State v. Jonathon S. Geiger

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 11, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1270-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2014CF220

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JONATHON S. GEIGER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Barron County: MAUREEN D. BOYLE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

¶1 STARK, P.J. After Jonathon Geiger’s probation was revoked, he
failed to appear in court for a sentencing after revocation hearing. The circuit
court therefore issued a warrant for Geiger’s arrest, and he was ultimately arrested
in Arizona and extradited to Wisconsin. At Geiger’s sentencing after revocation
No. 2022AP1270-CR

hearing, the State asked the court to order Geiger to pay the costs of extraditing
him to Wisconsin, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) (2021-22).1 After
holding further proceedings to address that issue, the court ordered Geiger to pay
the extradition costs.

¶2 Geiger now appeals, arguing that the circuit court lacked authority
under WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) to order him to pay the State’s requested
extradition costs because they were imposed after his original sentencing hearing.
Geiger also argues that the court erred by imposing those costs “in a separate order
after both the sentencing and sentencing after revocation hearings.” We reject
these arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In June 2015, Geiger entered a guilty plea to one count of exposing
genitals to a child. On September 17, 2015, the circuit court withheld sentence
and placed Geiger on probation for three years. Geiger’s probation was later
revoked, and a sentencing after revocation hearing was scheduled for July 5, 2017.
Geiger was released from custody prior to that hearing, however, and he did not
appear in court on July 5. The court subsequently issued a bench warrant for
Geiger’s arrest.

¶4 Geiger was arrested in Arizona in July 2021 and extradited to
Wisconsin. His sentencing after revocation hearing took place on September 28,
2021. The circuit court sentenced Geiger to eighteen months of initial

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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confinement followed by two years of extended supervision. During the
sentencing after revocation hearing, the court ordered that Geiger’s outstanding
financial obligations would be reduced to a judgment. The State then asked the
court to order Geiger to pay extradition costs of $3,264.40, in addition to his other
financial obligations. The court responded that it was not certain whether it could
impose the extradition costs. The State then asked for ten days to address that
issue, and the court granted the State’s request for additional time to do so.

¶5 On October 4, 2021, the circuit court clerk entered a judgment of
conviction after revocation from probation. On the same day, the clerk entered a
judgment for unpaid fines, forfeitures, and other financial obligations, which
reflected that Geiger owed a total of $518.

¶6 Thereafter, on October 20, 2021, the State moved to modify the
judgment of conviction after revocation from probation to “include the cost of
extraditing [Geiger] from the State of Arizona to Barron County in the amount of
$3,264.40.” The State cited WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) as the legal authority for its
motion.

¶7 The circuit court held hearings on the State’s motion in February and
April 2022. At the close of the second hearing, the court concluded that the plain
language of WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) allowed it to impose the State’s requested
extradition costs. The court therefore granted the State’s motion and entered an
amended judgment of conviction requiring Geiger to pay those costs. Geiger now
appeals.

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DISCUSSION

¶8 This appeal requires us to interpret and apply WIS. STAT.
§ 973.06(1)(a). “The interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed
set of facts are questions of law that we review independently.” McNeil v.
Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶7, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273. When interpreting a
statute, our objective “is to determine what the statute means so that it may be
given its full, proper, and intended effect.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Our analysis
begins with the plain language of the statute. Id., ¶45. “If the words chosen for
the statute exhibit a ‘plain, clear statutory meaning,’ without ambiguity, the statute
is applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms.” State v. Grunke,
2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769 (citation omitted).

¶9 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.06 “details those costs taxable against a
defendant and prohibits the imposition of any others.” State v. Amato, 126
Wis. 2d 212, 215, 376 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1985). As relevant here, the statute
provides that the “costs, fees, and surcharges taxable against [a] defendant”
include “[t]he necessary disbursements and fees of officers allowed by law and
incurred in connection with the arrest, preliminary examination and trial of the
defendant, including, in the discretion of the court, the fees and disbursements of
the agent appointed to return a defendant from another state or country.”
Sec. 973.06(1)(a).

¶10 This language plainly allows a circuit court to impose costs incurred
in connection with a defendant’s arrest, including costs associated with
transporting the defendant to Wisconsin from another state. In the instant case, the
State sought extradition costs associated with Geiger’s arrest in Arizona and his

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No. 2022AP1270-CR

subsequent transport to Wisconsin for his sentencing after revocation hearing. We
agree with the State that the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) permitted
the circuit court to impose those costs.

¶11 Geiger argues that the circuit court lacked authority to impose the
State’s requested extradition costs because WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) allows the
imposition of only those costs that are incurred in connection with a defendant’s
initial arrest, preliminary hearing, and trial, and the statute does not allow a court
to impose costs “incurred after trial and after the initial sentencing hearing.” The
statute plainly states, however, that a court may impose costs incurred “in
connection with the arrest … of the defendant.” Id. The statute does not include
any language limiting the costs that may be imposed to those associated with a
defendant’s initial arrest. Adopting Geiger’s interpretation of § 973.06(1)(a)
would require us to read the word “initial” into the statute, which the rules of
statutory interpretation prohibit us from doing. See Dawson v. Town of Jackson,
2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 (“We decline to read into the
statute words the legislature did not see fit to write.”); County of Dane v. LIRC,
2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (“We will not read into the
statute a limitation the plain language does not evidence.”).

¶12 Geiger also argues that WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) cannot be
interpreted to permit the imposition of extradition costs associated with a
sentencing after revocation hearing because this court has previously held that
costs under § 973.06(1)(a) “are taxable against a defendant as part of the sentence”
and cannot be imposed “in an order separate from the sentence.” See State v.
Grant, 168 Wis. 2d 682, 684-85, 484 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1992). Geiger asserts
that “[i]f the costs allowed by statute must be ordered during the sentencing
proceeding, as part of the disposition or sentence, they necessarily cannot include

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No. 2022AP1270-CR

those costs incurred in connection with events after sentencing, such as extraditing
a defendant for sentencing after revocation.”

¶13 We reject this argument because Geiger was not “sentenced” during
his original sentencing hearing in September 2015. Instead, the circuit court
withheld sentence and placed Geiger on probation at that time. “Probation is not a
sentence; it is an alternative to sentence.” State v. Edwards, 2013 WI App 51, ¶7,
347 Wis. 2d 526, 830 N.W.2d 109. Under these circumstances, the court properly
imposed the extradition costs “as part of [Geiger’s] sentence” imposed at the
sentencing after revocation hearing. See Grant, 168 Wis. 2d at 684.

¶14 Next, Geiger argues that even if this court “consider[s] the
sentencing after revocation hearing to be a sentencing proceeding at which costs
may be imposed,” the circuit court nevertheless erred by imposing the extradition
costs in a separate order entered more than six months after the sentencing after
revocation hearing. Geiger relies on Grant and State v. Perry, 215 Wis. 2d 696,
575 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1997), in support of this proposition. We conclude,
however, that both of those cases are materially distinguishable.

¶15 The defendant in Grant was sentenced on three counts, and during
his sentencing hearing, “no mention was made of fees for Grant’s court-appointed
private attorney.” Grant, 168 Wis. 2d at 683-84. After the sentencing hearing, the
State moved the circuit court to order Grant to pay those fees, pursuant to WIS.
STAT. § 973.06(1)(e). Grant, 168 Wis. 2d at 684. The court granted the State’s
motion, but we reversed that decision on appeal. Id. at 684-85. We reasoned that
costs under § 973.06(1) “are taxable against a defendant as part of the sentence,”
and we therefore concluded that the circuit court had erred by imposing costs “in
an order separate from [Grant’s] sentence.” Grant, 168 Wis. 2d at 684-85.

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No. 2022AP1270-CR

¶16 Grant is distinguishable because, in that case, the State did not
request the relevant costs—i.e., Grant’s attorney fees—during the sentencing
hearing. In fact, “no mention” of those costs occurred at sentencing. Id. at
683-84. Here, in contrast, the State expressly asked the circuit court to impose
extradition costs during Geiger’s sentencing after revocation hearing and provided
the requested amount. After the court indicated that it was not certain whether it
could impose those costs, the State asked for additional time to address the issue,
and the court granted that request. Thus, unlike the circuit court in Grant, the
court in this case expressly held open the issue of extradition costs during Geiger’s
sentencing after revocation hearing. We do not read Grant as preventing a circuit
court from holding open the issue of costs during a sentencing hearing when the
court lacks sufficient information to determine whether it has the authority to order
a particular item of costs.

¶17 Moreover, while the Grant court stated that the circuit court had
erred by taxing the relevant costs against Grant “in an order separate from the
sentence,” id. at 685, the circuit court in this case ordered that Geiger’s judgment
of conviction be amended to include the State’s requested extradition costs. There
is no indication that the judgment of conviction in Grant was amended to include
the relevant costs. We see nothing in Grant that expressly prohibits a circuit court
from amending a judgment of conviction—i.e., amending a defendant’s
sentence—to include a particular item of costs after the court has held that issue
open during the defendant’s sentencing hearing.

¶18 Geiger’s reliance on Perry is similarly unavailing. During Perry’s
sentencing hearing, the circuit court ordered him to pay restitution to the victims
of his crimes. Perry, 215 Wis. 2d at 703. The court directed the State to submit a
proposed restitution order and stated that it would enter that order unless Perry

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No. 2022AP1270-CR

objected to the amount of restitution sought. Id. The State later submitted a
proposed restitution order, which sought both restitution for the victims and
extradition costs. Id. During a subsequent restitution hearing, the State clarified
that it was seeking reimbursement for the extradition costs under WIS. STAT.
§ 973.06(1)(a), not as an item of restitution. Perry, 215 Wis. 2d at 703-04. The
court ultimately entered a restitution order that directed Perry to pay both the
State’s requested restitution and the extradition costs. Id. at 704.

¶19 On appeal, we agreed with Perry that the circuit court lacked
authority to impose the extradition costs “after Perry had been sentenced.” Id. at
712. We rejected the State’s argument that the restitution hearing was “a timely
continuation of the sentencing hearing,” stating there was “no indication in the
record of the sentencing hearing that Perry’s sentencing was continued for any
purpose.” Id. We explained it was “clear” that the restitution hearing was
convened “to determine an appropriate amount of restitution, not for the purpose
of a continued sentencing hearing.” Id. at 713.

¶20 Unlike the situation in Perry, the circuit court in this case clearly
held open the issue of extradition costs during Geiger’s sentencing after revocation
hearing. While there was “no indication” in Perry that the sentencing hearing was
continued “for any purpose,” see id. at 712, the court in this case specifically
contemplated that additional proceedings would be held to determine whether the
court could impose the State’s requested extradition costs. In addition, the circuit
court in Perry imposed the State’s requested extradition costs as part of a separate
restitution order, while the court in this case amended Geiger’s judgment of
conviction to include extradition costs. Again, we do not read Perry as preventing
a court from amending a judgment of conviction in this manner. Consequently,
Perry does not support Geiger’s claim that the circuit court erred by imposing

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extradition costs in a separate order following his sentencing after revocation
hearing.

¶21 For the reasons explained above, we conclude that the circuit court
had authority under WIS. STAT. § 973.06(1)(a) to impose the State’s requested
extradition costs. We further conclude that, under the circumstances presented
here, the court did not err by holding open the issue of extradition costs during
Geiger’s sentencing after revocation hearing and imposing those costs at a later
date. We therefore affirm Geiger’s amended judgment of conviction and the order
requiring him to pay the extradition costs.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

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