State v. Hararah

2026 UT App 157
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
HOUSTON R AEFAT HARARAH ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240453-CA
Filed October 16, 2026
Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable Ronald G. Russell
The Honorable Noel S. Hyde
No. 231700395
Emily Adams and Rachel Phillips Ainscough,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Connor Nelson,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Houston Raefat Hararah appeals his two forcible sexual
abuse convictions. He argues that the presiding judge abused his
discretion in denying Hararah’s motion to disqualify both the trial
judge assigned to his case as well as all the remaining Davis
County district court judges. He also challenges the trial court’s
decision to sentence him to concurrent prison sentences rather
than probation. Neither challenge is successful, and we affirm.

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 157
BACKGROUND
The Charges1
¶2 	Hararah “matched” with a woman (Victim) on a dating
app, 	and 	the 	two 	began 	messaging 	each 	other. 	Then 	in 	a
subsequent phone call, the two agreed to meet in person. Hararah
picked Victim up from her apartment, after which they drove to a
bar in downtown Ogden. From the beginning of the encounter,
Victim found Hararah’s comments “off-putting,” and after a
couple of drinks at the bar, Victim “didn’t want to be on the date
anymore” and told Hararah she wanted to go home. On the way
to take Victim home, Hararah offered her $200 to “make out” with
him. Victim “really needed money at the time,” so she agreed,
stating that she was willing to make out with Hararah but that she
would not participate in “sexual touching”; she specified that she
would keep her clothing on but also agreed, when asked, that
Hararah could touch her buttocks over her pants.
¶3 	Hararah pulled over on the side of a dirt road, and the two
began making out. At some point, Hararah removed Victim’s
pants and “immediately started touching [her] privates on the
outside of [her] underwear.” Victim “really didn’t like that,” so
she “squirmed,” moved Hararah’s hand away, and “told him
[she] 	didn’t 	want 	him 	to 	touch 	[her] 	there.” 	After 	some
repositioning and more kissing, Hararah again reached his hand
down and Victim felt “contact on [her] skin” on her “vaginal . . .
opening area.” She “jolted away from him” and stated that she
“didn’t want [him] to do that.” But after some more kissing,
Hararah touched her vaginal area again. She again told him no. A
bit later, Victim “could feel [Hararah’s] fingers directly touch [her]
1. “On appeal from a jury trial, we review the record facts in a
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts
accordingly.” State v. Speights, 2021 UT 56, n.1, 497 P.3d 340
(quotation simplified).

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 157
anus,” and she decided that this was “the last straw.” She “raised
[her] voice” and demanded to be taken home. Hararah did not
initially comply, but after Victim brandished a taser, he drove her
home.
¶4 	After 	arriving 	home, Victim 	called 	911 	to 	report the
incident. Based on her allegations, the State filed charges against
Hararah 	in 	Davis 	County, 	charging 	him 	with 	aggravated
kidnapping, attempted rape, and three counts of forcible sexual
abuse.
The Motion to Disqualify
¶5 	Shortly before trial was scheduled to commence, Hararah
filed a motion, along with a supporting affidavit, seeking the
disqualification of not only the judge assigned to his case but of
all district court judges in Davis County. The motion was based
on a “recent[]” discovery that Victim was the niece of a different
district court judge in Davis County. In the motion, Hararah did
not assert any claim of actual bias on the part of the assigned
judge. Instead, the motion acknowledged both that there was “no
reason to believe that any of the other Davis County judges ha[d]
personal knowledge and/or information related to the connection
between” Victim and the judge who is her uncle and that there
had “been no information provided to suggest that [that judge
had] disclosed his relationship to [Victim] with other members of
the bench.” Nonetheless, Hararah argued, “[G]iven the close
nature of the association between the district court judges and
their support staff, it’s highly likely this information will become
known at some point during the trial.” And Hararah argued that
based on the “collegial nature of the association” among the
members of the Davis County bench, there was an imputed
conflict of interest that required disqualification of all district
court judges in Davis County.

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 157
¶6 	The assigned judge, pursuant to rule 29 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, certified the disqualification motion to the
presiding judge of the district. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(b)(2)(A)
(“The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed
shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion
or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge.”).
¶7 	The presiding judge, after raising some concerns as to the
timeliness of the motion, determined that even if timely, the
motion and supporting affidavit were “insufficient to justify
[disqualification] of the assigned judge or disqualification of all
judges in Davis County.” The presiding judge stated that the
motion and affidavit acknowledged that Hararah was not “aware
of any facts that demonstrate bias, prejudice, or a conflict of
interest,” and that the allegations contained therein were “only
speculation, based upon an extended-family relationship between
an alleged victim and a judge who is acknowledged to be
uninvolved in the case.” The presiding judge therefore denied the
motion, 	concluding, 	“Such 	speculative 	and 	uncorroborated
concerns are not sufficient to support a finding of bias, prejudice,
or conflict of interest on the part of the assigned judge. While such
concerns would require closer scrutiny if the judge with the
family relationship were involved in the case, they do not, based
on the fact of the relationship alone, justify the disqualification of
all judges in Davis County.”
Trial and Sentencing
¶8 	The case then proceeded to trial. The jury convicted
Hararah of two counts of forcible sexual abuse—one count based
on touching Victim’s vagina and the other count based on
touching her anus—and acquitted him of the remaining charges.
¶9 	At sentencing, the trial court began the proceedings by
noting that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report
(the PSR) prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. The court then

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 157
asked the prosecutor and the defense attorney if there were any
corrections 	that 	needed 	to 	be 	made 	to 	the 	PSR, 	and 	both
responded in the negative. The court also stated that it had “taken
the time to review” several letters submitted on Hararah’s behalf,
including ones from his mother and grandmother.
¶10 	The court stated that it found the information in the PSR
helpful, but the court also noted that it had taken “the opportunity
to listen to the testimony at trial and hear very carefully what
occurred, the conduct involved, and the impact of the crime on
[Victim].” 	The 	court 	then 	specifically 	acknowledged 	several
factors weighing in Hararah’s favor:
I know, Mr. Hararah, I’m sure you’ve done
some great things in your life, and I appreciate the
fact that you volunteer for the homeless. You’ve got
a grandmother who loves you, and a mother who
loves you, and they wrote great letters regarding
your character. And they know that you have the
ability to change and to become the person you need
to be in your life. And I believe that you can change
yourself and move forward. I appreciate the fact
that you’ve been working on yourself in jail.
Nonetheless, the court indicated that, “[a]t the same time,” it
needed to also consider the impact of the crimes on Victim,
Hararah’s past misdeeds, and “the needs of justice that need to be
met.” Because the crimes here “led to the very real impact on
another person,” the court imposed a one-to-fifteen year prison
sentence for each conviction. However, the court also determined
that, considering various factors, including “the factors outlined
in the [PSR],” it was appropriate to run the two sentences
concurrently with one another.
¶11 	The court then reiterated,

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 157
But again, the impact of this crime and the
seriousness of it and the fact that I think, based even
on 	the 	letters 	that 	I 	reviewed 	that 	have 	been
provided regarding your character, I think that your
past has indicated that you’re a predator, and that
you are dangerous. And that this prison sentence is
necessary, not just . . . for rehabilitative purposes,
but also to protect the public from that kind of
behavior.
¶12 	Hararah now appeals his convictions and sentences.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 	Hararah first challenges the presiding judge’s denial of his
motion to disqualify the assigned trial court judge. “Determining
whether a trial judge committed error by failing to recuse himself
or herself under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct is a question
of law, which we ordinarily review for correctness. However, if
the trial judge complie[d] exactly with rule 29 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure in handling the motion for disqualification,
then the burden shifts to the petitioners to make an additional
showing of either actual bias or abuse of discretion.” State v. Asta,
2018 UT App 220, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 664 (quotation simplified).
¶14 	Next, 	Hararah 	challenges 	the 	trial 	court’s 	sentencing
decision. “Because trial courts are afforded wide latitude in
sentencing, a court’s sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. A court exceeds its discretion if it acts with inherent
unfairness in imposing a sentence, imposes a clearly excessive
sentence, or fails to consider all legally relevant factors.” Id. ¶ 16
(quotation simplified).

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 157
ANALYSIS
I. The Motion to Disqualify
¶15 	Hararah first argues that the presiding judge abused his
discretion in denying the motion to disqualify both the trial judge
assigned to Hararah’s case as well as all other district court judges
in Davis County. We disagree.2
¶16 	“As a general rule, a judge has a duty to preserve the
integrity and independence of the judiciary and should disqualify
[himself 	or] 	herself 	in 	a 	proceeding 	in 	which 	the 	judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” West Jordan City v.
Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ¶ 21, 135 P.3d 874 (quotation simplified). In
assessing 	an 	asserted 	appearance 	of 	bias, 	we 	employ 	a
“reasonable person” test that “looks to see whether a reasonable
person, knowing all the circumstances, would believe that the
judge’s impartiality could be questioned.” Id. ¶ 22 (quotation
2. 	Despite 	the 	presiding 	judge’s 	statement 	that 	there 	was
“insufficient information before the court to support a finding that
the motion [was] timely,” the judge went on to determine that
“[e]ven if” the motion was timely, it was “insufficient to justify”
the requested disqualification. And because we ultimately affirm
the presiding judge’s ruling on the merits, we need not reach the
underlying timeliness issue. Thus, we need not address Hararah’s
argument that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
sufficiently 	establishing 	the 	timeliness 	of 	the 	motion 	for
disqualification, and we therefore also deny Hararah’s related
motion brought under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure to remand for the entry of further findings related to
this argument, see Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) (“A party to an appeal
in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the
trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate
court’s determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 157
simplified); see also Fullmer v. Fullmer, 2015 UT App 60, ¶ 12, 347
P.3d 14 (“The question of a judge’s impartiality is determined by
viewing the question through the eyes of a reasonable person,
knowing all the circumstances.” (quotation simplified)). “The
word ‘reasonable’ connotes the idea that judges are not subject to
disqualification in every situation where their impartiality is
questioned, particularly when the potential for bias is remote.”
Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ¶ 21; see also Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988) (“An appearance
of bias or prejudice is sufficient for disqualification, but even
disqualification because of appearance must have some basis in
fact 	and 	be 	grounded 	on 	more 	than 	mere 	conjecture 	and
speculation.”).
¶17 	Hararah points to the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct—
particularly 	its 	provision 	that 	a 	judge’s 	impartiality 	may
reasonably 	be 	questioned 	when 	close 	family 	members 	are
involved in a case before the court, see Utah Code Jud. Conduct
R. 2.11(A)(2)—to argue that disqualification was required here.
But that provision does not address the situation before us. That
provision speaks to the impartiality of a judge who is assigned to a
case in which his or her family members are involved. And
indeed, the presiding judge recognized that if the judge who was
related to Victim had been the assigned judge here, “closer
scrutiny” would have been required. But the presiding judge
determined that, without more, the simple fact that there was a
familial relationship between Victim and another judge in the
county did not “justify the disqualification of all judges in Davis
County.”
¶18 	Hararah asserts that this familial connection creates an
appearance of bias for the trial judge assigned to this case,
positing that the two judges are “close colleague[s]” and that “an
average judge in [the assigned judge’s] position was unlikely to
be neutral, knowing that he was presiding over the case of alleged
sexual assault for his colleague’s niece.” But this reasoning seems

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 157
to be largely based on the assertion made in Hararah’s original
motion that due to “the close nature of the association between
the district court judges and their support staff,” the discovery of
the familial connection by the assigned judge was “highly likely.”
Thus, these assertions are based entirely on conjecture. Hararah
acknowledged in his motion that there was “no reason to believe
that 	any 	of 	the 	other 	Davis 	County 	judges 	ha[d] 	personal
knowledge” of the familial connection. And he has presented no
facts indicating that the judge related to Victim had a close
relationship of any kind with the assigned judge or that the nature
of 	their 	relationship 	with 	support 	staff 	had 	problematic
implications here.3 Nor was such a showing made in relation to
any of the remaining members of the Davis County bench.
¶19 	In sum, where the only fact presented was that Victim is
related to a different district court judge in the same county, we
agree with the presiding judge that Hararah’s “speculative and
uncorroborated 	concerns 	[were] 	not 	sufficient 	to 	support 	a
finding of bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest on the part of the
assigned judge.” We thus see no abuse of discretion in the
presiding judge’s denial of the motion to disqualify, and we
therefore affirm that ruling.
II. Sentencing
¶20 	Hararah 	next 	argues 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	abused 	its
discretion in sentencing him to prison rather than affording him
the privilege of probation, asserting that the court “failed to
adequately consider all of the evidence before it” and that the
3. It seems unlikely that Hararah could have presented facts
weighing in his favor on this matter because the assigned judge
later stated on the record that he worked in a different courthouse
from the judge related to Victim, that he therefore did not
“interact with [that other judge] very often,” and that he had not
“had any communication with [that judge] regarding this case.”

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 157
sentences were “clearly excessive under the circumstances of the
case.” Again, we disagree.
¶21 	Hararah points to several circumstances that he argues the
trial court failed to properly consider in arriving at its decision.
But we have no reason to think that the court overlooked any of
the considerations upon which Hararah relies.
¶22 	Indeed, several of the considerations Hararah raises were
specifically mentioned by the trial court. For example, Hararah
asserts he had “a prosocial influence in the community,” as
demonstrated by his volunteer work and the care he provided for
his grandmother, and he also points to the steps he had been
taking while incarcerated to change his lifestyle and to a letter
submitted to the court by his mother that spoke to his “positive
improvements.” 	But 	the 	trial 	court 	specifically 	recognized
Hararah’s volunteer efforts and the supportive letters from his
family, and the court also stated that it “appreciate[d] the fact that
[he had] been working on [him]self in jail.” Similarly, although
Hararah points to weaknesses in the State’s case that he argues
the court overlooked, the court referenced its “opportunity to
listen to the testimony at trial and hear very carefully what
occurred,” which suggests the court was precisely aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of the case against Hararah.
¶23 	Other considerations raised by Hararah are cast in a
different light by the actual language of the PSR—which the trial
court said it had reviewed and which Hararah’s counsel indicated
was not in need of any corrections. For example, Hararah asserts
that his criminal history “was minor,” that he had no criminal
associates, that he accepted responsibility for his actions, and that
he had shown he could be successful on probation. But the PSR
indicated that Hararah had “a criminal history dating back to
2006, 	with 	prior 	convictions 	for 	assault 	and 	alcohol-related
offenses,” that his time of incarceration “indicat[ed] criminal
acquaintances,” that “[h]e place[d] some blame on [Victim] and

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 157
his 	drinking 	habits,” 	and 	that 	prior 	probation 	“had 	been
successfully 	terminated 	once 	and 	unsuccessfully 	terminated
twice.” Likewise, although Hararah argues that the court should
have 	considered 	that he 	never “threatened” 	Victim 	or 	was
“violent” toward her (but was, in his words, just “persistent in
wanting to engage in sexual activities”), the PSR indicated that he
“shows signs of anger, assaultive behavior, and aggression,”
“lacks impulse control,” “and has a disregard for the feelings of
others.”
¶24 	Thus, we are not convinced that the trial court ignored the
various 	considerations 	raised 	by 	Hararah. 	Hararah 	clearly
disagrees 	with 	the 	way 	the 	court 	weighed 	the 	various
considerations, but that is simply not adequate to show an abuse
of the court’s discretion.4 See State v. Epling, 2011 UT App 229,
¶ 22, 262 P.3d 440 (“Although [the defendant] would have liked
the trial court to rely more heavily on the factors that he considers
mitigating, he has not shown that the trial court failed to consider
these factors completely. . . . The fact that the trial court assessed
the relevant factors differently than [the defendant] would have
liked does not indicate that it exceeded its discretion.”).
¶25 	When viewing the full spectrum of the evidence before the
court—including the seriousness of the crimes and their impact
on Victim, which are factors the court considered significant—we
cannot say that the court exceeded its considerable discretion in
determining that Hararah was “dangerous” and “a predator” and
that incarceration was therefore warranted here, consistent with
4. We further note that despite the trial court’s decision to
sentence Hararah to prison, many of the factors that he considers
mitigating 	factors 	may 	have 	been 	behind 	the 	trial 	court’s
determination to run the two sentences concurrently instead of
consecutively.

State v. Hararah
20240453-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 157
the recommendation of the PSR. We therefore affirm the court’s
sentencing decision.
CONCLUSION
¶26 	The 	presiding 	judge 	did 	not 	abuse 	his 	discretion 	in
denying Hararah’s motion to disqualify. Nor did the trial court
abuse its discretion in sentencing Hararah to prison. We therefore
affirm.