State v. Ronald E. Schroeder

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 7, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP1809-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2007CF496

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

RONALD E. SCHROEDER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
JENNIFER R. DOROW, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2020AP1809-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Ronald E. Schroeder, pro se, appeals from orders
denying his motion seeking modification of an extended supervision condition and
his motion for reconsideration. The extended supervision condition required that
he have no unsupervised contact with minors. He requested the modification
because he wanted to live with his girlfriend, Nicole Mathweg, who had a twelve-
year-old son.1 Schroeder makes three arguments. He claims the circuit court:
(1) exhibited bias against him based on comments Schroeder believes showed the
court had “predetermined its decision”; (2) erroneously exercised its discretion
when it denied his modification request because it relied on “unproven speculation
and conjecture” instead of the law; and (3) violated the separation of powers
doctrine when it said the Department of Corrections (DOC) could “trump” its
decision. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2007, the State charged Schroeder with thirty-three counts,
which included two counts of second-degree sexual assault, twenty-seven counts
of making a visual representation of nudity (for taking nude photos of his
then-girlfriend without her consent); one count of computer crimes (for accessing
data from his then-girlfriend’s email without her consent); one count of
misdemeanor battery, domestic abuse; one count of possession of a switchblade
knife; and one count of possession of child pornography (based on the discovery
of “over 100 images of what officers believed from their training and experience
to be children engaged in sexual[ly] explicit conduct” on Schroeder’s computers).

1
Schroeder referred to Mathweg as his girlfriend, but Mathweg described Schroeder as
her “friend[.]”

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No. 2020AP1809-CR

¶3 The circuit court granted Schroeder’s motion to sever the
knife-possession and possession-of-child-pornography counts from the other
thirty-one counts. The remaining thirty-one counts were tried to a jury, which
found Schroeder guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the severed counts were
dismissed and read in. The circuit court noted that the sentence imposed would be
longer because of the read-in child pornography charge. The court imposed six
years’ initial confinement followed by twelve years’ extended supervision for each
of the sexual assault counts, concurrent to each other. On the twenty-seven counts
relating to the nude photographs, the court imposed only costs on some and a
ninety-day sentence on others, all concurrent, and on the computer crime, it
imposed only costs. On the domestic battery count, the court imposed nine
months in jail, consecutive.

¶4 The sentencing court imposed multiple conditions for Schroeder’s
extended supervision, including, as material here: “The defendant is to have no
contact with minors, except incidental and in a circumstance where he is
supervised.” Schroeder’s postconviction proceedings and appeals are set forth in
decisions from this court in 2010, 2016, and 2017.2

¶5 After he was released from prison and while he lived in transitional
housing, Schroeder filed a pro se motion to lift the no-contact-with-minors
condition. Schroeder indicated that his girlfriend, Mathweg, said he could live in
her home, but, because she had a twelve-year-old son, the DOC would not approve

2
State v. Schroeder, No. 2008AP2810-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Feb. 17,
2010); State v. Schroeder, No. 2014AP1388, unpublished op. and order (WI App May 18, 2016);
State v. Schroeder, No. 2015AP1729, unpublished op. and order (WI App Apr. 12, 2017).

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No. 2020AP1809-CR

that living arrangement “until the no contact with minors language is stricken from
[the] Judgment of Conviction.”

¶6 The circuit court held a hearing on Schroeder’s motion on
July 16, 2020. At the hearing, the court asked Schroeder why he wanted
“modification of the no unsupervised contact with minors” condition. Schroeder
responded that “if it’s not lifted or modified, I’ll be homeless.” The court then
said: “And the home at which you seek to reside, again, I don’t approve of that
but I understand the relationship with the Judgment of Conviction, though, is the
home that Ms. Mathweg has; is that right?” The court then questioned Mathweg,
who attended the hearing to confirm she was aware of Schroeder’s convictions and
conditions. During that interchange, the court explained to Mathweg: “And,
again, I don’t approve of the residence. I’m being asked here today to give some
consideration in whether to allow, I guess make some type of an exception to the
order that’s in place.” The court asked Mathweg about the precautions she would
take to make sure Schroeder would not have unsupervised contact with her son.
When questioned, Mathweg admitted that there would be short periods of time
when Schroeder would have unsupervised contact with her son. Mathweg was not
concerned about her son’s contact with Schroeder.

¶7 In addressing the issue, the circuit court expressed concern because
Schroeder failed to provide the court with the DOC’s position on whether to
remove the condition. The court noted: “It’s not simple enough to modify a
restriction in the Judgment of Conviction because the reality is, the DOC could,
nonetheless, trump that if they felt it’s not an appropriate, you know, residence.”
The court did not grant Schroeder’s request because it lacked information from the
DOC as to whether the DOC would approve Mathweg’s residence if the court
were to make the condition modification.

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No. 2020AP1809-CR

¶8 After the hearing, the DOC sent a letter that indicated it had not
supervised “Schroeder long enough to meaningfully assess whether or not the
condition prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors should be lifted[,]” but it
had “no doubt that Mr. Schroeder will find an apartment[.]” Schroeder filed a
motion seeking reconsideration of the circuit court’s “July 16, 2020 oral
decision[.]” In August 2020, the court entered two separate written orders. One
order denied Schroeder’s original motion “[f]or reasons as stated on the record,”
and the second order denied his reconsideration motion. The reconsideration
denial explained:

Contrary to the defendant’s belief, the Court was not
required to address many of the issue[s] raised, as the court
had limited the hearing to addressing only court ordered
conditions of supervision. At the hearing, the defendant
was asked to identify which court ordered condition(s) of
supervision he was challenging. Mr. Schroeder only sought
modification of the prohibition of unsupervised contact
with minors. The Court did not and will not address the
rules of supervision or the merits (or lack thereof) of the
underlying conviction. The convicting court is not the
proper forum in which to challenge the rules of supervision
– that is an administrative process within the Department of
Corrections and then, if all administrative relief is
exhausted, court review through an appropriate writ.

¶9 Schroeder appeals both orders.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Bias

¶10 Schroeder’s first claim is that the circuit court’s comments at the
beginning of the July 2020 hearing exhibited judicial bias. Specifically, he asserts
that the circuit court’s two comments that it did not “approve of” where Schroeder
is allowed to live demonstrated that it had predetermined the case before “hearing

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No. 2020AP1809-CR

any testimony or arguments[.]” The comments Schroeder refers to about the court
not approving of where Schroeder lives are set forth in paragraph six above. The
“approval” comment first occurred in the court’s question to Schroeder. The court
explained that it does not approve of his housing arrangements. The second
“approval” comment came when the court spoke to Mathweg, noting that the court
did not “approve of the residence.” We reject Schroeder’s first claim for the
reasons that follow.

¶11 Schroeder failed to object to the circuit court’s comments both at the
hearing and in his reconsideration motion. Accordingly, he has forfeited his right
to raise this issue on appeal. See State v. Delgado, 2002 WI App 38, ¶12, 250
Wis. 2d 689, 641 N.W.2d 490 (“[A] specific, contemporaneous objection is
required to preserve error.”). If Schroeder had objected to these statements, the
circuit court would have had the opportunity to explain to Schroeder that it had not
predetermined the case. It would have been able to clarify its comments, which—
when read in context—appear to be statements simply advising Schroeder and
Mathweg that the DOC is the entity that actually approves of where Schroeder can
live, not the circuit court.

¶12 Further, we are not persuaded by Schroeder’s argument that his
pro se status and his failure to obtain the hearing transcript before filing his
reconsideration motion should excuse him from the forfeiture rule. As noted, in
context, the circuit court’s statements do not evidence any bias or prejudgment
against Schroeder. Instead, the comments reflect the circuit court’s attempt to
communicate to Schroeder that the DOC, rather than the circuit court, is the entity
that must approve of Schroeder’s actual housing arrangements. The circuit court
was not predetermining the conditions-modification request—it was making sure

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No. 2020AP1809-CR

that Schroeder and Mathweg knew the court could not approve a specific housing
situation.

¶13 To the extent Schroeder makes a due process argument, we reject it
as undeveloped. We decline “to decide issues that are not adequately developed
by the parties in their briefs.” Cemetery Servs., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Regul.
& Licensing, 221 Wis. 2d 817, 831, 586 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1998). “[M]ere
reference to an alleged ‘deprivation of due process’ is not sufficient to raise a
specific constitutional challenge.” Slawinski v. Milwaukee City Fire & Police
Comm’n, 212 Wis. 2d 777, 810, 569 N.W.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation
omitted); ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Board of Rev., 231 Wis. 2d 328, 349 n.9, 603
N.W.2d 217 (1999) (“This court will not address undeveloped arguments.”).

B. Denial of Modification Motion

¶14 Schroeder’s second claim is a general attack on the circuit court’s
decision. Schroeder acknowledges that a court’s modification decision is a
discretionary act and therefore will not be overturned unless the court erroneously
exercised its discretion. See State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d
465, 701 N.W.2d 47 (“Trial courts are granted broad discretion in determining
conditions necessary for extended supervision; such discretion is subject only to a
standard of reasonableness and appropriateness.”); Melone v. State, 2001 WI App
13, ¶6, 240 Wis. 2d 451, 623 N.W.2d 179 (2000) (depicting no erroneous exercise
of discretion when circuit court uses a “reasoning process” based “on the facts in
the record” and reaches “a conclusion based on logic and founded on a proper
legal standard” (emphasis omitted)).

¶15 It is clear from the Record that the circuit court’s discretionary
decision was not an erroneous exercise of discretion. At the hearing, the court

7
No. 2020AP1809-CR

declined to modify the condition because it had insufficient information.
Schroeder insisted that unless the court removed the condition, he would be
homeless. But, the DOC subsequently provided information to the court
indicating that the DOC had “no doubt that Mr. Schroeder will find an apartment,”
despite the condition. The court’s decision to deny Schroeder’s request was
reasonable and appropriate.

¶16 Schroeder criticizes the circuit court’s decision because he says it
was based on speculation and conjecture. His argument seems to be that because
the condition stemmed from the dismissed and read-in possession-of-child-
pornography charge, the court should remove it. He suggests that this condition is
overly broad and not reasonably related to his rehabilitation. He supports his
argument partly based on his belief that the court was biased against him and
partly based on the State’s reference to the contents of his presentence
investigation report (PSI), which Schroeder claims contained speculation and
conjecture.

¶17 Again, the Record refutes every argument Schroeder makes. First,
as we have already noted, the circuit court did not exhibit bias against him.
Second, the Record shows the court did not deny Schroeder’s request based on any
conjecture contained in the PSI. The court’s comments reflect it was not
persuaded by the State’s argument that the PSI deemed Schroeder a danger to
minors based on his “history with [his] other children” because the PSI referenced
“much, much younger” children than Mathweg’s child. Ultimately, the court
denied Schroeder’s motion, not based on the PSI, but because it lacked
information. The court said: “I do not have sufficient information that would
warrant a modification, and I’m going to deny your request. I’ll leave open the
possibility, sir, if your agent deems this to be an appropriate modification, for you

8
No. 2020AP1809-CR

to work with your agent to petition the Court again.” When the court asked
Schroeder if he understood, Schroeder responded: “I do. And that’s a reasonable-
-that’s a reasonable request.”

¶18 Third, as the State points out, the law authorizes the circuit court to
consider uncharged and unproven offenses when imposing sentence, see Elias v.
State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980), and allows it to impose
conditions for extended supervision, even if they do not “relate to the offense for
which the defendant is convicted as long as the condition is reasonably related to
the dual purposes of extended supervision.” Miller, 283 Wis. 2d 465, ¶13. To the
extent Schroeder challenges the initial basis for the condition when the sentencing
court imposed it back in 2007, he is procedurally barred from doing so. See State
v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185-86, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).

¶19 Schroeder fails to convince us that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion when it denied his motion. See Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017
WI App 38, ¶36, 376 Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381 (stating the appellant bears the
burden to demonstrate how the circuit court erred).

C. Separation of Powers

¶20 Finally, Schroeder claims that the circuit court erred because it said
that the DOC has “trump” powers over it and that this violates the separation of
powers doctrine by giving the executive branch the power to impose a sentence on
a defendant. Schroeder’s claim is based on the court’s comment that the DOC
could “trump” it. Specifically, the court said: “It’s not simple enough to modify a
restriction in the Judgment of Conviction because the reality is, the DOC could,
nonetheless, trump that if they felt it’s not an appropriate, you know, residence.”

9
No. 2020AP1809-CR

¶21 We reject Schroeder’s last claim. Schroeder forfeited this argument
because he failed to object to the circuit court’s “trump” comment in the circuit
court. “We will not ... blindside trial courts with reversals” when a party failed to
make a contemporaneous objection to give the circuit court an opportunity to
address the claim in the first instance. See State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 827,
539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995); Delgado, 250 Wis. 2d 689, ¶12; Young v.
Young, 124 Wis. 2d 306, 316, 369 N.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1985) (“The party
alleging error has the burden of establishing, by reference to the record, that the
error was raised before the trial court.”).

¶22 Schroeder did not object when the circuit court made the “trump”
comment, nor did he raise the issue in his reconsideration motion. Thus, the
circuit court did not have any opportunity to address the comment, and we decline
to address it.3 See State v. Ledger, 175 Wis. 2d 116, 135, 499 N.W.2d 198 (Ct.
App. 1993) (“[A] party must raise and argue an issue with some prominence to
allow the trial court to address the issue and make a ruling.”).

D. Reconsideration Motion

¶23 Although Schroeder appeals from both the initial order and the order
denying his reconsideration motion, he did not even mention the standard
applicable to reconsideration. “To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the

3
Although Schroeder’s initial motion asserted a separation of powers argument, he
abandoned it by not raising it at the July 2020 hearing or in his reconsideration motion. A claim
that a defendant raised in “motions” is “tacitly abandoned” if the defendant did not advance the
claim “in the actual proceedings[.]” State v. Ledger, 175 Wis. 2d 116, 135, 499 N.W.2d 198 (Ct.
App. 1993). In other words, a “motion made but not pursued is abandoned[.]” State v. Jackson,
229 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 600 N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). Schroeder failed to
even mention his separation of powers argument at the hearing, let alone argue or pursue it.

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No. 2020AP1809-CR

movant must present either newly discovered evidence or establish a manifest
error of law or fact.” Koepsell’s Olde Popcorn Wagons, Inc. v. Koepsell’s
Festival Popcorn Wagons, Ltd., 2004 WI App 129, ¶44, 275 Wis. 2d 397, 685
N.W.2d 853. Because Schroeder failed to present any argument to show the
circuit court erred under the reconsideration standard, there is no basis for us to
reverse the circuit court’s reconsideration order. See Gaethke, 376 Wis. 2d 448,
¶36.4

III. CONCLUSION

¶24 Schroeder failed to prove the circuit court erred in either its initial
order or in its order denying his reconsideration motion. Accordingly, we affirm
both orders.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2021-22).

4
Any claims we do not specifically address are denied as undeveloped or unsupported
by legal authority. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

11