Lisa Woolfolk v Loudoun County DSS

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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINA

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Wllis

LISA WOOLFOLK
MEMORANDUM OPI Ni ON’
Vv. Record No. 2715- 99-4 PER CURI AM
MAY 30, 2000
LOUDOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCI AL SERVI CES

FROM THE CI RCU'T COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Thomas D. Forne, Judge

(Dean S. Wrcester; Wrcester, Mns &Atwll,
P.C., on brief), for appellant.

(John R_ Roberts, County Attorney; John W
White, Assistant County Attorney; Office of
the Loudoun County Attorney, on brief), for
appel | ee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

Lisa Woolfolk appeals the decision of the circuit court
terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Jessica Renae
DeNeal. 	Woolfolk contends that the trial court erred by finding
(1) that the Loudoun County Department of Social Services (the
Department) presented clear and convincing evidence, as required
by Code §§ 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-228, that Jessica had been
neglected; and (2) that, as required by Code § 16.1-283(B),
termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the
child. 	Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we
conclude that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 	See Rule
5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App.
123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	"Code § 16.1-283 embodies
'the statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual
parental rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides
detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents
and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to
preserve the family." 	Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456
S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). 	"'In matters of a
child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's

best interests.'" 	Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463
(citation omitted). 	The trial judge's findings, "'when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" 	Id. (citation
omitted).
The trial court found that the Department presented clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to prove the statutory
requirements of Code § 16.1-283(B)(1), (B)(2), and (C)(2). 	Code
§ 16.1-283(B) provides that the trial court may terminate the
parental rights of a parent of a child "found by the court to be
neglected or abused and placed in foster care" if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interests of the child and that:
1. 	The neglect or abuse suffered by such
child presented a serious and substantial
threat to his life, health or development;
and
2. 	It is not reasonably likely that the
conditions which resulted in such neglect or
abuse can be substantially corrected or
eliminated so as to allow the child's safe
return to his parent . . . within a
reasonable period of time. 	In making this
determination, the court shall take into
consideration the efforts made to
rehabilitate the parent . . . by any public
or private social, medical, mental health or
other rehabilitative agencies prior to the
child's initial placement in foster care.
Subsection (B)(2) provides that the Department proves a prima
facie case of abuse or neglect by showing that the parent has
habitually abused or is addicted to alcohol or narcotics "to the
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extent that proper parental ability has been seriously impaired
and the parent, without good cause, has not responded to or
followed through with recommended and available treatment which
could have improved the capacity for adequate parental
functioning" or that the parent "without good cause, [has] not
responded to or followed through with appropriate, available and
reasonable rehabilitative efforts on the part of social,
medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies designed
to reduce, eliminate or prevent the neglect or abuse of the
child." 	Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(b) and (c).
At the ore tenus hearing, the Department proved that in
1989 when Jessica was born, she tested positive for exposure to
cocaine. 	Jessica was first placed in the Department's custody
in July 1992. 	From that date on, Jessica's physical and legal
custody changed periodically between mother and the
step-grandmother, Inez Woolfolk, except for a brief period when
Jessica was in a foster home. 	In June 1997, Inez Woolfolk
signed an entrustment agreement giving the Department custody of
Jessica because Woolfolk could not handle Jessica's behavior
problems. 	In June 1997, the Department placed Jessica in a
foster home where she has remained.
Beginning in 1989, the Department or other agencies
provided Woolfolk with at least eight different treatment
programs for her drug abuse. 	She also received assistance with
housing, finances, transportation, employment, daycare, respite
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care, and home-based parenting. 	In 1995, Woolfolk was convicted
of grand larceny. 	Woolfolk's probation was revoked several
times when she tested positive for cocaine. 	She was
incarcerated at the time of the ore tenus hearing in this case.
Woolfolk contends that the trial court lacked sufficient
evidence to prove that Jessica was abused or neglected as
required by Code § 16.1-283(B). 	However, the record proves that
Woolfolk has been repeatedly incarcerated or incapacitated due
to drug use. 	Throughout Jessica's life, Woolfolk often left
Jessica in the custody of Inez Woolfolk. 	At other times,
Jessica was in the physical custody of the Department. 	The fact
that others were available to care for Jessica when Woolfolk was
not available due to drug abuse and incarceration does not
warrant a finding that Woolfolk did not neglect Jessica. 	The
trial court noted that "here we have almost a total abdication
of parental responsibility in favor of satisfying one's own
desire to use drugs." 	The record supports the trial court's
finding that Woolfolk neglected Jessica.
Woolfolk also contends that the Department failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her
parental rights was in Jessica's best interests. 	We disagree.
Donna Willett, Jessica's therapist, testified that the child
suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome when therapy began
a year and one-half earlier. 	Jessica was quiet and depressed
and had nightmares and 	difficulty in school. 	Over time,
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Willett saw marked improvement attributable to the stability and
consistency of Jessica's daily living situation. 	Jessica had
increased success at school and became more articulate and
confident. 	She stopped having nightmares and stopped
demonstrating other symptoms associated with post-traumatic
stress syndrome. 	Although the evidence proved that Jessica
loved her mother and would need support in dealing with her
feelings of loss, the trial court found that the continued cycle
of uncertainty and instability which marked her life until then
was not in Jessica's best interest. 	The Department provided
extensive services to Woolfolk to enable her to overcome her
drug addiction. 	Despite the numerous programs, Woolfolk
repeatedly relapsed into drug use. 	The record supports the
finding of the trial court that the Department presented clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of
Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) and (B)(2) and to prove that termination
of parental rights is in the child's best interest.
The trial court also found that the Department presented
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to meet the statutory
requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 	That section provides,
in pertinent part, that the trial court may terminate parental
rights if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
that termination is in the child's best interests and that
[t]he parent . . . , without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period of time not to exceed
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twelve months from the date the child was
placed in foster care to remedy
substantially the conditions which led to or
required continuation of the child's foster
care placement, notwithstanding the
reasonable and appropriate efforts of
social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agencies to such end.
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 	Woolfolk raised no challenge on appeal
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings under this section. 	Our review of the record supports
the trial court's finding and holding.
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Accordingly, we summarily affirmthe circuit court's
j udgnent .

Af fi rned.