S. G. v. Wisconsin Department of Children and Families

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 3, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP472 Cir. Ct. No. 2023JC7

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.G., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

S. G.,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V.

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
AND WAUPACA COUNTY,

RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waupaca County:
TROY L. NIELSEN, Judge. Reversed.

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Blanchard, and Taylor, JJ.
No. 2024AP472

¶1 TAYLOR, J. S.G. appeals an order of the Waupaca County Circuit
Court dismissing a CHIPS petition that she filed on her own behalf.1 At the time
she filed her CHIPS petition, S.G. was a parentless child receiving services from
the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) pursuant to a
termination of parental rights (“TPR”) order that was set to expire on her 18th
birthday. S.G. filed the CHIPS petition in Waupaca County under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.13, and she requested that the court issue a one-year order to allow her to
continue receiving services after her 18th birthday, through her high school
graduation, as she transitioned to adulthood. Because she filed her petition less
than two weeks before her 18th birthday, S.G. also requested that the court hold all
of the required CHIPS hearings on one day as permitted by statute for uncontested
CHIPS petitions.

¶2 After S.G. filed her CHIPS petition, the Waupaca County
Corporation Counsel (“the Corporation Counsel”) asked the circuit court to be
added as a party to the CHIPS action pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5). The
Corporation Counsel also moved to dismiss S.G.’s action for improper venue, lack
of jurisdiction, and lack of proof that S.G. was a child in need of protection or
services. At the preliminary hearing on S.G.’s petition, the court interpreted
§ 48.09(5) as conferring party status on the Corporation Counsel, although the
Corporation Counsel neither brought the CHIPS petition nor was named in the
petition as a responding party, and on this basis the court allowed the Corporation
Counsel to contest S.G.’s petition. Because there was not sufficient time to hold

1
“CHIPS is the commonly used acronym to denote the phrase ‘child in need of
protection or services’ as used in the Wisconsin Children’s Code, [WIS. STAT. ch. 48 (2023-24)].”
Marinette County v. Tammy C., 219 Wis. 2d 206, 208 n.1, 579 N.W.2d 635 (1998). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise noted.

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the required fact-finding hearing on the contested CHIPS petition before S.G.
would turn 18, the court concluded that it was required to dismiss S.G.’s CHIPS
action. S.G. appeals the court’s order dismissing her action.

¶3 On appeal, S.G. argues that WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) does not confer
party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action when they are not a
petitioner. S.G. concedes that this issue is moot because she has already turned
18, but she contends that we should address this issue under one of the exceptions
to the mootness doctrine.

¶4 We conclude that the issue of the Corporation Counsel’s party status
under WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) falls within multiple exceptions to the mootness
doctrine, and we therefore exercise our discretion to address this issue. Taking up
the merits, we separately conclude that § 48.09(5) does not confer party status on a
corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 when
they are not a petitioner. Accordingly, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶5 There is no dispute as to the following material facts.

¶6 S.G. was born in Georgia on April 21, 2005. The parental rights of
her biological parents were terminated when she was a young child, and she was
initially placed with her aunt in Georgia. After her aunt, with whom she had been
living, failed a drug test, S.G. was placed with her grandmother in Wisconsin in
2007. While living with her grandmother, S.G. witnessed domestic violence and
suffered sexual abuse by her step-grandfather.

¶7 In 2010, S.G. was removed from her grandmother’s home and
placed in foster care. S.G. lived in three different foster homes before being

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placed with the Grants in 2011, who eventually adopted S.G. in 2012.2 While
living with the Grants, S.G. suffered physical abuse, torture, and emotional abuse
and neglect.

¶8 In 2018, S.G. was removed from the Grants’ home pursuant to a
CHIPS order issued by the Vernon County Circuit Court. The Grants’ parental
rights were terminated in 2021 pursuant to a TPR order issued by the same court.
S.G. was not adopted at the end of the TPR proceedings, and the TPR order
appointed DCF to be S.G.’s legal guardian.3 On the same day that it issued the
TPR order, the court dismissed the earlier CHIPS order that had removed S.G.
from the Grants’ home.

¶9 In the years following S.G.’s removal from the Grants’ home, S.G.
was placed in multiple foster homes and group homes around Wisconsin. During
this time, S.G. attended high school virtually and in person, and she was on track
to graduate in June 2023. She had also been accepted to a university for the fall of
2023 and had been hired to paint dorm rooms on campus in the summer before her
first semester. On April 7, 2023, just two weeks before her 18th birthday, S.G.
was placed in a foster home in Waupaca County.

2
Following the parties’ lead, we refer to S.G.’s adoptive parents with the pseudonym
“the Grants” to preserve confidentiality. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.81(8).
3
When a circuit court enters a TPR order, it must identify the “agency or individual” that
has received or will be receiving guardianship of the child. WIS. STAT. § 48.43(1)(a); see also
WIS. STAT. § 48.48(3) (authorizing DCF to “accept guardianship of children when appointed by
the court”). If the court designates DCF as the child’s guardian, the court must order the child
“into the placement and care responsibility of [DCF]” and must assign DCF “primary
responsibility for providing services to the child.” Sec. 48.43(1)(am).

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¶10 On April 11, 2023, S.G. signed a CHIPS petition and, through her
counsel, filed it on her own behalf in the Waupaca County Circuit Court, pursuant
to WIS. STAT. § 48.13(9).4 In her petition, S.G. asked the court to issue a one-year
CHIPS order so that she could continue accessing public services and benefits
after her 18th birthday in order to help her “manage her mental health and gain the
independent living skills that she needs.”5 In a separate letter to the court, S.G.
further explained that she would be turning 18 before she graduated from high
school and would need access to services through her high school graduation in
June 2023, but DCF (her legal guardian) was not authorized to provide services

4
As relevant here, the circuit court has jurisdiction in a CHIPS proceeding if a child who
is at least 12 years old signs the CHIPS petition and alleges that he or she “is in need of special
treatment or care which the parent, guardian or legal custodian is unwilling, neglecting, unable or
needs assistance to provide.” WIS. STAT. § 48.13(9). Additionally, the CHIPS petition may be
filed by “[t]he counsel or guardian ad litem for a parent, relative, guardian or child.” WIS. STAT.
§ 48.25(1).
5
Under WIS. STAT. § 48.355(4)(b), a CHIPS order arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 may
terminate after the child’s 18th birthday. In relevant part, § 48.355(4)(b) states:

[A]n order under this section … made before the child reaches
18 years of age that places or continues the placement of the
child in a foster home, group home, or residential care center for
children and youth, … shall terminate on the latest of the
following dates, unless the judge specifies a shorter period or the
judge terminates the order sooner:

1. The date on which the child attains 18 years of age.

2. The date that is one year after the date on which the
order is granted.

3. The date on which the child is granted a high school
… diploma or the date on which the child attains 19 years of age,
whichever occurs first, if the child is a full-time student at a
secondary school … and is reasonably expected to complete the
program before attaining 19 years of age.

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No. 2024AP472

after the Vernon County Circuit Court TPR order would expire on her 18th
birthday.6

¶11 The circuit court scheduled a plea hearing for April 19, 2023, just
two days before S.G.’s 18th birthday. Given the tight timeline, S.G. asked the
court to hold the dispositional hearing on the same day as the plea hearing. DCF,
as S.G.’s legal guardian and the respondent in the action, did not object to S.G.’s
petition or her request for an expedited hearing schedule.7

¶12 On April 13, two days after S.G. filed her CHIPS petition, the
Corporation Counsel wrote a letter to the circuit court requesting that the
Corporation Counsel be added as an “interested party” to S.G.’s CHIPS action
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5). This statute provides, in relevant part, that
“[t]he interests of the public shall be represented in proceedings under this chapter
… [b]y the district attorney or, if designated by the county board of supervisors,
by the corporation counsel, in any matter arising under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.13,
48.133, or 48.977 or, if applicable, [§] 48.9795.” Sec. 48.09(5). On April 18, the
day before the scheduled plea hearing, the Corporation Counsel moved to dismiss
S.G.’s CHIPS action for improper venue, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of proof

6
Here, there is no dispute that the Vernon County Circuit Court TPR order assigning
DCF as guardian of S.G. expired on S.G.’s 18th birthday and that there were no applicable
statutory exceptions that would authorize DCF to continue providing services to S.G. after her
18th birthday. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.366(3) (authorizing DCF to provide services after a
child’s 18th birthday under a voluntary “transition-to-independent-living agreement”).
7
When a CHIPS petition is filed, the circuit court must hold a “plea hearing” to
determine “whether any party wishes to contest an allegation that the child … is in need of
protection or services.” WIS. STAT. § 48.30(1). If the petition is not contested and the parties
give consent, “the court may proceed immediately with the dispositional hearing.”
Sec. 48.30(6)(a). At the end of the dispositional hearing, the court must issue an order granting or
denying the CHIPS petition. WIS. STAT. § 48.335(5).

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No. 2024AP472

that S.G. was a child in need of protection and services. The Corporation Counsel
also objected to S.G.’s request to hold the dispositional hearing on the same day as
the plea hearing.

¶13 At the April 19 hearing, both S.G. and the Corporation Counsel gave
oral arguments as to whether a corporation counsel is conferred party status under
WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) when the corporation counsel is not a petitioner. After
hearing the arguments, the circuit court concluded that § 48.09(5) confers party
status on a corporation counsel even when the corporation counsel is not a
petitioner. The court took the position that WIS. STAT. ch. 48 is written with the
assumption that a corporation counsel, as the entity representing the interests of
the public under § 48.09(5), would also be the entity filing the CHIPS petition.
The court further said that, because a corporation counsel has the right to file a
CHIPS petition, the corporation counsel must also have the statutory right to party
status under § 48.09(5) when the CHIPS petition is filed by another individual or
entity.

¶14 After concluding that the Corporation Counsel here was authorized
to act as a party in the CHIPS action under WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5), the circuit court
asked the Corporation Counsel whether the Corporation Counsel was contesting
S.G.’s CHIPS petition.8 The Corporation Counsel responded that the Corporation
Counsel was contesting S.G.’s assertion that she was in need of services. As a
result, the court determined that it could not immediately proceed with the

“If a petition alleges that a child is in need of protection or services under [WIS. STAT.
8

§] 48.13 …, the nonpetitioning parties and the child, if he or she is 12 years of age or older or is
otherwise competent to do so, shall state whether they desire to contest the petition.” WIS. STAT.
§ 48.30(3) (emphasis added). This statute does not define which individuals or entities qualify as
“nonpetitioning parties.”

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No. 2024AP472

dispositional hearing as S.G. had requested and that it was instead required to
schedule a fact-finding hearing on a date that would allow reasonable time for the
parties to prepare.9 However, the court would lose competency to issue a CHIPS
order when S.G. turned 18 two days later, see WIS. STAT. § 48.355(4)(b)
(requiring CHIPS orders to be issued “before the child reaches 18 years of age”);
see also Michael J.L. v. State, 174 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 496 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App.
1993) (“Mandatory statutory time provisions are included among those mandates
that must be complied with for a circuit court to have competency to act.”).
Therefore, the court determined that there was not reasonable time for the parties
to prepare for a fact-finding hearing and concluded that it was required to dismiss
S.G.’s CHIPS action.

¶15 S.G. moved for reconsideration the following day (the day before
her 18th birthday), arguing that the context and structure of WIS. STAT. ch. 48
show that the Corporation Counsel was not conferred party status for her CHIPS
action and therefore the Corporation Counsel lacked the authority to contest the
petition. Later that day, the circuit court denied S.G.’s motion. The court said that
it was not taking a position on S.G.’s legal arguments because S.G. would be
turning 18 in a matter of hours and the court had not received responses from DCF
or the Corporation Counsel to S.G.’s reconsideration motion.

9
“If the petition is contested, the court … shall set a date for the fact-finding hearing
which allows reasonable time for the parties to prepare but is … no more than 30 days after the
plea hearing.” WIS. STAT. § 48.30(7).

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¶16 On April 21, 2023, S.G. turned 18 and the circuit court lost
competency to enter a CHIPS order. See WIS. STAT. § 48.355(4)(b). S.G. appeals
the order dismissing her CHIPS action.10

DISCUSSION

¶17 On appeal, there is no dispute that a corporation counsel can be, and
often is, a petitioner in a CHIPS action. WIS. STAT. § 48.25(1).11 Instead, the
central issue on appeal is whether a corporation counsel is a party as a statutory
right pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) in a CHIPS action arising under WIS.
STAT. § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner. S.G. argues that here the
Corporation Counsel was not authorized by § 48.09(5) to act as a party to the
CHIPS action she commenced. In support, S.G. points out that a CHIPS petition
may be signed and filed by an individual other than a corporation counsel, see
WIS. STAT. §§ 48.13(4), (9) and 48.25(1), and that the statutory procedures for a
CHIPS action arising under § 48.13 do not require that a corporation counsel
receive notice of the petition or notice of hearings when the corporation counsel is
not a petitioner. S.G. concedes that this issue is moot, but she argues that multiple
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. The Corporation Counsel argues that
we should dismiss the appeal as moot. The Corporation Counsel also contends
that they were conferred party status under § 48.09(5) and were therefore

10
On appeal, both DCF and Waupaca County are named as respondents. DCF filed a
letter with this court stating that it would not be filing a response brief in this appeal.
11
As noted, WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) also authorizes the “district attorney” to represent the
“interests of the public” in a CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13. For the purposes of
this opinion, we reference only the corporation counsel because that office is the entity that
Waupaca County has designated to represent the interests of the public. However, our analysis
applies equally to district attorneys in counties in which those offices are designated to represent
the interests of the public under § 48.09(5).

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No. 2024AP472

authorized to contest S.G.’s CHIPS petition.12 For the following reasons, we
conclude that several exceptions to mootness apply and, separately, that § 48.09(5)
does not confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising
under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.13

I. Mootness

A. Standard of Review

¶18 “An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on
the underlying controversy.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶11, 386
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (citation omitted). Appellate courts generally
decline to address moot issues and will ordinarily dismiss an appeal if all the
issues are moot. Id., ¶12. Whether an issue has a practical effect on the
underlying controversy is a question of law that we review de novo. Id., ¶10.

¶19 We may choose to address a moot issue if it fits into one or more of
the following exceptions to the doctrine of mootness: “(1) the issue is of great
public importance; (2) the constitutionality of a statute is involved; (3) the issue

12
The Corporation Counsel did not argue in the circuit court that the Corporation
Counsel was authorized to intervene as an interested person pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 803.09(1),
which is a legal determination. Helgeland v. Wisconsin Muns., 2008 WI 9, ¶41, 307 Wis. 2d 1,
745 N.W.2d 1. The Corporation Counsel also did not ask the court for permissive intervention
under § 803.09(2), which is a determination that is left to the circuit court’s discretion. Id., ¶120.
To the extent that the Corporation Counsel intends to raise an alternative argument on appeal for
party status under § 803.09, we conclude that the Corporation Counsel has forfeited that
argument. See State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (issues
that are not preserved at the circuit court generally will not be considered on appeal).
13
For the purposes of this appeal, we consider only whether WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5)
confers party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13
because that is the statutory basis for S.G.’s petition. We express no opinion as to whether
§ 48.09(5) confers party status on a corporation counsel in actions arising under the other statutes
listed in § 48.09(5)—i.e., actions arising under WIS. STAT. §§ 48.133, 48.977, and 48.9795.

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No. 2024AP472

arises often, making a definitive decision necessary to guide circuit courts; (4) the
issue is likely to arise again and needs to be resolved to avoid uncertainty; or
(5) the issue is ‘likely of repetition and evades review.’” Outagamie County v.
C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36, ¶8, 404 Wis. 2d 1, 978 N.W.2d 493 (citation omitted).

B. Mootness Exceptions Apply

¶20 As noted, S.G. concedes the mootness of the issue she raises in this
appeal. Nevertheless, she argues, we should address the issue because it fits into
both the exception for issues of great public importance and the exception for
issues that are likely to arise again and need to be resolved to avoid uncertainty. 14
For the following reasons, we conclude that both of these exceptions apply here.15

¶21 First, we conclude that this issue is of great public importance.
Whether a corporation counsel is conferred party status under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.09(5) when they are not a petitioner directly bears on their ability to contest
and potentially defeat a CHIPS action that they did not initiate. As a result, a
corporation counsel’s authority to act as a party under § 48.09(5) can directly
affect a child’s ability to obtain protection and services under a CHIPS order when

14
S.G. also argues that this issue fits into the exception for issues that are likely of
repetition yet evade review. We conclude that this exception does not apply because our supreme
court has determined that this exception is “limited to situations involving ‘a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’”
Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶30, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (citation
omitted). Here, S.G. has already turned 18, so she will not be subjected to this issue again in the
future.
15
The Corporation Counsel also argues that we should affirm the dismissal of S.G.’s
CHIPS action on the alternative ground of improper venue. This issue of venue—like the issue of
a corporation counsel’s party status under WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5)—is moot because it will have no
practical effect on the outcome of this case. The Corporation Counsel does not develop any
argument that the venue issue fits into any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Therefore,
we decline to exercise our discretion to address the moot issue of venue.

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No. 2024AP472

the corporation counsel is not a petitioner. The resolution of this issue is
particularly important to parentless children such as S.G. who are receiving
services from DCF under TPR orders but who will turn 18 before their high school
graduations and will continue to need services. Because DCF often lacks
authority to provide services after the expiration of TPR orders on children’s 18th
birthdays, CHIPS actions are the only mechanism for these parentless children
who lack family support systems to receive support and services in their
transitions to adulthood. These young people are often among the most vulnerable
and disadvantaged children in the state, and the legislature has recognized that
their health, safety, and development are of paramount importance. See WIS.
STAT. § 48.01(1)(ag), (bg)1.

¶22 Second, we conclude that this issue is likely to arise again and
should be addressed to resolve uncertainty. As noted, WIS. STAT. ch. 48 provides
mechanisms for an individual or entity other than a corporation counsel to sign
and file a CHIPS petition under WIS. STAT. § 48.13. See § 48.13(4), (9) (a CHIPS
petition may be signed by the child or the child’s parent or guardian); WIS. STAT.
§ 48.25(1) (a CHIPS petition may be filed by the counsel or guardian ad litem for
a parent, relative, guardian, or child). We see no reason to doubt that there have
been in the past and will be in the future parentless children, similarly situated to
S.G., who are receiving services under TPR orders that will expire when the
individuals turn 18 but before they graduate from high school. It is easy to
anticipate that in such a case, when such an individual files a CHIPS petition
alleging that the individual continues to need protection and services, a
corporation counsel may attempt to participate as a party pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 48.09(5). In this circumstance, the question of a corporation counsel’s authority
to act as a party under § 48.09(5) in the CHIPS action is likely to arise.

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Additionally, because this is a matter of first impression, interested persons and
circuit courts will benefit from guidance on how to interpret and apply § 48.09(5)
when this issue arises in the future.

II. The Corporation Counsel’s Party Status

¶23 As noted, the central dispute in this appeal is whether WIS. STAT.
§ 48.09(5) confers party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising
under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 when the corporation counsel is not a petitioner.
Because this issue requires us to interpret the language of § 48.09(5), we begin by
setting forth the standard of review and the well-established legal principles of
statutory interpretation.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles of Statutory Interpretation

¶24 “The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.”
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶26, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810
N.W.2d 465 (citation omitted). We begin our analysis by examining the language
of the statute itself because we assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in
the statutory language. Id. We give statutory language its “common, ordinary,
and accepted meaning.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.

¶25 In addition to the text of the statute, our statutory interpretation
analysis may include considering the statute’s context, structure, and purpose, as
long as these elements “are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute
itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history.” Id., ¶48.
Statutory language is interpreted “not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation

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to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid
absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46. Further, the meaning of a statute
“cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose.” Id.,
¶49.

¶26 If a statute’s language, context, structure, and purpose yield a “plain,
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied
according to this ascertainment of its meaning.” Id., ¶46 (citation omitted). By
contrast, if this interpretive process “reasonably” gives rise to different meanings
of the statute, we may consult extrinsic evidence and other interpretive resources
outside the statutory text to help determine the meaning of the statutory language.
Id., ¶¶47, 50. The interpretation and application of a statute are questions of law
that we review de novo. Heritage Farms, 339 Wis. 2d 125, ¶24.

B. Statutory Interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5)

1. Statutory Language

¶27 We begin our statutory analysis by examining the language of the
statute itself. To repeat, WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) provides, in relevant part, that
“[t]he interests of the public shall be represented in proceedings under this chapter
… [b]y the district attorney or, if designated by the county board of supervisors,
by the corporation counsel, in any matter arising under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.13,
48.133, or 48.977 or, if applicable, [§] 48.9795.” S.G. argues that this language
merely designates the corporation counsel as the representative of the “interests of
the public” in certain proceedings under WIS. STAT. ch. 48 and does not confer
party status on the corporation counsel when the corporation counsel is not a
petitioner. In contrast, the Corporation Counsel argues that this statute
automatically confers party status on a corporation counsel because the statute

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No. 2024AP472

states that “the interests of the public shall be represented” in certain proceedings
under ch. 48.

¶28 We conclude that the language of WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5), on its own,
does not answer this question. Although § 48.09(5) states that the “interests of the
public” shall be represented by a corporation counsel in certain types of actions
under WIS. STAT. ch. 48, it does not state that the “interests of the public” must
always be represented in those actions. Beyond that point, the statute does not
expressly address whether a corporation counsel’s obligation to represent the
“interests of the public” confers party status on the corporation counsel in a
CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 when the corporation counsel is
not a petitioner. However, when we consider this language within the context,
structure, and purpose of ch. 48, we conclude that § 48.09(5) is not ambiguous and
does not confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising
under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.

2. Context and Structure

¶29 We now consider the context and structure of closely-related
statutes. As we now explain, the legislature’s intent behind WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5)
is evident from two contextual sources: (1) the statutory procedures governing
CHIPS actions arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13; and (2) the statutory procedures
governing guardianship actions arising under WIS. STAT. §§ 48.977 and 48.9795.
These two aspects of WIS. STAT. ch. 48 demonstrate that the legislature did not
intend to confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising
under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.

¶30 Turning to the first of these contextual sources of the legislature’s
intent, a CHIPS petition arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 must be “signed by a

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No. 2024AP472

person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them and believes
them to be true.” WIS. STAT. § 48.25(1). The legislature has explicitly recognized
that the person signing the petition may be the child in need of protection and
services, if the child is at least twelve years old, § 48.13(9), or the child’s parent or
guardian, § 48.13(4).16 Additionally, a CHIPS petition arising under § 48.13 may
be filed not just by “[t]he district attorney, corporation counsel or other
appropriate official” specified under WIS. STAT. § 48.09, but also by “[t]he
counsel or guardian ad litem for a parent, relative, guardian or child.”
Sec. 48.25(1). These provisions explicitly authorize individuals other than a
corporation counsel to sign and file CHIPS petitions.17 Accordingly, both
§§ 48.13 and 48.25(1) suggest that the legislature did not consider a corporation
counsel to be a required petitioner in a CHIPS action.

¶31 Further on this point, WIS. STAT. ch. 48 identifies the individuals
who are required to receive a copy of a CHIPS petition filed under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.13 and notice of the hearings on that petition. Under WIS. STAT. § 48.255, a
copy of the CHIPS petition “shall be given to the child if the child is 12 years of
age or over and to a parent, guardian, legal custodian, and physical custodian.”
Sec. 48.255(4). Notably absent from this list is a corporation counsel. Similarly,
under WIS. STAT. § 48.27, the circuit court “shall notify … the child, any parent,

16
The child may sign the petition if the child is “at least age 12” and the petition alleges
that the child “is in need of special treatment or care which the parent, guardian or legal custodian
is unwilling, neglecting, unable or needs assistance to provide.” WIS. STAT. § 48.13(9). The
child’s parent or guardian may sign the petition if the petition alleges that the parent or guardian
“is unable or needs assistance to care for or provide necessary special treatment or care for the
child.” Sec. 48.13(4).
17
Here, as noted, S.G. signed the CHIPS petition and, through her counsel, filed the
petition on her own behalf.

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guardian, and legal custodian of the child, any foster parent or other physical
custodian … of the child, … and [other individuals not applicable here] of all
hearings involving the child.” Sec. 48.27(3)(a)1. Again, a corporation counsel is
notably absent from this list. Taken together, these statutes establish that a
corporation counsel is not required to receive a copy of a CHIPS petition arising
under § 48.13 or notice of the hearings regarding that petition. By not requiring
that the corporation counsel receive notice of the CHIPS petition or notice of the
hearings on that petition when another petitioner initiates a CHIPS action arising
under § 48.13, these statutes indicate that the legislature did not consider the
participation of a corporation counsel in the subsequent CHIPS proceedings to be
necessary or required.

¶32 Because the legislature authorized individuals other than a
corporation counsel to file a CHIPS petition arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 and
excluded a corporation counsel from receiving notice of the petition and hearings
in such an action, it follows that the legislature did not intend for WIS. STAT.
§ 48.09(5) to confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action
arising under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner. We see no reason why the
legislature would confer party status on a corporation counsel under § 48.09(5) in
a CHIPS action arising under § 48.13—and thereby allow a corporation counsel to
contest a CHIPS petition—but then expressly exclude the corporation counsel
from receiving any notice that the petition was filed or any notice of hearings
scheduled on that petition. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (statutory language
must be interpreted “reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results”).
Therefore, these statutory procedures strongly support the view that the legislature
did not intend for § 48.09(5) to confer party status on a corporation counsel in a
CHIPS action arising under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.

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¶33 Here, the Corporation Counsel’s only response to the procedural
provisions of WIS. STAT. §§ 48.255(4) and 48.27(3)(a)1. discussed above is that
those provisions are not instructive because they do not explicitly prohibit a
corporation counsel from acting as a party in a CHIPS action that they did not
initiate. We are not persuaded. Although these statutes do not explicitly address
whether a corporation counsel is a party, they nevertheless shed light on the
legislature’s intent behind WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) in not treating a corporation
counsel as a party required to receive notice of the CHIPS petition or notice of
subsequent circuit court hearings on the petition. See id., ¶48. As explained
above, the fact that a corporation counsel is not required to receive a copy of the
petition or notices of the hearings demonstrates that their participation in these
proceedings is not necessary or required. This signals that the legislature did not
intend for § 48.09(5) to confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS
action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 that they did not initiate.

¶34 This brings us to the second contextual source of the legislature’s
intent behind WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5), which involves a corporation counsel’s
statutory authority in other types of WIS. STAT. ch. 48 actions in which the
corporation counsel represents the “interests of the public” under § 48.09(5). One
example is a corporation counsel’s authority in actions arising under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.977, the statute governing guardianships for children in need of protection or
services. Like CHIPS petitions arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13, guardianship
petitions arising under § 48.977 may be filed by a corporation counsel or by a
child, the child’s guardian, the child’s guardian ad litem, the child’s parent, or the
person with whom the child is placed. Sec. 48.977(4)(a). However, unlike the
notice requirements for a CHIPS action arising under § 48.13, the petitioner in a
guardianship action arising under § 48.977 must provide a corporation counsel

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with a copy of the petition and notice of the guardianship hearing even when the
corporation counsel is not a petitioner. Sec. 48.977(4)(c)1.h. When compared
with the procedures for CHIPS actions arising under § 48.13 discussed above, this
suggests that the legislature envisioned a greater level of involvement for a
corporation counsel in a guardianship action arising under § 48.977 than in a
CHIPS action arising under § 48.13 when the corporation counsel is not a
petitioner.

¶35 The statutory authority that applies to a corporation counsel is even
clearer under WIS. STAT. § 48.9795, the statute governing “private” guardianships
of a child’s person.18 Under this statute, the term “party” is defined, in relevant
part, as “the person petitioning for the appointment of a guardian for a child or any
interested person.” Sec. 48.9795(1)(b) (emphasis added). The phrase “interested
person” is defined, in relevant part, as the child, the child’s guardian ad litem and
counsel, and the child’s parent, guardian, legal custodian, and physical custodian.
Sec. 48.9795(1)(a)1. Additionally, if the child is “receiving or in need of any
public services or benefits,” then the phrase “interested person” includes the
county department of human or social services “through the district attorney,
corporation counsel, or other official designated under [WIS. STAT. §] 48.09.”
Sec. 48.9795(1)(a)1.f. This statute states that the petitioner must provide a copy of
the guardianship petition and notice of the hearing to “all interested persons,”

18
A guardianship under WIS. STAT. § 48.9795 is informally referred to as a “private”
guardianship. See B.K. v. A.Z., Nos. 2022AP492 and 2022AP493, unpublished slip op. ¶1 n.1
(WI App Feb. 16, 2023) (citing 2019 Wis. Act 109). This is because, unlike other types of
guardianships under WIS. STAT. ch. 48, guardianships under § 48.9795 do not require
involvement by the child welfare system. See Joint Legislative Council Prefatory Note, 2019,
§ 48.9795. For instance, a guardianship petition under § 48.9795 does not need to allege that the
child has been “adjudged in need of protection or services.” Compare WIS. STAT.
§ 48.977(4)(b)3. with § 48.9795(4)(b).

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§ 48.9795(4)(c)1., and that “any party” may contest the petition at the hearing,
§ 48.9795(4)(e)1. Accordingly, these provisions show the legislature’s intent to
give a corporation counsel a greater level of involvement in a guardianship action
arising under § 48.9795 than in a CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13.

¶36 These provisions in WIS. STAT. §§ 48.977 and 48.9795 illustrate that
the legislature knows how to define a corporation counsel’s role with respect to
petitions under WIS. STAT. ch. 48 when the corporation counsel is not a petitioner.
Because the legislature did not include similar language establishing a corporation
counsel’s role in a CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT. § 48.13 when the
corporation counsel is not a petitioner, it is reasonable to infer that the legislature
did not intend to confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action
arising under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner. In other words, if the
legislature had wanted to confer party status on a corporation counsel under
§ 48.13 when the corporation counsel is not a petitioner, it could have, and
presumably would have, expressly done so by adopting similar language as that
incorporated in §§ 48.977 and 48.9795. See State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129,
¶44, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623 (“If the legislature wanted the right to
counsel to be contingent upon a parent’s appearance in person, it could have
expressly stated so. The legislature, in constructing chapter 48, knew how to
require personal attendance at a termination of parental rights proceeding.”).

¶37 In sum, the context and structure of closely-related statutes strongly
support the view that the legislature did not intend for WIS. STAT. § 48.09(5) to
confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising under WIS.
STAT. § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.

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3. Statutory Purpose

¶38 A statute’s manifest purpose is also relevant to determining its
meaning because the meaning of the statute “cannot contravene a textually or
contextually manifest statutory purpose.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49. Here, the
legislature has instructed that WIS. STAT. ch. 48 “shall be liberally construed” to
effectuate a number of “express legislative purposes.” WIS. STAT. § 48.01(1).
One such “express legislative purpose” is:

To recognize that children have certain basic needs
which must be provided for, including the need for
adequate food, clothing and shelter; the need to be free
from physical, sexual or emotional injury or exploitation;
the need to develop physically, mentally and emotionally to
their potential; and the need for a safe and permanent
family.

Sec. 48.01(1)(ag). Another such express legislative purpose is:

To ensure that children are protected against the
harmful effects resulting from the absence of parents or
parent substitutes, from the inability, other than financial
inability, of parents or parent substitutes to provide care
and protection for their children and from the destructive
behavior of parents or parent substitutes in providing care
and protection for their children.

Sec. 48.01(1)(bg)1.

¶39 Here, the Corporation Counsel’s interpretation of WIS. STAT.
§ 48.09(5) runs contrary to these express purposes. The Corporation Counsel asks
us to interpret § 48.09(5) to confer party status on a corporation counsel in a
CHIPS action even when they are not a petitioner. This interpretation would allow
a corporation counsel to contest a CHIPS petition sought by a child, parent, or
guardian and potentially prevent the child from receiving the protection or services
that a circuit court might correctly determine the child needs. See WIS. STAT.

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§ 48.01(1)(ag) and (bg)1. (statutes should be construed to allow children to
“develop physically, mentally and emotionally to their potential” and to protect
children from the “harmful effects resulting from the absence of parents or parent
substitutes”). In sum on this issue, the express purposes of WIS. STAT. ch. 48
provide further support for our conclusion that § 48.09(5) does not confer party
status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.

CONCLUSION

¶40 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is reversed.

By the Court.—Order reversed.

Recommended for publication in the official reports.

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