Tanya Dionne Edwards v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
TANYA DIONNE EDWARDS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 0773-99-2 	JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
MAY 16, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
Wayne R. Morgan, Jr., for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
In a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Tanya Dionne
Edwards, appellant, of grand larceny, forgery, and uttering a
forged instrument. 	On appeal, appellant contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. 	We
disagree, and affirm.
"On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" 	Archer v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997)
(citation omitted).

So viewed, the evidence proved that appellant's twin
sister, Tonya Edwards (Tonya), was working as a caretaker for
the sister of Laura Robelen. 	Robelen and her sister lived
together. 	Tonya stole three checks from Robelen. 	She cashed
one check at a bank in the presence of appellant. 	The check was
made payable to "Tanya Edwards" and was endorsed "Tanya
Edwards."1 Tonya used appellant's identification to cash the
check.
Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence proved
nothing more than her presence at the bank when Tonya cashed the
check. 	On the contrary, the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, proved that the check was made
payable to "Tanya Edwards," was endorsed "Tanya Edwards," that
appellant allowed Tonya to use appellant's identification to
cash the check, and that appellant stood next to Tonya when
Tonya cashed the check. 	This evidence was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, at a minimum, was a
principal in the second degree to the commission of these
crimes. 	See, e.g., Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 269,
343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986) ("A principal in the second degree is
a person who is present, aiding and abetting, by helping some
way in the commission of the crime.").
1 Tonya testified that the check was made payable to her.
However, the trial court stated that it believed otherwise.
Furthermore, the check, which was entered as an exhibit, clearly
shows that it was made payable to and endorsed Tanya, not Tonya.
- 2 -

Furthermore, we reject appellant's contention that the
trial court erred in convicting her because the evidence is
susceptible of two interpretations--one innocent and one not.
Appellant's "innocent" interpretation is that she was merely
present while Tonya cashed the check and that she did not know
that Tonya was cashing a stolen check when she lent her
identification to Tonya. 	However, this interpretation of the
evidence springs solely from the testimony of appellant and
Tonya. 	The fact finder rejected that testimony. 	"In its role
of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to
disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused [and her
witnesses] and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal
his guilt." 	Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10,
500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). 	Having rejected appellant's
evidence as not worthy of belief, no "innocent" interpretation
of the evidence remained before the court.
Affirmed.
- 3 -