In the Matter of the Guardianship of: K.P.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Guardianship of
K.P.†
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No. 41099-4-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
COONEY , J. — Minor child K.P. was found dependent in 2020. In April 2024,
the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) petitioned the court for
an order establishing a guardianship for K.P. K.P.’s father, J.P., opposed the petition.
Following a trial, the court granted the Department’s petition and appointed K.P.’s
aunt and uncle as her guardians. J.P. appeals, arguing the Department failed to prove:
(1) it had provided or offered all services reasonably available and capable of correcting
J.P.’s parental deficiencies, (2) that there is little likelihood that K.P. could be returned to
J.P.’s care in the near future, and (3) that the guardianship was in K.P.’s best interests.
We disagree with each argument and affirm.
† To protect the privacy interests of K.P., we use their initials throughout this
opinion. Gen. Order for Court of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 22, 2018) (effective Sept. 1, 2018) http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts.
FILED
JANUARY 27, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

No. 41099-4-III
In re the Guardianship of K.P.
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BACKGROUND
Mother 1 and J.P. are the parents of K.P. K.P. first entered care through the
Department in 2016 when she was an infant. At the time, she was placed in the care of
her maternal uncle and aunt for approximately one year. In 2019, J.P. again sought
assistance from the Department under a voluntary placement agreement because he and
Mother were unable to provide a healthy environment for K.P. J.P. recommended the
Department temporarily place K.P. with her maternal aunt and uncle so he could obtain
safe housing and complete the services he agreed to during an earlier Family Team
Decision Making Meeting. The Department petitioned for an order of dependency during
the pendency of the voluntary placement agreement. The dependency petition was
agreed to by Mother and opposed to by J.P. A dependency was ordered in 2020, and
orders of disposition were entered as to both parents.
The initial parental deficiencies identified for J.P. were mental health issues,
domestic violence, instability, and parenting deficits. The court ordered J.P. to complete
an evidence-based parenting program along with mental health counseling, demonstrate
the ability to meet K.P.’s physical and psychological needs, maintain a clean and safe
1 K.P. and her mother share the same initials. We refer to K.P.’s mother as
“Mother” to prevent confusion.

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home environment, and attend all scheduled visits with K.P. Toward the end of 2022,
J.P.’s parental deficiencies were reduced to mental health issues and parenting deficits.
The court held several dependency review and permanency planning hearings
between 2020 and 2024. J.P.’s level of compliance with services was reported as ranging
from noncompliant, partially compliant, and fully compliant. On April 4, 2024, the
Department petitioned for an order establishing a guardianship for K.P. The guardianship
was agreed to by Mother and opposed to by J.P. The petition proceeded to trial on
January 7, 2025.
At trial, J.P. testified that he was homeless when he entered the voluntary
placement agreement and had resided at the House of Charity for eight months before
moving to Idaho and then to the Tri-Cities. J.P. stated he returned to Spokane and
resided at the House of Charity for two and one-half years while the dependency was
pending. J.P. testified that he attended sessions with John O’Neill, a mental health
provider referred by the Department, and had “got [himself] into” a “PEP program” for
employment training during his time at the House of Charity. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 394.
J.P. stated he secured employment through the “PEP program” and permanent housing
through the “HARPS program.” RP at 394, 397. J.P. testified that employment and
permanent housing “really changed where [he is] mentally, stability-wise even.” RP at
401. J.P. asserted that he had engaged in regular weekly visits and family therapy with
K.P., though K.P. stopped visits at times.

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Melissa Mace, DSW, of Discovery Counseling Group (Discovery), testified to
providing individual counseling services to J.P. and family counseling for J.P. and K.P.
J.P. completed a parenting assessment at Discovery in January 2020 and engaged in
individual counseling from March 2020 through February 2021. Dr. Mace identified
J.P.’s barriers to progress as “communication, the pandemic, isolation, [and] quality time
with one another.” RP at 74. Dr. Mace diagnosed J.P. with “dysthymia, which is a
persistent depressive disorder” that presented as “self-doubt and lack of motivation.” RP
at 75. The services provided by Discovery ended due to J.P.’s lack of attendance.
Renee Brecht provided family counseling to J.P. and K.P. between the fall of 2020
to early 2021, between the fall of 2021 to 2022, and between the beginning of 2024 to the
time of the trial. The first period of services ended because Ms. Brecht “had four weeks
of no contact from [J.P.].” RP at 91. The second period of services ended in March 2022
because “[J.P.] obtained employment and was unable to make the appointment times.”
RP at 92. The third period of services was dedicated to “rebuilding [the] relationship and
looking at increasing trust” because “[t]here had been a period of time with no contact
between [J.P.] and [K.P.].” RP at 93.
Ms. Brecht testified that K.P. had “refused visits in the community recently” and
“talked to [Ms. Brecht] about it privately, but [K.P. is] not willing to discuss it with
[J.P.]” because K.P. “doesn’t want to upset [J.P.].” RP at 94-95. Ms. Brecht testified to a
time where K.P. spent the night at a hotel with J.P., but “[b]y [K.P.’s] recollection, it

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didn’t go well.” RP at 96. K.P. had “identified that there were other people there that
weren’t supposed to be there.” RP at 104. Ms. Brecht stated that J.P. consistently
attended family sessions, but “he often arrived very late for the appointments sometimes”
due to work and the bus schedule. RP at 101.
Ms. Brecht explained that K.P. has told J.P. that she does not want to live with him
and that “[s]he said she feels safe where she lives now.” RP at 100. Ms. Brecht testified
that K.P. expressed a fear of J.P. in 2020 that has “remained pretty steady.” RP at 102.
Ms. Brecht testified that K.P.’s anxiety manifests itself through stomachaches and that
K.P. refuses visits with J.P. when her anxiety peaks. Ms. Brecht claimed K.P. wanted the
visits with J.P. to remain supervised. Further, Ms. Brecht stated that K.P.’s anxiety “led
to a stronger expression of anger and frustration as time has gone on” when J.P. is late or
misses an appointment. RP at 108. According to Ms. Brecht, J.P.’s barriers to progress
were his “late attendance, inconsistencies in contact, [and] sometimes failing to show at
visitation agency even though visits were confirmed.” RP at 105. Ms. Brecht believed it
was in K.P.’s best interest to remain with her current placement and was supportive of the
guardianship, provided K.P. maintains contact with J.P.
Julie Rudmann testified about Incredible Years, an evidence-based parenting
program that J.P. completed in August 2020. Ms. Rudmann testified that J.P. “made
progress with understanding [K.P.’s] needs during visitation, how to meet her needs,
additional supports that they might need for the family such as continuing family therapy,

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[and] support for himself.” RP at 124. Ms. Rudmann averred that J.P. had “increased his
insight into how something like a placement change might affect [K.P.]” by the time she
closed his case. RP at 130.
Mental health counselor Kelly Murphy testified that she provided individual
counseling to J.P. from November 2021 through March 2022. She stated that J.P.
regularly attended his appointments and, although some appointments were missed or
cancelled, “[g]enerally they were all attended and [J.P.] was prepared and on time for
sessions.” RP at 141. Ms. Murphy testified that transportation and the challenge of
“being able to have a work schedule with the visitation schedule and kind of keeping
those both on the same—you know, in working order” were a couple of barriers J.P.
faced. RP at 145. She confirmed that J.P. was “working late hours” and “then coming
right to session first thing in the morning” then going to visits afterward. RP at 145. Ms.
Murphy clarified J.P.’s treatment ended “because of logistics of work and schedules.”
RP at 146.
John O’Neill testified that J.P. was referred to him by the Department for mental
health services in February 2023 and, again, in October 2023. Mr. O’Neill stated that J.P.
was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Mr.
O’Neill stated that J.P. initially faced barriers such as homelessness, poverty, living in an
unsafe environment, and transportation. Mr. O’Neill stated these barriers were reduced
once J.P. gained full-time employment and stable housing. Mr. O’Neill said there were

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issues “historically” with visitations with K.P., and visits became more regular and
predictable once J.P. became more stable. RP at 215. Mr. O’Neill testified that J.P.
exhibited growth and improved insight into issues surrounding “the sense of trust in the
relationship between he and [K.P.].” RP at 220. Mr. O’Neill and J.P. parted ways in
October 2024.
Annie Gerut, with Renewed Stories Counseling, testified that she began providing
counseling services to J.P. in November 2024. Ms. Gerut stated she and J.P. worked to
“[i]dentify [J.P.’s] beliefs and to identify relationship with [K.P.] in regards to [J.P.’s]
mental health.” RP at 306. Ms. Gerut testified that she had seven sessions with J.P. as of
the time of trial and was still building a rapport with him.
Pam Hydrick, a play therapist, testified that she began individual therapeutic
sessions with K.P. shortly after the Department referred her in November 2020. Ms.
Hydrick testified that K.P. stopped attending counseling in 2022 because “[Ms. Hydrick]
had set up a meeting for [J.P.] to come to a session. And he ended up showing the last
five minutes of the session, and [K.P.] felt like I lied to her.” RP at 228. Ms. Hydrick
stated she had told K.P. that J.P. was supposed to be there at the beginning, and that K.P.
“was highly anxious throughout the session. And then when [K.P.] thought that [J.P.]
wasn’t going to show up, then she started to feel relieved.” RP at 229. Ms. Hydrick
stated that K.P.’s anxiety presented verbally, and that K.P. “kept on asking [her] when

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[J.P.] was coming, why he wasn’t there.” RP at 229. K.P. resumed counseling with Ms.
Hydrick in April 2023.
Ms. Hydrick stated the barriers to K.P.’s progress included “her parents just not
showing up” and “that she has anxiety.” RP at 235. Ms. Hydrick testified that K.P.
exhibited “rough” play in her initial sessions and that behavior resumed in the months
preceding trial. RP at 236-37. Ms. Hydrick stated that K.P.’s behavior “could be one
way of her expressing her anxiety through an aggression.” RP at 237. Ms. Hydrick
testified that K.P.’s anxiety manifests itself through “headaches and stomachaches,
feeling hot, and then just sometimes having nightmares.” RP at 242. Ms. Hydrick was of
the opinion that it would not be in K.P.’s best interest to live with J.P., and that “she feels
very safe and secure with her foster parents.” RP at 247.
Melike Bludau testified about the visitation services Unite Family Services (Unite)
provided K.P. and J.P. from 2019 through the time of trial. J.P. visited K.P. at Unite from
September 2019 through November 2020. The visits ceased due to the “referral being
resolved and unsupervised visits started.” RP at 256. Another referral from March 2021
was “resolved due to no engagement.” RP at 256. Visits resumed in April 2021, only to
again stop between June and August 2021 because Ms. Bludau was “unable to reach
[J.P.] to schedule.” RP at 258. Ms. Bludau stated that visits resumed between August
2021 and June 2022, before they received a referral shifting the visits to unsupervised
visits in the “community.” 	RP at 259. Visits with Unite resumed in January 2024.

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However, a visit scheduled in November 2024 was cancelled because K.P. refused to go
to J.P.’s residence and wanted the visit to be at Unite. Unite reported that K.P. had
“caused herself to bleed while making a decision to do a visitation at [J.P.’s] apartment.”
RP at 274.
Ms. Bludau stated that Unite had “adjusted the schedules [on] several occasions to
accommodate [J.P.’s] work schedule” and “adjusted pick-up and drop-off locations for
[K.P.] to try to help encourage or reduce any anxiety.” RP at 276. Moreover, Ms.
Bludau testified that “[K.P.] has made several statements in the visit reports that she’s
comfortable visiting [J.P.] as long as Unite staff are present.” RP at 277. Unite provided
services to J.P. and K.P. from the spring of 2023 through August 2023, at which time
Unite’s services ceased due to nonengagement and cancelled visits.
Cynthia Bryant, a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) for K.P., testified that
K.P. appears “frustrated” and “sad” about the guardianship and dependency proceedings.
RP at 318. Ms. Bryant testified that K.P.’s maternal aunt and uncle were “going above
and beyond meeting [K.P.’s] needs” and that K.P. “feels very comfortable” with them
because “[t]hat is her home.” RP at 319. Ms. Bryant explained that K.P. is “very scared”
and “nervous” about the possibility of living with J.P. and desires to stay with her
maternal aunt and uncle. RP at 319-20. Ms. Bryant believed a guardianship would be in
K.P.’s best interest, and “it would be damaging to [K.P.’s] emotional well-being to take
her out of this home where she feels safe.” RP at 320-21. Ms. Bryant supports K.P.’s

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relationship with her father but did not support continuing the dependency, stating, “It’s
time for [K.P.] to have permanency. It’s time for her to be a kid.” RP at 321. She also
expressed that she believed permanency would “help [K.P.] let down her anxiety, let
down her guard, and help her then build that relationship that she needs to have with
[J.P.].” RP at 322.
Jacqueline Armour, the Department’s assigned social worker, testified that
“housing was a big thing that [J.P.] was wanting to get solidified” at the time of the
voluntary placement agreement. RP at 167. She testified the Department still had
concerns about J.P.’s “stability of mental health, engagement in services,” and lack of
stable housing as the voluntary placement agreement deadline approached. RP at 170.
Ms. Armour testified that prior to being assigned to K.P., the plan “was largely focused
on the disrupted relationship between [J.P.] and [K.P.]” and that by the time of her
assignment, “housing instability really played a huge impact on not only [J.P.’s] mental
health but also his ability to maintain a stable, healthy, safe environment.” RP at 173.
Ms. Armour testified that J.P.’s initial parental deficiencies were mental health
issues, domestic violence, instability, and parenting deficits. By 2022, Ms. Armour stated
that J.P.’s parental deficiencies were mental health and parenting deficits. Ms. Armour
testified that J.P. was not in compliance with mental health treatment at times, had
disengaged with family therapy, and missed visits with K.P. Ms. Armour testified that in
April 2023, J.P. had started mental health counseling with Mr. O’Neill and was working

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on reengaging with family therapy. During this time, K.P. had refused visits with J.P.
Ms. Armour testified that J.P. was partially complying with services in October 2023, and
K.P. did “not want to engage in any services or to engage at all in her family therapy.”
RP at 337. Ms. Armour confirmed visitation was “intermittent” at that time due to J.P.
missing some visits and “[K.P.] was refusing consistently.” RP at 337.
At the August 2024 permanency planning hearing, Ms. Armour stated J.P. was
partially compliant with family therapy as there were “ongoing issues” regarding J.P.
arriving on time. RP at 340. Ms. Armour stated this was causing “conflict” during
sessions, and K.P. and J.P. would “have to focus on processing [K.P.’s] frustration and
sometimes anger over [J.P.] not being there on time, as well as a lot of anxiety.” RP at
340-41. Ms. Armour testified that at the time of a safety assessment she completed with
J.P. on December 30, 2024, J.P.’s parental deficiencies were “mental health as it relates
to his ability to care for [K.P.] and to provide parenting” and K.P.’s “substantiated fear”
of “either the home or being in the care of her father.” RP at 343-44. Ms. Armour
explained the parental deficiencies have been related to J.P.’s “ability to prioritize
[K.P.’s] needs,” and she stated the “cyclical nature of not showing up leads to [K.P.]
having a decreased trust.” RP at 345-46. She also stated she was not aware of any other
services that could be offered to remedy J.P.’s parental deficiencies, and that all services
that would, had already been offered.

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Ms. Armour testified that meetings were held with the Department to discuss
“[b]arriers to services, engagement, progress,” and there were also “ongoing service
letters” sent to J.P. to inform him the steps he needed to take to be “reunified” with K.P.
RP at 354, 364. Ms. Armour testified that because transportation was a barrier for J.P.,
“Uber cards” were provided to J.P. to assist him in timely arriving to family therapy after
work. RP at 357. She stated that J.P. had “received ongoing bus passes and we regularly
communicated to ensure those were up-to-date.” RP at 357. Ms. Armour explained that
barriers often “related to [J.P.’s] current work schedule” and “logistics.” RP at 360-61.
Ms. Armour testified that consistency was one of the “main” parental deficiencies
and a “huge barrier” had been the lack of insight into K.P.’s needs as well as insight into
the importance of, rather than “trying to diminish” K.P. verbalizing “not wanting to go to
[J.P.’s] apartment or spend time alone with him.” RP at 366-67, 369. Ms. Armour
stated, “[A] lot more time than would be reasonable to provide in the dependency” would
be needed to remedy the parental deficiencies that have been “the primary focus of the
dependency for almost five years.” RP at 372. She stated that a guardianship would be
in K.P.’s best interests and would still allow for a parent-child relationship for K.P. and
J.P. while “achieving permanency.” RP at 372.
At the conclusion of trial, the court granted the Department’s petition, ordered
that a guardianship be established for K.P., and appointed K.P.’s maternal aunt and uncle
as guardians. Relevant to this appeal, the court found:

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2.7: Guardianship is in the best interests of the child, rather than
termination of the parent-child relationship and proceeding with adoption,
or continuation of efforts to return custody of the child to the parents[.]
. . . .
2.8(d): Services ordered under RCW 13.34.130 and .136 have been offered
or provided and all necessary services reasonably available, capable of
correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future, have been
offered or provided.
. . . .
2.8(p): There is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that
child can be returned to the parents in the near future. [2]
Clerk’s Papers at 258-59, 261.
J.P. timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
J.P. argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the guardianship.
Specifically, J.P. contends the Department failed to prove (1) it offered or provided
necessary services capable of remedying his parental deficiencies within the foreseeable
future, (2) that there was little likelihood that the conditions would be remedied and that
2 J.P. also assigns error to the court’s findings of fact 2.8(e)-(n) in the February 7,
2025, “Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.” However, these were findings
that were a part of the amended findings and conclusions. See CP at 247-54. J.P. does
not provide argument dedicated as to how each of these findings were error. Rather J.P.
states that he assigns error generally to these findings “insofar as any statement therein
which characterizes the record is contradicted by the Appellant’s statements and
arguments in this appeal.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 3-4. Because these assignments of
error are unsupported by argument and authority, we decline review.

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K.P. could be returned to him in the near future, and (3) that the guardianship was in the
best interests of K.P. We disagree with each contention and affirm.
“Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and welfare of their minor
children.” In re Dependency of Schermer, 161 Wn.2d 927, 941, 169 P.3d 452 (2007).
This right, however, is not absolute and when a child’s mental or physical health is
endangered by parental deficiencies, “the State has a parens patriae right and
responsibility to intervene to protect the child.” In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757,
762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).
The standard of proof in a guardianship trial under chapter 13.36 RCW is a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 702, 344 P.3d
1186 (2015). We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Id. at
711. “‘Substantial evidence exists if, when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, a rational trier of fact could find the fact more likely
than not to be true.’” In re Welfare of Ca.R., 191 Wn. App. 601, 608-09, 365 P.3d 186
(2015) (quoting In re Welfare of X.T., 174 Wn. App. 733, 737, 300 P.3d 824 (2013)). We
do not reweigh evidence or witness credibility. Id. Rather, “[w]e give deference to the
trial judge’s advantage in having the witnesses before him or her, which is particularly
important in proceedings affecting the parent and child relationship.” In re A.W., 182
Wn.2d at 711.

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“[A] guardianship is an appropriate permanent plan for a child who has been found
to be dependent under chapter 13.34 RCW and who cannot safely be reunified with his or
her parents.” RCW 13.36.010. A guardianship may be ordered where certain statutory
elements are met. RCW 13.36.040(2). Relevant to the matter before us, and among other
elements, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) . . . that it is in the child’s best interests to establish a guardianship,
rather than to terminate the parent-child relationship and proceed with
adoption, or to continue efforts to return custody of the child to the parent[.]
. . . .
(iv) The services ordered under RCW 13.34.130 and 13.34.136 have been
offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available,
capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future
have been offered or provided;
(v) There is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the
child can be returned to the parent in the near future[.]
RCW 13.36.040.
N ECESSARY SERVICES
J.P. contends the court’s finding that all necessary services were offered or
provided is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, J.P. asserts the
Department failed to provide him with housing and employment assistance. We disagree.
When petitioning for a guardianship under chapter 13.36 RCW, the Department
carries the burden of proving it has expressly and understandably offered or provided
services reasonably available and capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within

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the foreseeable future. RCW 13.36.040(2); In re Dependency of M.P., 185 Wn. App.
108, 121, 340 P.3d 908 (2014). A “necessary” service is one that addresses a condition
or parental deficiency that is preventing a parent from reunification with their child. In re
Dependency of G.L.L., 20 Wn. App. 2d 425, 433, 499 P.3d 984 (2021). The services
offered must be tailored to the individual needs of the parent. In re Dependency of T.R.,
108 Wn. App. 149, 161, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001). When a service is necessary, the
Department is required to “[a]t a minimum . . . provide a parent with a list of referral
agencies that provide those services.” In re Dependency of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644, 651,
102 P.3d 847 (2004).
J.P.’s primary parental deficiencies were identified as mental health issues and
deficits in parenting skills. J.P. claims the Department’s failure “to provide services to
help ameliorate [his] recurrent struggles with homelessness and unemployment” created
barriers to accessing services and contributed to his failure to remedy his parental
deficiencies. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6-7.
Our Supreme Court held, “When a ‘condition’ precludes reunion of parent and
child . . . regardless of whether it can be labeled a ‘parental deficiency,’ the State must
provide any necessary services to address that condition.” In re Welfare of C.S., 168
Wn.2d 51, 56 n.3, 225 P.3d 953 (2010).
The Department recognized throughout the dependency that J.P.’s unstable and
unsafe housing contributed to his parental deficiencies and that his sporadic employment

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and work schedule were barriers to reunification. Although J.P.’s lack of housing and
stable employment were not identified as “parental deficiencies,” they were conditions
that hindered the resolution of his parental deficiencies and prevented reunification.
J.P. contends that because the Department failed to directly provide assistance
with housing or employment, then it did not provide or offer all necessary services,
reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the
foreseeable future. We disagree with J.P.’s argument that the Department had to directly
provide assistance when he was receiving support through other sources. The court can
consider the services received by the parent, regardless of the source, that bear on the
ability to correct the parental deficiencies. In re D.A., 124 Wn. App. at 651-52.
Here, J.P. received assistance through Mr. O’Neill, who was referred by the
Department, the “HARPS program” and the “PEP program.” RP at 212-13. These
programs, in conjunction with Mr. O’Neill’s assistance, allowed J.P. to secure permanent
housing and stable employment. The Department offered or provided services sufficient
for J.P. to obtain housing and employment, alleviating barriers to resolving his parental
deficiencies.
J.P. further argues that the Department should have offered or provided services to
assist him in obtaining employment that offered a more flexible work schedule, thereby
allowing him the ability to consistently attend services. J.P.’s contention does not align
with the statutory requirement that the Department offer or provide services that are

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“reasonably available.” RP at 371. Even so, adjustments were made to J.P.’s visitation
schedules to accommodate his fluctuating work schedule. Further, the Department
provided bus passes and gift cards for ride shares when J.P.’s transportation struggles
affected his punctuality and ability to attend visits and appointments.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the Department
expressly and understandably offered or provided services reasonably available and
capable of correcting J.P.’s parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.
LIKELIHOOD OF REMEDYING CONDITIONS
J.P. argues the trial court’s finding that there is little likelihood that conditions will
be remedied so that the K.P. can be returned to J.P. in the near future is not supported by
substantial evidence. We disagree.
The court looks to the parental deficiencies when evaluating whether there is
“‘little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the
parent in the near future.’” In re Guardianship of D.S., 178 Wn. App. 681, 690, 317 P.3d
489 (2013) (quoting RCW 13.36.040(2)(c)(v)). The “foreseeable future” is determined
from the child’s point of view. In the Matter of the Parental Rights to K.M.M., 186
Wn.2d 466, 486, 379 P.3d 75 (2016).
Here, J.P.’s lingering parental deficiencies were mental health issues and deficits
in parenting skills. Ms. Armour testified that J.P.’s lack of insight into K.P.’s needs and
failure to prioritize her needs are unresolved deficiencies that have led to K.P.’s

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decreased trust in J.P. Further, Ms. Armour testified that these deficiencies have been
consistent for almost five years and that “a lot more time than would be reasonable to
provide in a dependency” would be necessary to resolve the deficiencies. RP at 372.
Ms. Brecht described the fear and anxiety K.P. experiences, manifesting itself through
physical ailments, due to J.P.’s inconsistency. Ms. Brecht testified she is unaware of
anything that could remedy the “trust issue” between K.P. and J.P. in the near future.
RP at 108.
Ms. Hydrick similarly testified to K.P.’s anxiety, which she described as both
verbal and physical related to J.P.’s inconsistency and to the possibility of living with J.P.
Ms. Hydrick was unable to provide a timeline for how long it would take K.P. to rebuild
trust with J.P. Further, though Mr. O’Neill testified that J.P.’s consistency increased
when he gained employment and stable housing, he pointed to J.P.’s continued late
attendance, inconsistencies in contact with K.P., and failure to appear for visits with K.P.
as barriers to J.P.’s progress.
The trial court’s finding that there is little likelihood J.P.’s conditions will be
remedied so that the K.P. can be returned to his care in the near future is supported by
substantial evidence.
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
J.P. argues the trial court’s finding that guardianship is in the best interests of K.P.
is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

No. 41099-4-III
In re the Guardianship of K.P.
20
Courts consider several factors in determining the best interests of the child. In re
A.W., 182 Wn.2d at 711. “There is not an exclusive list of factors to consider but instead
the court must decide each case on its own facts and circumstances.” Id. at 711.
Here, K.P. has been dependent for approximately five years, during which time
she had been cared for by her maternal aunt and uncle. Ms. Armour testified that K.P.
and J.P. “both really love each other and have a parent-child relationship” and K.P. still
wishes to see J.P. RP at 372. Ms. Armour stated, “[A] guardianship would allow that
parent-child relationship to continue . . . while achieving permanency and continuing to
heal that parent-child relationship.” RP at 372.
Concordant testimony was admitted concerning K.P.’s need for permanency and
stability. Ms. Armour explained that K.P. has experienced “a ton of anxiety” predicated
on J.P.’s lack of consistency in her visits with J.P. and permanency in her life. RP at 373.
Ms. Armour described the importance of K.P. feeling safe and achieving permanency in
her household. Further, K.P. has refused visits, maintained that she wants visits to be
supervised, and has expressed anxiety and frustration about the possibility of living with
J.P. Ms. Armour, Ms. Hydrick, and Ms. Brecht all opined that a guardianship would be
in K.P.’s best interest. Additionally, K.P.’s CASA, Ms. Bryant, supported the
guardianship and reiterated the importance for K.P. to have permanency to alleviate her
anxiety and ultimately help her rebuild her relationship with J.P. Ms. Bryant stated that
K.P.’s maternal aunt and uncle were meeting K.P.’s emotional and physical needs.

No. 41099-4-III
In re the Guardianship of K.P.
21
Further, K.P. feels comfortable with her maternal aunt and uncle and considers her
placement there as her home.
The trial court’s finding that the guardianship is in the best interests of K.P. is
supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Cooney, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
Murphy, J.