State v. Shayne E. Todd

1 State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, 98 P.3d 46.
2006 UT 7
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah, No. 20041012
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F I L E D
Shayne E. Todd,
Defendant and Petitioner. January 27, 2006
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Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
No. 991906743
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Kris C. Leonard,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for defendant
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
¶1 We have accepted certiorari in this case to address a
narrow, albeit important, timing issue relating to filing motions
for new trial and appeals after a criminal sentence has been
adjudged. The detailed facts surrounding Defendant Shayne E.
Todd’s conviction of murder are well described in the decision of
the court of appeals.1 For our purposes, it is sufficient to
note that a trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty on the
charge of murder with which Todd had been charged. At a
sentencing hearing the trial judge orally announced Todd’s
sentence, for which he was immediately placed in custody, where
he has remained.
¶2 Fourteen days after the trial court announced the
sentence, the written sentencing order was officially entered by
the clerk of the court in the record. During this fourteen-day

No. 20041012 2
period, Todd had filed a motion seeking a new trial under rule
24(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which in part
requires that a “motion for a new trial shall be made within 10
days after imposition of sentence.”
¶3 Months later, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial, and Todd filed a notice of appeal. Since rule 4(b) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes that the timely
filing of a motion for new trial under rule 24 tolls the running
of the time for filing a notice of appeal, if Todd’s motion for
new trial had been timely filed in the first place, then his
notice of appeal would be timely as well.
¶4 In response to the appeal, the State took the position
that Todd’s motion for new trial was not timely. Specifically,
the State believes that the language of the applicable rules of
criminal procedure and the proper interpretation of prior cases
from Utah appellate courts deem the day upon which the written
sentencing order is entered in the court record as the reference
date, the date of “imposition of sentence,” after which such a
motion may be timely filed. The State’s position on Todd’s
motion is that since the motion was filed after the oral
announcement of his sentence by the trial judge, but before the
eventual entry of the written sentencing order in the court file,
the motion was premature. A premature motion is untimely, and
untimely is void, therefore the time for filing an appeal was not
tolled, and ultimately the notice of appeal was untimely as a
consequence. This, according to the State’s theory, deprives the
appellate courts of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
¶5 The court of appeals agreed, and dismissed the appeal
as untimely filed, thereby lacking in the capacity to vest
jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the court of appeals. Todd
sought our review of this point, and we granted the petition for
certiorari to review the narrow question of whether the oral
announcement of the sentence is legally equivalent to the
“imposition of sentence” contemplated in rule 24. We conclude
that it is.
¶6 In defense of the decision of the court of appeals, we
acknowledge that this is a question not previously addressed by
us, and not entirely clear from the language of our rules.
However, since the purpose of certiorari review is to correct
just such misimpressions when they arise, we take this
opportunity not so much to correct the court of appeals, but to
correct the inartful result of our own work.

2 In the event that the sentencing decision is first relayed
to the defendant by some other means, such as in writing for a
hearing impaired defendant, the date upon which the court first
gives such formal notice of the sentencing decision to the
defendant is the date of imposition of sentence.
3 No. 20041012
¶7 In the rules of criminal procedure, we have used
“impose sentence” and “imposition of sentence” only one time
each. Rule 22 requires the court to “impose sentence” and to
“enter a judgment of conviction.” Rule 24(c), under which this
difficulty has arisen, mandates that a “motion for a new trial
shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence.” Rule
22 certainly seems to contemplate that imposing sentence
and entering the written judgment of conviction are two distinct
actions. If so, only the oral announcement of the sentence is
available to qualify as the act of imposing sentence.
¶8 Both parties concede that what is most important is
that the rules be understood, and applied, with clarity and
consistency. It is not so important when the ten-day window for
filing a motion for new trial begins to run, as it is that the
defendant, the court, the state, and others be able to determine
when it begins. Both oral announcement of the sentence to the
defendant and filing of the written sentencing order would
fulfill this need for certainty. However, of the two, the
defendant is much more likely to be immediately aware of the
precise date of the oral announcement of the sentence than that
of the filing date of the document. As such, we conclude that
the date of the oral announcement of the sentence to the
defendant is the date of imposition of sentence for all
purposes.2
¶9 The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for consideration of the Defendant’s
appeal on its merits.
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¶10 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins’
opinion.