that 	the
property was his and not Darwin’s or Blaine’s. But at no point in
Carl’s testimony did he state that Appellees’ use of the disputed
area was not permissive. Rather, Carl testified that he had a
conversation with Darwin sometime in the 1980s, in which Carl
conveyed Dewey’s wish that Darwin be allowed to continue
using the disputed area “as had been done in the past.”
¶56 	Moreover, Carl was not the only one whose testimony
suggested that Appellees’ and their predecessors’ use of Parcel
34 had been with permission. Tawnee testified that in 1994,
Darwin told her that she could not move a dead tree to a spot in
the disputed area because the property was not his, and that he,
Layne, and Tawnee were allowed to use the area only “for
horses and cattle,” and “not for junk.” This evidence suggests
that Darwin did not view the old fence line as his property’s
boundary. And when Scott was asked whether he was aware of
any permission Blaine or Darwin had received to keep animals
on the property, Scott testified that he thought Darwin and Carl
“had an understanding.” Thus, given that Darwin lived until
2011—well within the twenty-year time period if counting back

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	26 	2021 UT App 146
from the date that Lundahl Farms issued the notice to vacate—
there is evidence in the record that Appellees’ occupation of the
disputed area was permissive.
¶57 	Third, we agree with Lundahl Farms that other than the
limited finding noted above, see supra ¶ 55, findings on the
evidence presented on the issue of permission are absent from
the trial court’s decision. To prevail against Lundahl Farms on
the 	issue 	of 	boundary 	by 	acquiescence, 	Appellees 	were
“required to present evidence that clearly and convincingly
established every essential element of [the claim].” See Armed
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 27, 70 P.3d 35
(emphasis added). The trial court, in turn, was obligated to make
findings of fact regarding the essential elements of boundary by
acquiescence “that could be reviewed on appeal to determine
both the adequacy of the evidence and the correctness of the
court’s ultimate conclusion.” See id.
¶58 	Here, the trial court’s factual findings on the issue of
permission 	are 	inadequate 	and 	prevent 	us 	from 	effectively
reviewing its decision. Perhaps the court did not find Carl, Scott,
and Tawnee to be credible. Perhaps it concluded that despite
these witnesses’ testimonies about permission, there was still
clear and convincing evidence that the parties, for a twenty-year
period, treated the old fence as a boundary between Parcel 33
and Parcel 34. But the court’s decision 	does not reveal its
thinking on these facts or this issue. And “without insight into
the [trial] court’s reasoning, we are unable to ascertain whether
the [court’s ruling] follows logically from, and is supported by,
the evidence.” See Maak v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2016 UT App
73, ¶ 46, 372 P.3d 64 (cleaned up).
¶59 	Thus, 	as 	is 	the 	case 	with 	findings 	that 	are 	clearly
erroneous, when the trial court’s findings are inadequate to
support its ultimate legal conclusion, we must vacate the trial
court’s ruling and remand the matter so that the court may

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	27 	2021 UT App 146
“supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them
conform to the issues presented and the facts as found from the
evidence” and “enter judgment in accordance with the findings
as revised.” See Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 28 (cleaned up); see also
Maak, 2016 UT App 73, ¶ 46 (vacating the court’s ruling and
remanding for the trial court “to determine the issue anew and
to provide the written analysis necessary to ensure that its legal
conclusion flows logically from, and is supported by, the record
evidence”). Specifically, the court should address with adequate
findings whether there was permission to use the disputed area
and, 	if 	so, 	how 	that 	permission 	affects 	the 	court’s 	mutual
acquiescence determination.
2. 	Evidence of Co-Occupation of the Disputed Area
¶60 	Lundahl Farms also complains that the trial court made
no findings about the use of the disputed area by Lundahl Farms
and its predecessors (including Dewey). There was evidence
introduced 	at 	trial 	that 	Dewey 	had 	occupied 	some 	of 	the
disputed area from the time of the parcel split in 1963 until his
death in 1987. Although there was some dispute between the
various 	witnesses 	about 	the 	extent 	to 	which 	Dewey 	was
involved 	day-to-day 	in 	the 	livestock 	operations 	(with 	Carl
characterizing Dewey as being in charge, whereas Scott and
Layne minimized his role), all witnesses were consistent in that
Dewey used the disputed area in Parcel 34 for that entire time
period to at least some degree, even if toward the end of his life
his use consisted only of storing farm equipment and other
personal property at the site.
¶61 	Further, 	evidence 	was 	introduced 	that 	beginning
sometime in the 1970s or 1980s, Parcel 34 was leased in its
entirety to Lessees, who have continuously raised crops on the
property (at least until the time of trial). Carl testified that he
sporadically accessed the property to conduct walkthroughs
with 	Lessees. 	Although 	this 	use 	is 	occasional—Carl

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	28 	2021 UT App 146
approximated 	that 	it 	happens 	“once 	a 	year 	at 	least”—the
evidence suggested that the use was consistent. And on these
occasions, Carl most often accessed Parcel 34 via the eastern
road—which constitutes a notable portion of the total area
within the boundary that the trial court found Lundahl Farms
and its predecessors had acquiesced to. Such use appears to be
“inconsistent 	with 	recognition 	of 	[the 	claimed] 	line 	as 	the
boundary,” see Linebaugh, 2020 UT App 108, ¶ 27 (cleaned up),
because Carl apparently felt free to use the eastern road to access
Parcel 34 whenever he considered it necessary.
¶62 	Appellees do not dispute the veracity of Carl’s annual
use, 	but 	instead 	argue 	that 	such 	infrequent 	use 	“is 	not,
objectively, enough to manifest to [the owners of Parcel 33] that
[the owners of Parcel 34] did not recognize the fence line as the
boundary between the properties.” In support, Appellees cite
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781, but that case is ultimately
not helpful to their position. In Ault, our supreme court clarified
that “record property owners are not required to take legal
action or otherwise ‘oust’ someone adversely occupying their
property to maintain their legal rights in their property”; rather,
“[t]hey must only take some action manifesting that they do not
acquiesce or recognize the particular line . . . as a boundary
between the properties.” Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Even “mere
conversations between the parties” can “refute any allegation
that the parties have mutually acquiesced in the line as the
property demarcation” if such conversations suggest that one or
both 	parties 	do 	not 	view 	the 	purported 	visible 	line 	as 	a
boundary. See id. ¶ 21.
¶63 	Indeed, 	this 	court 	has 	held 	that 	even 	uses 	that 	are
seemingly “minimal” compared to the claimants’ activities can
be “inconsistent with acquiescence.” See Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT
App 346, ¶ 15, 118 P.3d 301. In Argyle, the nonclaimants’ use we
characterized as minimal involved “occasional maintenance” of
a fence and “repairs performed on an artesian well located on

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	29 	2021 UT App 146
the disputed property.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 15. Although the frequency of
these uses was not specifically described in Argyle, this sort of
sporadic, 	relatively 	minimal 	use 	is 	arguably 	reminiscent 	of
Lundahl Farms’ sporadic, relatively minimal use of the disputed
part of Parcel 34.
¶64 	Unfortunately, the trial court did not make any findings
regarding this evidence of co-occupation. The court referred to
testimony that “portions west of the most western road were
utilized and rented out to [Lessees], not [Appellees],” but the
court did not make findings about the extent of the lease over
the disputed area, the extent of Dewey’s co-occupation of the
disputed area for more than two decades, or the extent of Carl’s
use of the property every year, including his use of the eastern
road—all of which could suggest that Lundahl Farms and its
predecessors were not treating the old fence near the slough as a
boundary. See Linebaugh, 2020 UT App 108, ¶ 26 (describing the
question of acquiescence as being “based solely on the parties’
actions in relation to each other and to the line serving as the
boundary” (cleaned up)).
¶65 	Without findings on these factual issues, we do not know
whether the court found the evidence of co-occupation credible
or how the court factored the evidence into its analysis on the
question of Lundahl Farms’ acquiescence to Appellees’ asserted
boundary. And because this is material to whether there was
mutual 	acquiescence, 	on 	remand 	the 	court 	must 	make 	the
requisite factual findings and provide the analysis necessary to
enable meaningful appellate review.15 See Maak, 2016 UT App 73,
¶ 46.
15. 	In 	declaring 	this 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	the 	mutual
acquiescence issue, we do not mean to conclude that Dewey’s
use of the disputed area—which ended nearly thirty years before
(continued…)

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	30 	2021 UT App 146
C. 	The Legal Relevance of Evidence Relating to Non-
Landowners’ Actions and the Purpose of the Old Fence
¶66 	Lundahl 	Farms 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	trial 	court
committed legal error in considering certain evidence as relevant
to the element of mutual acquiescence. Specifically, it argues that
the 	actions 	of 	non-landowners 	are 	not 	relevant 	to 	mutual
acquiescence. 	Lundahl 	Farms 	also 	appears 	to 	suggest 	that
because the original purpose of the old fence “was to keep cattle
out of the slough,” the court could not conclude that the parties
acquiesced to the fence as a boundary, and it asks us to reverse
the trial court on this basis. Other than in one small respect, we
disagree with Lundahl Farms on both points.
1. 	Non-Landowners’ Actions
¶67 	Lundahl Farms argues that the “actions of Scott . . . [are]
not relevant because [he] was never an adjoining landowner.” It
is true that the actions of certain individuals cannot serve as
evidence of mutual acquiescence if they do not own either of the
(…continued)
Lundahl Farms served its notice to vacate—is fatal to Appellees’
boundary by acquiescence claim. It may be that Dewey’s use
falls outside of the relevant twenty-year period. But in reaching
its conclusion that occupation and mutual acquiescence were
present for at least twenty years, the trial court did not identify a
specific 	time 	range 	that 	all 	the 	elements 	of 	boundary 	by
acquiescence had been established, instead simply concluding
that Appellees had “met the requirement of a long period of
time.” Without knowing at what point in time the trial court
determined the elements of boundary by acquiescence had been
met, 	we 	are 	unable 	to 	definitively 	state 	what 	evidence 	is
relevant. On remand, the court should state with clarity if and
specifically when the twenty-year period was met.

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	31 	2021 UT App 146
properties in question. See Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App 346,
¶¶ 11–12, 	118 	P.3d 	301 	(concluding 	that 	parties 	could 	not
acquiesce in a boundary on “property that neither of them
owned”); see also Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah 1966)
(“[A]ny inference of recognition and acquiescence in the ditch as
the boundary by the various individuals, [who were] not record
owners, who farmed the . . . tract is immaterial.”). But the trial
court did not cite Scott’s testimony recounting his own actions.
Although 	Scott 	did 	testify 	regarding 	his 	own 	uses 	of 	the
disputed area, he also described conditions present throughout
his 	lifetime, 	including 	the 	existence 	of 	certain 	fencing 	and
Dewey’s, Blaine’s, and Darwin’s uses of the property. To the
extent the court relied on these aspects of Scott’s testimony in
speaking to mutual acquiescence of the then-owners of Parcel 33
and Parcel 34, the trial court did not err.16
¶68 	The court did err, however, in relying on Scott’s statement
that “he assumed the [disputed] land was [Appellees’] as their
two predecessors had used it.” As explained above, to the extent
Scott testified about his recollection of the landowners’ actions,
from which mutual acquiescence could be objectively inferred,
his testimony was material. But any assumptions Scott made
about the parties’ respective ownership were not. See Fuoco, 421
P.2d at 947. On remand, the court should not consider any
assumptions Scott had about who owned the disputed area.
2. 	The Original Purpose of the Old Fence
¶69 	Lundahl Farms next challenges the parties’ ability to
acquiesce to the old fence at the slough serving as the boundary
16. For the same reason, it was not error, as Lundahl Farms
contends, for the trial court to cite evidence of Layne’s actions
demonstrating “usage of the area of the cattle operation prior to
becoming an adjoining landowner.”

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	32 	2021 UT App 146
line because “[t]he purpose of the fence . . . was to keep cattle out
of the slough” and the parties therefore could have “never
intended [for it] to be [the] boundary line between the two
properties.” Yet Appellees direct our attention to our recent
decision 	in 	Linebaugh 	v. 	Gibson, 	in 	which 	the 	nonclaimants
advanced an almost identical argument, “assert[ing] that if a
fence is built to confine animals,” that “initial intent . . . renders
any subsequent interaction between the nonclaimant property
owner and the claimant immaterial” to being able to establish
mutual acquiescence. See 2020 UT App 108, ¶ 28. We found that
argument to be inconsistent with both logic and precedent,
because it is “the parties’ objective actions in relation to the
boundary and not their mental state” that determines whether
there 	has 	been 	mutual 	acquiescence. 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up). 	We
therefore held that the initial purpose of any fence being asserted
as an acquiesced boundary is “not dispositive” to the mutual
acquiescence analysis; instead, “where such a fence is built and
how the parties thereafter regard it” are the relevant inquiries.
See id.
¶70 	Similarly here, the fact that the old fence was originally
built to keep animals out of the slough is relevant to the mutual
acquiescence analysis but is not dispositive on its own. What
matters is the objectively viewed actions of the parties since the
fence was constructed, and Lundahl Farms’ attempt to argue
otherwise is unavailing.17
17. 	In 	challenging 	the 	court’s 	mutual 	acquiescence
determination, Lundahl Farms also directs us to Carl’s testimony
that he has “consistently” paid taxes “for the entire area of Parcel
34” since the time that the property was deeded to his wife’s
trust. But Lundahl Farms does not identify what error, if any, the
trial court made with regard to this fact. Before the trial court,
Lundahl Farms cited Carl’s tax-related testimony in support of
(continued…)

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	33 	2021 UT App 146
CONCLUSION
¶71 	Boundary by acquiescence claims present “highly fact-
dependent 	question[s],” 	meaning 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	will
necessarily be in a more advantaged position than we are when
it is reviewing the evidence directly. See RHN Corp. v. Veibell,
2004 UT 60, ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 935 (cleaned up). Nevertheless, the
absence of “appropriate and specific findings” on such fact-
dependent questions “is a fundamental defect that makes it
impossible [for us] to review the issues that were briefed without
invading the trial court’s fact-finding domain.” Armed Forces Ins.
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 37, 70 P.3d 35 (cleaned up). In
other words, without adequate factual findings on all material
issues, we are unable to ascertain whether the trial court’s
decision follows logically from and is clearly and convincingly
supported by the evidence. “This fundamental defect prevents
us from proceeding forward and requires us to remand this case
to the trial court to complete the findings of fact and to conduct
further proceedings if necessary.” Id.
(…continued)
its argument “that if the [c]ourt finds that there was boundary by
acquiescence beyond the land under the back of the home, the
payment of taxes for all of Parcel 34 for more than 7 years
constitutes 	adverse 	possession 	over 	all 	of 	Parcel 	34.” 	But
Lundahl Farms does not repeat this argument on appeal, nor
does it offer any rebuttal to Appellees’ argument that insofar as
Lundahl Farms believes its payment of taxes is relevant to the
issue of mutual acquiescence, that argument is unpreserved.
Because Lundahl Farms does not identify an error relating to this
evidence, 	nor 	does 	it 	respond 	to 	Appellees’ 	argument
challenging preservation, we do not address the tax evidence
further.

Lundahl Farms v. Nielsen
20190905-CA 	34 	2021 UT App 146
¶72 	We largely reject Lundahl Farms’ challenges to the legal
relevance of some of the evidence the trial court considered in
concluding 	that 	Appellees 	have 	proven 	boundary 	by
acquiescence, but we deem certain of the court’s factual findings
to be clearly erroneous, and we conclude that its findings are
altogether 	inadequate 	to 	sustain 	its 	legal 	conclusion 	that
Appellees 	had 	established 	boundary 	by 	acquiescence. 	We
therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand the case for
the entry of supplemented or modified findings, and for the
court to enter judgment in accordance with its revisions. This
endeavor may involve “determin[ing] the issue[s] anew” based
on “the record evidence,” see Maak v. IHC Health Services, Inc.,
2016 UT App 73, ¶ 46, 372 P.3d 64, or, if the court deems it
warranted, further evidentiary proceedings, see Harrison, 2003
UT 14, ¶ 37.18
18. 	Largely 	because 	of 	its 	conclusion 	that 	Appellees 	had
established boundary by acquiescence, the trial court rejected
Lundahl Farms’ unlawful detainer claim and it did not reach
Appellees’ prescriptive easement and occupancy statute claims.
See supra note 9. Although we express no opinion on the merits
of those claims, nothing in this opinion should be construed to
limit the court’s ability to consider them on remand should it
reach a different conclusion on Appellees’ claim for boundary by
acquiescence.

Appendix A: Deeded Property Lines of Parcels 33 and 34
Parcel 34
Ancestral Home
Western
Road
Eastern
Road
Disputed Boundary Line

Appendix B: Boundary Recognized in First Order

Appendix C: Boundary Recognized in Amended Order
400 North Street
NB8.32'26 ₩
Hyrum City
529.15°
170.70
164.82
98.71
59.98'
125.01'
90.01
90.011
135.01
03-060~0065
$1'2734 ₩ 198.45'
Lundahl Farms LLC
140.01
/03-060-0055
David J.
03-060-0055
140.01
198.00'
225.02'
-
250.02' --
400 West Street
Darwin L. Nielsen 03-060-0033
N2'10'16E
56.00"
52'10'16"w
109.54
588'32767
244.11
N7.34'492
52.92
588-12'26 E
304.00*
511'37 26E
Judgement Parcel To be combined with parcel 03-060-0033 Containing 2.414 Acres
Existing Fance Line-/
50.75'
23.68'
$68 32 03
N89'41'24"W 4.99'
N89'33-28 W
L=43.47
R-57.300
30.97"
559742'58 W
Lundahl Farms LLC Parcel 03-060-0034
--
78.74'
99.47'
$89700 45
40.74"
111.28
S67 00 00 W
Judgement Parcel Description
Lundahl-Nielsen Exhibit
SURVEY CERTIFICATE
A PART OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 32. TOWNSHIP 11 NORTH, RANGE 1 EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN.BEGINNING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PARCEL 03-080-0033 LOCATED NORTH 88'32'26" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 529.15 FEET AND SOUTH 01'27'34" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 198.45 FEET FROM THE HYRUM CITY STREET MONUMENT FOUND AT THE INTERSECTION OF 400 WEST STREET AND 400 NORTH STREET. SAID POINT LOCATED BY RECORD 58 RODS NORTH AND 47 RODS AND 25 FEET EAST AND 142.92 FEET EAST AND 159.00 FEET SOUTH AND 99.00 FEET EAST FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 32; RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 88'32'26" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 59.98 FEET TO THE WEST LINE OF PARCEL 03-060-0035; THENCE ALONG THE WEST AND SOUTH LINES OF SAID PARCEL THE FOLLOWING TWO (2) COURSES: (1) SOUTH 02'10'16" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 81.01 FEET, (2)SOUTH 85'32'26" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 304.00 FEET TO AN EXISTING FENCE LINE; THENCE ALONG SAID EXISTING FENCE LINE THE FOLLOWING FOURTEEN (14) COURSES: (1) SOUTH 11'37'26" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 80.78 FEET; (2) NORTH 89'41'24" WEST. A DISTANCE OF 4.99 FEET; (3) SOUTH 68'32'03" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 23.68 FEET: (4) SOUTH 73'55'22" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 43.13 FEET; (5) SOUTH 80'49'23" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 27.60 FEET; (6) NORTH 89'33'28" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 79.41 FEET; (7) NORTH 82'43'35" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 50.99 FEET; (8) NORTH 85'32"16" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 58.56 FEET; (9) SOUTH 75'53'20" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 38.29 FEET; (10) SOUTH 61"21'47" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 42.63 FEET; (11) SOUTH
SCALE 1"=30'
property shown and described her is plot is e true and cortedi fepresentation of
LEGEND
survey to the best of my knowsign lowry stdinf.
---
Jeff Nielsen, R.L.S. No. 5152561
JEFF NIELSEN
ZATE OV
CONTAINING 2.414 ACRES.
59'42'58" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 138.69 FEET: (12) SOUTH 6346'45" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 52.04 FEET. (13) SOUTH 69'08'45" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 99.47 FEET. (14) SOUTH 6700"00" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 111.28 FEET TO THE EASTERLY LINE OF AN EXISTING DIRT LANE, THENCE ALONG SAID EASTERLY LINE THE FOLLOWING SEVEN (7) COURSES: (1) NORTH 00 55'12" WEST, A DISTANCE OF 40.74 FEET, (2) NORTH 0701'3" EAST. A DISTANCE OF 78.74 FEET: (3) NORTH 13'44"31" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 30.97 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVE TO THE RIGHT HAVING A RADIUS OF 57.50 FEET AND A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 43'18'58": (4) NORTHEAST ALONG THE ARC A DISTANCE OF 43.47 FEET CHORD BEARS NORTH 35'24'00" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 42.44 FEET; (5) NORTH 57'03'29" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 35.58 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVE TO THE LEFT HAVING A RADIUS OF 61.10 FEET AND A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 54'28'40"; (6) NORTHEAST ALONG THE ARC A DISTANCE OF 58.09 FEET CHORD BEARS NORTH 29'49'09" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 55.93 FEET; (7) NORTH 02'34'49" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 62.92 FEET: THENCE SOUTH 85'32'26" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 244.11 FEET; THENCE NORTH OZ'10"16" EAST, A DISTANCE OF 56.00 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
-----
Date
Existing Fence Line
42.6"
S61'21 47 W57653'20 W
N85-32 15 W
52.99
27.60'
57555'22 W
79.41
W82-43'35 W
NIT44'31 8
Losterty edge of road
52.04
56546'45 W
Carmen Drohlinge
03-060~0035
NO5512W
4. Jeff C. Nielsen, do hereby certify that I am a Registered L Surveyor, and that I hold Certificate No. 5152661 as prescribed the Laws of the State of Utah, and that I have made and d the survey of the property
and that this plot is
140.47'
House
Parcel 03-660-0034
140.01
d Maria Martinez
X 170.24%
03-060~0051
Felipe an
P.O.B.
58832'267
Arno and Florence Hinck
03-060-0035
House
81.01*
50.98"
Bruce and Kelly James
J.Darby
Craig and Julie Olsen
440.03"
et Monument
: 5152661
58.56

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of December, 2021, a true and correct copy of the
attached OPINION was sent by standard or electronic mail to be delivered to:
MICHAEL J BOYLE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
MICHAELJBOYLELAW@GMAIL.COM
JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS
JOSH M. CHAMBERS
J BRETT CHAMBERS
HARRIS PRESTON & CHAMBERS PC
JCHAMBERS@UTAHLAWFIRM.COM
JOSHCHAMBERS.LAW@GMAIL.COM
JBC@UTAHLAWFIRM.COM
HONORABLE KEVIN K. ALLEN
FIRST DISTRICT, LOGAN DEPT
FIRST DISTRICT, LOGAN DEPT
ATTN: JANET REESE
CACHE COUNTY HALL OF JUSTICE
logancrim@utcourts.gov
_______________________________________
Judicial Secretary
TRIAL COURT: FIRST DISTRICT, LOGAN DEPT, 170100126
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20190905‐CA