Waushara County v. Beatrice Bruning

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 7, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP300 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TR1316

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

WAUSHARA COUNTY,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

BEATRICE BRUNING,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waushara County:
SCOTT C. BLADER, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.

¶1 GRAHAM, P.J.1 In this appeal, Beatrice Bruning challenges the
result of a contested trial regarding a traffic citation that was issued to Bruning for
failing to control her vehicle. A court commissioner presided over the trial, found

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP300

Bruning guilty, and imposed a monetary forfeiture, and the circuit court denied
Bruning’s request to overturn the commissioner’s decision. Because Waushara
County now concedes that court commissioners are not statutorily authorized to
preside over trials of contested traffic matters, I conclude that the commissioner’s
decision is void, and that Bruning is entitled to relief under WIS. STAT.
§ 806.07(1)(d) on that basis. I therefore remand to the circuit court with directions
to vacate the commissioner’s decision so that litigation may proceed in the proper
forum.

BACKGROUND

¶2 About 7:00 a.m. one day, a sheriff’s deputy encountered Bruning’s
unoccupied vehicle in a ditch alongside a county road. Bruning arrived on the
scene while the deputy was present. She indicated that she had lost control of her
vehicle earlier that morning, around 1:00 a.m., after she swerved to avoid hitting a
deer that suddenly entered the roadway. The deputy observed skid marks on the
pavement and the position of Bruning’s vehicle, and he concluded that the vehicle
had crossed the center line of the road and spun 180 degrees before entering the
ditch. The deputy issued two citations to Bruning: one for operating her vehicle
left of center and one for failing to keep her vehicle under control.

¶3 Bruning challenged the citations, and the case went to trial before a
court commissioner. Bruning, who represented herself, argued that she was not
guilty of either violation because her actions were justified by the emergency
doctrine. See generally Totsky v. Riteway Bus Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 29, ¶¶21-23,
233 Wis. 2d 371, 607 N.W.2d 637 (addressing a defense that may apply under
certain emergency circumstances, when the person claiming the defense is “‘free
from negligence which contributed to the creation of the emergency’” (citation

2
No. 2025AP300

omitted)). The commissioner concluded that the emergency doctrine was
inapplicable because, the commissioner determined, Bruning had been driving too
fast under the circumstances.

¶4 The commissioner found Bruning guilty of failing to keep her
vehicle under control and entered a “dispositional order/judgment” that imposed a
forfeiture of $213.10. The commissioner dismissed the other citation after
concluding that any operation of the vehicle left of center was subsumed in the
failure-to-control violation.

¶5 Bruning filed a notice of appeal. After the record on appeal was
compiled and submitted to this court, we dismissed Bruning’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. As we explained in our dismissal order, judgments and orders that
are entered by a commissioner are not directly appealable to this court. We further
explained that appeals may be taken only from a judgment or order that is entered
by a circuit court. WIS. STAT. RULE 809.01(1); see Dane County v. C.M.B., 165
Wis. 2d 703, 708-09, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992).

¶6 Bruning then filed a document in the circuit court titled “Motion for
Reconsideration of Conviction.” The motion raised several evidentiary arguments
and made other claims of trial error. It also cited WIS. STAT. § 757.69, which sets
forth the powers of court commissioners, and asserted that the commissioner was
not authorized to preside over the trial on Bruning’s citation.

¶7 The day after Bruning’s motion was filed, the circuit court issued a
written order denying it. The court construed Bruning’s motion as a request for de
novo review of the commissioner’s decision and denied it on the ground that the
deadline to request a de novo review had passed. This was an appealable order,
and Bruning appealed it.

3
No. 2025AP300

ANALYSIS

¶8 Bruning maintains that the court commissioner lacked the authority
to preside over the trial. Case law provides that court commissioners have limited
powers, and Bruning cites WIS. STAT. § 757.69, which establishes the “[p]owers
and duties of circuit court commissioners.”

¶9 While a circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over “actions of
any nature whatsoever,” Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶8, 273
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 (internal quotation marks and quoted source
omitted), a court commissioner’s powers and duties are “purely statutory,”
Radmer v. Edell, 133 Wis. 2d 410, 413, 395 N.W.2d 629 (Ct. App. 1986). If the
statutes do not confer on a commissioner the authority to conduct a given
proceeding, the commissioner lacks subject matter jurisdiction to do so. State v.
Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 41, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981). A commissioner’s decision in
a proceeding over which the commissioner lacks subject matter jurisdiction is
“void ab initio” and may be challenged or expunged at any time. Id. at 43-44.

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 757.69(1)(c) addresses a court commissioner’s
powers and duties with regard to traffic and county ordinance matters. It provides
that a commissioner may “[c]onduct initial appearances in traffic cases[,] …
receive noncontested forfeiture pleas, order the revocation or suspension of
operating privileges and impose monetary penalties according to a schedule
adopted by a majority of the judges of the courts of record within the county, and
refer applicable cases to court for enforcement for nonpayment.” As Bruning
points out, presiding over a trial of a traffic or county ordinance case is not among
the enumerated powers and duties of a commissioner. Moreover, the statute
specifically limits the commissioner to receiving “noncontested” forfeiture pleas.

4
No. 2025AP300

¶11 In its respondent’s brief on appeal, the County concedes that, “upon
its review of WIS. STAT. [§] 757.69, … the powers of the Circuit Court
Commissioner do not include presiding over contested traffic and county
ordinance trials.” I accept the County’s concession, which appears to be
consistent with the statutory text.

¶12 As noted above, the motion for reconsideration that Bruning filed
with the circuit court pointed out the court commissioner’s lack of statutory
authority to preside over the trial. The court construed Bruning’s motion as a
request for de novo review under WIS. STAT. § 799.207 and denied it as untimely.2
But Bruning’s motion did more than simply ask the court to review the matter the
commissioner had tried—it also pointed out that the commissioner exceeded her
authority in trying the case at all. That is, Bruning’s motion asserted that the
commissioner lacked the power to preside over the trial and enter a dispositional
order deciding the case.

¶13 Here, Bruning’s motion raised a challenge to the commissioner’s
authority to conduct the trial, and the County concedes that the commissioner
lacked such authority. I conclude that, whatever else it may have been, Bruning’s
motion constituted a timely request for relief from a void judgment or order—a
type of relief that is available under WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(d) and (2). Because
the commissioner’s decision was entered following a trial that the commissioner

2
The circuit court cited WIS. STAT. §§ 799.207(2) and 757.69(8) when it determined that
a request for de novo review was untimely. Bruning and the County take issue with that
conclusion, and the County implies that there may not be a statutory deadline for a request for de
novo review of a court commissioner’s decision in a traffic or county ordinance case. I need not
decide this issue because I resolve this case on other grounds.

5
No. 2025AP300

did not have authority to conduct, Bruning is entitled to relief from that decision
under § 806.07(1)(d).

¶14 As to the ultimate remedy here, Bruning asks this court to direct that
the case be dismissed outright. However, Bruning does not cite any authority that
would support the imposition of that remedy, nor does she explain why my
conclusion that the commissioner’s decision is void would prevent the County
from pursuing its case after the record is remitted. I therefore remand this matter
to the circuit court with directions to vacate the commissioner’s decision. After
that point, the case may proceed in whatever forum the law permits, with one
caveat—if the proceedings necessitate a trial, that trial must be held in the circuit
court.3

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

Given my conclusion that the commissioner’s decision must be vacated, I need not
3

address Bruning’s other arguments about errors that, she contends, occurred in the trial before the
commissioner.

6