State Of Washington, Respondent V. Dougnyl Akeang, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48320-3-II
Respondent,
v.
DOUGNYL AKEANG, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — This appeal arises from Dougnyl Akeang’s conviction of third degree theft.
We hold that joinder of the third degree theft charge was not mandatory, and the trial court did not
err when it did not dismiss sua sponte the theft charge. We also hold that Akeang did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, we affirm his conviction.
FACTS
Just after midnight on January 3, 2015, a Safeway employee saw two men place liquor
bottles under their jackets and exit the store without paying. Approximately 20 minutes later,
Officer Andrew Bond responded to a shoplift that was in progress at a Walmart two miles away
from where the theft had occurred at Safeway. A Walmart employee reported that the four suspects
left the store and got into a green van, and the employee gave the license plate number to the police.
Officer Bond stopped the van. Akeang was the driver, Ranson Riklon was in the front
passenger seat, and two passengers were in the back seat. One passenger told Officer Bond that
they had stolen several bottles of liquor from Safeway before they went to Walmart. Akeang told
Officer Bond that the liquor bottles were under the back seat of the van. Akeang was arrested.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 18, 2017

No. 48320-3-II
2
Officer Eric Barry, who arrived to assist, informed Officer Bond that he could see a firearm beneath
the driver’s seat. The van was impounded. Officer Bond then contacted Safeway to confirm the
theft. Officer Bond watched the security camera footage of the theft and recognized the suspects’
clothing in the video as matching Akeang’s and Riklon’s. After obtaining a search warrant for the
van, the officers located a 9mm handgun with a loaded magazine underneath the driver’s seat.
Akeang was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of
unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. Before the first trial, Akeang filed a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of uncharged criminal conduct, including the theft from Safeway. The State
objected, arguing that the theft was part of the res gestae1 of the crimes charged. The trial court
granted the motion to exclude.
During the first trial, Laurie Woloszyn, the owner of the van in question, testified that she
discovered that the van and its keys were missing on January 2 or 3. She testified that she filed a
stolen vehicle report six days later. She also testified that Riklon was an acquaintance and that he
was at her house on the evening that her van disappeared. She testified that Riklon had driven her
van before, but that he did not have permission to take the van that night. She also testified that
she had never met Akeang.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on either the unlawful possession of a firearm charge
or the unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle charge and the trial court declared a mistrial.
Immediately following the mistrial, the State notified the trial court that it would amend the
1 “Res gestae,” Latin for “things done,” is a doctrine concerning the admissibility of evidence at
trial. Black’s Law Dictionary 1423 (9th ed. 2009); See State v. Grier, 168 Wn. App. 635, 644, 278
P.3d 225 (2012).

No. 48320-3-II
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information to add a new charge of one count of third degree theft. Akeang objected, but did not
cite any authority for his objection. The trial court referred the case for re-arraignment. At the re-
arraignment hearing, the State filed a second amended information, dropping the charge of
unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle and adding one count of third degree theft.
When discussing the prior motion in limine ruling with the second trial court, the State
explained that
at that time [of the first trial], Mr. Akeang was not charged with Theft in the Third
Degree. It was something that had been referred to Puyallup Municipal Court. He
subsequently was re-arraigned, and that charge was added.
I Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 5. During the second trial and on Akeang’s motion
for a CrR 3.5 hearing, the State told the trial court,
When we did this first trial, because of the Municipal Court versus Superior Court
concurrent jurisdiction, Mr. Akeang was not charged with the theft. I focused on
the statements solely related to the crimes with which he was charged.
I VRP at 42. Officers Bond and Barry, Woloszyn,2 and the Safeway employee all testified at the
second trial as to the above facts including the facts related to the theft charge. A jury found
Akeang guilty of third degree theft and acquitted him of unlawful possession of a firearm. Akeang
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Akeang argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing sua sponte the charge of third
degree theft under the mandatory joinder rule, CrR 4.3.1. Br. of Appellant at 1. Akeang also
argues that his counsel was ineffective when he objected to, but failed to move to dismiss, the theft
2 Woloszyn was unavailable for the second trial. Her testimony from the first trial was read to the
jury in the second trial. III VRP at 162.

No. 48320-3-II
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charge. Br. of Appellant at 1. The State argues that Akeang waived his right to mandatory joinder.
We hold that Akeang did not waive his right but that joinder was not mandatory. Because joinder
was not mandatory, Akeang’s argument that his counsel was ineffective fails.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s application of the mandatory joinder rule de novo. State v.
Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d 477, 480, 69 P.3d 870 (2003). “A claim that counsel was ineffective is a
mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 338-39,
352 P.3d 776 (2015) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d. 674 (1984)).
II. MANDATORY JOINDER
CrR 4.3.1(b) makes joinder of “related offenses” mandatory. Two or more offenses are
related offenses “if they are within the jurisdiction and venue of the same court and are based on
the same conduct.” CrR 4.3.1(b)(1). The “same conduct” is conduct involving “‘a single criminal
incident or episode.’” CrR 4.3.1(b)(1); State v. Downing, 122 Wn. App. 185, 190, 93 P.3d 900
(2004) (quoting State v. Lee, 132 Wn.2d 498, 503, 939 P.2d 1223 (1997)). Under CrR 4.3.1(b)(3),
a defendant who has been tried for one offense is entitled to dismissal of a charge for a related
offense unless he waived his right to consolidate the related offenses. The rule provides that the
motion to dismiss “shall be granted unless the court determines that because the prosecuting
attorney was unaware of the facts constituting the related offense or did not have sufficient
evidence to warrant trying this offense at the time of the first trial, or for some other reason, the
ends of justice would be defeated if the motion were granted.” CrR 4.3.1(b)(3).

No. 48320-3-II
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A. WAIVER
The State argues that Akeang waived his right to dismiss the theft charge under CrR
4.3.1(b)(2). Br. of Resp’t at 4-6. The State argues that Akeang was on notice that he had been
charged with third degree theft in Puyallup Municipal Court and failed to consolidate the charges
as required by the rule.3 Br. of Resp’t at 4-6. We disagree.
A defendant waives his right to consolidate under CrR 4.3.1 by failing to move to
consolidate when he has been charged with two or more related offenses with which he knew he
was charged. CrR 4.3.1(b)(2). A defendant does not waive his right to mandatory joinder when
he does not know that he will be charged later with a related offense. State v. Dixon, 42 Wn. App.
315, 317, 711 P.2d 1046 (1985); State v. Kenyon, 150 Wn. App. 826, 831 n. 4, 208 P.3d 1291
(2009).
Here, Akeang did not waive his right to consolidate. There is no evidence in the record
that he had been charged with third degree theft or that he had notice of the theft charge until after
the first trial. Thus, we hold that Akeang did not waive his right to mandatory joinder.
B. RELATED OFFENSE
Akeang argues that the three charges—unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle, and third degree theft—are related offenses for mandatory joinder
and, thus, the third degree theft charge should have been dismissed under the mandatory joinder
rule. Br. of Appellant at 7-10. We disagree.
3 The State asserts that Akeang was charged in Puyallup Municipal Court for the third degree theft
charge citing cause number 5z0032052. Br. of Resp’t at 5, n.3.

No. 48320-3-II
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Our Supreme Court has held that the “same conduct” for purposes of determining what
offenses are “related offenses” for mandatory joinder under CrR 4.3.1 are offenses involving “a
single criminal incident or episode,” which are
offenses based upon the same physical act or omission or same series of physical
acts. Close temporal or geographic proximity of the offenses will often be present;
however, a series of acts constituting the same criminal episode could span a period
of time and involve more than one place, such as one continuous criminal episode
involving a robbery, kidnapping, and assault on one victim occurring over many
hours or even days.
Lee, 132 Wn.2d at 503-04. Crimes that are factually and legally distinct are not related offenses
under CrR 4.3.1. Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d at 483-84.
Here, the three charges—unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a stolen
vehicle, and third degree theft—do not involve “a single criminal incident or episode.” Instead,
they involve separate incidents occurring at separate times, and involving different victims. The
van and its keys were stolen on either January 2 or 3 from Woloszyn’s driveway. On January 3,
just after midnight, Akeang and Riklon were video-taped stealing alcohol from Safeway. After
Officer Bond stopped the van later the same night, Officer Barry saw the handgun under the
driver’s seat. Woloszyn was the victim of the unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle charge;
Safeway was the victim of the third degree theft charge; and the public at large was the victim of
the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm. State v. Haddock, 141 Wn.2d 103, 110-11, 3 P.3d
733 (2000).
Finally, the charges of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle and third degree theft require
different elements of proof. RCW 9A.56.140; 9A.56.020. For the unlawful possession of a stolen
vehicle charge, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly

No. 48320-3-II
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possessed a stolen vehicle. RCW 9A.56.068. For the third degree theft charge, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant meant to deprive another of their property
which has a value of no more than $750. RCW 9A.56.050.
Because these three charges did not involve a single criminal incident or episode, involved
different victims, and are legally and factually distinct, mandatory joinder was not required under
CrR 4.3.1. Lee, 132 Wn.2d at 503-04; Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d at 483-84. Thus, we hold that
mandatory joinder was not required for the third degree theft charge. Accordingly, we hold that
the trial court did not err when it did not dismiss sua sponte the third degree theft charge under
CrR 4.3.1.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. State v. Humphries, 181 Wn.2d 708, 719-20, 336 P.3d 1121 (2014) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687-88). Performance is deficient if it falls “‘below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’” State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688). The defendant bears the burden of establishing deficient performance and must
overcome “‘a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.’” Grier, 171 Wn.2d
at 33 (quoting State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009)). A failure to demonstrate
either deficient performance or prejudice defeats an ineffective assistance claim. State v. Emery,
174 Wn.2d 741, 755, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).
Immediately following the mistrial, Akeang’s counsel generally objected to the addition of
the theft charge, but not on mandatory joinder grounds. Trial 1 VRP at 99. Even if Akeang’s

No. 48320-3-II
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counsel had argued for dismissal based on mandatory joinder grounds, such a motion would have
been futile because the trial court would have denied the motion because mandatory joinder was
not required. Thus, Akeang’s counsel was not deficient. Therefore, we hold that Akeang did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
We hold that joinder was not mandatory, and the trial court did not err in not dismissing
sua sponte the theft charge. We also hold that Akeang did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel. Thus, we affirm his conviction.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
JOHANSON, J.