In Re The Detention Of M. G.

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FILED
6/9/2025
Court of Appeals
Division |
State of Washington

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE
In re the Detention of:
No. 86955-8-I
M.G.,
DIVISION ONE

Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PER CURIAM — M.G. appeals from an order committing him for 14 days under the
involuntary treatment act (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW, and a later order committing him
for an additional 90 days. The 14-day commitment hearing was conducted via Zoom,
and M.G. and his attorney were not physically in the same room. At the outset of the
hearing, the trial court informed M.G. that if he needed to have a private conversation
with his attorney, he could raise his hand and the court would “try to see if we can take
a break at that point.” And during the hearing, the court recessed on two occasions to
allow M.G. to talk with his attorney after M.G. indicated his desire to do so. Later in the
hearing, however, the trial court ignored M.G.’s requests to talk with his attorney. The
State concedes that the trial court erred and violated M.G.’s right to counsel, and M.G.
moves this court to accept the State’s concession.

We grant M.G.’s motion and accept the State’s concession. Cf. In re Det. of
T.A.H.-L., 123 Wn. App. 172, 179-80, 97 P.3d 767 (2004) (acknowledging the right to
counsel in ITA proceedings, observing that “[t]he due process protection of the right to

counsel articulated in [the ITA] is meaningless unless it is read as the right to effective

No. 86955-8-I/2
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counsel,” and applying Sixth Amendment effective assistance standard); State v. Cory,
62 Wn.2d 371, 374, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963) (a person cannot receive effective assistance
of counsel without the right to confer with counsel in private); State v. Schlenker, 31 Wn.
App. 2d 921, 935-36, 553 P.3d 712 (2024) (“The trial judge must make sure that
attorneys and clients have the opportunity to engage in private consultation” and “must
not place an unreasonable expectation on a defendant to interrupt a proceeding to
assert his right to confer with counsel.”).
Additionally, the State agrees with M.G. that the appropriate remedy is to reverse
and vacate both the 14-day commitment and the later 90-day commitment order.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to vacate both orders.1 Cf. State
v. Ulestad, 127 Wn. App. 209, 214-15, 111 P.3d 276 (2005) (“[E]xcept for a limited right
to 	control 	attorney-client 	communication 	when 	the 	defendant 	is 	testifying, 	any
interference with the defendant’s right to continuously consult with his counsel during
trial is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.”); RCW 71.05.290(1) (providing
that a petition for additional treatment may be filed “[a]t any time during a person’s 14-
day intensive treatment period” (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d
612, 618, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989) (vacated judgment has no effect and leaves the parties
as though the judgment had never been entered).
1 As a result, we need not reach M.G.’s remaining assignments of error.

No. 86955-8-1/3

Reversed and remanded.

FOR THE COURT: