In re J.T....

2023 UT App 157
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF J.T. AND A.T.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
F.R.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20220623-CA
Filed December 21, 2023
First District Juvenile Court, Brigham City Department
The Honorable Bryan Galloway
Nos. 1051672 and 1210454
Christopher A. Beins, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
JUDGE JOHN D. L UTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. M ORTENSEN and R YAN M. HARRIS concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 	After minor children J.T. and A.T. were removed from the
custody 	of 	their 	mother 	(Mother), 	their 	grandmother, 	F.R.
(Grandmother), 	moved 	to 	intervene 	in 	the 	child 	welfare
proceeding. The juvenile court ultimately denied Grandmother’s
motion, and she appeals. We conclude that Grandmother should
have been allowed to intervene but only as a limited-purpose
party 	based 	on 	her 	statutory 	right 	to 	request 	preferential
consideration 	for 	temporary 	placement 	of 	the 	children. 	We

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therefore reverse the juvenile court’s ruling on Grandmother’s
intervention motion and remand this matter for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	J.T. and A.T. share the same mother but have different
fathers. 	J.T.’s 	father 	passed 	away 	before 	the 	proceedings
commenced. In 2021, J.T. turned eleven and A.T. turned eight. As
of the time of the events relevant to this appeal, A.T.’s father was
subject to an order that prohibited him from contacting A.T.
¶3 	Grandmother is the children’s maternal grandmother. In
September 2021, she filed a petition in the district court for the
appointment of a guardian for J.T. In her petition, Grandmother
alleged that Mother was “unwilling or unable to exercise her
parental 	rights,” 	and 	Grandmother 	requested 	that 	she,
Grandmother, be appointed as J.T.’s guardian.
¶4 	The district court ordered Mother and Grandmother to
mediation. The mediation resulted in a stipulation, filed in
January 2022, under which Mother and Grandmother agreed for
J.T., Mother, and Grandmother to each be evaluated by a therapist
and to then “abide by the appointed therapist’s recommendations
as a temporary order” until final resolution of the guardianship
case. Under the stipulation, Mother and Grandmother were
“required to cooperate in good faith and follow through with the
requests made by the appointed therapist.”
¶5 	Thereafter, the Division of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) received repeated referrals raising concerns that J.T. and
A.T. were being abused and neglected by Mother. In response to
those referrals, in May 2022 (while the guardianship action
remained pending in the district court), DCFS filed a petition in
juvenile court alleging that J.T. and A.T. were “abused, neglected,

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and/or dependent children.” The children were then removed
from Mother’s custody and placed in the temporary custody of
DCFS.
¶6 	At the ensuing shelter hearing, a temporary placement for
the children was discussed. Mother and A.T.’s father objected to
Grandmother as a temporary placement option. The juvenile
court considered their objections and ordered DCFS to “conduct
a reasonable search to determine whether there [were other]
relatives of the children or friends of the parents of the children
who 	[were] 	willing 	and 	appropriate 	to 	be 	considered 	for
placement of the children.” The juvenile court was “reluctant to
have the children placed with [Grandmother] based on . . .
accusations that [had] been made and the history involved in this
case,” and it stated that it did “not believe that a kinship
placement [was] appropriate if the children [were] going to be
kept together.”1 Nonetheless, the juvenile court left the temporary
placement decision “up to the discretion of [DCFS].”
¶7 	Shortly after the shelter hearing, DCFS held a kinship
meeting and considered all the placement options that had been
identified, 	including 	placement 	with 	Grandmother. 	DCFS
decided to place both children with A.T.’s paternal aunt and
uncle.
¶8 	Grandmother then filed a Motion to Intervene and for
Kinship Placement in the child welfare proceeding. In support of
her motion, Grandmother argued that she had a right to intervene
1. Grandmother was apparently the only kinship placement
option for keeping the children together: she appears to have been
the only maternal relative to express an interest in placement, and,
in light of J.T. and A.T. having different fathers, any paternal
kinship placement for one child would not have been a kinship
placement for the other.

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under rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 That rule
requires, among other things, that the movant “claim[] an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action” and that the movant be “so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability 	to 	protect 	its 	interest.” 	Utah 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	24(a)(2).
Grandmother claimed to have three interests that relate to the
subject of this child welfare action, each of which, she asserted,
might be impaired or impeded by resolution of the action: (1) an
interest related to potential grandparent visitation, (2) an interest
related to her petition for guardianship of J.T., and (3) an interest
related to her right to preferential consideration as a temporary
kinship placement for the children.
¶9 	The juvenile court acknowledged that Grandmother has
“some statutory rights . . . through the child welfare proceeding,”
including “the right to be given preferential treatment as it relates
to placement.” But it found that none of Grandmother’s rights
“would be compromised if she is not allowed to intervene as a
party,” 	and 	it 	therefore 	denied 	Grandmother’s 	request 	to
intervene. 	It 	also 	denied 	her 	request 	to 	be 	the 	children’s
temporary kinship placement. Grandmother appeals the denial of
her request to intervene in the child welfare proceeding.
2. Grandmother’s motion cited both subsections 24(a)(1) and
24(a)(2) in support of her argument that she has a right to
intervene, but her reply memorandum below and briefing on
appeal clarify that she relies only on subsection 24(a)(2) to support
her argument for intervention as of right. Grandmother’s motion
also requested permissive intervention under subsection 24(b),
but that issue is not before us on appeal.

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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶10 	On appeal, Grandmother again contends that she has three
interests related to this child welfare proceeding, that “her ability
to pursue each of these interests was impaired or impeded by
prior and prospective rulings in the child welfare case,” and that
“[e]ach of these three distinct interests is thus sufficient to support
her right to intervene under [r]ule 24(a)(2).”
¶11 	As to Grandmother’s first two claimed interests—namely,
her interest related to grandparent visitation and her interest
related to her guardianship petition—we resolve this appeal
under rule 24 and examine whether the claimed interests qualify
under rule 24(a)(2) as “interest[s] relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the [child welfare] action.” Utah
R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). “Whether the intervenor has claimed an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action” is an issue that “we review for correctness.”
Supernova Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC,
2013 UT 7, ¶ 16, 297 P.3d 599 (cleaned up).
¶12 	As to Grandmother’s claimed interest related to her right
to preferential consideration as a temporary kinship placement in
the child welfare action, we resolve the issue through application
of 	a 	controlling 	line 	of 	Utah 	Supreme 	Court 	cases—In 	re
guardianship of A.T.I.G., 2012 UT 88, 293 P.3d 276; State v. Brown,
2014 UT 48, 342 P.3d 239; and F.L. v. Court of Appeals, 2022 UT 32,
515 P.3d 421. “Our interpretation of case law . . . presents a
question of law reviewed for correctness.” State v. Morgan, 2001
UT 87, ¶ 1, 34 P.3d 767.

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ANALYSIS
I. Intervention as of Right Under Rule 24(a)(2)
A. 	Legally Protectable Interest
¶13 	To the extent that Grandmother based her motion to
intervene on rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,3
she was required to show (1) that her motion was timely, (2) that
she “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that
is the subject of the action,” (3) that the disposition “of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede [her] ability to protect
[that] interest,” and (4) that “existing parties” do not “adequately
represent that interest.” Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also Supernova
Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC, 2013 UT 7,
¶ 22, 297 P.3d 599. With respect to Grandmother’s first two
interests that she claims form the basis of her right to intervene,
we conclude that the interests do not qualify under rule 24(a)(2)
as interests “relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action” and, thus, that she is not entitled to intervene
based on those claimed interests.
¶14 	We begin our analysis by recounting the relevant history
of rule 24(a)(2). As of 1982, rule 24(a)(2) required a showing that
the applicant “is or may be bound by a judgment in the action.”
Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly,
therefore, the Utah Supreme Court held in 1982 that a “party
seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct interest in the subject
3. When a proceeding in juvenile court “involves neglect, abuse,
dependency, termination of parental rights, adoption, status
offenses or truancy, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply
unless inconsistent with” the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure.
Utah R. Juv. P. 2(a). We do not see inconsistency between rule
24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules
of Juvenile Procedure.

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20220623-CA 	7 	2023 UT App 157
matter of the litigation such that the intervenor’s rights may be
affected, for good or for ill.” Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 282
(Utah 1982) (emphasis added), superseded by rule, Utah R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2) (1987), as recognized in Supernova Media, 2013 UT 7, ¶ 39.
The court further explained:
The required interest does not include a mere,
consequential, remote or conjectural possibility of
being in some manner affected by the result of the
original action. It must be such a direct claim upon
the subject matter of the action that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by direct operation of the
judgment to be rendered.
Id. (emphasis added) (cleaned up).
¶15 	Rule 24(a)(2) was later amended—effective January 1,
1987—to eliminate the requirement to show that the applicant
would be “bound” by a judgment in the action. Utah R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2) 	(1987). 	The 	amended 	rule 	instead 	allowed 	for
intervention when “the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede [the applicant’s] ability to protect that
interest.” Id. The amended rule also changed the requirement to
demonstrate 	an 	interest 	in 	the 	subject 	of 	the 	action 	to 	a
requirement to “claim[] an interest relating to” the subject of the
dispute. Id. These changes mandated intervention on “more
liberal terms” than under the pre-1987 rule.4 Chatterton v. Walker,
938 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah 1997).
¶16 	Notwithstanding the 1987 amendment, both this court and
the 	Utah 	Supreme 	Court 	rearticulated 	the 	old 	standard 	in
subsequent cases where the difference between the old and new
4. Rule 24(a)(2) has been further amended since 1987, but the
amendments since 1987 have been stylistic, not substantive.
Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (1987), with id. R. 24(a)(2) (2023).

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standards was not determinative. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36,
¶¶ 51–52, 137 P.3d 809 (stating in a case where “the parties
stipulated that the [intervenor] had the necessary interest,” that
“[t]o justify intervention, the party seeking intervention must
demonstrate a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation”
(emphasis added)); Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101,
1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that “[t]he applicant’s interest
in the subject matter of the dispute must be a direct claim upon the
subject matter of the action such that the applicant will either gain or
lose by direct operation of the judgment to be rendered” but concluding
that the applicants had “no direct or remote interest in the subject
matter of the dispute” (emphasis added)).
¶17 	In Supernova Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard
& Moss, LLC, 2013 UT 7, 297 P.3d 599, however, the Utah Supreme
Court emphasized the effect of the 1987 amendment. In that case,
the party opposing intervention argued that the applicant had
“not established a direct, substantial, and legally protectable
interest in the . . . matter.”5 2013 UT 7, ¶ 35 (cleaned up). The
5. The party opposing intervention was apparently relying on the
standard employed by a number of federal circuit courts under
rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Coalition 	of 	Ariz./N.M. 	Counties 	for 	Stable 	Econ. 	Growth 	v.
Department of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring
that 	the 	applicant’s 	“interest 	in 	the 	proceedings 	be 	direct,
substantial, and legally protectable” (cleaned up)); United States v.
South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1991)
(applying the “direct, substantial, legally protectable interest”
standard). But see, e.g., Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d
1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming a prior rejection of “the
notion that [r]ule 24(a)(2) requires a specific legal or equitable
interest” (cleaned up)). While not “dispositive,” “interpretations
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the
(continued…)

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20220623-CA 	9 	2023 UT App 157
supreme court responded to this argument by explaining that the
party opposing intervention had “misstate[d] the standard: [the
applicant] is only required to claim an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action. [It] is not
required to ‘establish’ an interest, and the interest need not be
‘direct’ or ‘substantial.’” Id. (cleaned up). Notably, while the
supreme court disavowed the suggestion that our current rule
24(a)(2) requires an applicant for intervention to demonstrate
either a direct or a substantial interest in the subject of the action,
it did not disclaim the notion that the applicant’s claimed interest
must be a legally protectable one. See id. See generally Lima, 657
P.2d at 282 (holding that a party seeking intervention must show
that its “rights may be affected, for good or for ill” (emphasis
added)). Indeed, in In re United Effort Plan Trust, 2013 UT 5, 296
P.3d 742, which the supreme court had decided less than three
weeks before it issued Supernova Media, the court held that an
applicant’s interest in the proceeding must be an interest capable
of supporting a legally cognizable claim or defense. See id. ¶¶ 37–
38.
¶18 	In that case, a set of applicants for intervention claimed an
interest in the subject of the action “arising from a ‘sacred
priesthood 	charge, 	pursuant 	to 	scripture 	and 	belief’ 	and
grounded in the ‘tenets of [the applicants’] faith.’” Id. ¶ 37.
Another set of applicants similarly claimed an interest in the
subject of the action “stemming from a ‘priesthood stewardship.’”
Id. Although the court did “not question the importance of these
interests in the abstract,” it concluded that they were not the kind
of interests that triggered rule 24(a)(2). Id. In reaching this
conclusion, the court observed that “rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure provides helpful context for evaluating rule
24(a)(2)’s ‘interest’ requirement,” and it explained as follows:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar.” Noor v.
State, 2019 UT 3, ¶ 47 n.57, 435 P.3d 221 (cleaned up).

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Under 24(c), a party moving for intervention must
file an accompanying pleading setting forth the
claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
And rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in
turn, sets forth the requirements for pleading claims
and defenses, requiring for the assertion of a claim:
(1) a statement of the claim showing that the party
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment
for specified relief.
Id. ¶ 38 (cleaned up). The court then held that because the
applicants there 	had 	“asserted 	no 	such 	claim” 	and 	“[t]heir
purported ‘interests’ [were] abstract ones, disconnected from any
‘demand for judgment for specified relief,’” they “lacked an
interest in the subject matter of the dispute sufficient to sustain
their intervention under rule 24(a)(2).” Id. In sum then, In re United
Effort Plan Trust stands for the proposition that only a legally
protectable interest (not an abstract one) qualifies as an interest
related to the subject matter of the action under rule 24(a)(2)
because only on the basis of a legally protectable interest can one
state a cognizable claim for specified relief.
¶19 	Representative cases leading up to In re United Effort Plan
Trust demonstrate that its holding was not an innovation but,
rather, a more explicit articulation of a principle the court had
applied over time. For example, in In re adoption of I.K., 2009 UT
70, 220 P.3d 464, the court held that an unmarried natural father
who had “failed to timely establish his parental rights” under
applicable state law had “no interest in the [adoption] proceeding
[for his natural daughter] that would endow him with standing to
intervene under rule 24.” See id. ¶ 26. And applying the same
principle with a contrasting result, the court held in In re Discipline
of Alex, 2004 UT 81, 99 P.3d 865, that a landlord did have “a
cognizable interest . . . sufficient to justify its intervention” in an
attorney 	discipline 	action 	because 	the 	district 	court 	in 	the
disciplinary action had ordered a representative of the Utah State

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Bar to “recover, attach, remove and possess any and all property”
left by the attorney in the landlord’s building and the landlord in
its motion for intervention had also asserted a contingent right in
the attorney’s personal property “pursuant to [an] order of
restitution entered in [an] unlawful detainer action” against the
attorney. Id. ¶¶ 5, 25–28 (cleaned up). Accordingly, for an interest
to qualify under rule 24(a)(2) as an interest related to the subject
matter of an action, it must be a legally protectable interest, one
on the basis of which the applicant for intervention articulates a
demand for specified relief.6 See In re United Effort Plan Trust, 2013
UT 5, ¶ 38.
B. 	Grandmother’s First Two Claimed Interests
¶20 	Under 	the 	foregoing 	standard, 	we 	now 	examine
Grandmother’s first two interests that she contends entitle her to
intervention as of right under rule 24(a)(2).
6. There is a long-recognized companion to the rule we identify
here, which companion rule is that a legal liability that may be
enlarged or diminished by resolution of an action also qualifies
under rule 24(a)(2) as an interest related to the subject of the
action. See, e.g., Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 257–62 (Utah
1997) (holding that “an insurer who provides uninsured motorist
protection” has a right to “intervene in an action to determine the
liability of an uninsured motorist” and “raise all defenses to the
allegations 	of 	the 	uninsured 	motorist’s 	negligence—both
affirmative and negative—which the defendant could have raised
had the defendant appeared” because the insurer is contractually
obligated to reimburse its insured for the amount of the judgment
(cleaned up)).

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1. 	Interest Related to Grandparent Visitation
¶21 	Grandmother claims an interest related to her potential
pursuit of grandparent visitation rights under section 30-5-2(1) of
the Utah Code. That section provides:
In accordance with the provisions and requirements
of this section: (a) a grandparent has standing to
bring an action requesting visitation in district court
by petition; and (b) a grandparent may file a petition
for visitation rights in the juvenile court or district
court 	where 	a 	divorce 	proceeding 	or 	other
proceeding involving custody and visitation issues
is pending.
Utah Code § 30-5-2(1). Grandmother has not filed a petition for
visitation 	under 	this 	section, 	and 	she 	does 	not 	argue 	that
resolution of this child welfare proceeding may impair or impede
her right to file such a petition. Indeed, if Grandmother wishes to
petition for visitation under the provisions and requirements of
section 30-5-2, she is—and will remain—free to do so regardless
of the resolution of this action.
¶22 	Instead, Grandmother’s argument is that if she files a
petition for visitation under section 30-5-2, the visitation she
might be granted could be impaired because of the placement
decisions made in this action:
The minor children have been placed in a home 90
miles 	away 	from 	[Grandmother’s] 	home 	(they
previously lived in the same city); one of the minor
children has been placed in a home with a family to
whom he is not a relative; and [Grandmother’s]
access to visitation with the children has been
severely restricted since the date of removal.

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20220623-CA 	13 	2023 UT App 157
¶23 	But Grandmother has no legally protectable right to have
the children placed close to her home or to have them placed with
a relative. And she fails to articulate any legally protectable right
that is being violated by other allegedly severe but unidentified
restrictions that have been placed on her access to visitation with
the children. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of
Grandmother’s intervention motion to the extent that it was based
on her claimed interests related to grandparent visitation.
2. 	Interest Related to the Guardianship Proceeding
¶24 	Grandmother 	also 	claims 	an 	interest 	related 	to 	the
guardianship 	action 	she 	commenced 	in 	district 	court.
Grandmother bases this interest on the “signed stipulation in [the
guardianship] action [that grants Grandmother] certain rights in
relation to the guardianship action.”7 Under the stipulation,
7. In her motion to intervene, Grandmother also asserted that she
had “a right” to intervene “for the purpose of asking [the juvenile]
court to grant [her] custody and guardianship over [J.T.],” and in
support, she pointed to her guardianship action generally and to
the principle that the “next of kin, such as a grandmother, do have
some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and
welfare of children who become parentless, so that they may come
forward and assert their claim.” In re H.J., 1999 UT App 238, ¶ 32,
986 P.2d 115 (cleaned up). As to a grandparent’s inchoate right or
interest 	in 	the 	custody 	and 	welfare 	of 	grandchildren,
Grandmother failed to recognize that such a right “matures only
upon the death or termination of the rights of the parents.” Jones
v. Jones, 2013 UT App 174, ¶ 12, 307 P.3d 598 (cleaned up), aff’d,
2015 UT 84, 359 P.3d 603. Because Mother had neither passed
away nor had her rights terminated, Grandmother’s inherent
inchoate right had not yet matured into a legally protectable one
that could form the basis for intervention as of right under rule
24(a)(2).
(continued…)

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20220623-CA 	14 	2023 UT App 157
Mother and Grandmother agreed to an individual evaluation of
J.T., Mother, and Grandmother and to “abide by the therapist’s
recommendations as a temporary order” until final resolution of
the guardianship case. Yet in her motion and arguments below,
Grandmother never articulated a specified claim for relief based
on this stipulation. And she does not identify one on appeal.
¶25 	Moreover, we are not convinced that the stipulation gives
Grandmother protectable legal rights on which she could base a
cognizable 	claim 	for 	relief 	in 	this 	child 	welfare 	action.
Grandmother’s rights under the stipulation are rights as against
Mother, 	and 	Mother’s 	duty 	to 	perform 	is 	cabined 	by 	the
As to intervention as of right based on the guardianship
action generally, Grandmother’s motion offered no analysis, cited
no case law, and did not clarify whether intervention was being
sought under rule 24(a)(1) or 24(a)(2). In her reply memorandum
and 	at 	oral 	argument, 	Grandmother 	did 	not 	elaborate 	on
intervention based on the guardianship action generally and,
instead, focused on her claimed interest arising specifically from
the stipulation in the guardianship action. And in its ruling on the
motion, the juvenile court did not address intervention as of right
based on the guardianship action generally. “In order to preserve
an issue for appeal, it must be specifically raised such that the
issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the
trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to address
the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it.” State v. Noor, 2012
UT App 187, ¶ 5, 283 P.3d 543 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 288 P.3d
1045 	(Utah 	2012). 	“The 	mere 	mention 	of 	an 	issue 	without
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does
not preserve that issue for appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly,
we 	conclude 	that 	Grandmother 	did 	not 	preserve, 	and 	we
therefore do not address, the issue of her intervention as of right
under rule 24(b)(2) based on the pendency of her guardianship
action generally.

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20220623-CA 	15 	2023 UT App 157
“require[ment] to cooperate in good faith.” Thus, for example, we
cannot say that Grandmother has a legally protectable right to
Mother’s facilitation of a therapist’s evaluation of J.T. when J.T.
has been removed from Mother’s custody. Cf. Kilgore Pavement
Maint., LLC v. West Jordan City, 2011 UT App 165, ¶ 9, 257 P.3d 460
(“Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is
deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation
of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which
event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly
impracticable.” (cleaned up)).
¶26 	Because Grandmother has failed to point us to a legally
protectable right that she has under the stipulation and on the
basis of which she seeks some specified relief in this child welfare
action, we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of her intervention
motion to the extent that it was based on her claimed interest
related to the stipulation in the guardianship proceeding.8
II. Intervention as a Limited-Purpose Party
¶27 	Grandmother’s final argument is that her statutory right to
preferential consideration as a temporary kinship placement for
the children provides an interest that supports her intervention as
8. We acknowledge that Grandmother has made an argument on
appeal regarding the sufficiency of the juvenile court’s findings
related to her rule 24(a)(2) arguments and that the juvenile court
did not address Grandmother’s rule 24(a)(2) arguments in the
way 	that 	we 	have 	here. 	However, 	we 	need 	not 	address
Grandmother’s 	inadequacy-of-the-findings 	argument 	or 	the
juvenile court’s rule 24(a)(2) analysis because our review is de
novo and “we may affirm on any legal ground or theory apparent
on the record, as long as we do not reweigh the evidence in light
of the new legal theory or alternate ground.” State v. Malloy, 2019
UT App 55, ¶ 9, 441 P.3d 756 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2021 UT 61, 498
P.3d 358.

In re J.T.
20220623-CA 	16 	2023 UT App 157
of right under rule 24(a)(2). As we have noted already, however,
we do not address under rule 24(a)(2) Grandmother’s statutory
right 	to 	preferential 	consideration 	as 	a 	temporary 	kinship
placement. 	Instead, 	we 	address 	intervention 	based 	on 	that
statutory right under a controlling line of Utah Supreme Court
cases—In re guardianship of A.T.I.G., 2012 UT 88, 293 P.3d 276; State
v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, 342 P.3d 239; and F.L. v. Court of Appeals,
2022 UT 32, 515 P.3d 421.
A. 	Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
¶28 	We begin by reviewing the identified cases. In In re
guardianship of A.T.I.G., the mother of a child was “diagnosed with
terminal lung cancer.” 2012 UT 88, ¶ 6. “[I]n anticipation of her
death, [the mother] prepared a testamentary appointment of
guardianship and conservatorship of [her child] in favor of [the
child’s maternal grandparents].” Id. The child’s biological father,
who was never married to the mother, was not named on the
child’s birth certificate, and he had not signed a voluntary
declaration of paternity at the time of the child’s birth. Id. ¶ 3. Nor
was the father notified of the mother’s testamentary appointment
of guardianship. Id. ¶ 6. After the mother’s passing and funeral,
the grandparents took the child home and filed a petition for
confirmation of their appointment as guardians, and the district
court confirmed their appointment. Id. ¶ 7. When the father
learned that the grandparents had been appointed and confirmed
as the child’s guardians, he filed an objection. Id. ¶¶ 8, 19. The
district court denied the objection, and the father appealed. Id.
¶¶ 9, 11–12.
¶29 	On appeal, the grandparents argued that because the father
“never formally filed a motion to intervene in [the] case, he lacked
standing 	to 	object 	to 	the 	guardianship 	appointment” 	and
“standing to bring [the] appeal.” Id. ¶ 17 (cleaned up). The
supreme court disagreed, explaining that because section 75-5-203
of the Utah Code “permits ‘[a]ny person interested in the welfare

In re J.T.
20220623-CA 	17 	2023 UT App 157
of 	a 	minor’ 	to 	file 	a 	written 	objection 	to 	a 	guardianship
appointment,” “the statute confers intervenor status on any
person 	who 	files 	an 	objection 	pursuant 	to 	it.” 	Id. 	¶ 	18.
Accordingly, the court concluded, “when [the father] filed his
objection, [he] received statutory intervenor status.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶30 	A few years later, in State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, 342 P.3d
239, 	the 	supreme 	court 	reached 	a 	similar 	conclusion 	and
elaborated on its reasoning. There, it granted intervention with
“limited-party status” to a victim in a criminal proceeding. See id.
¶¶ 13–20. The defendant had been charged with sex crimes (and
later pleaded guilty to one of them), and the victim “sought to
intervene by filing a notice of a claim for restitution.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.
“The district court rejected [the] filing on the ground that [the
victim] was not a proper party and thus lacked standing to file
pleadings.” Id. ¶ 1. The victim appealed. Id. ¶ 2.
¶31 	On appeal, the supreme court acknowledged that “[t]he
traditional parties to a criminal proceeding are the prosecution
and the defense, and a crime victim is not that kind of party; a
victim is not entitled to participate at all stages of the proceedings
or for all purposes.” Id. ¶ 16. The court noted, however, that “[o]ur
crime victims bill of rights recognizes the right of a victim to ‘seek
restitution or reparations.’” Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Utah Code § 77-37-
3(1)(e)). It then explained that “the right to ‘seek’ connotes a
proactive right to ‘go in search of,’ or to ‘try to acquire or gain,’”
and that “the anticipated mode of seeking restitution is . . . by a
direct filing by the victim.” Id. (cleaned up). Reasoning that
“[n]on-parties have no standing to file motions or to otherwise
request relief,” the court concluded that the provisions of the code
allowing a victim to seek restitution through a direct filing
“recognize a victim’s status as a limited-purpose party.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶32 	Most recently, in F.L. v. Court of Appeals, 2022 UT 32, 515
P.3d 421, the supreme court again addressed the right of a crime
victim to intervene in a criminal proceeding as a limited-purpose

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20220623-CA 	18 	2023 UT App 157
party. The defendant in that case was also charged with sex
crimes, and he requested “that the district court conduct an in
camera review of [the alleged victim’s] therapy and counseling
records and release specific categories of information relevant to
his defense.” Id. ¶ 1. The court granted the request, conducted the
review, and issued orders quoting relevant excerpts from the
records. Id. The court then sealed the records, the case proceeded
to trial, and the defendant was convicted of one count of sexual
abuse of a child. Id. He then appealed, challenging “the adequacy
of the district court’s in camera review.” Id. ¶ 2.
¶33 	The appeal came to this court, and we initially “unsealed
[the] records and classified them as private, which allowed [the
defendant’s] attorney to make extensive use of those records in
his opening brief on appeal.” Id. The victim, however, asked this
court to reseal her records, and we responded by ordering the
records resealed and instructing the defendant “to file a revised
brief 	without 	references 	to 	the 	records.” 	Id. 	The 	defendant
complied but argued that “the sealing order violated his rights.”
Id. ¶ 3. The victim “then moved to intervene in [the] appeal as a
limited-purpose party to assert her privacy interests.” Id. We did
not grant intervention, but we did allow her to file an amicus brief.
Id. ¶ 4. She then filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the
supreme court, seeking an order allowing her to intervene as a
limited-purpose party. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
¶34 	The supreme court held that the victim was entitled to
limited-purpose party status “under the reasoning of State v.
Brown and as provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 506.” Id. ¶ 35.
The court determined that “[t]he reasoning of State v. Brown can
be distilled into this general rule: if the law gives crime victims the
ability to proactively assert a right or seek a remedy, then they
may enforce those specific rights as limited-purpose parties in
criminal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 37. Therefore, the question was
“whether the law [gave the victim] the right to proactively assert
her privacy interests in her privileged mental health records.” Id.

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20220623-CA 	19 	2023 UT App 157
The court declared that it did because under rule 506, “a patient
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing information that is communicated in
confidence to a 	mental health therapist for the purpose of
diagnosing or treating the patient” and “the privilege may be
claimed 	by 	the 	patient.” 	Id. 	¶ 	38 	(cleaned 	up). 	The 	court
emphasized that, “[s]imilar to the phrase ‘seek restitution’ in
Brown, the phrase ‘claim the privilege’ [in rule 506] connotes a
proactive right.” Id. Because rule 506 gave the victim a proactive
right 	to 	“assert 	that 	privilege 	and 	directly 	oppose 	[the
defendant’s] attempts to gain access to her records,” the court
concluded that the victim “possess[ed] the status of a limited-
purpose party.” Id. ¶ 39 (cleaned up).
¶35 	The court in F.L. also expressly addressed intervention
under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. ¶ 37
n.36. 	It 	observed 	that 	the 	defendant 	and 	the 	victim 	had
spent 	“much 	of 	their 	briefing 	arguing 	over 	whether 	[the
victim] should be allowed to intervene through Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 24, which [the victim] argue[d] should apply to
[the] criminal proceedings under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
81(e).” Id. The State, on the other hand, argued that the victim did
“not need to satisfy the requirements of rule 24 to become a
limited-purpose party under Brown.” Id. Importantly, the court
“[chose] the narrower option and resolve[d] [the] case based on
Brown and Utah Rule of Evidence 506 rather than rule 24,”
emphasizing that (1) it had previously “held that the traditional
parties to a criminal proceeding are the prosecution and the
defense, and a victim is not entitled to participate at all stages of
the proceedings or for all purposes”; (2) “rule 24 allows a person
to become a full-fledged party to the proceeding in every respect”;
and (3) it was “concerned with the broad consequences of
applying rule 24 to allow intervention in criminal proceedings.”
Id. (cleaned up).

In re J.T.
20220623-CA 	20 	2023 UT App 157
B. 	Right to Preferential Consideration as a Kinship Placement
¶36 	As with the father in In re guardianship of A.T.I.G. and the
victims in Brown and F.L., the law gives Grandmother the ability
to proactively assert a right or seek a remedy in the action into
which she seeks to intervene. Specifically, section 80-3-302 of the
Utah Code, which addresses shelter hearings in child welfare
proceedings, provides that when considering the temporary
placement of children removed from a parent’s custody, “[DCFS]
and the juvenile court shall give preferential consideration to a
relative’s or a friend’s request for placement of the child, if the
placement is in the best interest of the child.” Utah Code § 80-3-
302(7)(a)(i) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the preceding code
section, 	which 	also 	addresses 	shelter 	hearings, 	requires 	the
juvenile court conducting the hearing to “hear relevant evidence
presented 	by 	the 	child, 	the 	child’s 	parent 	or 	guardian, 	the
requesting party, or the requesting party’s counsel.” Id. § 80-3-
301(5)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). Just as the law’s recognition of the
rights to “file” an objection, “seek” restitution, and “claim”
privacy protections each indicate an ability to proactively assert a
right 	or 	seek 	a 	remedy 	and, 	thus, 	confer 	limited-purpose
intervenor status on persons who exercise those rights, section 80-
3-302’s recognition of a relative’s or a friend’s right to “request”
preferential consideration for child placement likewise indicates
an ability to proactively assert a right or seek a remedy and, thus,
confers limited-purpose intervenor status on relatives or friends
when they request such preferential consideration. See In re
guardianship of A.T.I.G., 2012 UT 88, ¶ 19, 293 P.3d 276 (holding
that “when he filed his objection, [the father] received statutory
intervenor status” (emphasis added)); State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48,
¶ 19, 342 P.3d 239 (“Non-parties have no standing to file motions
or to otherwise request relief. Such rights are conferred only on
parties.”).
¶37 	Persons who gain this type of statutory or rule-based
intervenor 	status, 	however, 	become 	only 	“limited-purpose

In re J.T.
20220623-CA 	21 	2023 UT App 157
parties” who may participate in the action solely to “enforce those
specific rights” that the law upon which their intervention is
based 	affords “the 	ability 	to proactively assert.” 	Id. 	Hence,
Grandmother’s limited-purpose party status allows her to request
preferential consideration for temporary kinship placement, see
Utah Code § 80-3-302(7)(a)(i), provide relevant testimony and
other relevant evidence on the issue of temporary placement
during the shelter hearing, see id. § 80-3-301(5)(b)(ii), and be
provided 	information 	that 	is 	anticipated 	to 	be 	reported 	or
requested during the portion of the shelter hearing that she is
entitled to participate in as a party, see id. § 80-3-107(1)(a).
¶38 	Grandmother contends that to the extent section 80-3-
302(7)(a)(i) 	does 	“create 	some 	right 	of 	limited-purpose
intervention,” that right should “not preempt” rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. As reflected in this opinion, we agree
with Grandmother to some extent: we do not see inherent
inconsistency between rule 24(a)(2) and the Utah Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, see supra note 3, and we have therefore analyzed under
rule 24(a)(2) Grandmother’s claimed interests that are not of the
sort that would give rise to limited-purpose party status, see supra
¶¶ 13–26.
¶39 	On the other hand, we note that quite like criminal
proceedings where “the prosecution and the defense” are the
“traditional parties” and others, including victims, are “not
entitled to participate at all stages of the proceedings or for all
purposes,” F.L., 2022 UT 32, ¶ 37 n.36, the traditional parties in
DCFS-initiated child welfare proceedings are the State (in the
interest of the children) and the parents or guardians of the
children, and other parties are not entitled to participate for all
purposes 	or 	at 	all 	stages 	of 	the 	proceedings. 	Given 	these
similarities, we are concerned, as was the supreme court with
respect to criminal proceedings, “with the broad consequences of
applying 	rule 	24 	to 	allow 	intervention” 	in 	child 	welfare
proceedings in instances where the “narrower option” of limited-

In re J.T.
20220623-CA 	22 	2023 UT App 157
purpose intervention is available. Id. For this reason, we follow
the supreme court’s lead and resolve the portion of this case
stemming from Grandmother’s claimed interest in preferential
kinship placement under In re guardianship of A.T.I.G., Brown, F.L.,
and Utah Code section 80-3-302(7)(a)(i).9
¶40 	Based on the foregoing, we hold that when Grandmother
requested 	preferential consideration 	as a 	temporary 	kinship
placement 	for 	the 	children, 	she 	acquired 	limited-purpose
statutory intervenor status. The juvenile court thus erred by not
recognizing Grandmother as a limited-purpose party.
CONCLUSION
¶41 	The juvenile court was correct when it declined to grant
Grandmother’s request to intervene in this child welfare matter
under rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based on
her claimed interests related to grandparent visitation and the
stipulation in the guardianship action in district court. The court
erred, however, when it did not recognize Grandmother’s status
as a limited-purpose party. We therefore reverse in part the
juvenile court’s denial of Grandmother’s motion to intervene and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
9. Because of the concerns expressed here, we invite the Utah
Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Rules of Juvenile
Procedure to consider whether an intervention rule separate from
rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and specifically
tailored to juvenile court proceedings may be merited in the Rules
of Juvenile Procedure.