State v. Timpson

2022 UT App 57
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
ALAYNE K. TIMPSON,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20200891-CA
Filed May 5, 2022
Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable David R. Hamilton
No. 191700910
Troy S. Rawlings and Nathan Lyon, Attorneys
for Appellant
Scott L. Wiggins, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 Alayne K. Timpson entered into a plea agreement under
which the State agreed, among other things, not to oppose that
she be allowed to serve part of her jail sentence through a work
release program administered at the jail. After Timpson pled
guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) with priors, but before
sentencing, the work release program shut down due to the
outbreak of COVID-19, thereby preventing Timpson from being
able to serve her jail sentence through the program. Some months
later, the program reopened, but it was no longer administered at
the jail: participants were allowed to serve their sentences through
home confinement on an ankle monitor. Timpson was sentenced
soon after the implementation of the ankle monitor program, and

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20200891-CA 2 2022 UT App 57
the district court imposed a sentence that permitted her to serve
her “jail sentence” through home confinement rather than at the
jail.
¶2 The State now appeals, arguing that the imposed sentence
is illegal because it allows Timpson to serve less than the
statutorily mandated minimum of 62.5 days in jail. We agree with
the State and therefore vacate Timpson’s sentence and remand for
resentencing.
BACKGROUND
¶3 On March 10, 2019, a police officer observed Timpson’s
vehicle “make a wide turn, crossing over a solid white line and a
second lane of traffic before entering the turn lane.” During the
maneuver, Timpson “failed to signal appropriately.” Thereafter,
the officer initiated a traffic stop.
¶4 During his first encounter with Timpson, the officer
“observed she had relaxed facial features, her eyes were watery
and bloodshot, and she was slow to respond to his questions.”
Based on the officer’s experience, he understood these
characteristics “were consistent with someone under the
influence of a depressant.”
¶5 The officer approached Timpson a second time and asked
her to exit her vehicle. As Timpson did so, the officer “observed
she was slow, deliberate, and appeared unsteady on her feet.” The
officer noted that these movements were “also consistent with
someone under the influence of a depressant.”
¶6 Based on these observations, the officer put Timpson
through field sobriety tests, which indicated that Timpson was
impaired. A subsequent Intoxilyzer test revealed she had a blood
alcohol content of 0.151. At the time of the incident, Timpson “was
an alcohol restricted driver” with “two prior D.U.I. convictions

State v. Timpson
20200891-CA 3 2022 UT App 57
within the past ten years.” As a result, the State charged Timpson
with three counts related to the incident: driving under the
influence of alcohol with priors (Count 1), alcohol restricted
driver (Count 2), and failure to signal (Count 3).
¶7 Timpson and the State negotiated a resolution to the case
by way of a plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea
agreement, Timpson would plead guilty to Count 1 in exchange
for the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3. In addition, the State agreed
to not oppose that Timpson be placed into the work release
program at the jail. On March 4, 2020, Timpson entered a guilty
plea pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, and sentencing
was scheduled for May 6, 2020.
¶8 Two days after entry of Timpson’s guilty plea, Utah’s
governor issued an executive order declaring a state of emergency
in Utah due to the outbreak of COVID-19. See Utah Exec. Order
2020-1 (March 6, 2020). In response to growing health concerns,
the availability of the jail work center “was initially limited”
before being completely closed. Consequently, Timpson’s
sentencing was continued a number of times awaiting a decision
on whether the work center would reopen.
¶9 In August 2020, when it became apparent that serving time
at the work center pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement
“may not be available to her,” Timpson filed a motion to
withdraw her guilty plea. Among other things, she argued that
because “the promises of the State” to allow her to serve her
statutory jail time at the work center “cannot be adopted and
sentenced,” her plea was not entered into “knowingly and
voluntarily.” The State opposed the motion, contending the plea
was entered into knowingly and voluntarily and that Timpson
“ha[d] received all the benefits and bargain described in the plea
agreement.”
¶10 While Timpson’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea was
still pending, the jail initiated a new work release program. Under

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20200891-CA 4 2022 UT App 57
the revised program, participants do not reside at the jail during
their sentence but instead are “under home confinement with an
ankle monitor.”
¶11 On September 30, 2020, the parties appeared before the
district court concerning a motion to continue Timpson’s
sentencing. A transcript of the hearing was not created; however,
based on the court’s discussion with defense counsel during the
hearing, the State prepared a Sentencing Memorandum.
¶12 In its Sentencing Memorandum, the State outlined its
objection to the court’s “indicat[ion]” during the September 30
hearing that “it would be willing to entertain a request to have
[Timpson] serve the mandatory 62.5 days incarceration through
the [jail’s] new work release program.” The State argued that
sentencing Timpson under the new work release program would
result in an illegal sentence. It explained that although the new
work release program was called “work release,” it was actually
only “home confinement with an ankle monitor,” and therefore it
did not satisfy the statutory requirement that all three-time DUI
offenders serve “a jail sentence” of at least 62.5 days. Accordingly,
the State requested that Timpson be sentenced “to 62.5 days of
incarceration at the [jail].”
¶13 One month later, the court held a hearing on Timpson’s
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Prior to the formal hearing,
the court “had an informal conversation with counsel on the
record” regarding the pending motion. However, this
conversation was not actually preserved as part of the record.
¶14 During the formal hearing, Timpson withdrew her motion
and asked the court to proceed with sentencing. The court, over
the State’s objection, sentenced Timpson to serve 62.5 days in jail
but allowed that sentence to be “facilitated through the ankle
monitor program at the [jail].” The court reasoned that the ankle
monitor program “is, in fact, the jail sentence carried out through
the use of ankle monitor and other features,” that the ankle

State v. Timpson
20200891-CA 5 2022 UT App 57
monitor program “is consistent with the circumstances . . . as a
form of work release,” and that “the release was contemplated
and agreed to by the State and [Timpson] given the circumstances
at that time.”
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 The State now appeals, arguing the district court erred in
interpreting Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) to permit home
confinement.1 “We review questions of statutory interpretation
1. Timpson approaches this issue differently, arguing we should
affirm the district court’s sentence because the court did not abuse
its discretion in its sentencing decision. In support, she advances
two arguments. First, she asserts the record on appeal is
inadequate because the State did not provide transcripts of two
“crucial proceeding[s]” during which the court “appears to have
expressed some kind of basis or rationale for the sentence so
imposed.” In light of this deficiency, Timpson contends it is “well
settled” that the reviewing court will presume the sentencing
decision “is reasonable, supported by the evidence, and did not
constitute an abuse of discretion or error,” and will therefore
affirm the sentence. Second, in a somewhat related vein, Timpson
argues the district court did not abuse its discretion when
sentencing her because the court’s decision was made after it
“thoughtfully considered the effects that the unprecedented
pandemic had on the sentence to be imposed.”
Both points miss the mark. District courts are afforded
discretion in their sentencing decisions only to the extent the
governing statute permits. “Therefore, legal determinations
concerning the proper interpretation of the statute which grants
the [district] court discretion are reviewed for correctness.” State
v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). Courts are not allowed
to impose an illegal sentence, no matter their rationale. Because
(continued…)

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20200891-CA 6 2022 UT App 57
for correctness, affording no deference to the district court’s legal
conclusions.” State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 8, 478 P.3d
1048 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
¶16 The State argues the district court erred in concluding that
the term “jail sentence,” as used in Utah Code section 41-6a-
505(3)(b), includes “home confinement.” As a result, it contends
Timpson’s sentence was illegal because it was less than the
minimum sentence mandated by statute.
¶17 Utah Code section 41-6a-505(3)(b) provides that in cases
involving three-time DUI offenders, “if the court suspends the
execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant on
probation, the court shall impose . . . (b) a jail sentence of not less
than 1,500 hours.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-505(3)(b) (LexisNexis
2018) (emphasis added).2 In interpreting this statute, the district
court concluded that in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the “jail
sentence” requirement could be “facilitated through the ankle
monitor program at the [jail].” This conclusion was incorrect.
¶18 When interpreting a statute, “our primary goal is to
ascertain the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” O’Hearon
v. Hansen, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 23, 409 P.3d 85 (quotation
we conclude the court’s sentence was in fact illegal, it matters not
what the court and counsel discussed during the proceedings that
were not included in the record on appeal. Nor does it matter that
the court’s sentence was evidently shaped by the “unusual
circumstances” of the time.
2. The relevant events in this case took place in 2020 and are
therefore governed by the version of the statute then in effect.
Since the statute has been substantively amended since 2020, we
cite the version in effect in 2020.

State v. Timpson
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simplified). Because “the best evidence of the legislature’s intent
is the plain language of the statute itself,” Marion Energy, Inc. v.
KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (quotation
simplified), “we determine the statute’s meaning by first looking
to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to the plain
language unless the language is ambiguous,” Wilson Supply, Inc.
v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 1177 (quotation
simplified). “Additionally, we presume that the expression of one
term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.” Marion
Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). “When the
meaning of a statute can be discerned from its language, no other
interpretive tools are needed.” Id. ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).
¶19 The plain language of section 41-6a-505(3)(b) requires
that as a condition of probation, a court shall impose “a
jail sentence of not less than [62.5 days].” Because the word
“jail” is not defined by statute, we simply apply the plain
meaning of that word. See Wilson, 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14. The plain
meaning of “jail” is a place or a building where “persons awaiting
trial or those convicted of misdemeanors are confined.” See Jail,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Jail, Merriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jail
[https://perma.cc/GZ5S-3JAF] (defining “jail” as “a place of
confinement for persons held in lawful custody”); Jail, Cambridge
Dictionary,https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/englis
h/jail [https://perma.cc/ZEV4-AQL7] (defining “jail” as “a place
where criminals are kept to punish them for their crimes, or where
people accused of crimes are kept while waiting for their trials”).
Thus, under the plain meaning of the term, being ordered to serve
a “jail sentence” necessarily entails incarceration.
¶20 The legislative intent of section 41-6a-505(3)(b) is further
clarified when read in context with other subsections of the same
chapter. “When interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain
and ordinary meaning of its terms. But we do not interpret
statutory provisions in isolation.” Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4,

State v. Timpson
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¶ 12, 390 P.3d 307 (quotation simplified). Instead, statutes are read
“in light of the relevant context of the statute (including,
particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme).”
Bright v. Sorensen, 2020 UT 18, ¶ 59, 463 P.3d 626 (quotation
simplified).
¶21 Under Utah Code section 41-6a-505(2)(a)(i), when an
individual is convicted of a second DUI, a court has two
sentencing options: (1) “a jail sentence of not less than 240 hours”
or (2) “a jail sentence of not less than 120 hours in addition to home
confinement of not fewer than 720 consecutive hours through the
use of electronic monitoring.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-505(2)(a)(i)
(LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added). The legislature’s use of the
phrase “in addition to” demonstrates that “a jail sentence” and
“home confinement” are intended to be two separate methods of
punishment. Indeed, if the terms were synonymous, there would
be no reason to distinguish between them. Moreover, that the
court may reduce the number of hours of incarceration in a “jail
sentence” from 240 to 120 if it imposes an additional 720 hours of
“home confinement” evinces the legislature’s intent that a “jail
sentence” does not equate to “home confinement.”
¶22 Here, in sentencing Timpson—a thrice-convicted DUI
offender—the district court was statutorily mandated to order her
to serve a 62.5-day jail sentence as a condition of her probation.
The court did not have the discretion to impose home
confinement in lieu of incarceration.
CONCLUSION
¶23 The district court erred by interpreting Utah Code section
41-6a-505(3)(b) as allowing a “jail sentence” to include “home
confinement.” As a result, Timpson’s sentence was less than that

State v. Timpson
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mandated by statute and therefore illegal. Accordingly, we vacate
Timpson’s sentence and remand the case for resentencing.3
3. If Timpson determines that serving her sentence in jail violates
the terms of her plea agreement, she is not precluded from seeking
to withdraw her guilty plea on remand.