Hall v. Hall

1. The Honorable Judith M. Billings, Senior Judge, sat by special
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2013 UT App 280
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANET K. HALL,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
DENNIS R. HALL,
Respondent and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20120437-CA
Filed November 21, 2013
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Samuel D. McVey
No. 054402483
Nathan E. Burdsal and Hutch U. Fale, Attorneys
for Appellant
Lori W. Nelson and Brent A. Orozco, Attorneys
for Appellee
SENIOR JUDGE JUDITH M. BILLINGS authored this Opinion, in
which JUDGES JAMES Z. DAVIS and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.1
BILLINGS, Senior Judge:
¶1 Dennis R. Hall (Husband) appeals from the trial court’s
orders resulting from a contempt hearing initiated by Janet K. Hall
(Wife). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Hall v. Hall
20120437-CA 2 2013 UT App 280
BACKGROUND
¶2 As part of their divorce in 2007, Husband and Wife reserved
several issues to be dealt with in a subsequent stipulation. That
later agreement (the Stipulation) was signed by the parties on
March 23, 2010. Two days later, Wife’s counsel sent a letter to
Husband’s counsel, clarifying her understanding that the cash
value of all of the parties’ life insurance policies would be equalized
under the Stipulation. Husband’s attorney responded with a list of
fourteen life insurance policies that he understood would be
equalized. Thereafter, the court signed a supplemental decree of
divorce as a result of the Stipulation.
¶3 Later that summer, Wife sought the issuance of an order to
show cause, arguing that Husband should be found in contempt
for several acts of noncompliance with the Stipulation. Husband
thereafter filed a response and also made several claims of
contempt against Wife.
¶4 The trial court held an order to show cause hearing. At the
hearing, the trial court (1) determined that the provision of the
Stipulation requiring the equalization of the cash value of life
insurance policies included the fourteen life insurance policies
listed in Husband’s attorney’s letter, (2) clarified Husband’s
obligation regarding refinancing the marital property, (3) stated
that Husband’s claims of contempt regarding personal property
and medical expenses were not adequately supported by the
evidence, (4) found that neither party was in contempt, and (5)
initially denied Wife an award of attorney fees but left open the
possibility for her to resubmit an attorney fees request. Wife
submitted a later request for attorney fees based both on her
inability to pay and her status as having substantially prevailed on
her claims. The trial court then awarded Wife attorney fees based
on her inability to pay.
¶5 Husband raises several claims of error with the trial court’s
findings and conclusions resulting from the evidentiary hearing.

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20120437-CA 3 2013 UT App 280
Wife responds with an assertion that Husband’s appeal was not
timely filed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶6 First, we address Wife’s argument that Husband has not met
the timing requirements set forth by rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 4(a). “If an appeal is not
timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Serrato
v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d 616. “An
appellate court’s determination of whether it has jurisdiction to
hear an appeal is a question of law.” State v. Norris, 2002 UT App
305, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 238 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). We address this argument first because a determination
that the appeal is untimely would be dispositive.
¶7 Second, Husband challenges the trial court’s determination
regarding the equalization of life insurance policies. The trial court
determined that the relevant provision in the Stipulation was
ambiguous and that the parties intended for the equalization to
include all the life insurance policies listed in the letter send by
Husband’s attorney. “[W]hether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law, which we review for correctness. But where an
appellate court finds that a contract is ambiguous and looks to
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties, it must
give deference to the lower court’s findings of fact.” Watkins v.
Henry Day Ford, 2013 UT 31, ¶ 19, 304 P.3d 841 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
¶8 Third, Husband contests the trial court’s interpretation of his
obligations under the Stipulation relating to the refinancing of the
marital home. However, due to actions taken while this appeal was
pending, Husband now asserts, and we agree, that this issue is
moot. We therefore do not address this issue on the merits.

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20120437-CA 4 2013 UT App 280
¶9 Fourth, Husband argues that the trial court erred in
determining that he had presented no evidence to support his
claims of contempt against Wife regarding medical bills and certain
personal property. Such legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
¶10 Fifth, Husband contests the award of attorney fees to Wife,
arguing that the statute cited by the court does not allow an award
based on Wife’s inability to pay. “Generally, [w]e review a trial
court’s decision regarding attorney fees in a divorce proceeding for
an abuse of discretion. However, the proper interpretation of a
statute is a question of law. Thus, the interpretation of the attorney
fee statute is reviewed for correctness.” Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT
App 139, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 836 (alteration in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Timeliness of Appeal
¶11 As an initial matter, we address Wife’s argument that
Husband’s appeal was not timely filed. See generally Utah R. App.
P. 4 (setting forth timing requirements for filing a notice of appeal).
First, Wife relies on the dates that various orders were signed to
determine whether the deadline for appeal was met. However, the
applicable rule provides that “the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.” Id. R. 4(a) (emphasis
added); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c) (“A judgment is complete
and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation
of a lien on real property, when it is signed and filed . . . .” (emphasis
added)). Second, Wife alleges that Husband did not appeal from
the April 30 contempt order until August 10. But the record shows
that Husband filed his first notice of appeal on May 24—within the
thirty-day time limit. Further, when a second order was entered
July 11, primarily to put the word “Judgment” in the title but

Hall v. Hall
2. Husband argues that Wife’s timeliness objection is frivolous and
requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 33(a). A frivolous
filing “is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law.” Id. R. 33(b). “The sanction for bringing a
frivolous appeal is applied only in egregious cases,” Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), and we do not see that Wife’s
argument on this issue merits such a sanction.
3. There is some discussion by Husband of the Stipulation’s
integration clause. However, “integration clauses do not
(continued...)
20120437-CA 5 2013 UT App 280
making no substantive changes to the prior order, Husband
responded by filing another notice of appeal on August 10—again
within the thirty-day time limit. Thus, Husband’s appeal is timely.2
II. Equalization of Life Insurance
¶12 The trial court determined that the provision regarding life
insurance in the Stipulation was ambiguous and that the
equalization was intended to include the value of all of the life
insurance policies listed in the letter sent by Husband’s attorney. In
addressing the issue of facial ambiguity, the trial court must follow
the two-part approach set forth in Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,
¶ 26, 190 P.3d 1269. First, when determining whether an ambiguity
exists, the trial court must consider “‘any relevant evidence’” in
order to avoid a determination that “‘is based solely on the
“extrinsic evidence of the judge’s own linguistic education and
experience.”’” Id. (quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 907
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995)). Then, after the trial court has considered
“evidence of contrary interpretations, the [trial court] must ensure
that ‘the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by
the language of the contract.’” Id. (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268).3

Hall v. Hall
3. (...continued)
necessarily bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence.” Watkins v.
Henry Day Ford, 2013 UT 31, ¶ 25, 304 P.3d 841. The reliance on
extrinsic evidence here is not to add to or vary the terms of the
Stipulation with outside information but, instead, to clarify what
the parties meant by terms that were included in the Stipulation.
20120437-CA 6 2013 UT App 280
¶13 The provision at issue here reads, in its entirety,
13. Life Insurance. The parties have life insurance
policies, which shall be divided as follows:
a. [Husband] has a life insurance policy on his life
with a face value of $1,000,000. It is fair and
reasonable that [Husband] be ordered to maintain in
full force and effect the $1,000,000 life insurance
policy on his life naming [Wife] as the beneficiary
until such time as [Husband] pays off the property
settlement owed by [Husband] to [Wife] as referred
to herein. [Husband] should submit once a year to
[Wife] proof that the policy is in full force and effect;
b. [Wife] has a life insurance policy on her life, which
she is awarded;
c. Each of the life insurance policies has a cash value.
The parties will equalize the difference in the cash
value and [Husband] shall pay [Wife] one-half the
difference within ninety (90) days of the signing of
this Stipulation.
The parties disagree about which life insurance policies were
intended to be covered by subsection (c). Wife argues that the
subsection refers to all of Husband’s and Wife’s family life
insurance policies, while Husband argues that it refers to only the
two policies discussed specifically in subsections (a) and (b).

Hall v. Hall
20120437-CA 7 2013 UT App 280
¶14 We first consider the relevant extrinsic evidence to
determine whether the Stipulation is ambiguous. Wife primarily
relies on correspondence between her attorney and Husband’s
attorney. Two days after the parties signed the Stipulation, Wife’s
attorney sent a letter to Husband’s attorney, stating,
[W]e need to clarify that all insurances will be
equalized and [Wife] gets one-half. Not just [Wife’s]
and [Husband’s] policies. [Wife] is aware that
[Husband] has been putting money away into several
policies for an extended period of time for himself
and the children. This is marital money and is
appropriately divided.
Husband’s attorney responded, providing a list of fourteen life
insurance policies and stating, “It is my understanding that these
policies are the policies to be equalized.” Based on this response,
Wife’s attorney sent Husband’s attorney a calculation of the
equalized amount and a request for payment. Neither Husband nor
his attorney questioned or objected to this calculation prior to the
proceedings on Wife’s order to show cause.
¶15 Husband argues that this evidence is not relevant because
nowhere in the letters do the parties specify that they are
discussing the Stipulation. However, the letter seeking clarification
was sent just two days after the Stipulation was signed and it
addressed other responsibilities of the parties that were set forth in
separate provisions of the Stipulation. Husband also argues that
the equalization that the parties discussed in the letters was in
reference to the valuation of the business. But we do not see, nor
does Husband point us to, any language in the Stipulation or other
correspondence that mentions equalizing family life insurance
policies as part of the business valuation and corresponding pay-
out to Wife. Thus we see no error in the trial court’s consideration
of this evidence as relevant.

Hall v. Hall
4. Husband argues that “the $1,000,000 life insurance policy” was
intended by both parties to refer to Husband’s largest life insurance
policy, notwithstanding the fact that the policy had a face value of
less than $1,000,000. But under this interpretation, Husband would
be required to keep Wife as the full beneficiary of this largest
policy, an action which he has admittedly not done. Instead, he has
made Wife a 67% beneficiary of this largest policy and a 100%
beneficiary of some smaller policy.
20120437-CA 8 2013 UT App 280
¶16 Although this extrinsic evidence clearly supports the
interpretation for which Wife contends—that the parties intended
to equalize the cash value of all their family life insurance
policies—Husband claims that this interpretation is not reasonably
supported by the Stipulation’s language. We conclude that the
contract language itself supports the interpretation advanced by
Wife. Section 13 contains initial language that purports to divide
the parties’ “life insurance policies,” which phrase could
reasonably be argued to encompass all of the parties’ policies.
Then, subsection (c) equalizes “each of the life insurance policies,”
which could reasonably be interpreted to refer to the “life
insurance policies” mentioned in section 13 prior to the colon that
introduces the subsections.
¶17 Husband argues that the life insurance policies referenced
in section 13(c) include only the one policy specifically mentioned
in subsection (a) and the one policy specifically mentioned in
subsection (b). However, Husband acknowledges that his attempt
to comply with subsection (a) has resulted in keeping Wife as the
beneficiary of not one policy with a value of $1,000,000, but
multiple policies that total $1,000,000. Thus, his current4
interpretation of subsection (a) as referencing a single policy is
somewhat inconsistent. It appears just as likely, if not more likely,
that the separate subsections were dealing with three different
aspects of life insurance policies—subsection (a) outlining
insurance protection Wife should enjoy until the property
settlement was paid off, subsection (b) awarding a specific policy

Hall v. Hall
20120437-CA 9 2013 UT App 280
to Wife, and subsection (c) determining that all of the parties’ life
insurance policies should be equalized.
¶18 Thus, the trial court correctly considered extrinsic evidence,
found ambiguity in the provision, and determined that Wife’s
interpretation was supported by the Stipulation’s language. We
conclude the trial court’s determination as to the parties’ intended
meaning of section 13 of the Stipulation was not an abuse of
discretion.
III. Refinancing
¶19 Originally, Husband argued on appeal that the trial court
erred in its interpretation of the parties’ refinancing obligations
under the Stipulation. However, in his reply brief, Husband states
that he has followed the trial court’s direction and has paid off the
second loan on the marital property. We agree with Husband that
the refinancing issue is now moot and that we need not address
this issue on appeal. See generally Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d
1057, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“A case is moot when the
requested relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants. Generally,
we do not consider mooted questions on appeal.” (citation
omitted)).
IV. Husband’s Contempt Motion
¶20 Husband argues that the trial court erred in failing to find
Wife in contempt due to her failure to pay certain dependent
medical expenses and give Husband certain personal property as
required by the Stipulation. Utah Code section 78B-6-302 requires
that for a claim of indirect contempt, that is, when the contempt
occurs outside the presence of the court, “an affidavit or statement
of the facts by a judicial officer shall be presented to the court or
judge of the facts constituting the contempt.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-302(2) (LexisNexis 2012). This affidavit requirement is
jurisdictional. Iota, LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co., 2012 UT App 218, ¶ 35,
284 P.3d 681. Husband argues that because he submitted such an

Hall v. Hall
20120437-CA 10 2013 UT App 280
affidavit and because Wife presented no counter-evidence at the
hearing, the trial court should have found Wife in contempt on
these issues.
¶21 However, we are not convinced by Husband’s argument
that the affidavit alone shifts the burden of proof to the party who
is alleged to be in contempt. We see no support for this position in
the relevant statutes or in the cases Husband cites. Indeed, all the
cases Husband cites that touch on the burden of proof also involve
issuances of orders to show cause and do not indicate that the
burden shifted prior to the issuances of those orders. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Utah 1977) (“On June 26,
1974, the defendant was before the court in response to an order to
show cause why he had not delivered the stock.”); De Yonge v. De
Yonge, 135 P.2d 905, 905 (Utah 1943) (“Appellant failed to make any
payments after August 29, 1941, whereupon the court issued an
order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court for failure to comply with the order.”). Indeed, one cited case
seems to specifically tie the shift of burden to the order to show
cause:
An order to show cause is an order from the court,
directed to the defendant to appear and show cause
why he should not be held in contempt for willfully
disobeying the previous order of the court. While it
is true that an order to show cause will not issue
except upon an affidavit that a party has violated or
disobeyed the court’s orders, once issued, the burden
is on the defendant to present evidence with respect
to the three [contempt] elements . . . .
Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156–57 (Utah 1983) (per curiam)
(emphasis added) (additional emphasis omitted).
¶22 More importantly, claims of indirect contempt require extra
procedural protections that would not be necessary were the

Hall v. Hall
5. Under similar reasoning, we reject Husband’s argument that
regardless of whether the burden of proof shifted to Wife, he
should have still prevailed because Wife never contradicted the
evidence set forth in his affidavit. Husband never introduced this
evidence at the hearing, even in the face of the trial court’s
assertion that no evidence regarding these matters had been
presented.
20120437-CA 11 2013 UT App 280
contempt committed in the presence of the court. Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1988).
The due process provision of the federal constitution
requires that in a prosecution for a contempt not
committed in the presence of the court, the person
charged be advised of the nature of the action against
him [or her], have assistance of counsel, if requested,
have the right to confront witnesses, and have the
right to offer testimony on his [or her] behalf.
Id. (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Although Husband never moved for an order to show
cause based on his contempt claims, the contempt claims were
included in the parties’ stipulated list of issues to be addressed at
the evidentiary hearing. Thus, Wife should have been prepared to
present a defense to these allegations. However, we are not
convinced that Wife had a true opportunity to present her defense
under the circumstances. During the evidentiary hearing, Husband
failed to introduce as evidence, or even mention, his affidavit
alleging contempt, notwithstanding the trial court’s assertion that
there had been no evidence presented regarding either the
children’s medical expenses or the personal property, which were
the basis of these contempt claims. Instead, Husband raised the
existence of his affidavit by a general reference in a post-hearing
brief. Such circumstances did not afford Wife an adequate
opportunity to offer evidence and testimony on her behalf and do
not meet the due process requirements.5

Hall v. Hall
20120437-CA 12 2013 UT App 280
¶23 Thus, we are not persuaded by Husband’s argument that the
existence in the record of his affidavit alleging contempt was
sufficient to shift the burden of proof to Wife. Nor are we
convinced that the circumstances of this case afforded Wife an
adequate opportunity to present evidence in her defense where
Husband wholly failed to present evidence of his allegations of
contempt at the hearing. We therefore see no error in the trial
court’s ruling on this matter.
V. Attorney Fees
¶24 Husband next argues that the trial court erred in awarding
attorney fees under Utah Code section 30-3-3(1), which provides
that fees may be awarded “in any action to establish an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). He argues that any
attorney fees awarded in this case must be awarded under section
30-3-3(2), which covers actions enforcing these types of orders and
requires a finding that a party “substantially prevailed upon the
claim or defense,” see id. § 30-3-3(2).
¶25 Wife responds that the attorney fees here were incurred in
establishing an order. Although this is true, the order established
was not “an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony,
or division of property in a domestic case,” see id. § 30-3-3(1). The
original divorce decree was such an order. Instead, the order
established was to force compliance with the prior divorce decree.
Indeed, Wife concedes that the current order “enforced terms of the
[original decree]” and “did not amend its terms in any respect.”
Also, the trial court characterized the order here as one “requiring
[Husband] to comply with the terms of the Decree of Divorce.”
These type of actions for enforcement are addressed by subsection
(2) as opposed to subsection (1). See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3; see
also, e.g., Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 2010 UT App 261, ¶ 12, 241 P.3d
365 (applying Utah Code section 30-3-3(2) to a request of attorney
fees after prevailing on an order to show cause). Thus, the trial

Hall v. Hall
6. Due to this unique posture, we reject Husband’s assertion that
Wife’s arguments on this subject are frivolous and merit an award
of attorney fees to him.
20120437-CA 13 2013 UT App 280
court erred in awarding attorney fees based on subsection (1) and
we reverse the award.
¶26 Admittedly, this is a unique situation because the order to
show cause not only sought enforcement of the divorce decree but,
as a necessary first step, sought clarification of ambiguous terms
within the decree. Nonetheless, in prior similar cases, we have6
consistently applied the attorney fee provisions relevant to the
enforcement of domestic orders. See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 2011
UT App 150, ¶¶ 8, 10, 260 P.3d 202 (affirming an attorney fees
award under Utah Code section 30-3-3(2) where the case involved
the “interpretation and enforcement of the domesticated Decree”);
Larsen v. Larsen, 2003 UT App 408U, para. 8 (upholding an award
of attorney fees not based on financial need where “the Order to
Show Cause was necessary to enforce an ambiguous provision in
the divorce decree”); Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶¶ 18, 33, 973
P.2d 431 (treating a case “presenting a question of the proper
construction of the original divorce decree” as one of enforcement
for purposes of attorney fees); Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027,
1030–31 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating, in a case where the divorce
decree was ambiguous, “Wife is not seeking to obtain or modify a
divorce decree but to enforce the provisions of a decree she
obtained in 1986. In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce
decree, an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial
court’s discretion, regardless of the financial need of the moving
party.”).
¶27 Although Wife requested attorney fees based both on
financial need and her claim that she substantially prevailed, the
trial court’s order based the award on financial need. Further, the
trial court crossed out a proposed finding that stated, “The court
also finds [Wife] substantially prevailed in the litigation and that an

Hall v. Hall
7. At oral argument, Wife’s counsel made a request for an award of
attorney fees incurred on appeal. Because this request was not
made in Wife’s brief, we deny the request. See GDE Constr., Inc. v.
Leavitt, 2012 UT App 298, ¶ 25 n.8, 294 P.3d 567 (rejecting a party’s
request for attorney fees incurred on appeal where the request was
raised for the first time at oral argument). See generally Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring a request for an award of attorney fees
to be explicitly stated in an appellant’s opening brief).
20120437-CA 14 2013 UT App 280
award of fees is justified on that basis as well.” However, it is not
clear if the trial court’s action was based on the court’s erroneous
belief that only an analysis under financial need was applicable
here or if it was instead due to a determination that Wife did not
substantially prevail. Indeed, other language of the award signals
a determination that Wife was successful on her claims: “The court
further finds that . . . but for the pursuit of the action there would
not be an order in place requiring [Husband] to comply with the
terms of the Decree of Divorce.”
¶28 Because we cannot determine why the trial court did not
award fees under Utah Code section 30-3-3(2), we remand to the
trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law related
to this issue. However, we do not intend to suggest or endorse any
specific outcome on the attorney fees issue. We recognize that an
attorney fees award granted under section 30-3-3(2) would be
within the wide discretion of the trial court, see Grindstaff, 2010 UT
App 261, ¶ 12 (“[T]rial courts have significant discretion in
awarding or declining to award attorney fees for actions to enforce
court orders.”), and that the trial court may consider a variety of
factors in determining whether Wife substantially prevailed, see,
e.g., Larsen, 2003 UT App 408U, para. 8 (upholding an award based
on the trial court’s reasoning that “although Wife did not prevail
entirely upon her claim, she was entitled to an award of 50% of her
attorney fees because the Order to Show Cause was necessary to
enforce an ambiguous provision in the divorce decree”).7

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20120437-CA 15 2013 UT App 280
VI. Erroneous Findings
¶29 As an alternative argument regarding attorney fees,
Husband challenges some trial court findings related to Wife’s
need and Husband’s ability to pay. Although we need not reach
this issue in light of our determination on the attorney fees award,
we choose to briefly address the matter under the circumstances.
¶30 The trial court made conflicting findings regarding
Husband’s net worth. In the findings from the March 6 order, his
net worth is listed as $2,148,705; but the findings from the May 16
order list his net worth as $1,240,000. Both parties agree, and the
evidence supports, that the lower number is correct and that the
higher number came from erroneously referencing the wrong
number on a statement of Husband’s assets and liabilities.
¶31 Because of this obvious error and because the parties contest
other figures in the trial court’s assessments regarding their
financial situations, we vacate those findings of the trial court
regarding Wife’s need and Husband’s ability to pay that are found
in the Order on Award of Attorney Fees. Thus, if similar issues
arise in future proceedings, the trial court should reconsider these
financial issues anew at that time.
CONCLUSION
¶32 We first conclude that Husband’s appeal was timely filed.
We also conclude that the trial court’s determination regarding
ambiguity in section 13 of the Stipulation was correct and that the
court did not abuse its discretion in its interpretation of the
ambiguous provision. Furthermore, we do not see any error in the
trial court’s conclusions regarding Husband’s contempt claims
related to medical bills and personal property. We make no
determination on Husband’s claim regarding refinancing because
it is now moot. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s award of
attorney fees under Utah Code section 30-3-3(1), vacate the related

Hall v. Hall
20120437-CA 16 2013 UT App 280
findings regarding Wife’s need and Husband’s ability to pay, and
remand to the trial court for a determination of whether Wife
should be awarded attorney fees under Utah Code section 30-3-
3(2).