Brown v. Sparks

Present: 	All the Justices
WILLIAM R. BROWN
v. 	Record No. 002794 	OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
November 2, 2001
HAROLD SPARKS, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge Designate
In this appeal, William R. Brown seeks reversal of the
circuit court's judgment holding that Brown's motion for
judgment was precluded by an accord and satisfaction.
Brown and Harold Sparks, an employee of Interstate
Batteries of Raleigh, N.C., t/a Interstate Battery Systems of
Southern Virginia (Interstate), had an altercation on
Interstate's business premises. 	Brown and Sparks swore out
criminal warrants against each other for assault and battery.
Prior to the general district court hearing, the parties
through counsel, orally agreed to dismiss the charges against
each other and the agreement was not later reduced to writing.
The general district court dismissed the charges and wrote on
Sparks' criminal warrant, "Plea of satisf. cost assessed."
Brown subsequently initiated the instant litigation
against Sparks on the theory of assault and battery and
against Interstate on the theory of respondeat superior.
Sparks and Interstate filed a joint motion for summary
judgment, asserting that, pursuant to the holding in Orndorff

v. Bond, 185 Va. 497, 39 S.E.2d 352 (1946), any right to a
civil remedy against Sparks was relinquished when Brown
compromised and settled his criminal claim against Sparks.
Following an ore tenus hearing, the circuit court granted the
motion and ruled that certain undisputed conduct of the
parties established an accord and satisfaction. 	We awarded
Brown an appeal.
Sparks seeks to have the Court uphold the trial court's
summary judgment order by arguing that "principles of res
judicata" bar Brown's motion for judgment in this case.
According to Sparks, dismissal of the criminal charges against
him in the general district court pursuant to Code § 19.2-151
and the notations on the warrant, "Plea of satisf. cost
assessed," conclusively established the existence of an accord
and satisfaction for all purposes and Brown is bound by that
judgment.
Sparks' argument is flawed in two respects. 	First, a
final judgment in a criminal proceeding does not operate as
res judicata in a civil proceeding based on the same events.
Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466, 472, 111 S.E.2d
434, 438 (1959). 	Moreover, in this case, the trial court did
not consider the dismissal of the criminal warrants pursuant
to Code § 19.2-151 as conclusive evidence that the parties had
entered into an accord and satisfaction. 	Rather the trial
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court stated that Code § 19.2-151 was not the "exclusive
method for the accomplishment of an accord and satisfaction,"
and that "the conduct of the parties," as outlined by the
court, established the accord and satisfaction.
The circumstances of this case are much like those found
in Orndorff. 	That case involved dismissal of a misdemeanor
charge of obtaining money under false pretenses pursuant to
the predecessor to Code § 19.2-151, former § 4849 (Code of
1942). 	The agreement to compromise and settle the criminal
complaint was not reduced to writing as the statute required.
The Court in Orndorff refused to allow the failure to comply
with the written agreement requirement of the statute to
"prevent its application where it appears that the aggrieved
party received satisfaction, appeared before the justice, and
the warrant was dismissed." 	185 Va. at 502, 39 S.E.2d at 354.
The Court in Orndorff considered the facts surrounding the
previous compromise and found that the evidence "conclusively"
established that the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the
amount sought by the defendant in return for dismissal of the
criminal charge and that the agreement had been fully
performed. 	Under these circumstances, the plaintiff "knew
what was going on and agreed to it" and was not entitled to
escape the effect of that agreement. 	185 Va. at 503, 39
S.E.2d at 355. 	Consequently, the Court held that the
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plaintiff was precluded from bringing a subsequent action for
malicious prosecution based on the bringing of the criminal
charge.
As in Orndorff, the parties in this case did not reduce
their agreement to writing. 	Thus, evidence was required in
order to determine the terms of the compromise and settlement,
and the parties' agreement to those terms.
In an ore tenus hearing before the trial court, Brown's
attorney testified that he told the general district court
judge that Brown and Sparks had reached an agreement to
dismiss the criminal charges and that "Mr. Brown would be
allowed to pursue any civil matters against Mr. Sparks or
others, and that this [in] no way affected the civil side of
the case, they were simply allowing, or agreeing, that the
criminal warrants would be dismissed." 	This testimony was
corroborated by Sparks' attorney, who testified that during
the criminal prosecution, Brown's attorney represented that,
in agreeing to dismiss the criminal warrants, Brown "wanted to
preserve his civil remedies." 	Sparks' former attorney also
testified that, when the general district court sought a
response, he told the court, "I'm here with an accord and
satisfaction and that's fine with me, but if we need to try it
we will try it." 	Following this exchange, the general
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district court made notations on the criminal warrants and
dismissed the cases.
Brown's refusal to relinquish his civil remedies is not
disputed. 	Both the attorneys and the court knew that Brown's
intent was to retain his civil remedies. 	Further, the
statement from Sparks' attorney, indicating that despite the
accord and satisfaction he would proceed to trial if
necessary, creates an inference that Sparks would not accept
an accord and satisfaction without the inclusion of civil
remedies. 	The general district court, however, proceeded to
dismiss the cases. 	Neither trial counsel objected to the
dismissal of the cases or asked for clarification regarding
the basis for the dismissal. 	Thus, the evidence is not clear
whether the dismissal of the cases without a trial included an
understanding that Brown's civil remedies were precluded by
the dismissal, or whether the dismissal of the cases without a
trial was based on an agreement regarding settlement of the
criminal matters only.
Summary judgment is available to a litigant only when no
material facts are in dispute. 	Rule 3:18; Turner v. Lotts,
244 Va. 554, 556, 422 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1992). 	We agree with
Brown that there was a material conflict in the evidence
regarding the nature of any agreement. 	Disputes of material
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facts should be submitted to the finder of fact and not
resolved on summary judgment.
Accordingly, the judgment will be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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