State Of Washington, Respondent V. Anthony Michael Barquet Jr., Appellant

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FILED
10/6/2025
Court of Appeals
Division |
State of Washington

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 85507-7-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE

V.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ANTHONY MICHAEL BARQUET, JR.,

Appellant.

PER CurRiAmM — Anthony Barquet, Jr., appeals from the judgment and sentence
entered on his jury conviction of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the
first degree. He asserts that remand is required to strike the $500 victim penalty
assessment (VPA), which trial courts were required to impose when Barquet was
sentenced but, due to a statutory amendment that went into effect while Barquet’s
appeal was pending, are now prohibited from imposing on indigent defendants. See
LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1 (amending RCW 7.68.035). The State does not dispute that
Barquet is indigent and does not oppose remand to strike the VPA. We conclude that
remand for this purpose is appropriate. Cf. State v. Schultz, 31 Wn. App. 2d 235, 255,
548 P.3d 559 (2024) (amendment to RCW 7.68.035 applied retroactively to defendant
whose appeal was pending on its effective date).

In a statement of additional grounds for review (SAGR), Barquet also asserts that
he was “push[ed] through a trial” with a lawyer who was not licensed in Washington,

whom Barquet “didn’t Know” and “only met 3 times,” and who had never been in a trial

No. 85507-7-I/2
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or courtroom and “lied to” Barquet. 	But the record reflects that Barquet’s trial attorneys
were both licensed to practice in Washington. 	Furthermore, to the extent Barquet
claims that trial counsel was ineffective, Barquet must show both that “(1) defense
counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances” and “(2) defense
counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable
probability that, except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” 	State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d
1251 (1995). 	In light of these standards, Barquet’s vague and conclusory assertions
about his trial counsel’s performance are insufficient to establish a basis for relief.
Barquet also claims in his SAGR that “the main person i[n] this case was told not
to come to court by both sides to tell what . . . really happen[ed]” and “it was on camera
they never fingerprint[ed] the gun.” 	But Barquet does not explain what he claims really
happened much less specify who the “main person” is and how their testimony would
have been material. 	Cf. RAP 10.10(c) (“[T]he appellate court will not consider a
defendant’s [SAGR] if it does not inform the court of the nature and occurrence of
alleged errors,” and “the appellate court is not obligated to search the record in support
of claims made in a defendant’s [SAGR].”). Nor does Barquet claim much less establish
that fingerprint evidence was required to support his conviction.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Barquet’s convictions but remand to the trial
court solely for the ministerial act of striking the VPA.

No. 85507-7-I/3
FOR THE COURT:
Colon, J.
,ACJ
Mann, 1.
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