Pohl v. Webelhuth

2008 UT 89
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Pohl, Inc. of America, 	No. 20070622
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Ron Webelhuth; Bret Miller;
Dennis Miller; Industrial Sheet
Metal Erectors, Inc.; and John 	F I L E D
Does I through X,
Defendants and Respondents. 	December 23, 2008
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
No. 050908318
Attorneys: 	David W. Scofield, Ronald F. Price, Salt Lake City,
for petitioner
Robert F. Babcock, Steven M. Cockriel, Cody W.
Wilson, Salt Lake City, for respondents
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	This case asks us to decide whether Utah’s long-arm
statute extends to defendants who allegedly engaged in a
conspiracy to tortiously interfere with the plaintiff’s contract
and economic opportunities. 	We address whether Utah’s long-arm
statute provides for jurisdiction over individuals who never
physically entered Utah but who conspired to cause tortious
injury in Utah, and directed their actions toward Utah knowing
that they would cause tortious injury there. 	We hold that it
does.

1 MFS Series Trust III v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61, ¶ 6, 96 P.3d
927 (internal quotation marks omitted).
No. 20070622 	2
BACKGROUND
¶2 	When reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss, “we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as
true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 1
We recite the facts accordingly.
¶3 	This case arises from the construction of a performing
arts center at the University of Missouri-St. Louis (the
“Project”). 	The general contractor for the Project was KCI
Construction Company (“KCI”), a Missouri company. 	KCI’s project
manager was Ron Webelhuth. 	KCI hired T.A.B. Company, Inc.
(“TAB”), a Missouri corporation, as a subcontractor responsible
for supplying panels to be installed on the exterior of the
building. 	Because the architect’s specifications for the
building called for exterior panels manufactured by Pohl, Inc. of
America (“Pohl”) or their equivalent, TAB subcontracted Pohl, a
Utah corporation, to manufacture and supply the panels. 	TAB also
subcontracted a separate company, Industrial Sheet Metal
Erectors, Inc. (“ISME”), to install the panels. 	ISME is a
Missouri corporation. 	Dennis Miller is the president of ISME,
and his son, Bret Miller, is the vice-president. 	Bret acted as
project manager on the TAB job.
¶4 	In May 2005, Pohl filed suit in Utah against Webelhuth,
Bret Miller, Dennis Miller, and ISME (collectively, the
“Defendants”), alleging intentional interference with contract,
intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and
civil conspiracy. 	Pohl alleges that, beginning in February 2003,
tensions began to arise between Pohl, ISME, and KCI regarding the
production, delivery, and payment schedule for the panels
fabricated by Pohl. 	According to Pohl, these tensions matured
into a conspiracy between Bret Miller, ISME, and Webelhuth to
interfere with Pohl’s contract with TAB. 	The object of the
conspiracy was to replace Pohl, as the panel supplier, with ISME,
which could produce and supply a different type of panel more
quickly. 	To this end, Pohl alleges that the defendants convinced
the architect and the owner of the Project to change the project
specifications from requiring Pohl panels to requiring panels
that could be produced by ISME instead. 	Pohl also alleges that
Webelhuth did not accept any other bids or research any other
companies before replacing Pohl with ISME as the panel supplier.

2 Pohl, Inc. of Am. v. Webelhuth, 2007 UT App 225, ¶ 1, 164
P.3d 1272.
3 Prior to 2008, the Utah long-arm statute was contained in
Utah Code section 78-27-24. 	In 2008, the statute was amended and
renumbered. 	The relevant amendments were minor and
nonsubstantive. 	We therefore cite to the current version of the
statute.
3 	No. 20070622
¶5 	This conspiracy allegedly commenced on February 17,
2003, when Bret Miller and Webelhuth drafted a letter to Pohl
demanding that all of the panels be delivered within two days, a
demand that all parties knew was impossible. 	Bret Miller sent
the handwritten draft to TAB, asking TAB to finalize the letter
and send it to Pohl in Utah, which TAB did. 	When the panels did
not arrive on February 19, 2003, TAB terminated Pohl’s contract
and KCI terminated its contract with TAB. 	After terminating its
contract with TAB, KCI entered into a subcontract with ISME to
supply substitute panels for the Project.
¶6 	Pohl filed suit, and the defendants responded with a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that
none of their actions fell within the specifically enumerated
acts of Utah’s long-arm statute and that there were insufficient
minimum contacts between the defendants and the state of Utah.
The bulk of their argument focused on the fact that all of the
allegedly tortious acts took place in Missouri. 	The district
court agreed and dismissed Pohl’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that the actions taken by the defendants
upon which Pohl based its claims “were performed exclusively in
the State of Missouri.” 	Accordingly, the district court found
“no nexus between Defendants’ contacts with Utah and Plaintiff’s
claims.”
¶7 	Pohl appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the
district court’s conclusion. 2 	We granted certiorari to review
whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the Utah long-
arm statute, Utah Code section 78B-3-205 (Supp. 2008). 3 	We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a) (Supp.
2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 	“On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision
of the court of appeals, not the decision of the district

4 Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, ¶ 8, 179 P.3d 768
(internal quotation marks omitted).
5 D.A. v. State (In re W.A.), 2002 UT 127, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 607.
6 Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120,
1121 (Utah 1992).
7 Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d 1299,
1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“Personal jurisdiction means the power
to subject a particular defendant to the decisions of the court.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
8 Arguello v Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120,
1122 (Utah 1992) (emphasis omitted).
9 Id. (emphasis omitted).
No. 20070622 	4
court.” 4 	“Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant under Utah law and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is a question of law, which we review
for correctness.” 5 	In a case such as this one, “[w]here a
pretrial jurisdictional decision has been made on documentary
evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only legal
questions that are reviewed for correctness.” 6
ANALYSIS
¶9 	The authority of the state to hale a nonresident into a
state court hinges on the ability to establish personal
jurisdiction. 7 	There are two categories of personal
jurisdiction: 	specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.
“General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power
over a defendant without regard to the subject of the claim
asserted” and is dependent on a showing that the defendant
conducted “substantial and continuous local activity in the forum
state.” 8 	Pohl does not assert this type of jurisdiction.
¶10 	“[S]pecific personal jurisdiction gives a court power
over a defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the
particular activities of the defendant in the forum state” and
only if the defendant has “certain minimum local contacts.” 9
Whether we have specific jurisdiction depends on two inquiries.
“First, do [the plaintiff’s] claims arise from one of the
activities listed in the [long-arm] statute,” and second, whether
the “defendant’s contacts with this forum [are] sufficient to

10 Anderson v. Am. Soc’y of Plastic & Reconstructive
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 1990); see also Arguello, 838
P.2d at 1122 	(explaining that the ability to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends on two factors:
“the breadth of the forum state’s jurisdictional statute and the
due process limitations on jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
11 Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122.
12 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205 (Supp. 2008).
13 Id. § 78B-3-205(1), (3).
14 Pohl, Inc. of Am. v. Webelhuth, 2007 UT App 225, ¶ 11,
(continued...)
5 	No. 20070622
satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.” 10
In determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, our analysis
begins with the long-arm statute. 	“If the relevant state statute
does not permit jurisdiction, then the inquiry is ended; if it
does, then the question is whether the statute’s reach comports
with due process.” 11
¶11 	Accordingly, we first analyze whether the court of
appeals correctly interpreted Utah’s long-arm statute, Utah Code
section 78B-3-205. 	Second, we analyze whether the court of
appeals correctly concluded that asserting jurisdiction over the
defendants would violate due process.
I. 	THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY INTERPRETING UTAH’S LONG-ARM
STATUTE TOO NARROWLY
¶12 	Utah’s long-arm statute provides: 	“[A]ny person . . .
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who, in
person or through an agent, does any of the following enumerated
acts is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
as to any claim arising out of or related to [the enumerated
acts].” 12 	The relevant enumerated acts in this case are (1) “the
transaction of any business within this state” and (2) “the
causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty.” 13
¶13 	The court of appeals concluded that Pohl could not
satisfy the tortious injury requirement because “the causing of
financial injury to a Utah business has been flatly rejected by
the Utah courts as a basis for exercising personal
jurisdiction.” 14 	We hold that the court of appeals interpreted

14 (...continued)
164 P.3d 1272 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
15 Id. ¶ 9.
16 Id. ¶ 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Patriot Sys.,
Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (D. Utah 1998)).
17 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205(3) (emphasis added).
18 Id. § 78B-3-201(3).
No. 20070622 	6
this requirement too narrowly. 	The court of appeals also held
that the “transaction of any business” requirement could not be
met because the defendants did not “physically conduct[] business
within Utah” or “purposefully direct[] mail or wire
communications to Pohl in Utah.” 15 	Although we clarify that this
limitation is more properly recognized as a due process
limitation on jurisdiction, we agree with the court of appeals on
this point.
A. 	The Tortious Injury Requirement
¶14 	The court of appeals erroneously concluded that “‘the
causing [of] financial injury to a Utah business has been flatly
rejected by the Utah courts as a basis for exercising specific
personal jurisdiction.’” 16 	This interpretation of the injury
requirement is erroneous because it unnaturally constricts the
plain language of the long-arm statute and does not comport with
legislative intent. 	Moreover, it oversimplifies the case law
regarding long-arm jurisdiction.
¶15 	The plain language of the long-arm statute asserts
jurisdiction over “claim[s] arising out of or related to” the
“causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty.” 17 	Nothing in the plain language of the
statute distinguishes between financial injuries and other
injuries. 	Furthermore, section 78B-3-205 expressly states the
legislature’s intent that the long-arm statute “be applied so as
to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 18 	We have
“explicitly upheld that policy,” and any defendant arguing that
the long-arm statute is less comprehensive than the Due Process
Clause faces an uphill battle, as we have stated in the past that

19 SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Am. Superabrasives Corp., 969
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998).
20 Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 250
(Utah 1980); see also STV Int’l Mktg. v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F.
Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Utah 1990) (“[L]oss of profits within a
state in which a place of business is maintained simply is an
insufficient basis on which to find that the injury occurred
within that state as compared with the impact of actual business
lost in another state.”).
21 883 F. Supp. 608 (D. Utah 1995).
22 Id. at 613.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
7 	No. 20070622
“any set of circumstances that satisfies due process will also
satisfy the long-arm statute.” 19
¶16 	While it is true that financial injury alone cannot
establish jurisdiction because such a rule “would lead to the
unacceptable proposition that jurisdiction could be established
anywhere a plaintiff might locate,” 20 the suggestion that
financial injuries cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction at
all is an oversimplification of the law. 	The cases relied on by
the court of appeals in concluding that economic injuries provide
an insufficient basis for jurisdiction are cases in which the
only injuries suffered in the state were the economic
consequences of torts directed elsewhere.
¶17 	For example, in Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo
Conveyor, Inc., no tortious injury occurred in Utah. 21 	The
plaintiff’s tortious injury argument was based on a letter sent
by the defendant’s Kansas office to a postal service employee in
Tennessee. 22 	The defendant also sent copies of the letter to
Virginia and to Illinois, but the letter was never published in
Utah. 23 	Thus, the tortious injury was “caused” in Kansas,
Virginia and Illinois, but not in Utah. 	The letter “[did] not
implicate Utah in anyway,” but the plaintiff argued that tortious
injury occurred in Utah because the plaintiff’s business in Utah
suffered because of the letter. 24 	The court properly rejected
this argument as an insufficient basis for jurisdiction. 25 	While

26 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 (D. Utah 1998).
27 Id. at 1321.
28 Anderson v. Am. Soc’y of Plastic & Reconstructive
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990).
No. 20070622 	8
the economic consequences of the tortious injury may have been
felt in Utah, the tortious injury itself was not caused in Utah.
¶18 	Similarly, in Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp.,
the plaintiff, a Utah corporation that developed, manufactured,
and sold computer software, alleged that the defendant, a
computer software company in Virginia, had intentionally
interfered with economic relations, misappropriated trade
secrets, infringed the plaintiff’s copyright, and engaged in
unfair competition. 26 	The court found that the plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate that the long-arm statute reached the
defendant because the plaintiff did “not allege[] defendant
committed these acts in Utah. 	Rather, the essence of plaintiff’s
complaint is that, because of defendant’s conduct, plaintiff has
suffered financial injury in Utah where it does business.” 27
Again, the plaintiff felt the injury in Utah, but the torts
occurred elsewhere and there was no evidence that the defendant
had directed its tortious activity at Utah. 	These cases stand
for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot claim that a tortious
injury has been “caused” in Utah by showing a diminished bank
account in Utah when the tortious activity was not directed
toward Utah.
¶19 	We acknowledge the analytical difficulty of
distinguishing between the satisfaction of minimum contacts in
the due process analysis and the satisfaction of the long-arm
statute. 	For this reason, “we often assume the application of
the statute--and go straight to the due process issue.” 28
Nevertheless, it is important to articulate whether the
limitation on jurisdiction stems from the breadth of the long-arm
statute or whether it stems from the principles of due process.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion, the plain language
of the long-arm statute does not exclude financial injuries
caused by tortious actions, and any such limitation must come
from the Due Process Clause, which we analyze below.
¶20 	Thus, to satisfy the long-arm statute requirement, a
plaintiff must allege only that the defendants caused a tortious
injury in Utah and that the plaintiff’s claims arise out of the
tortious injury. 	Pohl has satisfied this requirement by alleging
that it was the target of a civil conspiracy to commit tortious

29 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-202(2).
9 	No. 20070622
interference with Pohl’s contract and to interfere with Pohl’s
prospective economic relations. 	Pohl has alleged that the
defendants directed their conspiracy toward Utah and knew that
their actions would harm Pohl in Utah. 	Moreover, in contrast to
the two cases discussed above, Pohl has also articulated injuries
suffered in Utah that consist of more than a diminished bank
account. 	For example, Pohl’s primary place of business is Utah,
where it spent money and resources to satisfy the panel order.
In addition, after purported measurement errors delayed the
production schedule, Pohl entered into a contract with its parent
company in Germany to expedite delivery of the panels. 	Finally,
Pohl will not recover any of these expenses as a result of the
defendants’ allegedly tortious activities. 	These injuries are
the direct result of the defendants’ alleged tortious
interference with the contract. 	Therefore, Pohl successfully
pled facts showing that the defendants caused tortious injuries
in Utah and accordingly Pohl satisfied the requirement of the
long-arm statute.
B. 	The Transaction of Business Requirement
¶21 	Pohl also argues that the long-arm statute applies to
the defendants because they transacted business in Utah. 	The
legislature broadly defined the “transaction of business within
this state” as the “activities of a nonresident person, his
agents, or representatives in this state, which affect persons or
businesses within the state.” 29 	Pohl argues that the use of Pohl
panels on the Project required the defendants to communicate with
Pohl through a series of letters and faxes regarding the
dimensions and specifications of the panels, and that these
communications constitute the transaction of business and bring
the defendants within the reach of the long-arm statute. 	Pohl’s
argument seems to rely on two underdeveloped theories. 	First,
these communications “affected” Pohl because in response to the
scheduling demands imposed by Bret Miller, ISME and Webelhuth,
Pohl contracted with its parent company in Germany to fabricate
the panels and arranged for air freight from Germany. 	Second,
TAB acted as an agent or a representative for Bret Miller, ISME
and Webelhuth because TAB’s communications with Pohl made the
procurement of the panels possible and the panels were necessary
to complete the project.
¶22 	The court of appeals rejected Pohl’s argument,
concluding that the plain language of the statute requires that

30 Pohl, 2007 UT App 225, ¶ 9.
31 See SII MegaDiamond, 969 P.2d at 435 (“‘So long as a
commercial actor’s efforts are “purposefully directed” towards
residents of another state, we have consistently rejected the
notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there.’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985))).
32 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also MFS Series Trust III
v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 927.
33 MFS Series Trust III, 2004 UT 61, ¶ 10 (internal
(continued...)
No. 20070622 	10
“at least some activities must occur within Utah.” 30 	While we
believe that this requirement is more properly recognized as a
due process limitation, we agree with the result reached by the
court of appeals because we do not believe that the defendants
“purposefully directed” their efforts toward conducting business
in Utah. 31 	To the contrary, it appears that the defendants
purposefully avoided conducting business in Utah by hiring TAB as
a subcontractor responsible for hiring Pohl. 	While Pohl may be
able to satisfy minimum contacts by showing that TAB acted as an
agent or a representative of the defendants in Utah, Pohl has not
developed this argument beyond a statement of facts suggesting
this type of relationship. 	Because the agency argument was not
throughly developed, and because we conclude that Pohl can
satisfy the long-arm statute based on the tortious injury
requirement, we need not, and do not, decide whether the facts
alleged by Pohl are sufficient to support a finding that
defendants transacted business in Utah.
II. 	THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT THERE WERE
INSUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS AND UTAH TO
SATISFY FEDERAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
¶23 	Federal due process requires that in order to subject a
defendant to specific personal jurisdiction, there must be
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.” 32 	The purpose of requiring
minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state is to
ensure that courts only exert jurisdiction in cases where the
defendant creates a “substantial connection with the forum state”
such that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.” 33 	For this reason, “[e]ach defendant’s

33 (...continued)
quotation marks omitted).
34 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
35 MFS Series Trust III, 2004 UT 61, ¶ 10 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985); Fenn v. Mleads Enters.
Inc., 2006 UT 8, ¶ 10, 137 P.3d 706 (“Thus, a Utah state court
may assert specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant only if (1) the defendant has minimum contacts with
Utah and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction would not offend the
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”).
36 Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
37 Pavlovich v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara, 58 P.3d 2, 7
(Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 Fenn, 2006 UT 8, ¶ 13.
39 See, e.g., Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89.
11 	No. 20070622
contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.” 34
Finally, even if there are minimum contacts, “the concept of fair
play and substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in
forum activities.” 35
¶24 	“In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses
on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.’” 36 	The essential question is whether the defendant
“purposefully and voluntarily direct[ed] his activities toward
the forum so that he should expect . . . to be subject to the
court’s jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum.” 37 	A
defendant may direct its activities toward the forum by
“purposefully avail[ing] itself of the benefits of conducting
business” in the forum state, 38 or by purposefully directing
tortious activity toward the forum state. 39
¶25 	The premise of the conclusion reached by both the court
of appeals and the trial court was that because all of the
defendants’ allegedly tortious actions took place in Missouri, no
minimum contacts existed. 	This approach erroneously ignores the
fact that a tort is incomplete without an injury, and thus the
place of injury is an important component of the minimum contacts

40 See Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 569 (Haw. 1975) (“A
tort is committed where the injury occurs, and the phrase
‘tortious act’ encompasses the injurious consequences of an
act.”).
41 Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd.,
784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986).
42 465 U.S. at 789-90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Id. at 784.
44 Id. at 785-86.
45 Id. at 784.
46 Id. at 789.
47 Id. at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted).
No. 20070622 	12
analysis. 40 	Moreover, “within the rubric of ‘personal availment’
the Court has allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant whose only ‘contact’ with the forum state is the
‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the
forum state.” 41
¶26 	For example, in Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court
recognized that when “intentional, and allegedly tortious,
actions [are] expressly aimed at [a forum state],” and where the
defendants “knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by
respondent in the State in which she lives and works,” then the
defendants “must reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.” 42 	In Calder, two reporters wrote and edited a defamatory
article about Shirley Jones, a professional entertainer, in the
National Enquirer.43 	The reporters were from Florida, where they
did their writing, research and publishing. 	They alleged that
they did not go to California to work on the story. 44 	Jones
lived and worked in California. 45 	In finding jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court explained that “California is the focal point both
of the story and of the harm suffered. 	Jurisdiction over [the
reporters] is therefore proper in California based on the
‘effects’ of their Florida conduct.” 46 	Because the reporters
knew that their tort would cause harm in California, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the reporters “must reasonably anticipate
being haled into court” in California to answer for their
actions. 47

48 328 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
49 Id. at 1131.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
53 Textor v. Bd. of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir.
1983) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
(continued...)
13 	No. 20070622
¶27 	In Harris Rutsky & Co. Insurance Services, Inc. v. Bell
& Clements Ltd., the Ninth Circuit rejected the same argument
that the defendants make here. 48 	The defendants in Harris Rutsky
argued that jurisdiction was improper in California because “the
conduct [forming] the basis for the alleged torts--interference
with contract and business relations--took place in London.” 49
Relying on the “effects” test derived from Calder, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the purposeful availment prong “may be
satisfied if the defendant is alleged to have (1) committed an
intentional act; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state;
(3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered--and which the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered--in the forum state.” 50
The court concluded that the “effects” test was more than
satisfied because (1) the defendants were alleged to have
committed an intentional tort--interference with contractual and
economic relationships; (2) the defendants knew that the
plaintiff corporation was a California resident, and so the
alleged acts were expressly aimed at California; and (3) the
plaintiff was a California corporation with its principal place
of business in California, and the brunt of the harm was
therefore felt in California. 51
¶28 	The minimum contacts analysis in this case is
complicated by the fact that there are several defendants, all
alleged to be involved in a conspiracy to harm Pohl. 	Generally,
“[e]ach defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be
assessed individually.” 52 	Plaintiff, however, asks us to adopt a
conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, which imputes minimum contacts
to all members of a conspiracy if one member took a substantial
and overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy in the forum
state. 	“The conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction is based
on the time honored notion that the acts of [a] conspirator in
furtherance of a conspiracy may be attributed to the other
members of the conspiracy.” 53

53 (...continued)
omitted).
54 Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
55 Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005 UT 85, ¶ 10, 128 P.3d 1146.
56 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
57 Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.
1992).
No. 20070622 	14
¶29 	We see no need to adopt the conspiracy theory of
jurisdiction in this case because the Calder “effects” test
adequately addresses the issue. 	In Utah, civil conspiracy
requires proof of five elements: 	“(1) a combination of two or
more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of
the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more
unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result
thereof.” 54 	“In a conspiracy that results in tort liability, the
cause of action for which the co-conspirators are ultimately held
liable is not the tort resulting in the harm, but for the
conspiracy that led to the harm. 	These are separate and distinct
causes of action.” 55 	Thus, under the Calder “effects” test, to
establish jurisdiction over members of a conspiracy, the
plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendants were engaged in a
conspiracy, which is an intentional tort, (2) that the conspiracy
was expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) that the
conspiracy caused harm, the brunt of which was suffered, and the
defendants knew was likely to be suffered, in the forum state.
By requiring that the defendants intentionally direct their
tortious acts at Utah, this approach ensures that the members of
the conspiracy “will not be haled into [Utah’s courts] solely as
a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” 56
¶30 	Although this principle is easily articulated, its
application is more complicated because asserting jurisdiction
over members of a conspiracy could threaten to unravel the
individualized analysis required for minimum contacts. 	For this
reason, “a bare allegation of a conspiracy between the defendant
and a person within the personal jurisdiction of the court is not
enough” to establish jurisdiction. 57 	Because the plaintiff is
relying on the existence of a conspiracy to establish
jurisdiction over the defendants, the plaintiff bears the burden

58 Cf. United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st
Cir. 1992) (explaining that for certain issues, like standing,
that are “fundamental to the ability to maintain a suit . . . the
Court has saddled the complainant with the burden of clearly
alleging facts sufficient to ground standing . . . [and] that,
where standing is at issue, heightened specificity is obligatory
at the pleading stage”).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 807 P.2d 825, 826-27 (Utah 1990).
62 Id. at 827.
63 Id.
64 Id.
15 	No. 20070622
of clearly alleging facts that demonstrate the existence of a
conspiracy. 58 	This burden “cannot be satisfied by purely
conclusory allegations or . . . generalized averments.” 59
Instead, “[t]he complaint must set forth reasonably definite
factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each
material element” needed to show a civil conspiracy.” 60 	And
because jurisdiction will often “turn[] on the same facts as the
merits of the case,” the principles articulated in Anderson v.
American Society of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons regarding
pretrial determinations of jurisdiction apply. 61 	Specifically,
when reviewing documentary evidence, we accept the plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true, “unless specifically controverted by
the defendant’s affidavits or by depositions, but any disputes in
the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiff’s
favor.” 62 	Moreover, at the preliminary stages, the plaintiff is
only required to make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction.” 63 	Furthermore, “if the plaintiff has made a prima
facie showing . . . jurisdiction is determined by trial on the
merits” because a pretrial evidentiary hearing would “infringe[]
on the right to a jury trial” and would waste judicial resources
by requiring the court to hear the same evidence twice.” 64
¶31 	Because this standard differs significantly from the
standard applied by the district court or the court of appeals,
we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On remand, to the extent that the plaintiff requests leave to
amend, it would appear to be appropriate to allow an opportunity

No. 20070622 	16
to amend in light of the applicable standard that we announce
today.
CONCLUSION
¶32 	The Utah long-arm statute does not distinguish between
“financial injuries” and other tortious injuries. 	Because the
legislature has directed that we interpret the long-arm statute
to extend to the limits of the Due Process Clause, as long as a
plaintiff alleges that the defendant caused an injury in Utah,
any limitation on the type of injury that this court will
recognize is more properly recognized as a due process
limitation. 	We do not specifically adopt the “conspiracy theory
of jurisdiction” in this case because we believe that
jurisdiction can be established over the defendants under the
Calder “effects” test by showing that the defendants were engaged
in a conspiracy that was expressly aimed at Utah and that the
conspiracy caused harm in Utah, as the defendants knew it would.
Because the standard we articulate differs significantly from the
standard applied by the courts below, we remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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¶33 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
and Judge Backlund concur with Justice Parrish’s opinion.
¶34 	Justice Nehring does not participate herein; District
Judge John Backlund sat.
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WILKINS, Justice, dissenting:
¶35 	I respectfully differ with my colleagues. 	I would
affirm the court of appeals decision in all regards. 	While it is
possible to draw the distinctions described in the opinion of
Justice Parrish, I believe to do so invites other jurisdictions
to do so as well, and would subject Utah citizens and companies
to unnecessarily broad exposure to suit elsewhere. 	In this
matter, the actions complained of, while clearly impacting the
Utah plaintiff, just as clearly occurred in Missouri. 	None of
the acts complained of occurred in Utah. 	I believe defining them
as doing so violates the due process guarantees of the United
States Constitution.
---