stewart v vt constr co

7ermont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	08/31/26
Grand 	Isle 	UUnit
VERMONT 	SUPERIOR 	COURT 	CIVIL 	DIVISION
Grand 	Isle 	Unit 	Case 	No. 	24-CV-04268
PO 	Box 	7
North 	Hero 	VT 	05474
802-372-8350
.vermontjudiciary.org
Shyla 	and 	Andrew 	Stewart,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 	Defendants
v 	DECISION 	ON 	MOTION 	FOR
ATTORNEY'S 	FEES
Vermont 	Construction 	Company,
Defendant/Counterclaim 	Plaintiff
RULING 	ON 	MOTION 	FOR 	ATTORNEY'S 	FEES
This 	matter 	is 	currently 	before 	the 	Court 	for 	determination 	of Defendant Vermont
Construction 	Company's 	("VCC") 	motion 	for 	attorney's 	fees 	and 	costs 	under 	the 	Vermont
Prompt 	Pay 	Act 	(""VPPA"). 	On 	July 	13, 	2026, 	this 	Court 	granted 	summary 	judgment 	to
Defendant 	on 	both 	Plaintiffs 	Shyla 	and 	Andrew 	Stewart's ("the 	Stewarts") 	claim 	for 	breach 	of
contract 	and 	VCC's 	counterclaim for 	breach 	of contract.! 	See 	Decision 	on 	Cross 	Mots. 	for 	Sum.
J., 	dated 	7/13/2026. 	On 	July 	27, 	2026, 	VCC 	filed 	its 	motion 	for 	attorney's 	fees 	and 	costs. 	The
Stewarts 	oppose 	VCC's 	motion 	on 	several 	grounds, 	including 	that 	the 	fees 	requested 	are 	not
reasonable 	and 	do 	not 	all 	relate 	to 	VCC's 	counterclaim. 	For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	below, 	VCC's
motion 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN 	PART."
Discussion
The 	VPPA 	provides 	that 	"the 	substantially 	prevailing 	party 	in 	any 	proceeding 	to 	recover
any 	payment 	within 	the 	scope 	of this 	chapter 	shall 	be 	awarded 	reasonable 	attorney's 	fees 	in 	an
amount 	to 	be 	determined 	by 	the 	court 	or 	arbitrator, 	together 	with 	expenses." 	9 	V.S.A. 	§ 	4007(c).
No 	party 	disputes 	the 	applicability 	of the 	VPPA 	in 	these 	proceedings. 	Further, 	the 	Court 	has
already 	concluded 	that 	VCC 	is 	the 	substantially 	prevailing 	party, 	and 	there 	is 	no 	basis 	to 	revisit
On 	August 	10, 	2026, 	the 	Stewarts 	filed 	a 	Notice 	ofAppeal 	from 	the 	summary 	judgment
decision. 	However, 	the 	Court 	retains 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	motion 	for 	attorney's 	fees and 	elects 	to
exercise 	its 	discretion 	to 	rule 	on 	the 	motion 	at 	this 	time. 	See 	V.R.C.P. 	54 	-
Reporter's 	Notes
(stating 	"[w]hen 	an 	appeal 	on the 	merits 	has 	been 	taken, 	the 	trial 	court 	may 	rule 	or 	defer 	decision
on 	the 	motion 	for 	fees"). 	Further, 	Rule 	54(d)((D) 	instructs 	courts 	to, 	wherever 	possible, 	"resolve
issues 	relating 	to 	fess 	without 	extensive 	evidentiary 	hearings." 	Because 	the 	Court 	does 	not 	find
that 	a 	hearing 	on 	the 	disputed 	issues 	would 	be 	helpful 	or 	warranted, 	the 	Court 	decides 	the 	motion
for 	attorney's 	fees 	without 	a 	hearing.
* 	The 	Stewarts 	also 	suggested 	the 	Court 	should 	wait 	to 	rule 	on 	the 	motion 	pending 	disposition
of their 	motion 	to 	vacate. 	That 	motion 	has 	now 	been 	denied, 	so 	the 	argument 	is 	moot.

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this determination. See Decision on Cross Mots. for Sum. J., at 10. Therefore, the two relevant
issues are (1) the scope of the fees to be awarded under the VPPA, and (2) whether the requested
fees are reasonable.
Contrary to the Stewarts’ position, the VPPA does not require that the fee award be
limited to the single claim arising under the statute. Instead, courts may award attorney’s fees
based on a broader range of claims arising from a common core of facts that supports multiple
theories of recovery. Nystrom v. Hafford, 2012 VT 60, ¶ 19, 192 Vt. 300. Here, the Stewarts’
claim and VCC’s counterclaims all arose from the same set of facts, centering on repairs done to
the Stewarts’ house and the question of whether either party breached the contract. Further, the
same evidence was discussed in analyzing all claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that the
VPPA applies to support an award of all reasonable fees incurred by VCC in pursuing its
counterclaims and defending against the Stewarts’ claim. See id. (noting that “in most
construction cases that include PPA claims, courts typically determine the substantially
prevailing party, if any, and the award of fees with reference to the broader range of claims at
issue in the case rather than simply focusing exclusively on the PPA claim”).
The Court next turns to the reasonableness of the fees and expenses requested by VCC.
The Stewarts contest the reasonableness of VCC’s fees on several grounds, including (1) billing
for unrelated litigation (2) heavy redaction preventing review (3) double billing for the same
work (4) a request for costs not provided3 and (5) fees for a discovery dispute allegedly started
by VCC.
In general, courts have significant discretion in determining the reasonableness of fees
claimed and may adjust the fee figure upward or downward as necessary. Some of the factors for
the Court’s consideration include (1) the novelty of the legal issue, (2) the experience of the
attorneys, and (3) the results obtained in litigation. Spooner v. Town of Topsham, 2010 VT 71,
¶ 8, 188 Vt. 293 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3). However, for “purposes
of an award of attorney’s fees under Vermont law, the touchstone is reasonableness.” Perez v.
Travelers Ins. ex rel. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 2006 VT 123, ¶ 13, 181 Vt. 45. The key question
in determining reasonableness is “whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable
attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.” Spooner, 2010 VT 71, ¶ 11
(quotation omitted).
Here, the Court concludes that the large majority of the fees and costs claimed by VCC
are reasonable. But the Court credits the Stewarts’ objections with respect to the redacted entries
and the duplicative billing for deposition attendance.
First, VCC redacted a number of time entries in their entirety, providing no explanation
for the redactions nor anything in the record that would permit the Court to assess the type of
work performed and how it related to this action. Moreover, VCC appears to suggest that the
entries were redacted for reasons other than to protect work product or attorney-client privilege.
3 Plaintiffs contend there is no expense correlating with mediation costs. But as VCC explains
on Reply, the mediation cost is reflected in the entry for payment to “Hess & Gehris PLLC” for
$800. See Def. Ex. A, at 6 (filed 7/27/2026).

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See Def. Reply, at 6 (filed 8/12/2026). “Time entries must be accurate and allow the court to
assess whether the work performed was related to the litigation at issue.” Perez, 2006 VT 123,
¶ 13. VCC has not met its burden with respect to the fully redacted entries, and thus the Court
excludes them from the award.
Second, VCC seeks to recover its fees billed for two attorneys to attend the same
depositions of Tanya Stewart, Andrew Stewart, and Shyla Stewart. However, the billing entries
do not explain each attorney’s distinct role at the deposition, such that the Court can determine
that the attorneys were not “doing the same work.” Spooner, 2010 VT 71, ¶ 17; see Def. Ex. A,
at 5. Accordingly, because VCC has not demonstrated that billing for the attendance of two
attorneys at each deposition was reasonable, the Court disallows the fee for the second lawyer’s
attendance, who did not take the deposition. However, the Court will not reduce the fee award
for entries concerning multiple attorneys’ work on motions and other briefing or conversations
between colleagues working on the case. This is common practice, and the Court finds it is
reasonable for different attorneys to draft and revise legal filings or confer regarding issues in a
case. See id. ¶ 18 (noting that, “there are situations in which a certain level of duplication
between attorneys is reasonable” (citation omitted)); see also Constr. Drilling, Inc. v. Eng’rs
Constr., Inc., 2020 VT 38, ¶ 29, 212 Vt. 323 (“An award for time spent by two or more attorneys
is proper as long as it reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to the case and the
customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation.” (quotation omitted)).
In addition, the Court also excludes all fees that VCC incurred before the Stewarts filed
this action on October 24, 2024. The VPPA awards fees to the substantially prevailing party “in
any proceeding.” 9 V.S.A. § 4007(c) (emphasis added). VCC provides no authority for the
assertion that a party may recover fees under the VPPA incurred “in an effort to avoid the need
for litigation,” nor has the Court found any. See Reply, at 8 n.3. Further, there is no explanation
of how the work performed was reasonable and necessary to the ultimate litigation. Accordingly,
the Court does not award those fees incurred prior to October 24, 2024.
The Court rejects the Stewarts’ two remaining objections. The December 30, 2024 entry
for a conference with counsel in the Stewarts’ separate action against Peregrine Design/Build
does not warrant exclusion. That lawsuit concerns the same property that VCC later repaired,
and a reasonable attorney would confer with counsel in a related case to learn any relevant or
useful information. See Perez, 2006 VT 123, ¶ 13. The discovery-dispute objection fails as well.
The Stewarts contend that much of the billing flows from VCC’s delay in producing labor logs,
but they identify no specific entries tied to that delay, and they never moved to compel
production. Nothing in the record shows that VCC’s conduct unreasonably prolonged the
litigation. The Court declines to reduce the award on this basis.
Lastly, the Court finds that the attorney’s rates are reasonable and reflect the current
market. Moreover, the Stewarts did not challenge the reasonableness of the rates charged.
Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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The Court awards VCC $ 77,782.09 in fees and costs. That amount equals the
$81,622.59 that VCC requested, reduced by (1) the time entries redacted in their entirety ($999);
(2) the duplicative deposition billing described above ($2,391.50); and (3) all fees that VCC
incurred prior to the commencement of this action on October 24, 2024 ($450).
Electronically signed on August 27, 2026 at 11:23 AM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).
________________________________
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge