Wadman v. Wadman

2023 UT App 69
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
BENJAMIN LAMAR W ADMAN ,
Appellee,
v.
TRISHA WADMAN ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20210513-CA
Filed June 23, 2023
Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Reuben J. Renstrom
No. 954900752
Jill L. Coil, Stephen J. Oliphant, and Gabrielle G.
Jones, Attorneys for Appellant
Daniel S. Drage, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE R YAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and
M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 	Benjamin Wadman and Trisha Wadman are the parents of
a son (Son) who is now in his early thirties. In the parties’ original
divorce decree, entered in 1995, Benjamin was ordered to pay
child 	support, 	which 	he 	did 	until 	Son’s 	high 	school 	class
graduated. In 2021, Trisha filed a petition with the court, asserting
that Son is “incapacitated” and has been for many years, and
asking the court to require Benjamin to continue to pay child
support despite Son’s age. The district court dismissed Trisha’s
petition, and Trisha appeals. We agree with Trisha that—at least
at this procedural stage and at least on the basis of the reasons
given—the court should not have dismissed her petition.

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BACKGROUND0F
1
¶2 	Benjamin and Trisha1F
2 married in 1989 and had one child
together—Son—who was born in 1990. Early in his life, Son was
diagnosed with tuberous sclerosis, a condition that caused him to
experience 	seizures 	and 	migraine 	headaches, 	and 	that
necessitated surgery and other serious medical procedures. The
severity of the effects of the condition were not fully known when
Son 	was 	diagnosed, 	and 	his 	symptoms 	have 	fluctuated
throughout his life. As Trisha describes it, Son “suffers from
severe and frequent seizures that require[] constant supervision
and care,” and she reports that Son now “has the developmental
function of a seven-year-old,” even though he is in his thirties and
“can appear otherwise ‘normal’ at a glance.” Trisha asserts that
1. On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual
allegations in the petition to modify “as true and draw all
reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable”
to the petitioner. See Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022 UT
App 144, n.2, 524 P.3d 148 (quotation simplified). Additional facts
described in this section are drawn from the parties’ 1995 divorce
decree, as well as from certain other parts of the court file that both
parties, in their respective appellate briefs, have relied on as
authoritative. We thus follow the parties’ lead in reciting the
relevant background facts not only from Trisha’s petition to
modify—which is rather spare on facts—but also from other
sources in the historical court file that the parties jointly cite and
about which there is apparently no dispute.
2. Because several of the individuals involved in this case share
(or once shared) the same last name, we often refer to them by
their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent
informality. We recognize that Trisha now uses a different
surname, but in the interest of continuity we refer to her as Trisha
Wadman, in keeping with the case caption.

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Son is “incapacitated from earning a living and is not able to
support [him]self by [his] own means.”
¶3 	Benjamin and Trisha divorced in 1995, when Son was just
five years old. In the original divorce decree—which was arrived
at by stipulation, with both sides represented by counsel—Trisha
was 	awarded 	physical 	custody 	of 	Son, 	and 	Benjamin 	was
awarded parent-time and ordered to pay $282 in monthly child
support, as calculated by the child support guidelines existing at
the time. The decree made no mention of Son’s medical condition,
even though the parties were aware of the diagnosis at that point.
And 	the 	decree 	was 	silent 	with 	regard 	to 	the 	duration 	of
Benjamin’s child-support obligation.
¶4 	Throughout 	his 	childhood 	and 	adolescent 	years, 	Son
resided primarily with Trisha, and had periodic parent-time with
Benjamin, who timely made child support payments as ordered.
Son’s medical condition improved somewhat as he approached
his teenage years, but even Benjamin agrees that Son was still
“learning disabled and ha[d] special educational needs.”
¶5 	In 	2009, 	when 	Son 	was 	a 	senior 	in 	high 	school, 	he
participated in a graduation ceremony with his high school class,
but he did not receive a diploma and remained in 	school
afterward, until the age of 21, on an “IEP non-diploma track.”
Benjamin 	stopped 	paying 	child 	support 	soon 	after 	Son’s
graduation ceremony.
¶6 	Even after exiting the school system, Son has continued to
reside with Trisha, who has been providing necessary care for
Son. Trisha asserts that providing care for Son has affected her
ability to find employment. For a brief period, Trisha and Son
moved to Colorado, but they returned to Utah to be closer to
family. According to Trisha, Son’s disability has always been
present, but she asserts that his symptoms worsened in about
2013. 	Trisha 	asserts 	that 	Son 	will 	always 	require 	constant
supervision 	and 	care, 	and 	will 	never 	be 	able 	to 	live

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independently. Son has medical insurance through Medicaid and
receives monthly food assistance and Social Security disability
payments.2F
3 Trisha claims that Benjamin has rarely provided
financial assistance for Son since he left the school system.
¶7 	In February 2021, when Son was 30 years old, Trisha filed
a petition to modify. In her petition, Trisha asserted that Son “is
incapacitated,” and that Son therefore still qualifies as a “child”
for child support purposes. See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7)(c)
(defining “child,” for child support purposes, to include “a son or
daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living
and . . . is not able to support self by own means”). Trisha also
asserted that the parties’ incomes had changed significantly since
the decree was last modified. Accordingly, she asked “that child
support be modified (or established or re-established),” and that
Benjamin be ordered to pay at least $918 per month in child
support. She also asked for the order to be “effective as of January
2021,” but for the court to “also permit retroactive support back
to the month that the original child support order expired.”
¶8 	Benjamin moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that his
“child support obligation stopped when [Son] turned 18 and
graduated 	from 	his 	normal, 	expected 	high 	school 	class,”
especially given that the divorce decree did not acknowledge
Son’s disability or order that child support be paid past high
school graduation. Benjamin also argued that Trisha had not
demonstrated the existence of a “substantial and material change
in circumstances” since entry of the original decree.
3. Although Son’s benefit payments are not specifically discussed
in the petition to modify, Trisha’s attorney explained at oral
argument before the district court that the total amount of Son’s
monthly benefit payments are apparently less than what Trisha
believes Benjamin should be paying in monthly child support
given what she alleges his current income to be.

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¶9 	After full briefing and argument, the district court granted
Benjamin’s motion. The court noted that there was apparently “no
dispute that [Son] is unable to support himself” and that he
“resides with [Trisha] full-time.” However, the court did not
believe it had authority to order child support past age 21 because
“the parties did not include any provisions in their stipulated
[d]ecree suggesting that child support should continue past the
child’s minority.” The court was also concerned that the parties
may have “specifically bargained for the absence of this provision
in the [d]ecree.” The court therefore dismissed Trisha’s petition.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 	Trisha now appeals the court’s dismissal of her petition.
“We 	review 	a 	decision 	granting 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for
correctness, granting no deference to the decision of the district
court.” Bylsma v. R.C. Willey, 2017 UT 85, ¶ 10, 416 P.3d 595
(quotation simplified). Moreover, the district court’s decision was
driven, in large part, by its interpretation of a statute, and we
grant 	lower 	courts 	no 	deference 	on 	matters 	of 	statutory
interpretation. State v. Thurman, 2022 UT 16, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 128
(“We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness,
affording no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.”
(quotation simplified)).
ANALYSIS
¶11 	Under 	Utah 	law, 	parents 	are 	obligated 	to 	provide
financial 	support 	for 	their 	children. 	Our 	legislature 	has
mandated that “[e]very child is presumed to be in need of the
support of the child’s mother and father,” and that “[e]very
mother and father shall support their children.” Utah Code § 78B-
12-105(1). And our supreme court has stated that all parents have
“the duty to support the children [they have] brought into the
world, and this duty is inalienable.” State, Dep’t of Human Services

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ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1997) (quotation
simplified).
¶12 	The central question presented by Trisha’s petition is
whether Son qualifies as a “child” whose parents must provide
financial support. In the Utah Child Support Act (the Act), our
legislature has provided a statutory definition of “child” that is to
be used in calculations of child support. We set forth that
definition here in full, because it is important to our analysis:
(7) “Child” means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years
who is not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting,
married, or a member of the armed forces of the
United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years,
while enrolled in high school during the normal and
expected year of graduation and not otherwise
emancipated, 	self-supporting, 	married, 	or 	a
member of the armed forces of the United States; or
(c) 	a 	son 	or 	daughter 	of 	any 	age 	who 	is
incapacitated from earning a living and, if able to
provide some financial resources to the family, is
not able to support self by own means.
Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7) (emphasis added). Trisha asserts that
Son falls into the third category in the statutory definition of
“child,” because he is “a son . . . of any age who is incapacitated
from earning a living.”
¶13 	We agree with Trisha’s reading of the statute. Despite
Son’s age—he is in his thirties—he still qualifies as a “child,”
for purposes of calculating child support, if he is “incapacitated
from earning a living.” See id. Under the plain language of

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the statutory definition of “child,” parents have an obligation
to financially support their incapacitated sons and daughters,
regardless of how old they are. Id.; see also Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752
P.2d 909, 911 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that—under the
then-applicable 	child 	support 	statute—the 	term 	“‘[c]hild’
includes 	‘a 	son 	or 	a 	daughter 	of 	whatever 	age 	who 	is
incapacitated 	from 	earning 	a 	living 	and 	without 	sufficient
means,’” and holding that a parent was obligated to provide
support for an incapacitated thirty-seven-year-old daughter);
Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980) (“It is clear that [the
daughter’s] condition has incapacitated her from earning a living
. . . [and] she is likewise presently without sufficient means of self-
support. As such, the trial court was justified in continuing
support 	payments 	beyond 	her 	21st 	birthday.”); 	Garrand 	v.
Garrand, 	615 	P.2d 	422, 	423 	(Utah 	1980) 	(“[T]his 	Court 	has
recognized that when a child is so limited, either physically or
mentally, that he is unable to support himself when he reaches his
majority, his parents may be required to provide support beyond
that time.”); Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1976) (“[U]pon
a showing that any of the children of the parties is either
physically or mentally deficient or unable to support himself
when he reaches his majority, the court’s authority to require
maintenance may extend past the date upon which the child
attains his majority.”). Utah’s statutory scheme is not unusual in
this regard. See Erica Fumagalli, A Survey of Post-Majority Child
Support for Adults with Impairments, 29 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law
433, 442 (2017) (surveying the issue and noting that only “[n]ine
states explicitly follow the traditional common law rule that
parents’ duty to pay child support ends after their child reaches
the age of majority, regardless of any disability,” and that the rest
require some form of support for incapacitated adult children); see
also Hays v. Alexander, 114 So. 3d 704, 710 n.9 (Miss. 2013) (King, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the “majority of states impose a duty of
support on parents of adult disabled children, particularly when
the child was disabled during his or her minority,” and collecting
cases).

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¶14 	Despite the clarity of this statutory command, Benjamin
asserts that, for three reasons, the district court was correct in
dismissing Trisha’s petition.
¶15 	First, Benjamin argues that the Act’s automatic adjustment
statute operated to terminate his child support obligation. See
Utah Code § 78B-12-219. This statute provides as follows:
When a child becomes 18 years old or graduates
from high school during the child’s normal and
expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later,
. . . the base child support award is automatically
adjusted 	to 	the 	base 	combined 	child 	support
obligation for the remaining number of children due
child support . . . unless otherwise provided in the
child support order.
Id. § 78B-12-219(1). Benjamin emphasizes that the child support
order in effect at the time Son participated in his high school
graduation ceremony made no provision for support payments to
extend beyond Son’s graduation. As he interprets the automatic
adjustment statute, his obligation to pay child support therefore
automatically terminated at the moment Son participated in the
graduation ceremony with his high school class.
¶16 	We acknowledge Benjamin’s point that, in most cases,
child support obligations do automatically adjust when children
turn 18 or graduate from high school. But there are exceptions to
this general rule. One of them is expressly stated in the statute:
when the governing child support order “otherwise provide[s].”
See id. As Benjamin points out, that express exception does not
apply 	here, 	because 	the 	parties’ 	decree 	did 	not 	make 	any
provision for Benjamin’s support obligation to extend beyond
Son’s high school graduation. In our view, however, there exists
another exception that is implicit in the statute: when the child in
question is incapacitated.

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20210513-CA 	9 	2023 UT App 69
¶17 	The automatic adjustment statute provides that, after a
child turns 18 or graduates from high school, “the base child
support award is automatically adjusted to the base combined
child support obligation for the remaining number of children due
child support.” Id. (emphasis added). If the son or daughter in
question remains a “child” under the statutory definition of that
term, then the statute does not operate to remove that child from
the support calculation. As noted above, the statutory definition
of “child” has three subparts, here paraphrased: (1) a child
younger than 18; (2) a child 18 or over but not yet graduated from
high school; and (3) a son or daughter of any age who is
incapacitated from earning a living. See id. § 78B-12-102(7). If Son
is “incapacitated,” he remained a “child” for statutory purposes
regardless of his age and regardless of his high school graduation
status. Id. § 78B-12-102(7)(c). Thus, the automatic adjustment
statute, read together with the statutory definition of “child,” does
not prevent or limit a court’s ability to order parents to financially
support their incapacitated sons and daughters of any age.3F
4
¶18 	Second, Benjamin argues that, pursuant to a different
statute, “[c]ourts do not have the power to order child support for
children beyond the age of 21.” (Citing Utah Code § 15-2-1.) The
statute Benjamin references is found in Title 15 of the Utah Code—
a title captioned “Contracts and Obligations in General”—and is
found in a statutory chapter governing the “Legal Capacity of
Children.” See id. Title 15, Chapter 2. The specific provision in
question is titled “Period of minority,” and reads in its entirety as
follows: “The period of minority extends in males and females to
4. Benjamin’s citation to Hibbens v. Hibbens, 2015 UT App 278, 363
P.3d 524, is unavailing. In that case, the court applied the
automatic adjustment statute because the children in question—
who were not incapacitated—“both turned 18 and no longer
qualified as children under the Act.” Id. ¶ 22. Here, by contrast,
Trisha alleges—in an assertion we must take as true for purposes
of our analysis—that Son is incapacitated from earning a living
and therefore still qualifies as a “child” under the Act.

Wadman v. Wadman
20210513-CA 	10 	2023 UT App 69
the age of 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority by
marriage. It is further provided that courts in divorce actions may
order support to age 21.” Id. § 15-2-1. We disagree with Benjamin’s
interpretation of this statute.
¶19 	In our view, the statute simply authorizes—but does not
compel—courts to require that child support payments, in certain
circumstances, extend beyond age 18 up to age 21, even if the 19-
or 20-year-old son or daughter no longer qualifies as a “child”
under the statutory definition of that term provided in the Act. See
id.; see also Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that, even where a son “no longer qualifies as
a ‘child’ under” the Act’s definition of that term, section 15-2-1
authorizes a court to “order continued support until age 21” in
“unusual circumstances”). Utah appellate courts, in interpreting
this statute, have construed it as giving district courts “power to
order continued [child] support until age 21 when it appears to be
necessary and when the court makes findings of any special or
unusual circumstances to justify the order.” See Hibbens v. Hibbens,
2015 UT App 278, ¶ 19, 363 P.3d 524 (quotation simplified).
¶20 	We see no conflict between section 15-2-1 and the Act’s
provisions regarding incapacitated sons and daughters. After all,
section 15-2-1 does not so much as mention incapacitated sons
and daughters, and does not operate to override the inclusion of
those individuals in the statutory definition of “child” found in
the Act. See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7); see also Harris v. Harris, 585
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1978) (noting the existence of an “exception”
to the usual age limitations of child support for “parents of adult
children who are mentally or physically incapable of caring for
themselves”). But even if we were to assume, for purposes of the
argument, that there were some conflict between section 15-2-1
and the Act’s definition of “child,” the more specific statute would
control. See Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1252
(“When two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the
provision more specific in application governs over the more
general 	provision.” 	(quotation 	simplified)); 	see 	also 	Floyd 	v.

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20210513-CA 	11 	2023 UT App 69
Western Surgical Assocs., Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) 	(“In 	accordance 	with 	general 	principles 	of 	statutory
construction, the more specific statute . . . controls.”). The Act’s
detailed definition of “child” is the more specific statute here
because it is found in the “Utah Child Support Act” section of the
code and directly addresses incapacitated sons and daughters,
while section 15-2-1 is found in the “Contracts and Obligations in
General” section and does not discuss incapacitated individuals
at all. Thus, section 15-2-1 places no limits on a court’s ability to
order a parent to support an incapacitated son or daughter,
regardless of age.
¶21 	Finally, Benjamin asserts that the district court’s dismissal
of Trisha’s petition was proper because the parties’ 1995 divorce
decree—which contained the governing child support order—
made no mention of Son’s disability or incapacitation, even
though Son’s “disability was known at the time of” the decree,
and 	because 	the 	decree 	contained 	no 	provision 	requiring
Benjamin 	to 	pay 	child 	support 	beyond 	Son’s 	high 	school
graduation. Benjamin suggests—without, on appeal, grounding
this suggestion in any particular legal rule or doctrine—that the
parties’ failure to discuss Son’s incapacitation or to provide for
post-high-school 	support 	payments 	in 	the 	original 	decree
operates to prevent Trisha from now claiming that he has any
current obligation to pay child support for Son.
¶22 	But we are aware of no legal rule—in either statute or case
law—mandating that parents who do not, in an original decree,
seek classification of a child as “incapacitated” are always thereby
prevented from later asserting that a son or daughter has become
incapacitated. In support of his argument, Benjamin directs us to
Jefferies and Dehm, but his reliance on these cases is misplaced.
Benjamin asserts that, in both of those cases, the parties and the
trial courts made provision, in the original decrees, for lengthened
support of an incapacitated child. See Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 910–12;

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Dehm, 545 P.2d at 526.4F
5 But the appellate courts in Jefferies and
Dehm simply did not grapple with the issue of whether such
provisions must be included in original decrees. The mere fact that
both of those cases may have involved original decrees with
extended support provisions does not prove Benjamin’s point. As
we read those cases, nothing in them forbids a court from taking
up the issue of a child’s incapacity at a later point in the
proceedings in connection with, for instance, a petition to modify.
¶23 	In fact, our supreme court has on at least one occasion
affirmed a district court’s post-decree modification that extended
a parent’s obligation to pay child support to an incapacitated son.
See Garrand, 615 P.2d at 423. In that case, a parent sought to modify
the divorce decree—which made no provision for child support
beyond age 21—to require the other parent to pay continuing
child support, even beyond age 21, for their incapacitated son. Id.
at 422–23. The payor parent made an argument similar to the one
Benjamin makes here, and asserted that, “inasmuch as the divorce
decree awarded support for [the son] until he was 21,” the payee
parent’s request for continuing child support beyond that age was
barred by “res judicata.” Id. at 423. But our supreme court rejected
this argument and affirmed the district court’s order modifying
the decree to require continuing support past age 21. Id. The fact
that the original decree did not contemplate child support past the
age of 21 did not necessarily prevent the payee spouse from
seeking modification. Id.; see also Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275,
1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“The fact that one parent may not be
under a current obligation to pay child support does not terminate
that parent’s responsibility to pay support in the future.”).
5. 	Our 	reading 	of 	Dehm 	does 	not 	necessarily 	align 	with
Benjamin’s. We find no indication, in that case, that the parties’
original decree contained any finding of incapacity or any order
compelling the payor spouse to provide support beyond age 18.
See generally Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).

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¶24 	In this same vein, the district court—in its order dismissing
Trisha’s petition—expressed concern that the parties, at the time
of entry of the original decree, might have “specifically bargained
for the absence of” any provision requiring Benjamin to pay child
support for Son past high school. We reject this reasoning. “Utah
courts have long held that the right to receive child support is an
unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be bartered
away by the child’s parent or parents.” Fauver, 803 P.2d at 1278–
79. Because the right to future support payments belongs to Son,
his parents are not legally permitted to bargain away his right to
child support at some point in the future. See State ex rel. Utah State
Dep’t of Social Services. v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 885–86 (Utah 1996)
(“A child’s right to support is not subject to being bartered away,
extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement
or conduct of the parents.” (quotation simplified)).5F
6
¶25 	And in this context, it makes practical sense to allow
parents, where appropriate, to raise incapacity issues later, even
if a child’s incapacity is not discussed in the original child support
order. In many situations, incapacity may occur after entry of a
decree (e.g., if a child is involved in a debilitating accident). But
even in situations where parents know a child has a disability, it
may not be apparent at the time of the decree exactly how
disabling the condition will become over time; in this case, for
instance, we wonder whether Benjamin and Trisha knew, in 1995
when Son was just five, how his disability would manifest itself
years later, when Son turned 18. After all, the applicable statutory
language defines incapacity in terms of a child’s ability “to
support self by own means,” and it will not always be apparent
whether five-year-olds with certain medical conditions will be
6. These principles do not apply with regard to spouses’ claims to
alimony, which can be bargained away. Thus, the district court’s
reliance on McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2021 UT 22, 496 P.3d 44, is
misplaced. See id. ¶ 35 (concluding that a spouse’s “alimony
obligation terminated by operation of law because the decree did
not specifically provide otherwise” (quotation simplified)).

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able to support themselves when they turn 18. For these reasons,
and guided by the language of the applicable statutory definition
of “child,” we conclude that Trisha’s petition is not subject to
dismissal merely because the parties’ original divorce decree did
not discuss Son’s incapacity and did not require Benjamin to pay
child support beyond age 18.
¶26 	Thus, we reject each of the three arguments Benjamin
makes—and upon which the district court relied—in support of
dismissal of Trisha’s petition. We therefore conclude that the
court erred by dismissing that petition for the reasons offered, and
that Trisha has borne her burden on appeal of persuading us that
the court’s ruling was incorrect. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s order of dismissal.
¶27 	We note, however, that significant issues remain to be
litigated in this case before Trisha will have established a right to
receive continued child support payments from Benjamin. We
identify, without deciding, some of these issues in an effort to
provide guidance that will hopefully be useful on remand.
¶28 	First, the court will need to take up the question of whether
Son is incapacitated. In her petition, Trisha has alleged that Son is
incapacitated, and the district court indicated that “there appears
[to be] no dispute” on this point. Here on appeal, Benjamin does
not appear to dispute Trisha’s assertion that Son is in fact
incapacitated. But whether undisputed or not, a judicial finding
of incapacity needs to be made before Son can meet the statutory
definition of “child.” See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7)(c). And no
such finding has yet been made in this case.
¶29 	Next, in connection with considering the question of
Son’s incapacity, the court—if it determines that Son is in fact
incapacitated—may 	need 	to 	decide 	when 	Son 	became
“incapacitated” within the meaning of the statutory definition.
If the court finds that Son has been incapacitated all along—or,
at least, that he was incapacitated at age 18—it may not need

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to grapple with the next part of the question. But if the court
finds that Son only became incapacitated after Benjamin’s child
support obligation under the original order had expired, the
court will then need to concern itself with whether, under Utah
law, Son meets the statutory definition of “child.” There may or
may not be a distinction, in this context, between a son or
daughter who becomes incapacitated before otherwise reaching
adulthood, 	and 	one 	who 	becomes 	incapacitated 	only 	after
reaching adulthood. See Hays v. Alexander, 114 So. 3d 704, 710 n.9
(Miss. 2013) (King, J., dissenting) (suggesting that some states
may draw a distinction between cases in which the child “was
disabled during his or her minority” and cases in which the
child 	became 	disabled 	later). 	Because 	this legal 	question 	is
neither briefed nor squarely presented here, we do not attempt to
answer it.
¶30 	Third, if the court determines that Son is incapacitated and
that the decree should be modified to impose an obligation on
Benjamin to provide support, the court will then need to concern
itself with the proper amount of any such obligation. The place to
start any such inquiry, of course, is with the applicable child
support guidelines. See Utah Code §§ 78B-12-210(1), -301. But in
cases involving incapacitated sons and daughters, the statutory
definition 	of 	“child” 	contemplates 	situations 	in 	which 	an
incapacitated son or daughter is able “to provide some financial
resources to the family.” See id. § 78B-12-102(7)(c). Income earned
by many “children”—e.g., children under the age of 18—is not
typically accounted for in assessing the appropriate child support
amount. But the situation may be different here, in light of the
language 	of 	the 	statutory 	definition, 	and 	the 	court 	should
consider the extent to which it needs to account for any income or
other “financial resources” Son is able to generate. And in this
same 	vein, 	the 	court 	may 	also 	need 	to 	consider 	whether
Benjamin’s support obligation should take the traditional form—
payments to Trisha, presumably the custodial parent—or some
other form (e.g., payments to a care facility).

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20210513-CA 	16 	2023 UT App 69
¶31 	Finally, if the court determines that Son is incapacitated
and that the decree should be modified to impose an obligation
on Benjamin to provide support, the court will need to concern
itself with the retroactivity aspects of Trisha’s petition. To the
extent Trisha’s petition truly seeks modification, any changes
“may date back only to ‘the month following service’ of the
petition to modify ‘on the parent whose support is affected.’” See
McFarland v. McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 26, 493 P.3d 1146
(quoting Utah Code § 78B-12-112(4)). The original decree required
Benjamin to pay $282 per month, and any increase in the amount
of that obligation may date back only to March 1, 2021, the first
day of the month following the filing of Trisha’s petition.6F
7
¶32 	But in her petition, Trisha also asks the court to order
Benjamin to reimburse her for monthly child support payments—
at a $282-per-month clip—dating all the way back to 2009, when
Son participated in the graduation ceremony and Benjamin
stopped making payments. It is somewhat unclear whether Trisha
still seeks this particular relief, given some of her attorney’s
statements at oral argument before the district court, but if she
does, the court will need to consider this request, and determine
whether it is properly classified as one for modification or for
enforcement. 	And 	the 	court 	may—depending 	on 	its 	other
7. Benjamin claims in his brief that “Trisha fails to allege any
material 	or 	substantial 	change 	in 	circumstances 	to 	support
modifying the decree.” This could be seen as asking us to affirm
the court’s dismissal on an alternative ground. Trisha responds
that the parties’ incomes, as alleged in her complaint, have
sufficiently changed to warrant modification of the amount of
Benjamin’s obligation. See Utah Code § 78B-12-210(8), (9). “An
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record.” State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quotation
simplified). 	In 	our 	view, 	Benjamin’s 	alternative 	theory 	for
dismissal is not apparent on this record, so we decline to affirm
on this ground.

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20210513-CA 	17 	2023 UT App 69
predicate rulings, and on the merits of other defenses Benjamin
may raise—need to determine whether Trisha is entitled to
recover these payments, considering that no judicial finding of
“incapacity” was in effect between 2009 and now, and no order
commanded Benjamin to make any such payments.
CONCLUSION
¶33 	Under Utah law, parents are generally obligated to support
their “incapacitated” sons and daughters “of any age.” See Utah
Code § 78B-12-102(7)(c). As discussed herein, the district court’s
reasons for dismissing Trisha’s petition were faulty, and the court
erred 	by 	dismissing 	that 	petition 	on those 	grounds at 	this
procedural 	stage. 	We 	therefore 	vacate 	the 	court’s 	order 	of
dismissal, reinstate Trisha’s petition, and remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.