State v. George K. Pearson-Robb

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 9, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP191-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF891

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GEORGE K. PEARSON-ROBB,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Racine County: TIMOTHY D. BOYLE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP191-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. George K. Pearson-Robb appeals from a judgment
of conviction, entered following a jury trial, convicting him of armed robbery with
threat of force as party to a crime, three counts of kidnapping, and one count of
robbery of a financial institution, as well as an order denying his postconviction
motion. On appeal, Pearson-Robb argues that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of the armed robbery charge and to establish venue for most of the
charges, and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to venue and for
failing to object to the State’s closing argument. We reject Pearson-Robb’s
arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Pearson-Robb and two co-actors, Donterious
Robb and William Howell, with armed robbery with threat of force as party to a
crime, three counts of kidnapping, and robbery of a financial institution. At
Pearson-Robb’s trial,1 the State established that the trio staked out “Katherine,”
who was a Wells Fargo bank branch manager in Racine County. On June 28,
2019, the trio waited for Katherine to leave work. They then followed Katherine’s
red Impala in a maroon Acura through Racine County to Kenosha County where
Katherine lived. On the way, Katherine stopped to pick up her two children (ages
five and two) from a babysitter’s house. When Katherine arrived at her house,
Robb and Howell forced Katherine at gunpoint into the backseat of the Impala.
They covered Katherine’s face with clothing and drove her and her children from

1
Robb and Howell reached plea agreements with the State, and they pled to various
charges.

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Kenosha to a house in Milwaukee County. Pearson-Robb’s mother lived at the
house, and Pearson-Robb “stayed” there.

¶3 In Milwaukee, Robb and Howell forced Katherine and her children
into the basement at gunpoint and held them captive. The Acura broke down on
the way back to Milwaukee, and a state trooper assisted the driver, who was
identified as Pearson-Robb. The trooper drove Pearson-Robb to a gas station,
where surveillance captured him wearing a Victoria’s Secret black sweatshirt with
the letters PINK on it along with low-riding pants that revealed a distinctive-
patterned underwear. Howell testified, and surveillance confirmed, that he picked
Pearson-Robb up from the gas station in Katherine’s Impala.

¶4 At 6:00 a.m. the next day, the trio forced Katherine and her children
back into the Impala and took them at gunpoint to the Wells Fargo bank in Racine
County where Katherine worked. Once inside the bank, the men forced Katherine
to open the vault, and they stole approximately $48,000. Surveillance video
depicted Katherine and her children inside the bank with the men, who were
masked. One of the masked men was wearing a Victoria’s Secret black sweatshirt
with the letters PINK on it along with low-riding pants that revealed the same
distinctive-patterned underwear that Pearson-Robb had been wearing hours earlier.
The male wearing the PINK sweatshirt triggered an alarm, and the three men ran
out of the bank. The men left in Katherine’s Impala. The Impala was later
discovered in Milwaukee County destroyed by fire.

¶5 At trial, Pearson-Robb’s theory of the case was that he was not the
third member of the trio. Pearson-Robb did not testify at trial, but Howell testified
that someone else, who was now deceased, was actually the third member of their

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plot.2 Howell conceded that he had originally told police that Pearson-Robb was
the third member of the trio and drove the Acura.

¶6 The jury convicted Pearson-Robb as charged. Pearson-Robb filed a
postconviction motion alleging the evidence was insufficient to convict him and
counsel was ineffective. The circuit court denied the motion. Pearson-Robb
appeals. Additional facts will be included below.

I. Sufficiency of the evidence

¶7 On appeal, Pearson-Robb makes two sufficiency of the evidence
arguments. He first argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
for armed robbery with threat of force as party to a crime because the State failed
to prove one of the elements of that crime. He then asserts the evidence was
insufficient on the same armed robbery count along with the three kidnapping
convictions “because the information and verdicts alleged [the offenses] occurred
in Kenosha County which was an improper venue for an offense tried in Racine
County.” (Capitalization omitted.) We address each argument in turn.

A. Armed robbery

¶8 Pearson-Robb contends the evidence was insufficient to establish
one of the elements of armed robbery with threat of force as party to a crime. This
count related to the trio’s robbery of Katherine’s Impala. Pearson-Robb argues the
State failed to prove that he “inten[ded] to permanently deprive” Katherine of her

2
In the circuit court’s written decision denying Pearson-Robb’s postconviction motion,
the court noted, among other things, that it sentenced Howell after Pearson-Robb’s trial and
during his sentencing Howell “actually apologized for his concocted story/testimony” from
Pearson-Robb’s trial.

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No. 2024AP191-CR

vehicle. See WIS. STAT. § 943.32(1)(b) & (2) (2023-24)3; WIS JI—CRIMINAL
1480 (2016). He argues the “evidence only showed that Pearson-Robb was
involved in the taking and use of the” property and “there was no evidence
presented that he shared the intent of his co-defendants to destroy the car since he
left the group well before” they destroyed it. He also asserts “[t]here was no
evidence of a plan to keep the vehicle or destroy it” and he “was not involved in
[any] abandonment or disposal of the vehicle after the robbery and kidnapping was
over.”

¶9 Whether evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury’s verdict is a
question of law reviewed independently. State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342
Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court considers the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State and
reverse[s] the conviction only where the evidence ‘is so lacking in probative value
and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶10 We conclude the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s
determination that, as party to a crime, Pearson-Robb intended to permanently
deprive Katherine of possession of her Impala. See WIS. STAT. § 939.05(2)
(party-to-a-crime liability attaches when a person is “concerned in the commission
of [a] crime,” meaning the person directly committed the crime, intentionally
aided and abetted the commission of the crime, or was party to a conspiracy with
another to commit it). Here, once Katherine’s Impala was taken from her at
gunpoint, Katherine had no ability to use the car, and Howell drove the car for his

3
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP191-CR

own use. Further, after the bank robbery, Katherine testified that the three robbers
ran out of the bank and drove away in her Impala, which she did not see again
until it was recovered. Howell similarly testified that he and his co-actors drove
away in the Impala, adding that one of his accomplices “torched” it.

¶11 As the circuit court reasoned when denying Pearson-Robb’s
postconviction motion, because Pearson-Robb and his accomplices “left in the
victim’s Impala after the bank” robbery, and the Impala was “eventually found
destroyed by fire,” it was “easy to conclude that [Pearson-Robb’s] intent was to
permanently deprive [Katherine] of possession.” We agree. None of this evidence
is incredible as a matter of law. See Smith, 342 Wis. 2d 710, ¶24.

B. Venue

¶12 Pearson-Robb next argues “the evidence was insufficient” on the
armed robbery and three kidnapping convictions “because the information and
verdicts alleged [the offenses] occurred in Kenosha County which was an
improper venue for an offense tried in Racine County.” (Capitalization omitted.)
He asserts “[t]he problem was that the State’s pleadings (the complaint and the
information) and the verdict submitted to the jury never alleged there was any
basis for venue in Racine County where this case was filed.” He seemingly argues
that trial for the robbery and the three kidnapping charges should have occurred in
Kenosha County because he asserts that “A trial that takes place in a location not
authorized by law is void.”

¶13 We reject Pearson-Robb’s arguments. As a threshold matter,
Pearson-Robb’s arguments do not appear to challenge the evidence introduced at
trial that was used to establish venue in Racine County. He concedes to this court
that “there were facts at trial that might have enabled the State to prove venue in

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No. 2024AP191-CR

Racine County.” Instead, although presented as a sufficiency of the evidence
argument, it appears Pearson-Robb’s assertion is that the second amended
information alleged these counts occurred in Kenosha County and that the jury
was not instructed to find that any of those counts occurred in Racine County.
However, as the jury was instructed, the information is not evidence and indeed is
“nothing more than a written, formal accusation” against the defendant. As the
State argues, Pearson-Robb cites no authority for the proposition that the test for
proper venue assesses the language of the charges or jury instructions. See State v.
Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 408, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998) (“[V]enue is a matter
of procedure and not an element of a crime.”). The venue test is whether the
evidence at trial supported the finding that venue was proper in Racine County.
See id. at 407-08.

¶14 In any event, even if Pearson-Robb’s argument is that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to establish venue in Racine County, we
conclude venue was sufficiently established in Racine County. In Wisconsin,
“venue is not an element of a crime, it nonetheless must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt” at trial. State v. Schultz, 2010 WI App 124, ¶12, 329 Wis. 2d
424, 791 N.W.2d 190. In general, “[c]riminal actions [must] be tried in the county
where the crime was committed.” WIS. STAT. § 971.19(1). Where a crime has
two or more elements, venue may be proper in any county where any element of
the crime occurred. See State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, ¶21, 261 Wis. 2d 633,
660 N.W.2d 12. Sufficiency of the evidence is the test for determining whether
the State proved venue in a criminal case. See Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 407-08.

¶15 To find Pearson-Robb guilty of armed robbery with threat of force as
a party to a crime, the jury was instructed that they had to find the State proved
that Pearson-Robb either “aid[ed] and abett[ed] the person who directly committed

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No. 2024AP191-CR

[the crime] or [was] a member of a conspiracy to commit the crime.” WIS JI—
CRIMINAL 401 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 939.05(2). Armed robbery has the following
elements: (1) the victim was the owner of the property; (2) the defendant took and
carried away the property from the victim; (3) the defendant intended to
permanently deprive the owner of possession of the property; (4) the defendant
acted forcibly; and (5) at the time of the taking and carrying away, the defendant
used or threatened to use an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the
person reasonably to believe it was capable of producing death or great bodily
harm. WIS. STAT. § 943.32(1)(b) & (2); WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1480 (2016).

¶16 Here, at a minimum, the evidence presented at trial permitted the
jury to find that, while in Racine County, Pearson-Robb demonstrated an intent to
assist in permanently depriving Katherine of the Impala. Katherine and Howell
each testified that at the end of the bank robbery, all the robbers ran out of the
Racine bank and drove away in Katherine’s vehicle. The evidence sufficiently
establishes venue in Racine County for Pearson-Robb’s armed-robbery-with-
threat-of-force-as-party-to-a-crime conviction.

¶17 To find Pearson-Robb guilty of kidnapping, the State had to prove:
(1) a defendant transported another person from one place to another; (2) the
defendant transported that person without that person’s consent; (3) the defendant
forcibly transported that person; and (4) the defendant intended that the person be
secretly confined or imprisoned. WIS. STAT. § 940.31(1)(a); WIS JI—CRIMINAL
1280 (2016).

¶18 Here, the evidence at trial established Pearson-Robb was driving the
Acura that initially followed Katherine’s Impala from her bank in Racine County
to her home in Kenosha County. This allowed the jury to reasonably find that

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No. 2024AP191-CR

Pearson-Robb demonstrated his intent to kidnap within Racine County. Further,
the kidnappings continued until the end of the robbery the next day while at the
bank in Racine County. Katherine testified that she and her children were
transported against their will, at gunpoint, back to the bank in Racine, and that she
was forced, at gunpoint, to unarm the branch and open the vault once inside the
bank. The evidence sufficiently established that at least two of the kidnapping
elements—forcible transport and transport without consent—occurred within
Racine County.

II. Ineffective assistance of counsel

¶19 Pearson-Robb next argues he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must prove
both: (1) deficient performance by counsel; and (2) prejudice resulting from that
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We
need not address both elements of the ineffective assistance test if the defendant
fails to make a sufficient showing on one of them. State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85,
¶32, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.

¶20 “To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
considering all the circumstances.” Id., ¶34. “In evaluating counsel’s
performance, this court is highly deferential to counsel’s strategic decisions.” Id.,
¶35. We must make “every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689.

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No. 2024AP191-CR

¶21 “To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish that ‘particular
errors of counsel were unreasonable’ and ‘that they actually had an adverse effect
on the defense.’” State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶33, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d
89. We evaluate whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶22 On appeal, Pearson-Robb first argues counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge venue in Racine County. The State responds that venue
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and Pearson-Robb could appeal that
issue as a matter of right, regardless of whether it was raised before or during trial.
See State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶54, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203. We agree
with the State. Because there was no need to preserve a venue objection based on
sufficiency of the evidence, Pearson-Robb cannot prove prejudice and therefore
counsel was not ineffective. See id.; see also Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶32.

¶23 Pearson-Robb next argues counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to statements made by the State during its closing rebuttal argument. We
will begin our analysis of this issue by putting the State’s rebuttal argument into
context. During Pearson-Robb’s closing argument, his trial counsel argued the
State had not met its burden of establishing that Pearson-Robb was the third
member of the trio. Trial counsel observed that the State had made a big deal of
the Victoria’s Secret black sweatshirt with the PINK lettering and the
distinctive-patterned underwear that the State argued Pearson-Robb had been
wearing during the crimes. Pearson-Robb’s counsel then argued:

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No. 2024AP191-CR

This PINK sweatshirt, that black hoodie with the PINK
lettering, where is it? If we’re going to make such a big
deal about the underwear and a sweatshirt, where is it and
where has the DNA and testing been done? Has there been
any DNA testing done? We don’t show that.

¶24 During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor
responded, in part, that people may trade clothes but they do not trade or share
underwear. The prosecutor continued:

[Y]ou certainly don’t wear [underwear] until 11:00 at night
and then hand them off to someone else at 6:00 the next
morning. It’s just not a reasonable assumption for people
in regular society.

Only George Pearson-Robb knows where the PINK
sweatshirt is. Only George Pearson-Robb knows where
those underwear are. How else are we supposed to know in
the infinite area of the world where he would put his
clothes that night, but I’ve got one idea that would make a
lot of sense. They’re in the burned out Impala with the rest
of the evidence.

¶25 On appeal, Pearson-Robb argues the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument
that only Pearson-Robb knew the location of the sweatshirt and underwear was an
improper comment on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. He argues
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument.

¶26 The Fifth Amendment bars “either comment by the prosecution on
the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt.” Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). To establish a Griffin
violation, the defendant must prove three elements. State v. Hoyle, 2023 WI 24,
¶29, 406 Wis. 2d 373, 987 N.W.2d 732. “First, the prosecutor’s language must
have been ‘manifestly intended to be’ or was ‘of such character that the jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be’ a ‘comment on the failure of the [defendant]
to testify.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the prosecutor’s language must also

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No. 2024AP191-CR

have been ‘manifestly intended to be’ or was ‘of such character that the jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be’ [a comment] ‘that such silence is evidence
of guilt.’” Id. (citations omitted). “Finally, the prosecutor’s comments must not
have been ‘a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel.’” Id.
(citation omitted).

¶27 We conclude the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was not a Griffin
violation. At a minimum, the comments were a direct response to Pearson-Robb’s
closing argument, and thus, Pearson-Robb has not established the third element of
a Griffin violation. See Hoyle, 406 Wis. 2d 373, ¶29. Because the prosecutor’s
rebuttal argument was not a Griffin violation, trial counsel’s failure to object on
that basis was not deficient performance. See Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶53.
Pearson-Robb’s trial counsel was not ineffective. See id., ¶54.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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